The business response to climate change : case studies of Australian interest groups by Pearse, Guy Dugald
  THESES SIS/LIBRARY        TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2      FACSIMILE:  +61 2 6125 4063 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY      EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au 
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USE OF THESES 
 
 
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be  
copied or closely paraphrased without the  
written consent of the author. 
The business response to climate change: 
case studies of Australian interest groups 
By Guy Dugald Pearse 
PhD Candidate 
Policy and Governance Program 
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government 
The Australian National University 
Canberra 
July 2005 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University 
Acknowledgements 
Supervisors--for their patience, advice and consistent encouragement: 
Glenn Withers (panel chair) 
Clive Hamilton 
Elim Papadakis (to 2003) 
Ad'\'isors and others-who in different ways inspired this research: 
Ian Marsh; 
HemyLee; 
Robert B!ackVlill; 
David Marsh; 
Robert Hill; 
Chris Pup!ick; 
Fred Chaney; 
John Hewson; 
Warwick Parer; 
Roger Beale; 
John Faulkner; 
Tim Flannery; 
all the interviewees; and especially the greenhouse 'mafia' (vi de reference at footnote 661 ). 
Other ANU Staff who assisted along the way: 
Jan Prowse 
Andrew Macintyre 
Finally, with special thanks to: 
Wendy Pearse; 
David and Elizabeth Pearse; 
Carey Ramm; and lastly 
Kay Faulkner and Brian Reader (for the incomparable Settlers Cottage at Nelligen where 
much of this thesis was ultimately written). 
3 
Contents 
Declaration 
Acknowledgements 
Acronyms 
Abstract 
Chapter l: Group interest and behaviour: literature review 
Chapter 2: Research strategy, design, methods and presentation 
Chapter 3: Case 1-the Australian Aluminium Council 
Chapter 4: Case 2--the Australian Gas Association 
Chapter 5: Case 3-the National Association of Forest Industries 
Chapter 6: Case 4-the National Farmers' Federation 
Chapter 7: Case 5-the Tourism Council of Australia 
Chapter 8: Case 6--the Insurance Council of Australia 
Chapter 9: Case 7-the Sydney Futures Exchange 
Chapter l 0: Patterns across the case studies 
Chapter 11: Conclusions 
Bibliography 
Appendix A: Interview dates and interviewee codes 
Appendix B: Text of consent form used for interviews 
4 
Page 
2 
3 
5 
7 
9 
40 
69 
99 
137 
168 
202 
233 
266 
294 
334 
364 
383 
385 
AAC 
ABARE 
ABI 
ACA 
ACF 
AFFA 
AFGC 
AFMA 
AGA 
AGO 
AHA 
AIG 
AIGN 
AMA 
ANU 
APIA 
APP EA 
ASX 
ATC 
AXISS 
BCA 
BCSE 
BRS 
CEO 
CFCs 
CIF 
COAG 
COP 
CSR 
DEH 
DEST 
DFAT 
OPIE 
EA 
EBA 
ESAA 
ESD 
ENA 
EU 
FCCC 
GBR.MPA 
GST 
GTEM 
ICA 
IDRO 
IEA 
IPA 
IPCC 
JSCOT 
LNG 
LPG 
LUCF 
Acronyms 
Australian Aluminium Council 
Australian Bureau of Agdcultural and Resource Economics 
Association of Bdtish Insurers 
Australian Coal Association 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Agriculture Forestry and Fishedes Australia 
Australian Food and Grocery Council 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
Australian Gas Association 
Australian Greenhouse Office 
Australian Hotels Association 
Australian Industry Group 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network 
Australian Medical Association 
Australian National University 
Australian Pipeline Industry Association 
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association 
Australian Stock Exchange 
Australian Tourist Commission 
Australian Centre for Global Finance 
Business Council of Australia 
Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
Bureau of Rural Sciences 
chief executive officer 
Chlorofluorocarbons 
Cement Industry Federation 
Council of Australian Governments 
Conference of the Parties 
carbon seque"tration right 
Department of Environment and Heritage 
Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Department of Primary Industry and Agriculture 
Environment Australia 
Environment Business Australia 
Electricity Supply Association of Australia 
ecologically sustainable development 
Energy Networks Association 
European Union 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
goods and services tax 
Global Trade and Environment Model 
Insurance Council of Australia 
Insurance Disaster Response Organisation 
International Energy Agency 
Institute of Public Affairs 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (Australian Parliament) 
liquefied natural gas 
Liquid Petroleum Gas 
Land Use Change and Forestry 
5 
MCA 
MDBC 
MR.ET 
NAFI 
NCP 
NEM 
NFF 
NGAP 
NGGI 
NGO 
NHMRC 
NHT 
ONA 
PACs 
PF Cs 
PMO 
PTAA 
R&D 
RFA 
SEDA 
SFE 
TCA 
TIF 
UN CED 
WTTC 
Minerals Council of Australia 
Murray Darling Basin Commission 
Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
National Association of Forest Industries 
National Competition Policy 
National Electricity Market 
National Farmers Federation 
National Greenhouse Advisory Panel 
National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
Non-government organisation 
National Health and Medical Research Council 
Natural Heritage Trust 
Office of National Assessments 
political action committees 
Perfluorocarbons 
Prime Minister's Office 
Plantation Timber Association of Australia 
Research and Development 
Regional Forest Agreement 
Sustainable Energy Development Authority 
Sydney Futures Exchange 
Tourism Council of Australia 
Tourism Task Force 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
World Travel and Tourism Council 
6 
Abstract 
This research project is predominantly aimed at improving our understanding of interest 
group1 behaviour. Assessments about 'group interest' and decisions about group 
engagement in the Australian greenhouse policy network2 provide a useful opportunity to 
pursue this research aim. As an empirical contribution to the study of interest groups and 
policy networks, this research is atypical in a few ways. 
First, while most of the literature concentrates on the role of interest groups and policy 
networks in explaining policy outcomes, this study focuses on understanding group 
behaviour. Second, while the literature concerns itself heavily with group-government 
relationships, the focus here is on group decision-making about network engagement-
relationships with government are addressed only to the extent that they impact on these 
decisions. Third, while most interest group research assumes that groups know and pursue 
their interests, or that behaviour reveals group preferences, this research does neither. 
Instead there is a strong emphasis on what forces shape and change perceptions of group 
interest and no assumption that groups necessarily pursue those perceived interests. 
These differences necessarily mean that this work does not deal heavily with some of the 
main preoccupations in the literature-like why groups mobilise and whether they are good 
for society. Instead, light is shone on aspects of interest groups and policy networks which 
are acknowledged as important but receive relatively little attention. Alongside the primary 
objective--to make the empirical contribution to the literature-the aim here is also to 
1 For the purposes of this study the definition used for 'interest group' is broad by comparison to others 
used. Interest groups have been defined in many ways (Wilson 199!:1; Baumgartner and Leech 
1998:22-3). Broadest definitions effectively include any aggregated interest beyond that of the 
individual, even a family. Others have tried to break down the definition of interest group into 
associational, institutional and non-associational categories. The most constant quality across the various 
definitions appears to be a desire on the part of the group to influence government policy whilst not 
actually seeking to hold public office (Richardson 1993: I). Some definitions of interest groups are broad 
enough to incorporate individual companies, recognising the empirical reality that companies 
(particularly larger ones) often demonstrate many of the same desires and behaviour as representative 
groups-indeed these companies can be more effective in some instances than groups. By and large, 
however, when people discuss interest groups they are referring to 'pressure groups' or groups which are 
either promoting or defending a particular producer, professional or consumer interest. 
2 For tho puipose of this study, the c-0ncept of policy networks describes the collection of groups, 
institutions, and individuals who are interested in and actively involved in processes which deal with a 
particular policy area. The way policy networks operate also varies greatly with issue networks (in which 
access is open to interested parties and policy is heavily contested) and policy communities (in which 
access is closed except for a few insiders and there is a strong consensus about maintaining the status 
quo). The policy networks concept is explored further in Chapter 2. For a good introduction to the field 
see Smith (1993). 
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contribute to a greater understanding of the history of greenhouse3 policy development in 
Australia. This is seen as being valuable in its own right and it addresses widespread 
curiosity about why business groups with an apparent interest in climate change policy 
have responded so differently in the Australian context 
The result is seven case studies which examine the greenhouse responses of a diverse range 
of business interest groups4 that have been active in, or judged relevant to the Australian 
greenhouse policy network. The case studies rely heavily on analysis of interviews 
conducted with 56 people drawn both from the case groups and from a broad cross-section 
of other important players in the greenhouse policy network. 
As a study of the wider policy network, this work is arguably unprecedented in scope. 
Those interviewed include party leaders, cabinet ministers, advisors and departmental 
secretaries spanning the Hawke, Keating and Howard federal governments. Past and 
present leaders of industry associations, think tanks, environmental organisations, along 
with academics, and journalists were also interviewed with all sides of the debate 
represented. The results presented here aim to make an commensurate contribution to our 
knowledge of both interest gronp behaviour and greenhouse policy development in 
Australia. 
3 The tenns 'climate ehange' and 'greenhouse' here refer to increasing scientific evidence that human 
activity is warming the earth's clima1e. Human activity appears to be interfering with the naturally-
oe<:urring blanket of gases that provide an insulatory barrier without which the earth's climate would be 
much colder. This naturally-occurring greenhouse effect is, according to a consensus among climate 
scientists, being exacerbated by rapid post-industrial revolution increases in the emission of greenhouse 
gases (carbon dioxide, methane, and others) from human activity. 
4 Using the broad definition already applied here for 'interest group' the term 'business interest group' is 
also applied broadly here. It includes professional associations, producer associations, 'umbrella' groups 
whose members are associations in their own rit,1ht, and even individual companies. 
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1 
Group interest and behaviour: literature review 
Introduction 
Having introduced the research in the Abstract, this chapter sets out to anchor the work in 
the extensive range of relevant academic literature. Chapter 2 then describes just how the 
research was conducted-the design, strategy and methods used-and why the case study 
results have been presented as they have in Chapters 3-10. However, here the focus is on 
understanding where this thesis fits into the literature. 
At the outset, it is important to appreciate that this research seeks to aid our understanding 
of what influences group interest and group behaviour, not to explain particular policy 
outcomes. The focus is how and why seven business interest groups made decisions on 
their involvement in Australia's greenhouse policy network. As a consequence, the 
empirical contribution which this research seeks to make draws significantly on interest 
group theory and the policy network concept. To a large extent the latter evolved from the 
former but is now sufficiently well developed to he treated in its own right. Depending on 
one's perspective, the development of both fields has been tested, side-tracked or 
strengthened by a series of critiques from rational choice economists. Tue research 
conducted here necessarily draws on interest group and network theory because because it 
involves seven separate case studies of individual interest groups, all relating to the same 
policy network. 
With this in mind, Chapter 1 seeks to set out some of the important elements of the interest 
group and policy networks literature which act as an important background context for this 
empirical research. The chapter begins with a discussion of the main strand of the relevant 
literature which has been the debates between pluralists, corporatists and rational choice 
theorists about interest groups-how and why they fonn, how they interact with 
government and whether they are good for society. This i~ considered both a relevant and 
essential theoretical backdrop for any research on how and why interest groups behave as 
they do. 
Next, the chapter discusses the consensus in the literature about the advantage which 
business interest groups enjoy over their public interest group counterparts. This advantage 
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is considered especially significant to the work done here, given its exclusive focus on 
business interest groups. Then follows a discussion of the policy network concept and 
subsequent debates about its use as an analytical tool. This is also considered relevant here, 
given that the analysis of group behaviour undertaken here focuses heavily on decisions 
about engagement in a particular policy network. It is assumed that the network itself exerts 
influence on the decision making by groups, so the network literarure is instructive.5 Again, 
this discussion includes some important contributions and critiques from rational choice 
theorists. Finally, given these theoretical underpinnings, the chapter concludes by detailing 
and justifying the analytical framework and indicators used to examine group behaviour in 
this research, with reference to the literature. 
Interest group theory-some of the key debates 
In order to explore how and why interest groups behave as they do, it is important to 
appreciate some of the relevant debates that have occurred in the literature on interest group 
studies. It has long been understood that interest groups are an integral part of the process 
of governance in all countries, particularly in democracies. Academics from a range of 
disciplines have contributed to a voluminous literature on interest group studies. 6 There 
have been some significant contributions from Australia (Bell 1994; 1995; Economou 
1998; Marsh, I. 1987; 1997; Matthews 1980; 1990; 1993; Wanna 1992; Warhurst 1982; 
1984; 1993; 1994; 1997). Because of the relatively recent proliferation of interest groups in 
industrialised democracies since World War II, and even more so since the 1960s & 1970s 
(Cigler and Loomis 1995:10-1), conventional wisdom and popular thought might lead us to 
believe that interest groups and the academic study of them are relatively recent 
phenomena. In fact, however, there is a long history of interest group srudies whose roots 
precede the 20th century .7 
While it is perhaps a little unfair to simplify the literature to this degree, interest group 
studies have tended to focus on a few dominant questions which can be loosely grouped 
into two main categories. Firstly, why is it that interest groups form, survive or fail? 
Second, what is the nature and direction of interest group relationships with government 
' It is worth noting tbat economic theorists have made significant contributions which reinforce a similar 
assumption in tenns of the impact ofindustry structure on the level of interdependence of firms. 
6 For good introductions see: Baurngrartner and Leech (1998), Richardson (1993); Wilson, G.K. (1990); 
Cigler and Loomis (1995); and Jordan and Richardson (1987), 
1 For a good summary of the roots of interest group studies in the works of Rousseau. Madison and De 
Tocqueville see Wilson (1990:1-3) 
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and is this a positive thing for society?8 These two lines of inquiry are somewhat different 
to the ones being examined in this research which focuses specifically on why groups 
behave as they do, and more particularly why they made the decisions they did about their 
involvement or otherwise in a particular policy network. Nonetheless, the two dominant 
lines of inquiry vvhich have been addressed by most interest group theorists are still highly 
relevant to this research because they require researchers to make explicit and implicit 
assumptions about what motivates groups to behave as they do and make the decisions they 
do about allocating time and resources. 
1n exploring these two areas of research-group mobilization and survival, and whether 
interest groups are good for society-the field has been dominated by three main 
approaches: pluralism, corporatism, and rational choice. This is not to say that these are the 
only treatments of interest groups. There are many others including among others, social 
movements (Tarrow 1998; Wisely 1990; Oberschall; 1983; Marsh, I 1999); marxism: 
(Miliband, 1983); rent-seeking (Tullock 1967; Tollison 1991); new institutionalism (March 
and Olsen 1984); social capita! (Putnan1 2000); and demosclerosis (Rauch 1994). However, 
these three approaches appear to have been the most dominant. While there are clear 
precursor !inks in the literature {Williamson 1989:25), pluralism was the earliest and 
dominant strand with challenges from corporatism and rational choice emerging since the 
1960s and 1970s. The challenges to pluralism marked a decline in group theory which was 
at one point considered the dominant mainstream focus for explaining all politics 
(Baumgrartner and Leech 1998:3,44-64). 
The easily-understood dichotomy between corporatism and pluralism makes it relatively 
simple to portray the literature as a two-way battle {Williamson l989:ix-xiv). However, the 
dichotomy has narrowed significantly and while significant areas of confusion remain, 
there have been significant advances marked by emerging consensus (Baumgrartner and 
Leech 1998:3-22). This consensus has arguably been possible because of two main factors: 
increasing accommodation of reality (which in part led to the rise of policy network 
analysis which is discussed later below), and sustained critiques mounted by the rational 
choice theorists which have caused closer questioning and reconsideration of traditional 
assumptions in group theory. In some ways this consensus has led to the emergence of 
policy net\vork analysis, which is discussed in more detail later. 
3 Major figures !n interest group studies such as Baumgartner and Leech, and Cigler describe these areas 
offocus somewhat differently, but the findings are much the same. See: (Baumgrartner and Leech 1998, 
7-·8) 
II 
In the first instance, however, it is worthwhile to briefly outline the different approaches, 
both of which have descriptive and prescriptive elements. In other words, each approach is 
laden with assumptions about both the way the world is, and the way it ought to be, in 
terms of the role of interest groups in society. While there have been some notable 
exceptions-for example, new right theorists who believed corporatism was happening but 
was a bad thing-in the main, those describing pluralist and corporatist trends also 
supported the respective trends. 
Pluralism is a difficult concept to define as it has been interpreted differently. The most 
succinct definition of pluralism comes from the leading corporatists in the field, Phillipe 
Schmitter. Pluralism, Schmitter (1979:15) said: 
... can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units 
are organised in an unspecified number of voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically 
ordered and self-determined ... categories which are not specially licensed, recognised, 
subsidised, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest 
articulation by the state, and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational 
activity within their respective categories. 
This is broadly consistent with the pluralist interpretation (Dahl 1961; Truman 1951; 
Polsby 1971 ). In more simple terms, pluralists felt that interest groups emerged 
spontaneously with members joining of their own accord as a consequence of shared 
interest (Baumgrartner and Leech 1998:3). Government was not involved in licensing or 
encouraging group formation (Wilson, G.K. 1990:35). Interest groups were independent of 
the state and offered a positive way for government to communicate with people between 
elections in part because they were seen as representative (1990: 176). 
The system was grass-roots up and members could always support alternative groups where 
there was underperformance (Williamson 1989:52). The system was fair because where an 
imbalance of interest group power emerged, countervailing groups would spontaneously 
emerge to provide a counterbalancing force (1989:52; Macfarland 1987:146; Galbraith 
1963:123-5). Despite unequal distribution of resources, all groups had some capacity and 
opportunity to influence government (Jordan and Richardson 1987:51) and none enjoyed a 
dominant position (Wilson 1990: 13). Influence was not equal, but it was widely dispersed 
(1989:53) The number of interest groups and their power reached a healthy equilibrium in 
the eyes of the pluralist and so their presence was generally viewed as being a good thing, 
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because healthy competition to represent potential members amounted to a realistic 
reflection of tbe public interest (1987:51 ). 
Corporatists generally agreed that interest groups were a good thing but saw their role quite 
differently. Corporatism, Schmitter said, can be defined as: 
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a 
limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered 
categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by tbe state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders, and articulation of demands 
and supports (Schmitter and Lembruch 1979: 13 ). 
Unlike tbe pluralists, corporatists believed there was a steady evolution towards a situation 
in which large interest groups would become an integral part of government, and that a 
tendency towards this was already evident (Wilson 1990:36). This required government-
sanctioned monopoly coverage by groups of potential members to ensure that sections of 
the economy could communicate and work with government effectively. Rather than an 
arms·length relationship with government and competition between groups to represent 
sections of society, corporatism envisaged that a few large groups would be sheltered from 
competition as pseudo-extensions of government in policy development and program 
delivery. Government could also play an important role in sanctioning the formation of 
favoured groups and in their leadership and decision making. 
Far from the arms-length system which the pluralists envisaged, in theory at least 
corporatism could still enhance governability in society (Wilson 1990:30-1; Schmitter 
1985). The main difference, it would seem, between the two approaches was that one 
favoured efficient association and representation while the other favoured free association 
and representation. For many years the interest group studies literature was dominated by 
seemingly endless debates over which approach better described the real world and the 
likely trend (Pols by 1971; Schmitter and Lembruch 1979; Schmitter 1989; Grant 1985; 
Dahl 1982).9 International variation and plenty of 'shades of grey' provided fertile ground 
for prolonged argument (1990:34-7). This was further fueled by differences between those 
who accepted the corporatist trend. Some saw it as a solution emerging from a decaying 
capitalist/pluralist system (Schonfield 1965) while othern-particularly in the new right--
viewed the corporatism with great suspicion (Parsons 1995:258). 
"See also the ool!ection of essays in Jordan and Richardson (1987) 
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Among the critics of the corporatist trend, rational choice economists were prominent early 
and they were to permanently change the debate. Economic theory offered a very different 
interpretation because it questioned one of the central assumptions of both corporatism and 
pluralism. Mancur Olson dismissed the conventional wisdom that interest groups emerge 
because it is in the interest of individuals in similar situations to support and participate in 
collective activity (Olson 1965; Macridis 1990:224; Jordan and Richardson 1987:62). In 
keeping with economic theory, rational choice theorists had no problem accepting the idea 
that people should follow their own interests. Economic theory is, after all, laden with the 
assumption that individual decision making and behaviour are closely linked to a desire to 
pick the option which best serves the individual according to a hidden utility maximisation 
curve (Shapiro 1994:15; Wilson 1990:185). 
However, what was very interesting and confronting for corporatist and pluralist theorists 
was that the rational choice theorists used the same logic of following one's interest to 
draw the completely opposite conclusion. That is, while others viewed collective action as 
being in the interest of the individual, rational choice found that self interest was usually 
best served by the individual not participating in collective action. 
Rational choice theory accepted that people pursue their own interest, but disputed the 
notion that group involvement was in fact ever in their interest whenever there was an 
option to 'free ride.' Empirical evidence that individuals clearly were able to free ride on 
the work of groups in a great many cases appeared to add weight to their argument that 
traditional approaches were based on a false premise. Following the rational choice 
assumptions through to their logical conclusions meant that rational choice theorists came 
to some very different positions on the main questions pondered in interest group studies: 
why groups formed and how they survived, what were the consequences of their relations 
with government, and were interest groups good or bad for society. If interest maximisation 
alone was not sufficient to drive collective action, the answers to why groups form, survive, 
and relate to government, and whether the system was good and/or fair, were likely to be 
very different. Various rational choice theorists turned their attention to such questions, 
including Stigler (1972; 1974), Peltzman (1976), Tollison (1991; 1998), Moe (1980), 
Posner (1974), Becker (1983) and Tullock (1967)--to name but a few. They highlighted a 
'collective action dilemma' that has spawned an enormous expenditure of time and effort 
upon mobilization issues in the field of interest group studies, arguably at the expense of 
other important issues. As Baumgartner and Leech (1998:xvi) note, 'Our understandings of 
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the difficulties of mobilization may have improved as we have focused on this new 
research question, but our collective understandings of the roles of groups in the policy 
process have not.' 
Group mobilisation and survival 
What is very interesting about traditional interest group studies in both the corporatist and 
pluralist literature is how much is taken for granted about why groups form, why they 
survive or fail. It is assumed, for example, that 'groups of individuals with common 
interests usually attempt to further those common interests' and on that basis the motive for 
joining the group hardly seems questioning (Olson 1965). The focus instead is mainly on 
how they do and/or should interact with government, whether--and if so how-they have 
an influence on policy outcomes, and based on all this whether and why they are a good 
thing for society. 
Underlying the pluralist assumption that spontaneous group formation was spurred by the 
shared interests of individuals or firms, conventional group theory also assumed a need in 
society for such collective action. Groups survived and had influence to such an extent and 
for so long as their members, and broader society, required them. They might fail because 
the collective interest which sparked their formation had faded, or because another more 
effoctive competing organisation had emerged which better represented the interest of 
members. For so long as they lasted, however, they were seen to meet a need in society. 
Some pluralists noted empirical patterns in the formation of different types of groups, 
differences between group formation and behaviour in different countries, and even some 
patterns of group evolution (Pross 1986). Aspects of group behaviour, style, tactics, 
resources, structure and leadership were all acknowledged along with other factors as being 
linked to interest group success or failure. However, group success or failure was generally 
assumed by the pluralists to be benign-if there was a need for groups in society (which 
pluralists assumed there was) then they would form, and healthy competition between 
different groups seeking to represent the same potential members would ensure that quality 
of representation reflected a need in society. 
There were some parallels in the way corporatists viewed group formation. They also felt 
that group representation was reflective of society's need. However, rather than the 
spontaneous competition between groups to represent potential members societal demand 
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for interest group activity was more effectively met by collaboration between government 
and different sections of society. This collaboration was most effective where government 
could deal with interest groups that had complete coverage over their potential 
membership. Such groups could be trusted by government to play a role in policy 
development and program delivery, and they could also be trusted by members to deliver a 
clear single message to government. For the corporatists, the key to the fonnation of 
effective and influential interest groups which would survive the test of time was the extent 
to which they followed the corporatist approach. 
Unlike their corporatist and pluralist counterparts, rational choice theorists did not assume 
that groups met a societal need, nor that group formation and membership reflected self· 
interest maximisation by individuals. In the absence of selective incentives to encourage 
participation and/or selective disincentives to discourage non-participation, the rational 
choice held that individuals would not to join a group even though that the success of that 
group is likely to result in collective benefits which would be consistent with their own 
interests. Instead, they maintained, the rational choice is to 'free ride' wherever possible 
(Olson 1965). 
Given this very different assumption, the view of Mancur Olson and his successors in the 
field was that interest groups fanned and flourished for reasons other than collective 
interest. The ingredients for successful and tong lasting collective action included selective 
incentives or co-ercion, small size, good leadership, and good luck or circumstances (Olson 
1984:14-5). These qualities helped to create situations whereby the few could extract 
significant benefits from collective action at the expense of many (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998:66-75). According to Olson, groups which thrived had common features. In addition 
to being impossible to free ride on their activities, they tended to be private-interest groups 
not public-interest ones. These groups had the added advantages of i) greater financial 
resources than 'public interests'; and ii) pre-existing organisational structure in the fonn of 
the finn. This is not to say that rational choice theorists like Olson, Stigler, Wilson, Moe, 
and others felt that businesses inevitably have an interest in collective action. However, the 
greater the interest and the fewer the membership, the higher the likelihood of collective 
action because of the greater the scope for selective incentives and disincentives under 
these circumstances.10 
19 See Stigler (1971; 1972; 1974) and see also Moe's discussion of small groups with large individual 
members (1980:192-3). 
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Olson's contribution was later seized on by a range of economists. The work of Stigler, 
Tullock and Peltzman initiated a body of literature focused on the political economy of 
regulation that further challenged conventional group theory. They took Olson's ideas 
further to develop universal theories to demonstrate that collective action was only likely 
where the net benefits were likely to outweigh the transaction costs {Stigler 1971). Society, 
they maintained, could be divided into those who were demanders of favourable regulation 
or transfers and suppliers of such benefits--the demanders being those for whom the 
benefits of collective action outweighed the costs, the opposite being the case with 
suppliers (Tollison 1998). The theory posited that while the power of groups might not be 
equal or fair, an equilibrium was reached which resulted in an optimum least-cost 
distribution of transfers. Some economists like Tullock focused on the 'dead weight loss' 
caused by the 'rent seeking' behaviour of the transfer demanders (1967). At its core, 
though, the rational choice approach had dealt a major blow to conventional wisdom in the 
field and created a collective-action dilemma which has preoccupied interest group theory 
ever since. The preoccupation has been fuelled in part by the effectiveness of responses to 
rational choice critiques which forced the economists onto the back foot (Kimber 1993:3g,... 
48). 
The primary criticism of rational choice explanations by other group theorists has been that 
it too is so often contradicted by reality, For example, there is a wide range of examples of 
individuals joining groups in large numbers even though there are no selective incentives 
offered by the group and even though the group has neither the desire or capacity to punish 
those opting out. Public interest groups in particular (Greenpeace, Amnesty, UNICEF for 
example) have attracted large membership without offering significant selective incentives 
to join or imposing punishments for non-joiners. In addition, there is significant empirical 
evidence suggesting that interest group behaviour is often not consistent with the collective 
interests of members. David Marsh (1978:384), for example, has questioned why 'any 
interest group continues to attempt to supply the collective good if potential members only 
join to obtain selective benefits. Vlhy don't interest groups merely supply selective 
incentives?' 
Rational choice analysts of interest groups have in more recent times accepted this critique 
and sought to incorporate it into their framework by adding 'solidary benefits' and 
'purposive incentives' to the list of primary motivations for individuals to join a group 
{Clark and J.Q. Wilson 1961:129-66). Solidary benefits include 'friendship, enjoyment, 
status and other intangibles' that 'arise from the act of associating' and purposive 
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incentives 'are even less tangible than solidazy benefits, involving the good feelings that 
people get from contributing to a cause in which they believe' (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998:69). 
Rational choice theory has arguably become more acceptable but less potent as a result. 
Given the almost infinite scope of factors from which potential members might derive 
solidary and purposive benefits, the significance of material selective incentives and or 
disincentives as motivators for collective action becomes less important. Further, if the 
psychic satisfaction generated by non-material incentives is then included in the definition 
of self-interest (the pursuit of which is arguably the primary notion underpinning rational 
choice theory), the notion itself begins to lose its meaning. 
The rational choice response was to focus on membership structure as an indicator for 
group behaviour~that is, suggesting that where there are a few large individual members 
contributing a large share of the group's finances, they often exert dominant control over 
the group's activities). Moe further suggested that the autonomy of an interest group's 
activity is linked to the degree to which selective benefits are a motivator for membership. 
According to him, the more important selective benefits are a motivator for membership, 
the greater the flexibility the interest group has in determining its activities. Conversely, the 
more agreement with principle is a membership motivator, the less the flexibility available 
to the interest group (Moe 1980). Again, while this makes the rational choice approach to 
interest group analysis more plausible, it also arguably dilutes its strength. That is, if 
successful interest groups are possible notwithstanding the prevalence of material selective 
incentives, it reduces the importance of the very incentives which had been central to the 
rational choice approach (Wilson 1990: 185). 
One issue upon which pluralists, corporatists and rational choice theorists did agree was 
that group behaviour was at least in part driven by a desire for the group itself to live on. 
'VV'hile the pluralists envisaged this survival instinct being driven by constant healthy 
competition between groups seeking to advance the interests of members, the corporatist 
approach assumed a strong group survival requirement because of the systemic importance 
of the group in the functioning of government. Rational choice, on the other hand, viewed 
groups as simply wanting to survive in order to protect rents. As Olson (1984: 15) said, 
once groups get started 'they will almost never disband ... they are likely once organised to 
have found selective incentives, to last indefinitely.' 
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Without question, rational choice principles from economics have made a significant 
contribution to interest group studies by focusing attention on issues that were hitherto 
overlooked. Corporatism and pluralism certainly underestimated the significance of 
selective benefits and incentives in the formation and survival of groups and as an 
important influence on group behaviour. Prior to the intervention of rational choice, group 
studies largely either overlooked this important membership motivation or took for granted 
that membership motivation was primarily based on shared ideology and the pursuit of 
shared interests (Moe 1980: 198-9). 
Questioning these assumptions has proven essential to advances in the field. It cast group 
behaviour in a much different light, and as we shall see it cast serious doubt over the widely 
held view that the sum of interest group behaviour broadly reflected the public interest and 
was generally good for society. Granted, the rational choice critique has been watered down 
as it has been refined-on the definition and supremacy of selective incentives-hut it has 
also taken a significant toll on the old corporatist and pluralist positions. It has forced a 
reassessment and many significant concessions, as well as a retreat from the dichotomous 
positions which preceded it. 
Baumgartner and Leech (1998:67) go so far as to say that with Olson's 1965 publication: 
... the pluralist perspective was essentially dead, since there was no way for most 
scholars after that date to accept the idea that the natural working of the group system 
could be expected to. generate a set of active interest groups that would be 
representative of interests in society. Some interests would always he more equal than 
others. 
Crucially, Olson demonstrated that the representation of interest group activity can be 
under-supplied where material and non-material incentives-punishments and rewards-
were difficult to deliver in a selective way to potential members. 
The rational choice critique and the debates it spawned are highly relevant to the research 
conducted here on the question of what constitutes 'group interest' and how one measures 
its influence on group decisions. As the debates between the economists and others in the 
field have demonstrated, incentives and benefits ean be both financial and non-financial. It 
logically follows that the same material-;ion-material concept applies to the idea of group 
interest. Presumably, in relation to any given issue, the financial component of a group's 
interest is constantly changing as membership rises and falls, or as exchange rates, interest 
rates and various other influences fluctuate. Even taking these into account, however, 
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calculations of what groups may win or lose financially in relation to public policy issues 
(like greenhouse policy) do not properly incorporate non-financial, intangible elements of 
group interest. There are a great many of these elements: wanting to maintain a good 
relationship with government, wanting to project an image of strong corporate citizenship, 
wanting to retain a strong presence in rural communities, not wanting to upset 'sister' 
interest groups-to name but a few. Lack of information, division within groups, and 
variation in intensity of concern among individual members further complicate the task of 
measuring group interest. This suggests that the conventional wisdom that vested interests 
drive group behaviour is misplaced because group interest is dynamic rather than static, and 
it cannot be measured or reduced to financial stakes alone. Rather, there are other forces 
which inform the overall judgment of group interest and influence group behaviour, and 
these need to be assessed in other ways-something dealt with further below. 
Group relationships with government and impact on society 
Perhaps the most discussed question has been whether interest groups are a positive or 
negative feature of democratic society-whether they provide or promise to provide a 
representative and complementary enhancement of government between elections or 
whether they are in fact unrepresentative obstacles to good government which invariably 
put self interest over the national interest. Of particular concern has been the way in which 
relationships between groups and the state have become ritual or routine (Richardson 
1993:10). How this question was answered was central to the differing theses offered by 
corporatism, pluralism and rational choice. An interesting feature has been gradual 
consensus and softening of what once were quite firm positions on this question. 
For the traditional pluralists, interest groups were a healthy aspect of a liberal democracy 
because they are inevitably numerous and competitive and, by and large, they 
counterbalance one another in such a way that no particular sector of society dominates 
representations to government on the direction of public policy (Cigler and Loomis 
1995:5). Furthermore, pluralists believed that within individual sectors, competition would 
always be likely between different groups and this would ensure that no particular interest 
group would generate monopoly coverage. Overlapping membership would also help 
prevent extremism. The democratic system, they felt, had built-in safeguards that ensured 
that no group could mobilise too much power around an issue, because their actions would 
spur the formation of potential counterbalancing interest groups. Pluralists considered that 
latent interest groups were an important part of the political process, in that powerful 
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groups can emerge very quickly in response to either new policy issues as they reach the 
public agenda or action by other opposing groups. 11 
Furthermore, pluralists held that unequal financial resources would not necessarily lead to 
distorted outcomes in interest group activity. Less well financed groups would have other 
significant non-financial resources at their disposal which would compensate. Furthermore, 
pluralists maintained, government processes were structured in such a way as to ensure a 
fair hearing irrespective of money. With the trend towards greater interest group numbers, 
especially in the United States, pluralists believed that this was not only the way of the 
world, but the way the world should be--in other words, pluralism was a descriptive and 
prescriptive approach (Wilson 1990:4). The rise of public-interest groups in the US in 
particular, and the tendency towards competition to represent economic sectors, professions 
and public interests alike also seemed to reinforce the pluralist argument. For pluralists, 
healthy competition for interest group representation, and access for groups in government 
processes, would foster better policy development and this was good for society. 
Corporatists saw the world differently, yet with some interesting para!lels. 12 They too 
believed that interest groups could foster better policy where they could speak exclnsively 
for their sectors, and thereby enable government and groups to work towards policy 
solutions in the most efficient manner (Wilson 1990:180). They recognised that there were 
many economic sectors in which a limited number of interest groups with monopoly 
representation were entering into exclusive relationships with government, in which they 
were offered a central role in policy development and implementation in exchange for 
delivering cooperation from across their membership base. With the increased economic 
intervention by the state in various countries in the J 970s and 1980s, they noted that there 
were also closer and more stable relationships developing between government and interest 
groups--especially in European nations. In many instances, and almost always related to 
economic policy issues, they noted that 'corporatist arrangements' emerged between 
government and key groups; these had both representative and regulatory roles. That is, in 
exchange for delivering monopolistic support or at the very least acquiescence in response 
to government policy, government provided such groups with inpnt into policy 
development along with a key role in policy implementation itse!f(Williamson 1989:9-48). 
Exclusive insider access was the quid pro quo for sector-wide solidarity. Like the pluralists, 
11 For a good discussion of these and other pluralist interpretations of the desirability of interest groups in 
society see Jordan and Richardson (1987:43-61). 
12 For some good introductions to Corporatist interest group theory see Williamson, P.J. (1989). 
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corporatists believed that this was increasingly the way of the world. While there were 
some exceptions, particularly in the United States, where corporatist arrangements were 
viewed v.ith some suspicion, most corporatists saw this trend as something desirable, 
because it offered the prospect of more efficient government (1990:12; Lembruch 
1979:55). 
As we have seen, rational choice challenged both pluralist and corporatist notions by 
disputing their common view that interest groups were, or were likely to be, a positive 
force in society. The rational choice view was that interest groups were a much more 
malicious force in society than had been previously assumed. Groups were often part of the 
problem, not part of the solution. Rational choice disputed the pluralist argument that 
interest group power was generally counterbalanced by countervailing groups. On the 
contrary, they maintained, power imbalances were not necessarily offset, vacuums were not 
automatically filled and the system therefore did not have any type of built-in systemic 
fairness. The reason why the system had nothing to do with fairness was that collective 
interest did not inevitably lead to collective action. Rather, the economic incentive was 
always to free ride if at all possible. This accounted for the self-evident empirical finding 
that many interest groups flourished even though they were clearly not helpful from a 
society-wide point of view, while other groups--especially those seeking to improve 
'public goods' -struggled to survive. The more a group's activity was associated with 
public goods, the easier it was for potential members to free ride, the harder it was to 
survive. By extension, the more interest groups there were the worse it probably was for 
society because the ones which survived and thrived are those which were least concerned 
with the delivery of public good. Instead, they tended to be those groups most concerned 
about the delivery of selective incentives-often in the form of private goods. Various 
rational choice theorists started to warn of the malicious impact of interest groups in 
democratic systems of government. Rent-seeking behaviour by groups was contributing to 
what was called 'demsclerosis' and was seen as a factor in the decline of certain western 
economies (Rauch 1994; Olson 1984). In more recent times, though, some have 
acknowledged that business interest group activity often goes beyond rent-seeking and is 
sometimes good for society (Doner and Schneider 2000). 
Reconciling the argument on both tbe state of reality and the best direction for the future 
has been the primary struggle in interest group studies. This partly explains the strong focus 
on examining interest group activity with a view to determining whether policy outcomes 
have been influenced. Ultimately, no side has really won the debates. Resolution has only 
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been reached by the arrival of the competing camps at the conclusion that empirical 
evidence over time increasingly rendered the corporatist, pluralist and rational choice 
approaches all inadequate, or perhaps complementary in their own way. While there were 
instances of corporatist style 'iron triangles' (close relationships between the executive, 
legislature and particular groups) with respect to particular policy issues it, was hardly a 
general rule, and corporatist and pluralist arrangements were often found side by side 
(Williamson 1989:15). Corporatists had to concede that the tendency some had identified 
and even strongly promoted was in fact in decline and unlikely to be dominant (Streck and 
Schmitter 1991:146). Even the most strident corporatists like Schmitter had to question the 
model in terms ofhoth its likelihood and its efficiency (Schmitter 1989:67-72). While the 
corporatist model was an ideal type it was almost never found in the wild (Richardson 
1993:13). 
Similarly, the once enthusiastic proponents of pluralism began to retreat as it became clear 
that their initial optimism was neither borne out by reality nor likely to be in the future. For 
example, Dahl and Lindblom were among many pluralists who believed originally that in a 
democracy the different range of interest groups neutralised one another, rendering the 
governmental decision-making system essentially benign and incrementalist. However, 
later in their careers, both of these theorists acknowledged that the system was indeed not 
neutral and rather that business interest demands predominated over others (Dahl 1982; 
Lindblom 1977; Parsons 1995:252-3).13 Business was able to exert relatively more 
influence over govermnent, they felt, because it was uniquely positioned with the ability to 
threaten economic sanctions against the govermnent (by relocating industries to alternative 
jurisdictions or nations). Having recognised the dominance of business interests, pluralists 
began to accept that this was not in the community's interests. This concession was 
important as a bridge to the other main strands of interest group studies. That it was now 
almost universally acknowledged that business interest groups enjoyed a marked advantage 
in their relations with government relative to other groups had important implications. It 
meant that the relationships between interest groups and government were clearly more 
complex and less equal than previously appreciated. This had significant implications in 
terms of ascertaining the likely degree of influence groups had on government policy, and 
the desirability of that influence, given that it could not be assumed to be balanced. 
13 Dahl's increasing reservations are discussed by Grant Jordan in Richardson (1993:54). In relation to on 
Lindblom's change in position see Jordan and Richardson (1990:80) and Wilson (l 990: 177). 
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Accommodating reality-the business interest group advantage 
While the primacy of the influence of business interest groups over others was a significant 
erosion of a long-held view by pluralists, it was long accepted not just by corporatists, but 
also by marxists and rational choice theorists. 14 While there is some variation in the 
consensus between sectors and across different countries, observers of interest group 
behaviour agree that business interest groups (generally well-resourced producer groups) 
have a distinct advantage over other groups battling to influence government policy 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998:9). 
There are some important reasons for this advantage. Resources are one of the most 
obvious factors which set most producer groups apart. While resources are no guarantee of 
success, those with a greater ability to fund staff and facilities and purchase information 
begin with a very significant advantage in the attempt to influence government policy. 
There are celebrated examples where small issue-based groups win out, many of them in 
the environment policy sphere (for example, DDT, asbestos, tobacco, and 
chlorofluorocarbons). Membership numbers, intensity of concern and good organisation 
can be more powerful than money (Marsh, I 1997 :328). However, issue-based non-business 
groups usually only succeed after many years of failure against better-resourced business 
interests, and normally when success does occur, it is an issue 'whose time has come.' So, 
while they may not ultimately stop inevitable change, established and well-funded business 
interest groups are extremely effective at delaying change.15 
In addition to their superior resources, business interest groups have superior links into 
government, often enjoying long-standing close working relationships with political parties 
or government agencies. This insider status provides an enormous advantage over groups 
operating without it Business interest groups also enjoy a culture which is more in sync 
with government agencies and major political parties. They are generally less inclined to 
engage in visible, grass roots, confrontational communications with government, such as 
protest marches and rallies, blockades, hunger strikes and other political stunts. Business 
groups need not engage in these activities, because they usually have more effective tools 
14 For good coverage of the widespread view on the unequal advantage of business interest groups see 
'The power of business,' Chapter 4 in Jordan and Richardson (1987:80-90). 
" Titis was also the finding of Crenson in the classic case study of industrialists in fast Chicago and 
Gary, Indiana delaying attention to pollution discussed in fordan and Richardson (1987:83). 
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at their disposal to ensure that their message is potent and taken seriously (Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998:92-99). 
These groups tend to opt for more subtle methods like detailed submissions in support of 
their policy preferences, attendiog and/or sponsoring conferences involving political and 
bureaucratic elites, and a wide range of lobbying activity, mostly behind the scenes. They 
can also, for example, raise the prospect that their industries will suffer and inflict 
significant economic damage nationally or regionally, and that jobs will be lost A threat to 
decamp to other countries is a particularly powerful weapon not available to public interest 
groups. These advantages mean that business interest groups are generally judged by 
government to be more trustworthy, competent and more easily taken into the policy-
making process. 
This insider status is enhanced by the presence of revolving doors between business interest 
groups, government agencies and political parties, allowing regular and extensive exchange 
of personnel at staff and leadership level (King and Walker 1991:69). This varies 
significantly from country to country and while it has not reached the extremes seen in the 
United States when there is a change of presidential administration, it is nonetheless an 
aspect which has drawn significant attention here in Australia. There is increasing assertion 
in the interest group literature to suggest an increasing business advantage born of more 
disciplined unity among business interest associations, and a parallel increase in 
government/business collaboration on policy development and delivery. The revolving 
door between business and government is a part of this trend. This is in stark contrast to a 
well-documented era of fragmentation of Australian business interests where the 'old 
school tie' was more important than the 'revolving door.' There are strong signs of a 
macro-level shift in the political environment in which Australian groups operate--in 
business groups' favour, though perhaps only where they present to government speaking 
as one.16 
The advantages of the business interest group are also often enhanced by their membership 
structure. Business interest groups tend to be less democratic and less grass roots than 
public interest groups. As such they can spend somewhat less time on internal process and 
more time advancing their agenda. They also tend to benefit from the presence of a 
16 For a detailed discussion on the fragmented history of business interest association dealings witti 
government and the transformation into greater unity and intermingling '\<Vith government on policy, see 
the following: (Bell 1994:137-158; Eccleston [undated]; Abbott 1996). 
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relatively small group of large members with significant resources that can be brought to 
bear to enhance the effectiveness of their communications to government (Moe 1980:192-
3). The close connections into the dominant political culture of government that key 
members might enjoy also amplify the capacity of business interest groups to ensure their 
message is heard. Sympathetic third parties can place well-targeted and effective calls to 
the people that count. Additional funds can be solicited when lobbying requires more 
horsepower like some economic research from an expert consultant. 
So, while it is well acknowledged that some pluralism in the system exists, the cards are 
heavily stacked in favour of well-resourced groups-particularly producer groups. The 
broad acceptance of the relative strength of business interest groups is an important 
precursor for this research. It is one of the primary reasons for focusing on seven business 
interest groups here as case studies in the response in Australia to the issue of climate 
change. The cross-sectoral relevance of this policy issue provides a unique opportunity to 
explore the advantage of business interest groups. It is one thing to appreciate that they 
have an advantage, but the reality is that they are often pitted against one another in policy 
debates. Consequently, the dynamics of how business interest groups behave and what 
influences decisions on their involvement in policy debates and lobbying activity is a 
question of some consequence. Climate change responses provide a good opportunity to 
explore this. 
Accommodating more reality-the policy network concept 
In focusing on the behaviour of seven business interest groups in terms of how they 
responded to the same policy issue, it is impossible to ignore the literature of policy 
networks that has evolved from the interest group studies debates between the corporatist, 
pluralist and rational choice theorists. Just as the consensus on business interest group 
advantage is highly relevant here, the policy network concept is similarly relevant to this 
research. 
In hindsight, much of the initial variance between the corporatist and pluralist 
interpretations was based upon geographical difference. Pluralists, in the main, came from 
countries like the United States, where the trend in the 50s and 60s tended to match their 
interpretations, whilst corporatists were more likely to come from European nations, which 
operated much more in keeping with their framework, particularly during the 1970s and 
1980s (Richardson 1993:13; Salisbury 1979). By the late 1980s, both sides had realised the 
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need for a new approach more flexible than the one-size-fits-all approach that each side had 
been promoting. Many began to realise that pure corporatism and pure pluralism were both 
really two extreme points along an empirical continuum rather a dichotomy. 
As Williamson (1989:64) acknowledged, 'most corporatist writers agree that in practice 
corporatist and pluralist arrangements are often found side by side or in some mixed 
combination.' Pluralists, similarly, had to acknowledge that it had become increasingly 
evident that, despite the proliferation in interest group numbers, particularly close and 
highly exclusive arrangements did tend to emerge in a wide range of settings. Theorists 
such as Lowi (1969) had noticed the common emergence of 'symbiotic relationships' of a 
triangular and exclusive nature between interest group, congressional committee and the 
central government. The corporatists could see some validation in the emergence of sub--
governments and 'iron triangles,' which seemed to support a 'closed shop' corporatist 
interpretation of interest group/government interaction. However, this was not something 
that could be generalised across policy areas, governments, or nations. Furthennore, as the 
enviroumental, women's, and nuclear non-proliferation movements gained more and more 
momentum, the corporatist framework was unable to account for the strength of advocacy 
groups without strong economic resources. 
For many corporatists like Grant, Cawson and Williamson, the assimilation of corporatism 
by pluralism was vehemently fought. However, the two sides started to acknowledge the 
need for reconciliation, not only in their interpretation of reality, but in terms of their 
principles on what was best for democracy and good government. People like Goldthorpe 
began to suggest that 'American-style pluralism' and 'European-style corporatism' were 
equally possible routes to success (Wilson 1990:31; Goldthorpe 1985). Others, like Stigler 
( 1971) and Lowi ( 1969), contended that policy shaped politics---essentially that the level of 
interest group involvement in policy processes depended on the issue. Interest groups were 
important in regulatory or distributive issues, while redistributive issues tended to be 
dominated by broader political forces like political parties. 
lJltimately, these were small steps towards the emergence of a largely 'neo-pluralist' 
approach which acknowledged the empirical reality of some nee-corporatist arrangements 
in certain policy contexts. 'While the neo-corporatist interpretation seemed to fit in some 
instances, the neo-pluralist alternative seemed increasingly more relevant as 'iron triangles' 
began to be broken down in more and more cases. As Heclo (1978) and Smith (1993) 
identified, iron triangles were being increasingly replaced with more dynamic arrangements 
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involving more players, partly in line with demands for greater transparency in 
government. 
For an increasing number of scholars, a better descriptor or framework was required to 
better understand what was becoming more commonly observed than the old corporatist 
versus pluralist dichotomy (Atkinson and Coleman 1989:66). Theorists like Smith (1993) 
found described a continuum of what they called policy networks, with stable 'policy 
communities' at one end and open 'issue networks' at the other. Policy ccmmunities most 
closely matched the situation described by relatively more corporatist iron triang!es--with 
few privileged groups operating in a close relationship with bureaucratic and political 
players, in a policy environment of ccllegial and gradual change. Other groups advocating 
more radical change were locked out of these policy communities and found it almost 
impossible to break in. 
Issue networks, on the other hand, described a more pluralist situation in which either there 
is no established stable policy community, or there has been a breakdown in the policy 
community. In contrast to the stable closed-shop arrangements, an issue network describes 
a policy area which is heavily contested, open to a wide range of players, and is in most 
cases in the midst of major change--arrangements involving, among others, a wide array of 
players from interest groups to academia to lobbyists to the media to competing 
government agencies. 
This approach pioneered by Richardson and Jordan (1979) and others has proven a far 
more open and flexible framework. For some corporatists who had invested so much in 
their own approaches over the years, the policy networks framework arguably amounted to 
a hostile take-over of their ideas by pluralists. Others took some ownership of the new 
concept. As Grant (1995:35-6) says, 'The corporatist debate did ... help to stimulate a new 
wave of theoretical and empirical work on pressure groups promoting a re-examination of 
pluralist theory, and thereby encouraging the development of new forms of pluralist 
.analysis, such as the idea of policy communities.' 
For some, policy networks were seen as a model of interest group representation which was 
superior to, and could even subsume corporatism and pluralism (Marsh, D. 1998:8). The 
one certainty, however, is that the policy network concept has enabled the corporatists, 
pluralists, and even some rational choice exponents to operate within the same framework. 
It catered for the reality that both neo-pluralist issue networks and nee-corporatist policy 
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communities existed at the extreme and that reality was often somewhere in between. The 
new approach also allowed for the dynamic nature of politics and public policy. It 
accommodated the rapid and sometimes very substantial shifts in opinion which completely 
reshape composition and/or power structure within a policy network. 
Cautious acceptance of network analysis by both sides of the traditional debate has opened 
the way for some consensus and accommodation of alternative approaches--and not 
simply corporatism and pluralism. As Smith (1993:74) points out: 
For Marxists, the networks would be closed and dominated by the interests of capital. 
For elitists, networks would be closed and domiruited by a small number of interest 
groups and state actors as in a corporatist model. For state theorists, networks could 
take different forms but would exist in order to pursue the interests of state actors. 
For pluralists, networks are continually breaking down into issue networks which 
make it increasingly difficnlt for a small number of groups to dominate policy 
sectors. 
As Parsons notes, in this way, the pluralist framework has provided a promising new 
direction-potentially a 'common framework within which a multiplistic approach to 
public policy could develop' (Parsons 1995:254). However, the policy networks field has 
encountered its own challenges-many of them once again emerging from rational choice 
critiques. Without dwelling too much on them here, the central problem has been the extent 
to which policy networks provide a useful analytical framework. For some rational choice 
critics like Dowding (2001 ), for example, the objective of any serious analysis should be to 
explain policy outcomes, and he views the policy networks approach as simply being 
unable to deliver that. Rather than providing a rigorous analytical framework, he would say, 
the policy networks concept is more metaphor, the potential of which has been overdone by 
its exponents. Network analysts like Marsh and Rhodes have mounted their own vigorous 
defences against these attacks and a degree of consensus has emerged. However, the 
debates remain lively and unresolved (Marsh, D. and Smith 2000; Raab 2001; Evans, M. 
200 l; Dowding 2001; Marsh, D. and Smith 200 l ). 
The reasons why policy network analysis is relevant to this research are less contentious. 
What matters here is that this type of analysis recognises that interest groups coalesce 
around issues and that the networks that form are dynamic, with the relationships and 
processes involved constantly evolving. They may sometimes seem corporatist and 
sometimes more pluralist. The scope for gradual and rapid movement between issue 
network and policy community provides a realistic framework against which to analyse 
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group activity. Another very important aspect of policy network literature which is relevant 
here is the widespread acceptance that network or meso-level pressures strongly influence 
group behaviour (Smith 1993 :7-8 ). In other words, what happens in the network matters. 
The lively debates in the literature over the relative importance of network structure versus 
rational action by network participants in explaining network outcomes, and whether 
networks are a mere metaphor not terribly relevant here. That is because the aim of this 
research is to understand how groups assess their interests and how they behave, not to 
explain policy outcomes. The main point of relevance here is that what happens in policy 
networks matters a great deal. Meso-level networks influence policy outcomes and they 
also influence group behaviour and decision-making, which are the subjects that matter in 
this research. 
Policy network analysts have focused much attention on meso-level aspects (not 
surprisingly given that it is a meso-level concept). However, they have also acknowledged 
that network outcomes are influenced by macro-level external pressures (the broader 
political context in which network activity occurs) and micro-level forces (such as internal 
influences on the individual group players in the policy network) (Daughbjerg and Marsh, 
D. 1998:53-72). Hence network analysis needs to encompass all levels. As Evans 
(2001 :542-3) puts it, ' .. .if used in isolation from other levels of analysis, macro· or micro-, 
the meso-level approach is limited in terms of the scope of the variables it can consider and 
hence the causal pathways it can establish.' So long as all levels are properly incorporated, 
the network approach provides a useful foundation for understanding group decisions on 
their involvement in a policy network. While this work is not intended to constitute a 
significant addition to policy network theory, it is intended to be a useful and relevant 
empirical application. 
The need to ground the empirical analysis in the literature 
As stated at the outset, this research aims to enhance our understanding of interest group 
behaviour. It also seeks to shed light on Australian. greenhouse policy network-how it has 
evolved, how it currently operates and where it might be headed. It is arguably the first 
systemaric study of this policy network and a large number of groups therein. While the 
main aim is to make an empirical rather than a theoretical contribution, it is acknowledged 
that the work must be sufficiently grounded in the relevant literature to be of relevance and 
use to others engaged in the theoretical discussions. With that in mind, interpretations by 
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participants and observers about the behaviour of different interest groups have been 
collected. These interpretations were then analysed with reference to a range of indicators, 
which are either generated from the interest group and/or policy network literature, or 
emerge from the data itself. 
The policy network approach is relevant for this research into business interest responses to 
climate change for a range of reasons. First, the emergence of climate change has been 
accompanied by the emergence of a new policy network around the issue. While some have 
covered the development of greenhouse policy by government and its desirability in some 
depth (Hamilton 2001), the greenhouse policy network in Australia has not been studied in 
any great depth. Second, the issue of climate change is bringing about alliances between 
traditionally opposed interests (for example, environmental non-government organisations 
and the natural gas industry), schisms between traditionally allied interests (for example, 
gas and aluminium), and the emergence of cross-sectoral interests with little prior 
involvement in environment-related policy networks (for example, Insurance Council of 
Australia and the Sydney Futures Exchange). These features are likely to make an 
empirical analysis of the evolving policy network interesting and valuable on many levels. 
One of the most usefol features of the policy network approach in relation to the work done 
here is that it accounts for change. It recognises that group relations with government can 
change over time as new issues emerge and/or evolve, making it impossible not to admit 
new players, or in some cases to sustain the favoured positions of existing players. TI1is is 
particularly relevant in the case of business responses to greenhouse policy in Australia, 
given that the issue is so long-term and v.ill span many changes in government. 
Conversely, as David Marsh has observed, the policy network approach also 
accommodates the potential of networks to act as a brake on radical policy change as was 
the case in Thatcherite Britain. There, according to Marsh (and Rhodes 1992:185), it was 
'the continued existence and power of policy networks which has acted as the greatest 
constraint on the development and implementation of radical policy.' Similarly, this 
research suggests that the dynamics of the existing greenhouse policy network have indeed 
acted as a very effective brake on government policy development in Australia. 
By analysing interest group behaviour with reference to the wider policy network, this also 
enables some exploration of rational choice principles as they relate to group behaviour and 
network evolution. More than any other approach to understanding interest group 
behaviour, rational choice theory addresses the key issue of why individuals join groups in 
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the first instance-the assumption being that group behaviour has a great deal to do with 
maintaining membership, and hence the actions of groups are closely linked to the 
motivations behind membership. 
The subject matter of this work also lends itself to exploration of some of the rational 
choice assumptions on the issue of 'interest' or perceptions of it Climate change is an issue 
as much about economics as it is about the environment. The economic costs and benefits 
associated with climate change impacts, mitigation and adaptation are all potentially 
enormous and vary greatly from sector to sector. Consequently, the policy decisions by 
government and the international community about who bears which costs and who enjoys 
the new opportunities are inherently significant to business groups. This shapes group 
perceptions of economic self-interest and group interest more broadly, and this in turn 
influences group decisions on the nature and extent of engagement in the policy network. 
The diversity of business interests involved offers an ideal opportunity to test the extent to 
which business interest activity on the issue of climate change is motivated by the pursuit 
of interest maximisation. 
Some key steps taken to link the analysis with the literature 
The approach taken in the research to data collection and analysis is discussed further in 
Chapter 2. However, it is important at this point to explain some of the important links 
between the indicators used to sort and analyse the dara, because of their links back to the 
interest group studies and policy network literature. The research starts with an assumption 
that the behaviour of interest groups can be driven by a wide range of forces. As the 
literature shows us, various motivations are relevant to group behaviour depending on 
one's assumptions. In line with the mainstream economic argument (Samuelson 1947), for 
example, one might assume that real preferences (that is, group interest) are reflected in 
actions (or group behaviour). As has been discussed above, one might assume that group 
behaviour reflects the collective interest of members. In the case of business interest groups 
one might assume that the interest is to maximise the incomes of member firms. 17 On that 
basis, group behaviour could be assumed to constitute steps taken with the aim of 
delivering a selective incentive to members to overcome the 'free rider' problem of 
collective action and ensure group survival. Alternatively, one might view group behaviour 
as an upshot of 'rules of the game' decisions made by the state, as the result of the structure 
17 This assumption becomes problematic, however, if vested interest is extended to encompass psychic 
satisfaction and other non~material benefits. 
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of a policy network or as a consequence of the power balance between individual players in 
a network. Another alternative would be to focus on the internal aspects of the organisation 
as a powerful filter of decision making, or even a source of unprompted action. There are 
several ways in which group interest and group behaviour can be viewed. It is an area in 
which the field lacks consensus as Baumgartner and Leech point out: 
Scholars have used a variety of definitions of interests over the years. Each individual 
definition may make sense, but such a large range of different definitions are used 
that the literature provides little guidance for the researcher attempting to reach a 
simple decision on what is an interest (1998:25). 
The challenge is to capture the forces which shape group interest assessment and group 
behaviour in a balanced way. As we have seen above, one of the important challenges is to 
go beyond simple and inadequate notions of 'vested interest' to uncover the factors which 
contribute to group assessments ofinterest. 
TI1e response taken in this work has been to divide interest forming and behaviour 
motivating indicators into three categories: Micro- (meaning factors internal to the group); 
Meso- (meaning factors flowing from within the relevant policy network) and Macro-
(meaning factors external to the group and the network). 
A key assumption here is that factors operating or emanating from all of these levels 
contribute to an overall, and yet dynamic, assessment on the part of groups about their 
interest in an issue. These assessments largely shape group behaviour, network activity and 
policy outcomes. TI1e diagram below shows how this dynamic process works, and how it 
relates to policy outcomes. 
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This assessment, in turn, it is assumed, largely drives behaviour-whether or not the 
assessment is right or wrong. There is strong support in the interest group literature and 
policy networks literature to suggest that influences at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels 
all have a significant impact on group deeision-making.18 On that basis, the approach 
employed in this research deliberately captures all three, consistent with most strands of the 
literature. The next important choice is deciding which indicators to use within these 
categories in order to enable strongly supported assessments about what has caused groups 
to behave as they have. 
18 In relation to all three levels see, for example, Daughbjerg and Marsh, D. (1998), Williamson, P J 
(1989) and Eccleston (undated); In relation to macro-level drivers, for example, see discussion of 
'structural factors' like the dominant culture and ideology of government, the need to consider cultural 
and historical context of the state in question in: Wilson (1990:114-16), Macrldis (1990:224) and 
Baumgartner and Leech's appeal for !,'feater incorporation of context (1998:11, 17, 23); discussion of 
external legitimacy in Abbott (1995:24). See also Stigler's theory of economic regulation (1971), with its 
heavy emphasis on micro-level considerations. 
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In respect of the micro-level forces, a somewhat more prescriptive approach has been taken 
in asking specific questions about four influences on group interest and behaviour: 
organisational culture, leadership, membership structure, and resources. Arguably the first 
three are components of the last but dis-aggregation was used for the purposes of better 
distinguishing the forces at play. There is strong support in the existing literature for 
choosing these behavioural motives. '9 However, while these four forces were explicitly 
nominated in the interviews, scope was allowed for interviewees to put forward other 
internal factors felt important. As it happened, none emerged on a consistent basis, but 
offering interviewees scope to introduce alternative micro-level influences did avoid 
complete apriorism. The assumption made beforehand and impression gained afterwards 
was that, while different categories (and even sub-catgories) might have been used, the four 
micro-level factors used here sufficiently encapsulated the range of forces acting within the 
groups studied. 
In respect of both the meso- and macro-level forces, the researcher certainly began with 
some preconceptions about which indicators might be significant. A similar apriorism 
might have been applied at this level. For example, at the meso-level one might have 
considered the size of the network in terms of the number of players, the extent of the 
economy covered, the balance between business and public interest groups and so on. A set 
of predetermined macro-level causes of group behaviour is also easy to conceive. However, 
a conscious decision was taken not to apply the same degree of apriorism used in the 
micro-level analysis. The main reason for this decision was that the main unit of analysis is 
the business interest group, not the network, and not the broader macro-level politi.cal 
environment. While the research seeks to compare groups, for all groups the network and 
political environment is the same. Hence, while pre-determined meso-level factors would 
be very useful for a comparison of policy networks, and predetermined macro-level factors 
would be useful for comparing differences between countries, they are less relevant here. 
Instead, it seems more informative to allow the meso· and macro- impressions of 
interviewees to determine what they felt were the more relevant contributors to different 
group responses to the same network. 
" In relation to Organisational Culture and Leadership, for example, see Shein (l 985)-particularly 
Chapter 15, Allison (1971). Note Olson's (1984) emphasis on the importance of leadership to group 
success; In relation to resources, note reference to the inequality of resource distribution from very early 
in Dahl (1961:227), Moe (1980) and Cigler and Loomis (1995:4); On the influence of membership 
structure on group behaviour, see Moe (1980), Pross (1981:288-9) and Wilson (1990:19-21); Note 
Olson's (1984:14) emphasis on the importance of small membership as a key to group success; Note 
Doner and Schneider's focus on 'membership density' (2000). 
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That said, it was certainly assumed by the researcher that particular causes of behaviour at 
the meso- and macro- levels would be important. Scientific uncertainty associated with the 
extent and timing of climate change impacts, for example, was thought a likely candidate. 
Similarly, it was assumed that the limitations on policy-makers in terms of the practicality 
of implementing different responses to climate change might encourage or discourage 
action on the part of certain groups. 
However, in keeping with the above reasoning against apriorism at these levels, the 
nomination of forces exerted by the policy network and the wider political environment 
was left to the participants themselves. Certainly some of the indicators assumed to be 
important were raised by the interviewer in the course of the interviews (for example, 
policy implications, scientific complexity, international processes, and so on) but these this 
did not guide discussion to any significant degree. In general, interviewees had strong 
views of their own and needed little prompting to introduce relevant discussion. By taking 
this less formal approach, a wide range of factors emerged as important at the meso- and 
macro-levels including some that were not anticipated by the researcher. Similarly, some 
factors assumed to be significant by the researcher turned out not to be. These are discussed 
in further detail in the case chapters and in Chapters 10 and 11. 
By using a three level categorization of reasons for group behaviour, but letting most of 
these reasons emerge from the data, this work seeks to avoid trying to make the data fit 
models drawn from any particular strand of the relevant literature. In this way, the research 
aims to maximise the scope for objectivity and originality. As it turned out, many of the 
indicators which emerged as important are also considered important in much the 
literature--albeit sometimes phrased differently. For example, coalition activity emerged as 
a very significant cause of behaviour in this research. This is well supported in the literature 
(Byerk and Maney 1995; Hula 1995; Jordan and Richardson 1987:259-77). Activity in 
related networks is another influential factor identified here, which is consistent with what 
others have found, particularly in relation to environmental issues (Bomberg:167-183). 
The results obtained using the indicators chosen here also lend themselves to further 
discussion relevant to current debates in the literature. For example, within many of the 
behavioural causes explored here it was easy to see elements of rational action and of 
structural influence--a major ongoing area of contention in the policy network debate. In 
some cases these elements were arguably distinct and one was able to say one was more 
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significant than the other. However, in most cases, while they were both visible it was 
almost impossible to separate them or say which came first. On the surface, this might 
suggest that the choice of indicators did not add value to the literature. However, the 
alternative interpretation, which may be equally valid, is that the indicators demonstrate the 
inherent impossibility of resolving some of the debates. The data collected here generally 
point to the impossibility of separating intertwined forces and find that these forees are 
often subject to reinforcing feedback loops. This highlights the difficulty of the task at the 
theoretical level. 
Conclusion 
A review of the existing interest group and policy network literature suggests the 
possibility that more attention may be due to micro-level contributors to interest group 
behaviour. Interest group studies and policy network analysis by and large assume that 
group behaviour and policy networks have an influence on policy outcomes. It is perhaps 
not surprising therefore that the bulk of research in interest group studies has focused on 
group mobilisation and survival, and on group relationships with government. Nor is it 
surprising that much of the discussion has been around questions of whether the 
proliferation of interest groups and the way they deal with government is fair or positive for 
democracy. What is perhaps a little surprising, however, is the lack of focus on what 
actually happens inside interest groups themselves and how this drives group behaviour. 
While there certainly has been a good deal of research on the likely sources of group 
influence on government and the evolution of different types of policy networks, in the 
main relatively little emphasis is given to forees emanating from within groups. Some have 
acknowledged the weakness, and the importance of micro-level analysis (Daughbjerg and 
Marsh, D. 1998:53; Peters 1998:31). Interest group studies often focus on macro-level 
forces or on the relationship between groups and government. In part this approach 
recognises that individuals may be prone to overemphasis of the micro-, and be unwittingly 
influenced by meso- and macro- forces. Policy network analysts too tend to focus on the 
meso-level networks themselves, and on the interaction between participants (including 
groups and government) in shaping policy outcomes. There is relatively little attention paid 
to the internal machinations of the component groups. 
This is not to suggest that the dominant areas of focus are erroneous-they are clearly valid 
and very valuable contributions. There is no question that much of the action and plenty of 
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the answers sought about the influence of groups and networks on policy outcomes lie in 
the areas which have received most attention. Nor does this research seek to suggest that 
micro-level forces are completely ignored by the existing literature--just that they are not a 
central concern. In the search for explanatory power, the macro- and rneso-level debate 
tends to focus on altogether different types of issues. For example there is debate over 
whether different types of government favour different types of interest group/government 
relationships and whether rational action better explains the impact of policy networks than 
network structure. Where there have been attempts to focus on the micro-level, the 
emphasis has been mostly limited to mapping or measuring the density of network 
interaction in the search for explanation of outcomes. 20 Relatively few recognise a greater 
role for qualitative methods including extensive interviewing with network participants 
(Daughbjerg and Marsh, D. 1998:69). 
It is probably fair then to say that macro- and meso-level influences on group behaviour 
and the role of groups in policy networks is fairly well covered in the literature. The 
opportunity taken in this research is to shed somewhat more light on what actually drives 
the decisions made by groups about the policy networks with which they often have to 
choose whether or not to engage. An assumption made here is that internal forces are very 
powerful in determining whether or not groups get involved in policy networks. The issue 
of climate change provides an ideal network in which to test this assumption because it 
covers a long period and a broad range of different interests. Another important assumption 
made here is that the behaviour of groups can not be read as a rational reflection of their so 
called vested interests. The classic economic arguments that behaviour reveals true 
preferences (Samuelson 1947) or that preferences are what they are and the 'task is to trace 
the consequences of any given set of wants' (Friedman 1962) are seen as incomplete. This 
view is reinforced by some of the more prominent rational choice theorists like (Dowding 
1991 :30-47) whose work highlights the difficulty in applying the same assumptions to 
group interest and behaviour as has been commonly applied by economists to the 
preferences and actions of an individual. 
Rather, it is assumed here that a me.ssy mix of forces, micro-, meso-, and macro-, combine 
to distort the rationality of groups. These forces contribute to dynamic group assessments 
about their interest in an issue--something which is impossible to measure effectively 
20 Baumgartner and Leech (1998:14-6) cite such efforts, and flaws in them where attempts have been 
made in the US to attribute causality for policy outcomes in elections and Congressional votes to 
donations by interest groups through political action committees (PACs). For a good background on 
sociometric mapping in policy networks see John and Cole (l 998: 132-46). 
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because of its material and non-material components. The challenge is to examine those 
factors which shape perceptions of group interest and in turn influence group behaviour. 
Key epistemological and ontological assumptions made here (which are explored in the 
next chapter) mean that there is no attempt made to build a scientific model which can 
explain policy outcomes. Rather it is assumed here that the best we can do is to inform our 
understanding of outcomes with reference to the empirical evidence, and in particular the 
competing 'constructions' of active and potential network players as to what they think 
happened and why. Consequently, the focus here is on interpretation, not on measuring or 
mapping activity, in an effort to attribute causality as some others have attempted to do. As 
the next chapter details, the research is implicit and qualitative rather than explicit and 
quantitative. 
As we shall see, the results appear to strongly reinforce the case that micro-level forces are 
perhaps under-appreciated in tenns of interest group behaviour and dedsions on network 
involvement, and that constructivist research has plenty to offer in improving our 
understanding of these forces. It is to be hoped that this is a useful addition to the interest 
group studies and policy network literature. 
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2 
Research strategy, design, methods and presentation 
Introduction 
This chapter describes how and why the research was conducted as it was and seeks to 
explain the structure of the thesis and the reasoning behind it. In order to enable the reader 
to appreciate the work, this section sets out the research objectives, research questions, 
research strategy and design, the method'l used, and finally, the approach taken in 
presenting research findings. 
Without dwelling on matters more appropriate for elaboration in a philosophy thesis, it is 
important to acknowledge that this work is influenced by some important assumptions 
about the nature of reality and knowledge.2 t The result of these assumptions is a 
'constructivist' approach, both to the way this research was conducted, and to how it is 
presented. 22 
In short, the constructivist approach used here assumes that there is no absolute objective 
truth as to why interest groups have behaved as they have in respect of climate change. 
Instead, there is a range of plausible understandings which can be generated to answer that 
question and these understandings can best be accessed by drawing on the meanings and 
interpretations which different people are in a position to provide. Critically, the research 
does not aim to explain policy outcomes (as is the focus of most interest group and policy 
network studies) as much as it seeks to understand behaviour-specifically group decisions 
on engagement in a policy network. 
21 This refers primarily to Epistemology and Ontology. Epistemology is our theory of knowledge-how 
we know the world, and how we view the relationship between the inquirer and the known. Ontology is a 
branch of metaphysics which deals with theories of the nature of reality. The broad array of 
epistemological and ontological assumptions which can be made by researchers inevitably infonn 
methodological decisions about the best ways to gain knowledge about the world. For further 
infonnation, see Denzin and Lincoln (1994:99) and Creswell (1998:74-S). 
22 
'The constructivist paradigm assumes a relativist ontology (there are multiple realities), a subjectivist 
epistemology (knower and subject create understandings), and a naturalistic {in the natural world) set of 
methodological procedures ... Terms such as credibility, transfembility, dependability and confirmability 
replru:e the usual positivist criteria of internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity' (Denzin 
and Lincoln (1994: 13-4). For an excellent explanation of the competing research approaches and their 
<'IJistemological, ontological, and methodological differences, including positivism and constructivism 
see Guba and Lincoln (1994:105-18). 
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The reason for this limited focus is threefold-first a constructivist approach is consistent 
with seeking to understand group behaviour whereas it is inconsistent with explaining 
policy outcomes; second, group behaviour is a major undertaking in itself thus the limited 
focus aids manageability; and finally group decisions on network engagement is in itself an 
interesting, worthwhile, and arguably under-studied aspect in the literature. All this said, 
however, whilst the research does not seek to explain particular policy outcomes or 
measure group influence, the opportunity is taken here to make some limited observations 
about the wider policy network. 
Constructivist assumptions play an important role in framing the research objectives, 
research questions, and research strategy. These, in turn, determine the research and 
analytical methods used, and the way in which the thesis is ultimately presented here. 
The researeh strategy 
Objectives 
As mentioned previously, this research has had two distinct research objectives: improving 
our understanding the behaviour of business interest groups and contributing to a greater 
understanding of the evolving Australian greenhouse policy network. In explaining the 
research strategy choices made here in design and data collection and analysis, it is 
important to keep these objectives in mind. 
The network approach provides a useful vehicle with which to frame group responses and 
recognises that most policy action on issues occurs in these networks. However, whilst 
aceepting the network concept, the research also assumes that group behaviour in a network 
is not driven exclusively from within the network any more than it accepts that motives for 
group behaviour are entirely endogenous. On that basis, the judgment has been made here 
that the research design needs to capture factors which influence group behaviour, whether 
they occur at the group or network level, or wider as part of the broader political context in 
which groups and networks operate. 
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Questions 
With this in mind, a range of questions guides the research which has been undertaken 
here. Some of these questions have been there from the beginning-others have emerged 
from the research. For example: what has been the nature of the response of business 
interest groups in Australia to climate change-in terms of group engagement in the policy 
network?; what have been the most critical factors driving group behaviour in the policy 
network-micro-, meso-, or macro-level factors-and which are most important within 
these categories?; to what extent does perceived group interest shape group behaviour, and 
what shapes perceptions of group interest?; and what does this work tell us about the wider 
greenhouse policy network in Australia-its evolution and likely future direction. 
Strategy 
The research strategy is part descriptive-in seeking to answer 'what' questions it calls for 
a research strategy with inductive elements. It is also part explanatory-in seeking to 
answer 'why' questions it calls for some deductive research strategy. Because the 'why' 
questions are focused on the past as well as the present, and since the emphasis is on 
understanding as opposed to explaining, it could be argued that the research strategy in this 
instance is part abductive or interpretative as well. To the extent that the research strategy 
has some deductive elements, it is relevant to apply theoretical frameworks in order to help 
shape the analysis and generate more powerful answers to the 'why' questions, being 
asked. On the other hand, the abductive nature of the research would suggest that a strict 
application of hypotheses prior to data collection would be over-restrictive and probably 
inappropriate in this instance. Rather, it would be more appropriate to let any theoretical 
framework develop around the data as part of a parallel process. In order to strike a 
workable compromise in this instance, the original approach as described in Chapter 1 has 
been used to ground the work in the mainstream interest group and policy networks 
literature without being so inflexible as to preclude other existing or new interpretative 
ideas being applied. Use of the only loosely descriptive and dynamic policy network 
concept allows for a broad range of interpretations to be tested and allows for change over 
time-a particularly relevant point in the case of climate change, given its relevance over a 
long period. 
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The research design 
It is conceivable that the research questions in this project could have been addressed in a 
wide range of ways. A qualitative research approach seems most appropriate. To this 
researcher it is clearly the most effective way to get answers required to construct a 
meaningful and reliable explanation of interest group responses to climate change. It is 
manifestly impossible to conceive of an effective quantitative approach which would pick 
up the nuances and political sensitivities which this research would inevitably have to take 
into account to assess and explain group responses. A series of case studies with an 
emphasis on interviews with policy elites seemed the most effective direction to answer 
effectively the research questions posed here.23 However, the rationale for these 
assumptions still needs to be explained. 
The research design could have focussed exclusively or primarily on content analysis of 
documentary evidence. Given that the research questions are aimed at what motivates 
group behaviour rather than simply documenting that behaviour, documentary data would 
in all likelihood require access to many confidential internal documents that detail the 
decision-making process and rationale underlying group decisions on greenhouse policy 
matters. Agendas and minutes of private meetings, diary notes, and internal 
communications would have to be accessed and considered in order for documents to 
provide the depth of information required. Because access to such information is likely to 
be denied by most if not all business interest groups, any type of research design based on 
this approach would be impractical and/or inadequate. In addition, it is highly questionable 
whether much of the most important evidence is committed to written documents. In all 
likelihood, much of the important relevant exchanges have been verbal and only survive in 
the memory of the participants. 
In theory, a quantitative researcher with less constructivist assumptions may believe that 
there is a reliable way to measure group interest, and further to reliably disaggregate the 
elements of group response motivation. Assuming that there is one 'right answer,' such a 
researcher could try to isolate key variables in climate change policy development (for 
example, Australian government policy in terms of stated national target for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions over time) and endeavour to establish a correlation between 
changes in this variable and measurable changes in group interest and behaviour (for 
23 For good summaries of the nature of case study research and its advantages, see Creswell (1998:61-4). 
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example, number of press releases on greenhouse policy issued, number of appearances 
before and submissions t-O parliamentary committee inquiries, number of staff dedicated to 
greenhouse policy, media coverage as measured by media monitoring agencies and so 
on).24 
Similarly, one could attempt to explain group behaviour (as opposed to policy outcomes) 
by surveys of group participants in an effort t-0 quantify opinion on the most eonvineing 
reasons for behaviour in relation to greenhouse policy. An econometrician might also seek 
to quantify group interest by aggregating the financial stakes for group members. This 
might generate a model which tries to measure the likely economic impacts on individual 
firms and/or sectors of the economy under different greenhouse policy scenarios. 
In practice, however, while this approach may generate some interesting patterns of 
correlation, and perhaps even allow a percentage figure to be put on the extent to which 
group interest and group activity match, it would be in all likelihood be misleading. It 
would not capture non-financial interests, and it would probably not properly capture 
fluctuations in group interest. The reality is that group responses are the result of actions by 
tens or hundreds of people-each with different and evolving levels of awareness, skill and 
influence--whose actions are shaped over time by hundreds or thousands of short-, 
medium-, and long-term factors, many of which are not related to the so called vested 
interest of the group, no matter how one seeks to measure it. While similar challenges exist 
in relation to gauging consumer and voter sentiment, researchers in those fields have the 
advantage of 'the proof of the pudding being in the eating' in that they are ultimately able 
to measure market results and election outcomes. As has been widely acknowledged, group 
studies are at a significant disadvantage to these other fields because of the difficulties in 
measuring influence (Jordan and Halpin 2002:13-4; Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 13-4). 
For example, we might have a situation in which Australia experienced an outbreak of mad 
cow disease at the same time as the government announced a commitment to stabilise 
greenhouse emissions within five years. A survey of NFF and Cattlemen's Union media 
statements during that month is likely to find misleading results. What it might well 
interpret as a low level of interest and activity on greenhouse would in fact be the direct 
24 There are plenty of examples of researchers attempting to make such links ·~ for example in the US 
seeking to link political donations by groups with specific policy outcomes or election results 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Jordan and Halpin 2002). 
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result of an emerging very high priority issue which has temporarily at least overshadowed 
the groups' interest in greenhouse issues. 
Similarly, it is easily conceivable that a general survey of all interest group members about 
reasons for group response to climate change could generate findings that are completely 
different from the response of a small number of players in the interest group who know 
what really happened and why. The reality is that, while most rank and file members will 
have some impressions and possibly even opinions on climate change, the decisions on 
group policy and action rest in relatively few hands--mainly group board members, large 
and/or influential members, and a small munber of senior and/or specialist group staff. 
Another research reality is that most of the main players in business interest group decision 
making processes simply would not respond to survey questionnaires sent out as part of 
PhD research. Surveys would probably be completed by junior officials with little 
understanding of the history of group responses to climate change or of the formal and 
informal decision making processes. Either that, or they would be filled with generalities 
that would be of little value to the researcher. 
Taking these practicalities into account, decisions were made early this research on the 
most effective way to access especially useful accounts of what happened and why in 
respect of group responses to climate change. The most important decision made was to 
inform publicly available documentary records by interviewing a broad range of policy 
elites who would be in a good position to know what happened and why. Wbile this 
generated very different accounts, as was anticipated, it enabled the research to generate the 
type of 'thick description' needed to answer the research questions in a way which 
enhances the reader's understanding (Denzin and Lincoln 1994:361-75; Clandinin and 
Connelly 1994:421). 
Given the wide range of business groups whose responses to climate change are pertinent 
to the research questions, manageability is also an important issue, as it is simply 
impossible to provide the type of 'thick description' required in respect of all groups. Given 
the acknowledgement that individual group reactions are just that-individual rather than 
automatically generalisable-then the idea of seeking answers right across the spectrum 
also becomes less relevant. It is impractical to seek answers to the questions right across the 
spectrum. However, in respect of individual groups it is realistic. The question then 
becomes how to study the groups and which to study. 
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The case study approach and issues addressed in choosing the cases 
Before discussing the directions taken in designing the case study approach used in this 
work, it is useful to examine this approach and why it is seen as the best fit for this type of 
project. The use of case studies in public policy, as with other social sciences, has a Jong 
and controversial history. From the 1930s when the case study approach was first seriously 
challenged by those emphasising the use of quantitative analysis, there has been an ongoing 
debate about the validity of case studies (Blaikie 2003 :214). As increasing numbers of 
social scientists came to treat their discipline as a science, there was increasing pressure to 
conduct research as if it were a science. That is, research should begin with a theory, and 
using quantifiable measurement which can be replicated that theory should be tested by 
experiments. Qualitative research, and most particularly case study research was seen as 
dubious, because it sought to create meaning based to a large extent on interpretations and 
recollections constructed by the very 'social actors' being studied. For the proponents of 
quantitative research, this translation of 'common sense' as recalled by research subjects 
into academic explanation was an invalid and unscientific fonn of analysis. 
However, the very biases and validity concerns associated ;vith case study qualitative 
research could also be leveled at the quantitative techniques which were promoted in its 
place. Questionnaires, and assumptions inherent in quantitative research models, 
necessarily involved subjective decisions by the researcher, and could not incorporate every 
possible explanation. Because they could not cover every possible explanation or fuctor 
contributing to a phenomenon, quantitative survey methods, as with econometric models, 
often suffered from left-out variable bias, just as qualitative interviewees can suffer from 
selective memory. It is now \videly accepted that criticisms of the qualitative case study 
concerning its presumed lack of representativeness and methodological rigour were poorly 
founded. 'The case study is not without its drawbacks ... [However] the inherent problems 
and confines of quantitative methods have propagated a renewed interest in the case study, 
and more generally in qualitative methods (Hamel 1993 :27). 
It has come to be accepted that neither approach is any better than the other and the least 
worst choices depend on the circumstances of the research. Ultintately, quantitative and 
qualitative approaches have come to coexist. Case studies have also survived, often 
enhanced by the application of quantitative approaches. But most important, the closer 
scrutiny brought to bear on case study methodology as a result of the quantitative versus 
qualitative dichotomy has led case study researchers to be far more careful in research 
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design to ensure that their choices for case study are more representative where 
generalisations are intended based on the results. It has also led case study researchers to be 
more cautious in what they claim about the explanatory power of their research. In 
particular, they now emphasise the relevance of uniqueness and particularity of the case 
itself in enhancing our understanding of an event or phenomenon of interest. In contrast to 
the quantitative assumption that all research should be aimed at providing an explanation, 
at generalising to a wider population, and ultimately building the-0ry, qualitative case 
studies are directed at building a better 'understanding' of the case itself (Stake 1994: 236-
238). 
As Stake (1995:236-7) points out, 'Case studies are not a methodological choice. We 
choose to study the case. We could study it in many ways.' In some cases, recording what 
we find in cases is suited to quantitative methods, in others qualitative. 'We may 
simultaneously carry on more than one case study, but each case study is a concentrated 
inquiry into a single case.' Generalisation should not be an objective, let alone assumed. As 
Blaikie (2000: lO) emphasises, 'Case studies are neither research designs nor methods of 
data collection. They constitute a method of data selection and, as such, require particular 
procedures for generalising from the results produced.' 
Case studies range from i) single case studies where one is intereste-0 particularly in the 
single case or where the case can provide insight to an issue or refine a theory to ii) 
collective case studies where one studies numerous cases jointly 'in order to inquire into a 
phenomenon, population or general condition.' With a collective case study, the single case 
is less important-individual cases chosen 'because it is believed that understanding them 
will lead to better understanding, perhaps better theorizing, about a still larger collection of 
cases' (Stake 1995:237). There is often overlap between these types of cases, as there is in 
this research where the case choices have intrinsic, instrumental and collective elements. 
Selection of the cases is critical--representativeness is important with reference to the 
phenomenon the researcher is seeking to study, particularly where generalisation is a 
research objective. However, in choosing cases, typicality and representativeness needs to 
be balanced against the potential to offer an opportunity to learn in choosing cases. As 
Stake suggests, an important guiding principle is to take the cases from which we feel we 
can learn the most. This is even more important than balance and variety. The latter are 
desirable, along with typicality and access, but opportunity to learn is the primary criterion 
(Stake 1995:243). 
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Why a collective case study was appropriate? 
An important question for this researcher, irrespective of which approach was chosen has 
been the breadth of the analysis. It is difficult to see how the entire range of business 
interest groups could be adequately covered by this project, let alone the whole greenhouse 
policy network. Hence, it has been necessary to refine the coverage of the research in a way 
which ultimately still makes a solid contribution to knowledge. The most effective means 
of doing this is by v.'lly of a collective case study-using a small selection of interest groups 
for careful study and comparison with intensive interviewing with policy elites providing 
the main source of data, bolstered by analysis of documents readily available. The number 
of groups chosen for study is an important issue along with the question of which groups to 
study. 
Why seven case studies? 
The decision to use seven case studies is a compromise between coverage and depth. It is 
also a compromise between the two research objectives described at the outset. On one 
hand, in that using more rather than fewer case studies helps to maximise the contribution 
of this work to our understanding of the greenhouse policy network. On the other hand, the 
decision to use case study groups rather than to have the policy network itself as the main 
unit of analysis is an acknowledgement of the need for a certain amount of depth in the 
examination of interest group behaviour. To focus on the entire network was deemed likely 
to generate results that would be too shallow, while to focus on too few case study groups 
was deemed unlikely to shed much light on the greenhouse policy network. Seven case 
groups has been an ambitious task, but i:t strikes a balance between the imperatives of 
coverage and depth. 
Why only business interest groups? 
The decision to focus on business interest groups is an important one. It automatically 
restricts the degree to which the analysis incorporates the activity of other key actors in the 
greenhouse policy network, of which there are many: politicians, government departments, 
green interest groups, quasi-government organisations, academic and research institutions, 
the media, international institutions, and influential individuals. Again, the decision is a 
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deliberate compromise between the dual objectives of the research--understanding interest 
group behaviour and understanding the greenhouse policy network. 
In part the decision to concentrate only on business interest groups stems from the very 
diverse range of sectors in the economy affected by climate change. That is, because the 
issue affects so many sectors of Australian business, more business interest groups must be 
covered by way of case study to examine the network surrounding the issue in a 
sufficiently broad way. Given that the primary objective of this work is to understand 
interest group behaviour, the spotlight is deliberately not on government, political, media, 
or institutional players in the network. Nonetheless, it is impossible to research business 
interest group responses without also dealing thoroughly with non-business interest groups. 
Also, initial work determined that the business interest groups were more likely to provide 
the most useful material in relation to both research objectives. Firstly, the response of 
business groups to greenhouse is rich in variation, whereas t11e reaction of green non-
govemment organisations has arguably been less heterogeneous in terms of the policy 
responses they have advanced. The relative lack of priority given to greenhouse by the 
Australian green movement appears to be an issue worthy of further research, but is 
somewhat tangential to the main issues sought for analysis here. 
Finally, there is strong consensus among theorists involved in interest group studies and 
policy network analysts that business interest groups have the cards stacked in their favour. 
As is discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, the business group advantage is almost 
undisputed. In the case of greenhouse policy, there is little doubt that the position of 
business has been critical of the responses of governments in Australia and elsewhere to the 
issue of climate change, Taking all of these factors into account, the response of a diverse 
group of business interest groups is deemed more relevant for exclusive study here and a 
useful and sufficient focus. 
Why generalisation is of limited importance here 
While this research does seek to inform our understanding of the greenhouse policy 
network in Australia, its ambition for generalisation is deliberately limited. As has been 
discussed by numerous qualitative researchers, case studies are first and foremost aimed at 
informing the reader about the individual case under study. Where multiple cases are 
studied, it is argued, these effectively constitute separate samples which may enhance the 
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findings of the original case. In combination, a selection of cases studied intensively can 
make a solid contribution to our understanding of the Australian greenhouse policy network 
without claiming to generalise the findings to the behaviour of all interest groups. 
Whether case representativeness matters much here 
The question of which groups to study is not necessarily answered by whether a group is 
representative of most others which might be used as case studies. In theory, 
representativeness might be an important motivating factor in choosing not only case study 
groups, but who to interview in relation to them. Representativeness is important if 
maximum generalisation is sought (Kidder and Judd 1986:34-5). However, in many 
instances, qualitative researchers can learn more from the atypical case study than the 
typical case study-particularly where generalisation is not an important research aim. It is 
often the counterintuitive results from the atypical organisation which tell us more. 
Mitchell, for example, suggests that 'extreme, deviant or least likely cases' can provide 
stronger corroboration of theoretical frameworks being tested (Blaikie 2000:222). The 
choice to focus on business interest groups alone rather than the entire spectrum of actors in 
the greenhouse policy network reflects an appreciation of this. Further, this research began 
with a wariness of choosing to study only those most dominant and visible players in the 
greenhouse policy network. The assumption has been that groups that might have been 
more involved in the network (but have chosen not to be) are at least as interesting a part of 
the story as those who have been most active. To focus only on those who have dominated 
risks missing half the story. Consequently the limited ambition of representativeness 
incorporates those heavily engaged in the policy network along with those that have 
arguably 'missing in action.' 
Whether cases have current and continuing relevance 
Another primary consideration in choosing the best selection of interest groups for case 
study in this research has been the desire to incorporate groups seeking to represent sectors 
which are likely to become significant players in the Australian greenhouse policy network 
in future, even if they are not at present. For example, while tourism, insurance, forestry 
and agriculture as sectors have been intermittent and/or peripheral players, as we shall see, 
their importance in the greenhouse policy direction has long been recognised by the federal 
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GQvemment. 25 As a consequence, including the interest groups representing these sectors 
helps us to understand their late attention to greenhouse issues relative to the 'usual 
suspect' groups. As well, including them assists in making the results of the research more 
relevant to the future development of greenhouse policy in Australia. 
The importance of capturing variability in group position 
A final consideration in choosing the case study groups ha.~ been the extent to which the 
greenhouse policy positions of groups themselves are likely to vary, given the alternatives 
on offer in domestic and international greenhouse policy fora. The assumption here is that 
where there is more potential for variation between approaches to climate change, the 
research is likely to be more relevant and fruitful. For example, it might be reasonably 
assumed that the interest of the Australian Coal Association and their position on what 
greenhouse policy direction should be is unlikely to waver a great deal irrespective of the 
policy direction of government. On the other hand, for the National Association of Forest 
Industries (NAFI) or the National Farmers' Federation (NFF) there is a potentially very 
significant difference in their interests and probable policy position depending on whether 
and how fast farmers and foresters are likely to be rewarded for investing in 'greenhouse 
forests' as part of an emissions trading regime. In essence, these groups are more critical to 
the future of greenhouse policy, as they constitute the 'swinging voters' of the policy 
network. To learn the most, therefore, there has been a deliberate emphasis in this research 
on choosing this type of interest group. 
The final sample chosen for case studies 
Consequently, the seven groups chosen as case studies in this research arguably include 
only 2 of the most regular players in the greenhouse debate--the Australian Aluminium 
Council (AAC) and the Australian f'rtts Association (AGA)--and only one whose position 
is unlikely to vary a great deal (the AAC). The remaining five groups chosen are 'less 
likely suspects' and/or 'part-timers;' either liable to become major players in the 
greenhouse policy network, or groups with an interest and policy position that is highly 
variable depending on government policy direction. These groups are the NFF, the NAFI, 
the Tourism Council of Australia {TCA), the Insurance Council of Australia (ICA) and the 
Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE}. Both the TCA (defunct) and the AGA (now restructured 
25 For example, see sections on Tourism and Agriculture (Australian and New Zealand Environment 
Council 1990} 
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with the lobbying functions moved to the Energy Networks Association) no longer exist as 
they did when this research was conducted. However, their respective sectors remain as 
relevant today, if not more so, along with the case studies included here. 
Research methods 
Having chosen several case studies to compare and contrast in the context of their level of 
engagement in a policy network framework, the next important set of choices relates to 
research methods. By its very nature, as has already been discussed the research does not 
lend itself to quantitative analysis or statistical inference - in part because of its 
constructivist assumptions which have been discussed above. It is very difficult to conceive 
of a quantitative approach which could more effectively uncover and explain the evolution 
of interest group activity on climate change. As mentioned previously, most of the most 
valuable relevant information depends on accessing the recollections and opinions of policy 
elites both within and outside of the case study organisations. Most written questionnaires 
submitted to these research subjects would not be completed at all, or they would be 
completed by subordinates. Questionnaires conducted by interview seeking to codify 
characteristics of interest group responses are likely to be both poorly received and largely 
ineffective, owing to the uniqueness of each group's situation and its leadership. Hence the 
choice of one-on-one focused interviews with policy elites. 
One-on-one focused interviewing of policy elites 
Interviewing, applied in a flexible way in one-on-one situations, is judged the most likely 
source of significant and reliable data collection in this instance-particularly if publicly-
available documents are used as 'anchor points,' which can complement and inform 
interview questioning. Having chosen interviews, a wide range of issues had to be 
addressed.26 Given the sensitivity of much of the material sought, in-depth, one-on-one 
interviews are also seen as the most prudent and effective form of data collection. Hence, 
the bulk of the data collected in this research, and by far the most useful, have come from 
non-standardised, focused interviews, primarily but not exclusively with current or former 
policy elites from government departments, political offices, or the various case groups. 
The study involved 56 interviews with persons involved either in the case groups, or in an 
26 For exploration on strategies to address interviewing concerns see Rubin and Rubin (1995). 
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external position from which they can competently comment on the cases or on the broader 
policy network. 
So why are these methods assumed to lead to more effeetive data collection, greater 
research validity and more reliable explanations than alternative approaches and what are 
the limits of this choice in method? As has been mentioned above, this research is grounded 
in some important constructivist assumptions about the nature of meaning, knowledge and 
human sciences in general. Perhaps the most pertinent assumption with respect to the 
choice of interviewing as the primary source of data collection is that there is no absolute 
true version of facts which establish either the nature of interest group responses to climate 
change, or the reasons behind them. Instead, there is a series of different versions of events 
and why they occurred. This is best accessed from the key players involved, rather than 
from documents or by attempting to measure the activities of groups. 
Interviews present a wide range of advantages that are directly relevant in this instance to 
effectively answering the research questions. For example, less structured interviews allow 
researchers to 'obtain a more intensive study of perceptions, attitudes, and motivations than 
a standardized questionnaire pennits.' (Kidder and Judd 1986: 273) Because these 
interviews are flexible, they help to bring out the values and biases of the subject in order to 
determine their significance---eliciting the personal and social context of beliefu and 
feelings. Interviewing is the most effective means of gaining clear, candid and in-depth 
responses. Climate change is a complex issue and the factors behind group responses to it 
are also likely to be complex and requiring elaboration, and also heavy with nuances, 
instinct, ideology and emotion. 
Interviews generate a greater rapport with the research subjects and in doing so they are 
best suited to accessing the reasoning behind interest group behaviour, decisions and 
opinions. It is the most appropriate technique for use with a small number of policy elites 
as was planned in this research. It is better than alternatives to allow assessment of bias and 
motivation, clarification of sensitivities and complexities. It allows for an iterative process 
of simultaneous questioning and analysis-and assimilation within and between interviews. 
The interview environment maximises the scope for spontaneity on the part of both the 
researcher and the subject providing the best possible situation to elicit information that the 
subject, would be unlikely to offer up using other data collection techniques. The interview 
approach also allows for much greater specificity. Unlike a survey where questions are 
standardised and set, the interview enables the researcher to pose follow-up questions 
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where it is felt that the initial answer does not provide sufficient detail or depth. In short, 
the non-standard focused interview approach to data collection in this case is much more 
likely to access the real story behind the public story about what happened and why. 
This is not to say that the choice of interviewing as the primary source of data collection is 
not without disadvantages. In terms of time, cost, and access, the interview process is more 
cumbersome and difficult compared with the use of surveys or exclusive reliance on public 
and/or private documentary evidence. Because the interviews are non-standardised, the 
number and nature of the questions, the time allotted for the interview, the circumstances of 
the interview, and other variables, reduce the validity of making direct comparisons 
between the answers provided in any quantitatively meaningful way. This means that 
analysis of the data is much more complicated and difficult than would be the case where 
survey data are simply run through a quantitative model. However, given the constructivist 
assumptions about the nature of the answers to the research questions here--that is, the 
inherent unsuitability of quantitative alternative approaches in this instance--the interview 
approach is seen as the best alternative despite its limitations and the extra work it entails. 
Choosing the interviewees 
Given the number of case groups studied here, there is a limited number of people who 
could reasonably be interviewed in appropriate depth within the constraints of a PhD 
timetable. This has made the choice of interview subjects all tbe more impo1tant. There is a 
relatively small number of people who, it can be reasonably expected, are in a very good 
position to provide the kind of 'thick description' required in relation to the case groups. 
They are mostly current and former CEOs of case study interest groups, current and former 
board members, and some key senior staff past and present. These people were targeted in 
assembling the list of interviewees for this research. 
In addition, there are other very obvious interview targets outside the case groups-people 
who are in a very good position through their current or past professional capacity to 
enhance our understanding of interest group responses to climate change. These people 
range from state and federal bureaucrats, politicians and their staff, academics, journalists 
as well as members of other interest groups. These interview subjects are in many cases just 
as important as the internal group subjects, as they are often in a good position to comment 
on more than one group, they can have less motivation to 'spin' their recollections of 
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events involving groups, and they provide very useful evidence with which to verify 
infonnation provided by case study group interviewees. 
However, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to choosing the right interview subjects for 
each of the case study organisations chosen here. The best choice depended upon a range of 
factors in each case. In some cases, groups have had a large number of leaders since 
climate change emerged as an important issue and it was simply impractical to interview 
everyone. In other instances, the organisation's leadership have refused to grant interviews. 
Interview conduct and content 
The interviews needed to serve a dual purpose. Given that the research questions sought 
many descriptive answers regarding the evolution of group responses to greeohouse ('what 
happened' questions) as well as explanations ('why it happeoed' questions) it was 
important to structure the interviews in such a way that they allowed subjects the flexibility 
needed to cover as much of the relevant ground as possible. At the same time, the 
interviews also needed to be structured in a way which ensured that group data were 
relevant and workable to the policy network framework being used. Hence, while the 
interviews did not unduly constrain interviewees from offering explanations in terms 
outside of the policy network framework, they did ensure that the network notion was 
understood and that there was every opportunity to frame responses in that context. 
Interviewees were asked fairly loosely structured questions primarily aimed at getting them 
talking about their impressions concerning interest group responses to climate change-
their level of engagement in the network and the main reasons for this behaviour. In the 
case of subjects linked exclusively to a particular interest group, a list of more specific 
questions was then used to explore some of the milestone events in the evolution of group 
responses. These milestone events were established to the extent possible prior to 
interviews, when a careful review of the documentary record of case group activity was 
conducted. 
Order of interviews 
The order in which to conduct interviews was a difficult issue. Given the type of policy 
elites involved in this project follow up interviews were impractical. As a consequence, the 
order in which people were interviewed was especially important. Some informal 
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introductory discussions were first held with case group identities to obtain background 
information and documents which would help frame questions for follow-up in a formal 
interview. This background information was then used to develop a greenhouse policy 
response chronology for each of the case study groups in which key interest group 
decisions and actions were highlighted. This was then overlaid on a similar type of 
chronology covering the greenhouse policy network more broadly. Choice of interviewees, 
content analysis of the chronologies and background material helped to shape the questions 
to be asked in the interviews, and the order in which people were interviewed. 
It was assumed that conducting interviews with the 'peripheral' individuals before the 
interest group elites would allow for further enhancement of both the chronologies of 
greenhouse milestones and, in parallel, the data collection process. This approach helped to 
ensure that when the final interviews with group elites were conducted, they were as well 
focused as possible, taking into account the impressions and opinions of others external to 
the group. Without this iterative process, there was a strong chance that the interviews 
would have been poorly focused and less able to contribute to a better understanding. 
Why such heavy reliance on interviews? 
Just as seven case study groups is a relatively large number in the context of PhD research, 
56 face-to-face interviews of over an hour each on average is a relatively high level of data 
collection in a work of this kind. Again, this is the consequence of trading off the need for 
sufficient depth in analysis (for which it was deemed more thorough interviews would be 
required) and the need for sufficient breadth in interviewees. This is necessary to ensure 
that the data collected were not biased to such a degree that the case analysis was being 
distorted because of a narrow choice of sources. Also significant in this choice is an 
assumption that the central focus of the cases-what happened and why-is best 
understood by discussion with participants as well as relying on the public record (press 
statements, speeches, submissions to parliamentary inquiries and so on). Due to its 
sensitivity, it is assumed here that the most effective way to reveal the story behind the 
publicly available story is to discuss the case studies at length with network participants 
and observers in a manner which protects their identity. Hence, the choice here has been to 
focus heavily on interview data--though not exclusively-and to ensure that those 
interview data are sufficiently sweeping in coverage and depth to support the level of 
analysis required. 
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Data storage, reduction and analysis 
There is a wide range of ways in which qualitative data can be reduced and analysed in 
case study research. According to Stake (1995:71-91) there are at least four ways that are 
most appropriate: categorical aggregation, direct interpretation, patterns and naturalistic 
generalisations. However, before one moves down these trails, decisions have to be made 
in relation to how data are to be recorded and stored in order to facilitate reduction and 
make analysis possible. In this collective case study, there are two main types of data-
documents and interviews. The documentary evidence is important in its own right both for 
its contribution to building a greenhouse response chronology and informing the 
interviews, and for the fact that it enables the checking of interview data later on. The 
documentary evidence has been stored here in two main ways: first, an extensive record of 
the evolution of the Australian greenhouse policy network has been assembled; and second, 
separate extensive files covering the response of each case study group have been built up. 
The interview data are stored in two ways. Wherever possible, interviews have been 
recorded on audio tape and transcribed for later analysis. In only a very few interviews has 
recording permission not been granted, Where taping has not been possible and there is no 
transcript, detailed notes have been taken instead. The transcripts and interview notes 
provide the basis for interview summaries, which have been prepared as soon as possible 
after the interview in order to maximise the value and accuracy of recollections from the 
meetings. Where interviews have been recorded, notes have also been taken during the 
interview to supplement analysis of the transcript. These interview records--transcripts, 
notes and interview summaries-~highlight the main points of the interview, identify key 
themes and patterns in the interview, and enable the researcher to compare and contrast the 
views on group decisions on network engagement in order to enable a narrative about what 
happened and why to be written more easily and reliably. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, particular emphasis has been given to interpreting business 
interest group behaviour data against the backdrop of interest group theory in general and 
in the context of a policy network in particular. While the analysis has not been be so 
inflexible as to mask other alternative explanations, it has been an ideal opportunity to test 
the relative importance of factors which have been previously emphasised by interest group 
and policy network theorists--,such as the relative importance of micro-, meso- and macro-
level influences on interest group behaviour in a policy network. 
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In order to enable the data to be properly analysed against this theoretical backdrop, and to 
meaningfully explore the issues alluded to above, the data have been reduced via a 
codification process. Transcripts and or interview summaries from all 55 interviews 
conducted here have been entered electronically into a qualitative analytical program called 
NVivo, the advantages of which are well documented for such large data sets (Creswell 
1998:155-61; Huberman and Miles 1994:434). Each transcript and summary has then been 
coded at various levels. Interviewees have been coded, for example, by speaker, by group 
source, by their professional background, political outlook, location, gender and various 
other attributes. The interviews and summaries have been coded according to a wide range 
of themes, concepts and perhaps most importantly different factors contributing to group 
decisions about network engagement. 
The factors driving group engagement are broken dow11 into about 40 different types, 
which are then broadly grouped into three categories, micro-level (meaning internal interest 
group forces), meso-level (meaning forces beyond individual groups to do with the policy 
network) and macro-level (meaning forces which are external to both the group and policy 
network). These influences are then qualitatively coded where they emerge in the 
transcripts and summaries according to whetl1er they are said to have a positive, negative or 
negligible impact. Quotes in the transcripts are also marked where they are deemed to be 
particularly telling or representative of the patterns emerging in the data. Other issues are 
also coded in the documents according to their relevance to debates in the interest group 
and policy network literature. 
By coding some 750,000 words of data in this way, the material is readily reduced in a 
meaningful way through a series of computer analyses testing for patterns across all of the 
above-mentioned concepts and more. By using the NVivo system, a convincing array of 
relevant and telling quotes in support of definite patterns 'jumps right out of the data.' Once 
the data are coded, the search engines in NVivo also enable better cross-checking to ensure 
that counter-intuitive instances are not overlooked, thereby minimising errors. Without 
question, this has enabled far better reduction, analysis and interpretation than could ever 
be possible by conducting the work manually. 
This codification process, it should be understood, was not predetermined. As described in 
Chapter l, indicators emerged largely from the data collection process itself. Some of the 
important patterns emerging in the research, and some of the causes for group behaviour 
identified, were roughly anticipated prior to data collection, and during the early stages of 
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content analysis of background documentary data. However, many of the behavioural 
causes that were eventually coded into the NVivo record of the interview data were not 
anticipated. Hence it was important to use a codification method which allowed for 
iterative formulation. Even though specified micro-level causes of behaviour were 
embedded in the questioning, flexibility was allowed to ensure that interviewees could 
suggest alternatives. All of the mesa- and macro-level influences emerged out of the 
interview data without prompting. 
This flexible approach took into account that the research aimed at generating patterns, 
consensus, 'thick description' and understanding, rather than scientific explanation and 
correlations between dependent and independent variables. The NVivo analysis did allow 
for some quantitative checking of the patterns emerging in the data, however this has not 
been reported here because of its inherent limitations. For example, the program did map 
and count recurring themes and enable these to be tallied across interviews, providing 
interesting patterns which reinforced the impressions gained. However, these data are 
problematic because they double count repeated mention of themes and do not distinguish 
between the relative emphasis placed on the point by the interviewee. Hence, though it has 
been a useful tool for cross checking results, the quantitative element of NVivo has not 
been reported or highlighted in this research. Partly, this has been to avoid over-assertion 
and provide the most relevant information required in the knowledge that readers will make 
their own generalisations. 
Triangulation of data sources 
Triangulation is a term used by researchers to describe a range of procedures that aim to 
reduce misinterpretation in case study projects (Stake 1995:107-21). By triangulating, or 
cross-checking, one piece of data with others, the researcher is better able to determine the 
strength of the original data, and better able to draw conclusions. In respect of the research 
conducted here on interest group responses to climate change, triangulation is important, 
because there are many sensitivities and personal interests associated with most of the 
sources from which data have been drawn. Confidential interest group documents relating 
to climate change responses have not been made available to the researcher in the main and 
public documents such as press releases and opinion editorials are likely to have been 
'spun' according to the interest group 'line.' Interviews per se have been used here as a 
way to triangulate data obtained from public documentary records. Comments made by 
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groups in public statements, for example, have been checked against the interview 
comments, and explored further. 
However, interview subjects have also- in some cases had a very strong interest in spinning 
or even misrepresenting events and group decisions in order to portray themselves and their 
organisations in the best possible light. This applies to interviewees both currently and 
previously employed by case study groups, but also to a degree to external interviewees in 
the bureaucracy, politics, academia and the media. Each have reasons to temper or spin 
their version. Consequently, a major challenge in this research has been to reconcile two 
types of inherently 'spun' data (documents and interviews) on both the 'what happened' 
and 'why it happened' research questions. Triangulation of the data helps one to judge the 
relative strengths of different accounts. 
This is achieved in two main ways. First, by cross-checking between interviews-that is, 
the testimonies of interviewees are compared with each other. In some instances, a number 
of interviewees have verified a single account, while in others the accounts of major 
players involved within the interest group have been starkly different from that offered by 
external commentators. The second main triangulation technique used here has been via 
cross-checking with document analysis-that is, to compare the comments made in 
interviews with the content of publicly-available documents and vice versa. This cross-
checking includes, among other things, evidence provided by interest groups to 
parliamentary inquiries into climate change, material provided to other relevant 
government processes, speech transcripts, media releases, news coverage, other public 
statements made by interest groups. It also includes a range of documents made available to 
the researcher from the case groups. Comparing the testimonies of interview subjects with 
the evidence publicly available enables some identification of key areas of convergence and 
departure in respect of the versions of events and the reasons offered for them. 
At the end of this process, the data cover a wide spectrum, with recollections and 
arguments upon which there is general consensus at one extreme, and recollections and 
arguments upon which there is great debate and disagreement at the other. An assumption 
made here is that recollections and arguments at either end of the spectrum are valuable in 
aiding our understanding of the Australian greenhouse policy network. However, the extent 
to which triangulation has discovered consensus does add weight and ought to be 
considered in arriving at conclusions. 
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Other key choices and trade-offs in framing the research 
Why climate change? 
Climate change is chosen here in part because it is a good issue for the purposes of the 
primary objective of improving our understanding of interest group behaviour. Climate 
change is an issue which already has a long history. There is a rich record of documentary 
and other evidence of the response of interest groups over time-something that enables 
greater understanding by overcoming short-term aberrations in group behaviour. It is also 
an issue which is relevant to all sections of the economy, and to society at large. This 
means that it avoids the possibility that group responses might be specific to a particular 
sector of the economy. That is, greenhouse is an issue that readily allows for analysis of 
interest group behaviour society-wide. Finally, it is a public policy challenge that will 
remain important for a long time, and is therefore deemed to be an area of study where a 
contribution via a PhD can be made that will be of lasting relevance to practitioners and 
observers in the field alike. 
How the ethical considerations were handled 
Before this research commenced, significant ethical concerns were anticipated, given the 
nature of the topic and the interviews planned. Much of the information sought during 
interviews would be of a highly sensitive nature--involving subjective, contentious and 
negative reflection upon the behaviour and motives of persons and/or organisations 
including the case studies used here, the bureaucracy, political leadership, and others in the 
policy network. Direct attribution of quotes containing such information has the potential to 
cause a wide range of problems for the subject (embarrassment, compromising of career 
prospects and so on) if not handled sensitively. Under the circumstances, it would be 
unethical to include such quotes in the thesis identifying the subject without their consent. 
At the same time, interviewees could reasonably be expected to be less candid and 
forthcoming with useful information without a degree of anonymity in their commenis at 
interview. 
The challenge was how to get the most useful information for the research without 
transgressing the reasonable ethical expectations of academic research.27 A mechanism had 
27 For the types of issues confronted and techniques which researchers use to deal with them, see Lee 
(1993) and Kimmel (1988). 
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to be found so that quotes could be used extensively without an unmanageable amount of 
correspondence between researcher and interviewee. A consent fonn28 was seen as the most 
effective solution. 
The consent fonn was signed by all interviewees, and prevents attributed quotes without 
the pennission of subjects. However, it makes clear that interviews are to be recorded 
where it is agreed, that all interviews (including where interviews are not recorded on 
audiotape) are 'on the record,• and that all quotes may be used at the discretion of the 
researcher in a manner which is not attributed and which does not readily make 
identification of the subject possible. This effectively eliminates the possibility of any harm 
and discomfort for all subjects to be interviewed 
With respect to documents, the consent form makes clear that any documents made 
available to the researeher may be used in the final PhD thesis. Knowing this up front 
helped to prevent confusion and prevent documents being made available which the subject 
would not like to see published. The same guidelines applied to the thesis v.ill also apply to 
any subsequent work published by the researcher. Beyond these conditions, the researeh 
has sought to adhere to other relevant codes of ethical research including those of the 
NHMRC's National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research involving Humans and the 
Australian Journalists' Association Code of Ethics. 
These arrangements overcame the most significant ethical concern identified in advance of 
the research. Supplementary issues did arise during the write-up phase of this research on 
the question of how to handle quotes by interviewees where, for example, they may have 
used words about themselves or others in a way which makes them identifiable. In 
conjunction with the ANU Ethics Committee, agreement was given to alter words (such as 
'I' and 'we') to minimise this risk.29 As an additional precautionary measure, the list of 
interview subjects and references used here has been designed in such a way as to make it 
very difficult for others (including supervisors and examiners) to ascertain with any degree 
of certainty the identity of subjects responsible for quotes. 
While the protocol overcomes most ethical sensitivities, some data simply cannot be used 
because of an unreasonably high probability that peers could readily identify the source. 
"The Ethics Protocol and Consent Fonn used for the research was cleared by the ANU Human Research 
Ethics Committee in June 200 l. 
29 This approval was given in September 2004 
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Other comments have been excluded because, while one statement in isolation may readily 
protect identity, multiple quotes make identity protection progressively more difficult. 
These realities have meant that in some cases valuable and relevant comments have been 
excluded altogether. 
While protection of the identities of interviewees is all-important, it is in tension Vlith the 
need of the reader to appreciate the authority with which the interviewee makes the 
comments. That is, without some idea of what type of person is making the comments at 
interview, it is entirely reasonable for the reader to be unconvinced that the comments carry 
much weight. In order to deal with this problem in an ethically appropriate and practical 
way, the 56 interviewees have each been allocated a code number from 1 to 57 .30 This 
number is allocated in random order. In the thesis proper, where quotes are taken from 
interview transcripts, this code is used in the reference rather than the interviewee's name. 
As a result, alphabetical order in which the interviewees might ordinarily be sorted bears no 
relationship to the code used for citation. A table is then presented by way of an appendix 
which lists some attributes of the interviewees along with their code rather than their name. 
In this way, the table provides the reader with a means of appreciating the position of 
authority from which the interviewee's comments are made without revealing his or her 
identity. 
Research limitations 
Many of the limitations associated with this thesis research are common to most PhDs. 
Time has been limited, resources have been limited. Other limitations are associated Vlith 
the research strategy and design. There are important constraints on what a researcher can 
realistically achieve by using a case study approach, and by relying heavily on semi-
structured non-standardised interviews as a major souree of data. Most of these perceived 
limitations have to do Vlith the positi\~st notion that the research ought to be subjected to 
the same notions of verification and statistical rigour which would be applied to 
quantitative research. 
"' There are 57 codes for 56 interviews because in one instance, an interviewee has been allocated dual 
codes to further protect their identity. The interviewee in question provided crucial material in relation to 
both a case study and to broader government greenhouse policy development over many years. The use 
of a single code for both types of data would have made the identity of the person impossible to protect. 
The split code solution allows the inclusion of both types of material. 
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The first limitation which a quantitative critique might raise is that the research should 
generalise from these results to a larger population. As mentioned previously, the 
qualitative case study researcher is less interested in generalising from the assertions. The 
primary interest is in what happened and why in respect of the case itself. Where 
generalisations are intended, they are naturalistic in nature, that is they are left for the 
reader to make based on the evidence presented in the report narrative and on what the 
reader already knows. In this case, there is certainly an aim to enable greater understanding 
of the evolving Australian greenhouse policy network. The collective case study approach 
used here will enhance the ability of the reader in this regard. However, there is no claim 
on the part of the researcher that the results of this work will constitute a formula which can 
be applied to any interest group in order to generate reliable and verifiable greenhouse 
response outcomes. The research may generate for any given reader a checklist of factors 
that ought to be considered in analysing interest group responses, but no universal formula 
was ever likely to emerge. To the extent that these factors are found to have a distinct 
degree of relative importance in one or more of these case studies {something which is 
certainly asserted later in this thesis) there is no ambition here to generalise to a wider 
population beyond this policy neV.vork. 
The second limitation which a quantitative critique might raise is that the results of this 
work should be replicatable by another researcher were the same data collection procedures 
followed. While this may well be a useful measure of the validity of the quantitative 
research process, it is completely unsuitable as a measure of the validity of qualitative case 
studies of this nature. The reality is that researchers generate unique rapports with 
interviewees, have varying degrees of aecess granted to interview subjects, bring their own 
unique set of subjective knowledge to the research, and as a consequence will draw 
different elements out as priorities from the data. Interviews are also conducted in a 
particular order and at a particular moment in time, and as such they can never be 
replicated because of inevitably changed circumstances, which would lead to different 
results. The factors contributing to interest group responses are likely to be so variable that 
it would be impossible to generate any 'formula' which could predict the response of 
groups in different settings. Group responses to policy issues are likely to resemble 
fmgerprints--no two are going the be same. Every group and every public policy issue is 
different and no group faces precisely the same circumstances twice. Even with the best of 
endeavours and the most rigorous efforts to follow the work of the original researcher, 
perfect replication by another person is simply impossible and irrelevant as a measure of 
validity (Blaikie 2000:253-5). To the extent that replication might be understood as a 
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capacity to make similar conclusions from the same data set (especially from the interview 
data) limited replication might be more relevant and valid in this instance. This is more in 
keeping with the notion that triangulation is 'not a tool of validation but an alternative to 
validation' (Denzin and Lincoln 1994:2). 
The third notion which might be inappropriately applied to the validity of this research is 
the idea that research should be theory building in some sense--disproving existing theory, 
building on existing theory, or generating completely new theoretical concepts. While this 
may be appropriate in some instances, it is not necessarily so in this case. In fact, starting 
with a hypothesis in this work may well be counterproductive in obscuring the emergence 
of alternative explanations for group responses to climate change. That said, there is no 
question that a collective case study such as this does provide a good opportunity to apply 
relevant theoretical concepts such as tho;;e debated by policy network analysts. This can 
make an important contribution to that literature even with limited theory-building 
ambitions. For that reason, the research has been designed in such a way as to embed the 
notions of policy networks into the interviews and documentary data collection, reduction 
and analysis, but in a tempered way, so as not to obscure the construction of broader 
meanings and understanding. Others may seek to use the results of this research in theory 
building, but such ambitions for the findings here are neither intended nor claimed. 
Finally, there are problems which have more to do vvith the specific subject of study~ 
business interest group responses to climate change. Many of the answers to the research 
questions posed in this research project reside in sources i11hich are not readily accessible to 
members of the public. While the inductive questions about what happened in terms of 
group decisions about climate change are partly available on the public record, many 
important answers are not publicly available. As mentioned previously, much of the best 
material is not committed to VITiting and resides only in the memories of participants in the 
policy network, and their competing versions of events. Therefore, in respect of the 
deductive questions about why groups responded the way they did, most of the evidence 
required to generate meaningful assertions which enhance our understanding of group 
behaviour are only accessible with some degree of cooperation from group figures past 
and/or present. While the researcher has made every effort to secure this cooperation it is 
inevitable that the leadership of groups changed over the course of the research along with 
groups' priorities and circun1stances. In some cases, this has come with a change in the 
disposition of the groups to cooperate with the researcher's data collection attempts. \Vhile 
lack of group cooperation is not necessarily cause to abandon case study groups, it has 
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somewhat limited the extent to which the researcher is able to provide the degree of 
meaningful description and assertions that would have ideally been possible. 
Presenting the case study results: key decisions 
Chapters 3 to 9--the ease study chapters 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge arising from seven case studies is presenting their 
results in a manner which enables the cases to be fully appreciated without obscuring from 
view the important connections between, and patterns across, the cases and across the 
wider policy network. A tension exists between presenting results in a manner that makes 
the cases the central focus or doing so in a way that makes the factors shaping group 
interest and behaviour the main focus. A choice has had to be made between case based or 
canse based chapters. On the grounds that the 'story' of each case study would be far easier 
to follow, 1he choice has been made here to present the seven cases separately as individual 
chapters. 
Chapters 4 to 9, therefore, present an analysis of the greenhouse responses of the case study 
groups with particular emphasis on the contributors to behaviour of greatest relevance. The 
chapters cover the case studies in the following order: the Australian Aluminium Council 
(Chapter 3); the Australian Gas Association (Chapter 4); the National Association of Forest 
Industries (Chapter 5); the National Farmers' Federation (Chapter 6); the Tourism Council 
of Australia (Chapter 7); the Insurance Council of Australia (Chapter 8); and the Sydney 
Futures Exchange (Chapter 9). 
A format is used in presenting tbe case studies which provides in consistent order the 
micro-, meso- and macro-level factors that influence group decisions about both tbeir 
interest and their network engagement.31 This helps to make the patterns, consistencies and 
inconsistencies between the cases more readily apparent to the reader. 
31 In the context of this thesis the terms micro-, meso-, and macro- refer to forces operating at the 
following different levels: Micro- (meaning within the interest group itself); meso- (meaning beyond the 
group but within the policy network); and macro- (meaning external to both the group and the policy 
network). 
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Chapters lO and 11-bringing it all together 
The final two chapters enable cross-case comparison and a sharper focus as a consequence 
on which factors most influence business interest group decisions. Jn Chapter 10--Patterns 
across the case studies-an effort is made to address any shortcomings arising from the 
decision to present the case studies separately in their own chapters. Chapter 10 identifies 
the most important patterns extending across the cases. In contrast to the case chapters, the 
focus here is recurring influences on group behaviour rather than the cases. In this way, it is 
to be hoped, a practical and effective balance has been stmck which gives the cases due 
prominence whilst not unduly hindering the cross-case connections and synergies 
associated with a multi-case study. 
Chapter 11 serves two purposes. Firstly, the opportunity is taken to present conclusions 
about the research, what it tells us about interest group behaviour, and how these findings 
relate to existing literature. Comments about the limitations of the research and possible 
areas worth further exploration are also made. However, Chapter 11 serves a second 
important purpose, by taking the opportunity to offer some observations arising from this 
research about the state of the Australian greenhouse policy network. In this way, the final 
chapter seeks to home in on the two stated research priorities-interest group behaviour 
and the greenhouse policy network. 
Footnotes dominated by interview quotes-making the most of the interview data 
Another important task has been so to stmcture the thesis that it provides the most insight 
from the interview data to the reader. This is viewed as being important for two main 
reasons. First, this material provides critical support for the findings made and arguments 
presented in the case study chapters and also in Chapter l 0 where the patterns across the 
cases and the wider network are analysed in more detail. As mentioned previously, the 
interviews are the dominant data source used here to generate findings, so it is considered 
very important not to under-expose the reader to the supporting evidence. 
As a consequence, the interview data are presented through extensive referencing within 
the case study chapters. Mostly because of their length, the supporting interview extracts 
are presented by way of footnote. By incorporating the quotes in this way rather than in the 
chapter text proper, it is intended to provide sufficient supporting interview detail without 
unduly compromising readability. Similarly, the choice to present interview quotes as 
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footnotes rather than endnotes is made to ensure that the reader is best able to make the 
relevant connections between argument and evidence. This approach also allows more 
scope for discussion in the chapter text 
While the extent of the quotes included might be considered excessive compared with most 
PhD theses, this remains a relatively very small portion of the raw data, which includes 
transcripts of 56 separate interviews of over an hour each, 
Use of unorthodox style iu footnotes 
In order to aid the reader, somewhat unorthodox punctuation and style are used in the 
footnotes. Given that interview quotes comprise the vast majority of footnotes in the case 
study chapters, and in Chapter 10 and 11, quotations marks are not used to capture 
interview extracts, Except where no transcript reference follows, the reader can assume in 
these chapters that all footnote text not captured in parentheses or brackets of some kind, 
are direct transcript extracts from interviewees. Comments or clarification provided by the 
author are included in parentheses, while questions from the author to interviewees are 
included in curly brackets. 
The need to protect interviewee confidentiality accounts for the other noteworthy stylistic 
practice that has been adopted. In providing sources for the interview extracts, the name of 
interviewees cannot be used, Instead, a numbered reference is provided within square 
br.ickets. The first number within the brackets is the interview number-allocated, as has 
already been described above, at random according to the agreed ethics protocol. A semi-
colon follows the interview number, and the second number, or range of numbers, shown 
before the closing square bracket relates to the paragraph number/s within the interview 
transcript from which the extract is drawn. 
Other appendix items 
Other significant items are included by way of appendix in order to aid the reader in 
appreciating the research. These include the consent form provided to interviewees and a 
table setting out the timing and coverage of the interviews to demonstrate the balance 
sought and achieved. 
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3 
Case 1-the Australian Aluminium Council 
Introduction 
The Australian Aluminium Council (AAC) is a particularly useful case study in that it has 
perhaps the most to lose of any Australian interest group from climate change. The 
Australian Aluminium Council represents companies involved in all sectors of the 
industry-bauxite mining, alumina refining, metal production, and the production and 
distribution of semi-fabricated aluminium. The membership is dominated by companies 
involved in aluminium smelting--one of the most greenhouse emission intensive industrial 
processes in Australia, due to its dependence on coal fired electricity. 
As a consequence, the incentive to organise around the issue of climate change has been 
very high. In terms of what factors lead an interest group to be highly engaged and 
effective in its advocacy on the issue of climate change, the AAC is possibly the best 
example. The AAC also makes a useful comparison to other groups representing sectors 
·whose perceived interest is more ambiguous and/or less profound and urgent. 
This research finds strong evidence to support the notion that internal organisational micro-
level factors have been extremely powerful in driving the AAC. While there is a wide range 
of meso- and macro- forces which have played a prut in the Aluminium Cotmcil's close 
involvement in the greenhouse policy network, the internal forces seem most influential. 
The leadership, membership structure, organisational culture and resources base of the 
AAC have been uniquely aligned in such a way as to ensure heavily concentrated advocacy 
by the organisation. Tue other striking feature of the data collected here in the AAC's case 
is that almost no factor at any level can be found which discouraged AAC involvement in 
the greenhouse policy network. It was all 'one way traffic' with pressure at all levels to 
take a strong and defensive stance as a central player in the debate. 
In these two ways-extreme micro-level pressure and unambiguously consistent pressure 
encouraging engagement-the AAC is different from all of the other case study groups, 
Not surprisingly, the AAC has been one of the most consistent and determined combatants 
in the greenhouse policy battles. 
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Activity 
Across the greenhouse policy network there is unanimous recognition that the AAC has 
been one of the earliest32 and most active stakeholders.33 In terms of their sustained and 
forceful contribution to the public debate, their regular attendance at international and 
domestic conferences, thorough participation in government processes, and central role in 
co-ordinating coalition activity through the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network 
(AIGN) and other 'umbrella groups,' the AAC's attendance record is perhaps unrivalled.34 
This is certainly true of the case studies examined in this research, and arguably true across 
the entire Australian greenhouse policy network. While their contribution has fiercely 
represented their members' somewhat narrow business interests it has been consistently 
thorough, detailed, clearly well resourced, and strongly delivered by a series of effective 
AAC representatives. These impressions are widely held across the full spectrum of 
network players.35 It is a record of which AAC insiders are understandably proud.36 
32 Australian Aluminium Council: they were active early. [25;37]; and they have been heavily involved 
and engaged for a long time ... [48;15]; they have been vigorously engaged in the debates-have been for 
a long time. [30; 16) ... the Australian Aluminium Council I would say have been very active-probably 
the most active of the groups on this list. [39; 12] they have been a very, very prominent player since at 
least the mid 1990s ... [1 !;30) The aluminium industry from my perspective-is probably one of, but not 
the, earliest industry group to recognise greenhouse as an issue. [40;!4) you know from the early '90s in 
terms of greenhouse development of policy and lobbying. [13;12] 
33 
... well running down your list the AAC have clearly been very active from the early stages ... I would 
say of all those groups that have been active of those groups this one has been the most active by a wide 
margin. By my recollection it goes back to least to the beginning of the ESD (consultation) process (run 
by the Hawke Government) ... [11;22] 
34 
••• Aluminium Council has always been a main player in that debate ... Probably the hardest line of all 
those concerned about the Kyoto Protocol. ... The Aluminium Council, in a sense, is almost created to 
deal with the issue. [52;14] Certainly the most active industry association on greenhouse issues. Certainly 
in terms of public profile ... they have a genuine concern but have tended to take a fairly negative stance 
on greenhouse perhaps more so than is really justified. [53;11]; the Australian Aluminium Council I 
would judge to have been the most public in their responses to greenhouse by business groups. [19;10--
11) You know you would see them at most greenhouse policy forums, consultations and they usually 
have a strong role in influencing the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, for example. [39;12] 
35 I think they've done a pretty fair job in terms of explaining to government what the situation is from 
the industry's perspective. 'Yes, we are energy intensive but we have been working on it and here's the 
information supporting that. We've identified PFCs (pefluorocarbons) as an opportunity area that we 
could do something about, we've done something about it, we're doing more.' So I think they've got that 
information across to government fairly well. [29;29] 
36 {Ifwe go back and we look at all of the processes, and there's been so many of them, whether they be 
parliamentary inquiries, or AGO's, emission trading proposals and discussion papers and so on, the AAC 
would be probably the only one that could say that they haven't missed a single day at school?} That's 
right, yes. {Every single process you guys have made a submission.} And if we missed something it was 
because we would have been involved somewhere else on the same issue essentially, ie we don't go to all 
the commercial conferences for example because of the cost of those. That's a relative assessment of 
where we get the best bang for our buck. But anything that was active and this continues today. [34;46-
52] 
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There is also almost complete agreement among the important players in Australia's 
greenhouse debate on the style with which the AAC has delivered its contribution--in short 
it can be described as relentless, ruthless and highly aggressive. Since its formation in the 
mid 1990s, the AAC has delivered a barrage of polished yet threatening messages to 
government urging great caution and restraint in policy responses to climate change. They 
have pointed forcefully and repeatedly at potential costs to the wider economy should the 
local aluminium sector be threatened in any way, and more subtly they have cast doubt on 
the climate change science underpinning the global push to reduce greenhouse pollution. 
Drav.>ing on the typical interview data, there is clear consensus on the strong degree of 
AAC activity in the greenhouse policy network.37 Their involvement goes back a very long 
way,38 and their activity on greenhouse is generally seen to have been a negative influence 
on policy in terms of slowing its pace.39 Their strong engagement is seen as being driven by 
resources, unity, and a clear group interest.4!J 
Analysis of group response 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a wide range of different forces exerted 
pressure on the AAC to be engaged in the policy network. Three important aspects are 
noteworthy at this point: the range of forces in play was larger than for any other case study 
group, the forces unanimously exerted pressure to engage rather than to disengage or sit on 
the sidelines of the network, and the internal micro-level factors were arguably more 
powerful in this case compared with any other. 
Micro-level 
All four of the main internal influences on behaviour explored here exerted pressure on the 
AAC to be strongly engaged in the policy network. The data collected mainly confirmed 
31 active early ... very focused. [25;37] {They have} always been a main player in the debate ... they were 
(as one senior bureaucrat notes) in a sense almost created to deal with the issue. (54;14] 
"(The AAC) not literally in the guise of the Council, but the industry has been enmeshed in all facets of 
this process gDing right back. [27;16] 
39 (Says one interviewee), the aluminium industry has been to the core in resisting most aspects of the 
greenhouse agenda. [51;158] 
4-0 They (the AAC) have a direct fmaneial stake here and they have been heavily involved and engaged 
for a long time ... they are a much closer knit organisation with just a few CEOs and they all know what 
their interests are. {48;75] 
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the anticipated impressions among policy elites about the impact of these internal forces as 
they related to the organisation's climate change response. 
Organisational culture 
The AAC could be characterised as having a mono-cultural, highly conservative, 
professional,41 well prepared42 and aggressive culture.43 The organisation is overseen by a 
board made up of Aluminium business leaders from member companies. As such, it is very 
high powered, used to getting its way, and ready, willing and able to apply the resources 
necessary to ensure that it does.44 Expectations of AAC professionalism and performance 
are very high relative to those of other interest groups. 
It would be fair to say that the AAC's culture is very sceptical and suspicious of 
environmental policy issues--particularly climate change.45 The culture is also extremely 
sensitive to input price shocks-·-·for example, leaps in the price of energy, given the 
competitive price-taking international trading environment for their commodities.46 
41 Very professionally represented. (7; ll] 
42 I do remember the AAC being quite vocal on the issue not so much challenging the science on 
greenhouse, but pointing out what they saw as the cataclysmic effects which ratifying a Kyoto-like 
approach would have on the aluminirnn industry which is obviously very energy-intensive. One of the 
key interventions which you haven't got there would have taken place in about 1995 where they were a 
prominent speaker at hearings .. , for the federal government on the possibility of raising a carbon tax ... 
public hearings around the country on that. And they turned up fully armed to oppose the concept of a 
carbon tax .. [12;11-15] 
43 So they had a very consistent, again fairly narrow, although not an unsophisticated approach to the 
narrow .... [6;159] They are pretty over the top you know, very alarmist in their analysis [39;12] 
44 I suppose in the context of the question you're posing you take the Aluminium Council and say, well it 
fits the bill to a significant extent. It's mono-cultural in terms of its product, it is a few like-minded 
companies, it is under significant threat from energy prices going wrong, it has developed over a long 
time a group attitude in terms of dealing with government and everyone who is around it that can be quite 
aggressive. It's an industry that's had to scrap very hard to make its way in the world, the stakes are very 
high. I guess when you discover that that kind of aggression works in one area you're a little inclined to 
try and make it work in every other. So I think par excellence, they're an example of where a culture 
impacts upon and shapes what they're doing in an area like this. [37;183) 
45 Being, as you'd expect from its membership, being associated with international capital, trans-national 
corporations and being opposed to any impediments, whether it's union organisations or environmental 
regulations that makes life difficult or less profitable for those international organisations. I mean it's !he 
most coherent and most cohesive of those interest groups because it's got a small number of members 
who have a clear organisational culture and people tend lo move between those companies. [9;202] 
46 I put that down to that domestically people feel far more exposed, If you're a global company you 
couldn't cm:e less about where you produce your aluminium. If you're producing it here you know that 
the global company couldn't care less. [52;150]; BasicaUy what is common around that network is that 
they are all in business, they all have a major interest in a cheap energy supply, and it's one which is 
based largely on coal. In the case of the coal association, their business is coal, in the case of the ESAA 
and the AAC they have an interest in selling or consuming electricity in great quantities at a very low 
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Another important aspect of AAC culture is mobility-there is a preparedness to move 
more quickly in a crisis than with other organisations, perhaps born of necessity and 
experience. There is a lean and mean sense to the organisation, of which insiders are proud 
and many outsiders are wary.47 
Finally, by importing government insiders as leaders and consultants, the AAC has the 
ability to communicate to government in terms that government understands. Information is 
presented in a form government can use--something not unc-0nnected with the faet that its 
two most recent leaders previously held senior positions in the federal government-Ron 
Knapp in the Industry Assistance Commission and David Coutts in DPIE. These aspects 
were generally well appreciated and accepted both within and outside the AAC and on all 
sides of the debate. This was widely acknowledged as a major advantage48 except for two 
types of interviewee with little else in common: the extremely well-informed technocrats 
within government,49 and those outside government who are more opposed than the AAC 
to the greenhouse policy agenda and who were less complimentary about the Council's 
cultural affinity with government.50 
The AAC's anti-green organisational culture has given it a predisposition to take a strong 
and consistent counteracting stance to the green movement on climate change. Its mobility 
and 'take no prisoners' approach has enabled the organisation to be early to most of the 
battles in the greenhouse netwoi:k and enthusiastic and effective in most policy fights,51 
price and that equals coal. And so it all links back together. [27;20] ... the Victorian Aluminium industry 
is totally dependent upon the brown coal electricity generators in the La Trobe Valley. [49;16] 
47 Yes, it's a very small secretariat and they intend to keep it a small secretariat. There are no plans 
whatsoever to increase the size of the secretariat. .. the best way to do it is to keep the thing very lean, 
very hungry. [34; 184] 
48 {The AAC viewed climate change} as an issue which had the potential to have a significant negative 
effect on the profitability of their investment .... I have always felt that they have been at the forefront of 
public debate in tenns of their ability to as a sector brigade a lot very useful infonnation to support their 
case. So, their claims are not based on back of the envelope calculations or general assumption>r-they 
have probably got one of the best data sets around on what would be the implications of greenhouse 
response strategies: what their emissions are, where the opportunities for abatement action lie-and they 
have got that not just at the Australian level, but also the international level. So it has been a fairly 
coordinated data set and a fairly consistent approach internationally. {40;22] 
49 I've had problems with the Micky Mouse people that they've brought in to actually make the counter 
arguments. It's never been a proper debate. They've had these very weak arguments ... [38;24] The AAC 
doesn't quite have that 'in' in any department other than Industry ... [2; 168] 
50 
•• .it's been a more passive role than l would have liked. I mean they would deny this but I'm an 
outsider looking on. [49;24] 
" ... a very very consistent line-..you can almost predict v.iiat they are going to say about absolutely 
anything to do with greenhouse. [l l ;30] They have been remarkably consistent-1he AAC-in the 
approach that they take from day one. And that approach has been twofold, that 'we will do everything 
that is commercially practicable to abate greenhouse gas. but we will resist anything which 1'i!I 
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sometimes to the annoyance of those who prefer a low key approach and think it more 
effective.52 
Its professionalism and penchant for detail have made it more effective in dealing with 
government as has its cultural linguistic skill in communicating with government in 
familiar bureaucratic and political terms.53 The AAC prides itself on presenting policy 
options to government which are pro-industry, realistic, and relevant to the needs of 
government--qualities it has been relieved at times not to see matched on the green side of 
the debate. 54 This is generally acknowledged except for a few instances where the AAC has 
'tried on' some proposals which even made some of their close AIGN colleagues cringe.55 
Membership structure 
The AAC's membership has a number of structural benefits which have enhanced its role 
in the greenhouse policy network. First and foremost, unlike many interest groups, the 
fundamentally raise the costs of our production relative to our competitors .. .' the Aluminium Council is 
where it is because it has a lot of money and it has a lot of expertise. And it has had people who have 
brilliant intellectual skills, good scientific skills and good PR skills ... they are small, they are focused, it 
is vital for them, it is a major cost, they have good operatives right across the game. [18;338] my other 
general impression of them is that they have used a rather crass public relations firm to do work for them. 
(39;12] 
52 
••• a different strategy to the Aluminium Council which engages with government through the pages of 
the Financial Review. The auto industry does it far more quietly in the corridors of power. [27;228] 
53 The approach being-a gently, gently approach to climate change overall, gently gently is one 
description of it-others would say that they have been too hairy chested on it-but you know what I 
mean ... The other side which I have seen to the Aluminium Council is a fair determination to do their bit. 
To sign up to things like the greenhouse challenge, to work with the energy efficiency best practice 
program, to try to glean any possible energy efficiency gains that will improve their environmental 
credentials. Now, there is a fairly large degree in that of vulgar self-interest if you like-and there is a 
degree of altruism-and I will leave it for you to decide where the balance lies ... (they are) keen to do 
what they can, but they are also keen to see the government hold its line. (47;24] 
54 We're opposed to any expansion ofMRET (Mandatory Renewable Energy Target) because of the cost. 
It cannot be put forward as an efficient greenhouse debate measure because of where the costs are at the 
moment. So when a number of groups have come out and proposed a doubling or a threefold increase in 
MRET that's good because if they were only going to do a small increase it might be harder to knock off. 
The more extreme, the easier to knock off. [34;260] 
55 
••• they have been arguing for things like no real increase in energy tariffs in Australia which would run 
completely contrary to the market based approach that most of us would prefer to take. It is just 
nonsense. {You mean legislating no increase in energy tariffs?) Yes. I mean it's just completely 
ridiculous. But by the nature of these organisations periodically you will get these sorts of silly ideas 
thrown up. Yes, we would love to have constant energy prices-let's just remove all the risk and 
uncertainty in the whole world. The fact is that there are lots of risks and uncertainties-the exchange 
rate variability and so on, so it is just ridiculous to suggest. So, you know some of us have to say 1well 
that completely undermines the credibility of our longer term rational principled framework.' (13; 16] 
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AAC has monopoly representation of its potential membership.56 While the AAC's 
member companies are probably all members of other organisations as well (such as the 
Minerals Council of Australia, BCA, and APPEA to mention but a few) there are no other 
organisations setting out to represent the aluminium sector exclusively. The interviews 
reinforce the view that this is an important advantage. 57 
The AAC has a further distinct advantage over most other interest groups in the greenhouse 
policy network in that it has a very small membership-only 23 members.53 As well, the 
members are generally very big companies--Alcoa, Rio Tinto, Comalco, Alcan, BFIP 
Billiton, Pechiney and others. While in theory a small number of highly competitive large 
players may be expected to find it difficult to collaborate, this has not been the case in 
relation to the ongoing climate change response via the AAC. 
In fact, there has been an impressive degree of consensus and unity of purpose in the AAC 
in relation to climate change which flows directly from the small membership. 59 One factor 
which has probably assisted is that the primary concern of those who represent the member 
companies on the AAC is in the Australian aluminium operations of the parent company 
rather than in its the global operations-the bulk of which may be offshore, and/or involve 
other commodities. 
As such, it could be argued that the interests of the AAC Board members are probably 
more in synch than the boards of their parent companies.60 All AAC board members 
56 The critical thing for the Council is that (AAC) have I 00 per cent coverage of bauxite and aluminium, 
primary aluminium. [34;92] 
57 (As one senior government player observed) ... the AAC now seems to be the sole representatives of 
aluminium industry. [2;20] 
58 [34;172] This has risen to 27 members since the interview. The membership is dominated by 
aluminium smelting companies, many of which are multinational. 
59 
... with the Aluminium Council, they are a much closer knit organisation with just a few CEOs and 
they all know what their interests are .... Aluminium Council filters down into the CEO of Rio Tinto and 
the CEO of Alcoa and so on. You know, that is an entirely different beast .... {So it is easier to coutrol a 
smaller number of more tightly knit large groups which have a unity of purpose?} Yeah, absolutely. You 
probably have only about eight members and you probably have two or three people only in those 
companies who are dealing with this issue. [4&;75-83] ... AAC have identified the work priorities of the 
Council ... And it wouldn't come as any surprise that the executive committee of the Council has 
identified euergy and greenhouse as the two top priorities and it's difficult to separate those. [34;40] 
60 
... if you were talking about Chip Goodyear (CEO of BHP Billiton), he has to balance it across their 
whole range of commodities, a whole range of issues and sometimes those commodities may have 
competing and conflicting things. One of the things that makes the (Aluminium) Council's policy 
position, I believe, easy, is that they all have a focus of the same issues in the sense of we are dealing 
\Vith that specific. commodity rather than a mining house type approach to it which may have ... {So that 
means when the BHP aluminium guy comes along to (AAC Board meetings)?} ... He is there as a 
producer of bauxite and aluminium. {So that means that when the BHP aluminium guy comes to your 
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perceive a strong interest in lobbying for climate change policies that assist in expanding 
the aluminium industry in Australia. The clear focus by the AAC on the upstream 
aluminium sector rather than downstream processing industries also enhances the unity of 
purpose on the greenhouse issue. 
A small and united group of members with a fairly simple membership structure has 
enabled the AAC to arrive at consensus positions more quickly than all of the other case 
groups examined here. While there have certainly been some differences of opinion at 
board level from time to time, there is a degree of unanimity that is rare in this policy 
network, and this has enhanced the organisation's capacity to play a strong leadership role 
in advocating a position of policy caution on climate change. While others have had to take 
vague, fence-sitting positions from time to time because consensus has been elusive, the 
AAC has not had this problem. They can concentrate on advocating their position while 
many others are busy devoting time and effort to formulating one.61 
Leadership 
The leadership of the AAC has been viewed across the policy network as strong, quite 
negative in terms of opposing many measures to reduce greenhouse pollution, and heavily 
constrained by the financial stakes of its members. In many instances the AAC has been the 
public face of the 'blocking' or 'anti' side of the policy debate-often being willing to 
make comments publicly at the request of a wider group of organisations. In this sense it 
has had a leadership role on the anti-side of the debate.62 
Aluminium Council meetings he is not being asked to make a recommendation on behalf of BHP 
Billiton, the overall company-he's being asked about 'how does this effect your line area. On behalf of 
your line area do you think this is a good idea?'} That's right. {Which makes your decision making a lot 
easier?} And also more predictable. [34;100--12] 
61 
•• .it's very convenient ... Don't get me \\Tong, sometimes ifs hard to get to decisions on some issues. 
But in general terms to be able to use that commodity specific approach is reasonably predictable and it 
also means ... a lot more flexibility in terms of being able to engage with ministers, bureaucrats and the 
media. [34; 112] ... if we look at who has been powerflil and has acted powerfuUy, it has tended to be the 
groups that are relatively small. The five star membership. Small, but rich memberships. Thal is a better 
way of putting it. \Vhose interests are focused and direct. [54; 122] 
62 There is an element of free riderism in who actually publicly comments. But only a small element of 
it. There would be a lot of people who say 'thank God it's David Coutts (then executive director of the 
AAC) out there talking--! don't have to. {Because I can still enjoy the benefits of his action?}Yes. I still 
enjoy the benefits of David talking. In fact behind the scenes tliere is a much more active involvement 
going on. It would not be uncommon for David to ring up and say - 'Christ, l am on ABC at 2 o'clock 
today "nat the fuckin' hell do I say? How can I pitch it a different way?' You know, three or four 
telephone calls might go around. But David will go out there and be the front man. (18;360-364] 
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The AAC is seen as being the most regular attendee in the greenhouse policy network when 
it comes to conferences, government processes, submissions, public comment, and 
participation in international negotiations. ln contrast to the hard-edged reputation of its 
spin and backroom lobbying consultants-John Hannagan and Noel Bushnell, the AAC has 
tended to choose sophisticated and polished leaders who are less inclined to be so 
controversial. David Coutts and Ron Knapp both fit that mold and have generally been seen 
as effective and professional by both the AAC's supporters and their opponents.63 
Nevertheless, it has also been perceived that the AAC leadership has been held on a 'tight 
leash.' That is, only a handful of those interviewed believed that it was conceivable that 
another AAC leader might have successfully tried to take the AAC in a 'greener' direction 
on the issue of climate change. Notwithstanding the less defensive posture of the 
aluminium sector in other countries, the lack of low-cost fuel-switching options for the 
Australian industry-away from greenhouse emission-intensive coal-constrained the 
scope for successive leaders to take anything but a blocking and defensive stance in the 
greenhouse debate. 
While in the other case groups, leaders are dealing with individual persons as members, or 
state associations of members, here the organisational leaders answer to boards 
representing multi-billion dollar multi-national corporations and this is a significant 
limitation on their capacity to show discretion in policy campaigns and steer the 
membership in a different direction. This constraint is something general!y appreciated 
within and outside the AAC, however AAC insiders put it differently, citing clear 
instructions but significant flexibility to implement the agenda. 64 
With such unanimity of purpose, a clear perceived group interest, a small number of large 
and powerful member companies, AAC leadership direction is much more heavily 
constrained than is the case with almost any other player in the greenhouse policy network. 
As a consequence most felt that the AAC's recruiting policies were such that they would 
never hire someone who was remotely likely to take a different position. AAC insiders 
confirm this acknowledging, for example, that the appointment of current CEO, Ron Knapp 
was 'explicitly or specifically' based upon his experience and involvement in energy and 
63 (By comparison to Hannagan and Bushnell) Coutts was rather more. Certainly active from '96 in the 
lobbying process .... Knapp might well be more sophisticated [54; 14,26] 
64 
••• you don't have to sit around speculating on what the outcomes are, (AAC) have been given 
adequate riding instructions and also leeway and trust and faifu--(they're) able to respond quickly on 
issues. [34;140] 
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greenhouse issues. Knapp had previously worked in the minerals industry65 and most 
recently held the position of chief executive of the World Coal Institute. The compatibility 
of the leader to advance the preferred greenhouse policy agenda of the membership is seen 
as critical and non-negotiable at the AAC.66 
Their choice of two former senior bureaucrats with strong sympathies for the fossil fuel and 
metals processing sectors, David Coutts and Ron Knapp, are reflective of what is viewed 
by outsiders as a tight and unambiguous preference for Canberra insiders who know how to 
work the political and bureaucratic systems and are enthusiastic to support the industry line. 
Resources 
Whilst the AAC's secretariat is very small compared to that of many other interest groups, 
it is deceptively well resourced and its limited range of issue coverage has significantly 
bolstered its capacity to engage and be influential in the greenhouse policy network.67 
The AAC secretariat has only a handful of people68 and a deliberately limited budget for 
running its secretariat in the inner-north Canberra suburb of Dickson69-well away from 
the more expensive and prestigious lobbying precincts closer to parliament. However, 
appearances are misleading in terms of the level of greenhouse related resources to which 
65 Knapp was recruited explicitly or specifically because he had been involved with the issues that the 
Council saw as key to their interests--energy and greenhouse. Those were the issues that he was 
involved in London (with the World Coal Institute) in 1997 and that's not by accident-he also had a 
background in mlneralg,-so he was ramiliar with the Australian aluminium industry in its generic sense 
before he went to work in London. [34; 1401 
66 {Do you think it's conceivable that there might have been a CEO of the Aluminium Council that 
would have taken a significantly different direction on greenhouse ... } No. {Or would you say that the 
direction is fairly constrained by the interests of the membership on this issue?} I think it's that. And I 
think that any incoming CEO would find it difficult if he had a position that was different to that. {So 
you're not going to get a John Brown suddenly taking the Aluminiwn Council off on a boldly different 
direction on this issue.} No. [34;140-521 
67 
••• fairly significant because the costs of following the debate a fairly high, you have to go to these 
meetings in expensive places. Again, the Aluminium Council seems to have had a big cheque book and 
that has helped tl!em. I can't say that ! have seen the evidence of the effe<:ts of money elsewhere, but you 
would have to be reasonably well of as an organisation to be able to track all of this. [2;272] Well the 
Aluminium Council is only a couple of people, but obviously they can afford to employ fairly 
sophisticated people who can then draw on all the resources of their member companies so I assume 
they're very well resourced. [7;171] 
68 There's only what I describe as four people employed by the Council.[34;92J 
"'Well I would say people would most probably be surprised at how meagre the AAC budget is ... They 
don't have a large budget ... don't have a fighting fund ... don't have any reserves whatsoever. They run 
year on year and that's how I believe the industry association should run, ie AAC don't want a secretariat 
that is comfortable and fat because that only leads to bad practices and bad behaviour. [34; l 841 
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the organisation has access. To begin with, the CEO works almost full time on the issue of 
climate change, which is paramount among the other policy areas addressed by the 
organisation. There is also the capacity to draw on the financial and political resources of 
the AA C's member companies as required.70 This potential assistance has been drawn upon 
by ,'\AC CEOs on an almost continual basis since the late 1990s. The AAC Board has 
regularly agreed to supply funding for consulting work on climate change to the point that 
the Council has been arguably the most prolific contributor of submissions and research in 
the climate policy arena among interest groups. There is no suggestion from insiders 
consulted here that member companies have ever declined to 'kick the tin' when financial 
resources have been sought on the issue of climate change. 
As well, the AAC has had ongoing in-kind assistance of member companies who have 
deployed formidable specialists to advance the interests of the organisation on greenhouse 
policy. One good example is John Eyles who has worked almost full time on climate 
change with Alcoa, ran the AIGN for many years, and assisted the AAC in vatious ways 
without actually being on their payroll. Similarly, the AAC has Jong had at its disposal the 
public relations expertise, political connections, and all-round intimidation factor of 
Melbourne based consultants John Hannagan and Noel Bushnell. 
Infamous in the policy network, and clearly loathed by many on tbe green side of the 
debate (both inside and outside of government), there is grudging acceptance that the pair 
have been a powerful tool for the AAC.71 They have longstanding links to the aluminium 
industry and are renowned for an extremely aggressive and reactionary approach to climate 
change. Hannagan has represented the AAC at most Framework Convention on Climate 
70 {But most of the heavy hitting you think is done is in-kind, as required basis?) Yes, as required. If 
AAC need money, (a member will say) 'well, here's some.' If they need other resources, (a members will 
say) 'here's the other resources.' ... I then would most probably have to accept most of what those people 
have said to you .. , AAC do receive a very large amount of what you might say is the total Council pool 
ofresources as in-kind resources. [34; 184] 
71 Hannagan was very focused, he was a key player and was very tuned in. [25;37] [Hannagan is] larger-
than-life caricature of a plutocrat. .. cigars, wears extravagant sort of jewelled watches and that sort of 
thing--gold etc ... reaHy 'in your face' style ... makes a habit of dropping names of influential 
people .... claims to have access right through to the PMO (Prime Minister's Office) and everybody who 
matters in govemment ... very punge.nt approach to Iobbying ... used to work ·with a guy called Noel 
Bushnell who's still around and we called them the 'dodgy brothers' because of their style-a sort of 
'snake oil salesmen' style ... despite aU that flamboyant baggage, I have no doubt that he has big influence 
on those parts of the bureaucracy, and possibly also ministers, who are knee-jerk responsive to the 'old 
economy' interests which he represents as effectively as anybody. [2;20] ... there was a pair of characters 
known as the 'dodgy brothers' to the climate change community, that was a joking sort of appellation 
from all sides. [54;14] I would put John Hannagan in there as someone who is working behind the scenes 
with aluminium and related things, Not a very public figure ever but certainly in there having a lot of 
impact on where industry was coming from. [48; !47] 
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Change (FCCC) Conferences of the Parties and other relevant gatherings internationally 
and domestically. As the public record well reflects, the pair have been assiduous in filing a 
consistent stream of negative reports and media statements on the AAC's behalf decrying 
most attempts to combat climate change. 
1bere is also likely to have been a good deal more underlying truth than was intended in 
one AAC insider's throwaway line that Hannagan and other consultants have worked 'all 
for the love it.'72 The AAC position certainly appears to have more than a little of their 
personal view on climate change stamped on it. 73 AAC insiders are in little doubt that the 
personal stake taken by those providing in-kind assistance, with its hard-nosed edge, has 
been to their distinct advantage.74 
Finally, the AAC has benefited from human resources which are well connected. Aside 
from consecutive CEOs with good connections into the bureaucracy, Hannagan and 
Bushnell have had important links into the organisational and parliamentary wings of the 
Liberal Party and have found sympathetic ears.75 The AAC has also been able to use the 
72 {The fact that they were able to fund people to go to the COPs (Conferences of the Parties to the 
climate change convention) consistently right through, and had consultants like Hannagan and Bushnell 
who no doubt were doing it partly for the love of it but probably also ... } (Laughing) All of it for the love 
of it! {But the fat.'l thatAAC had those guys there?} That's right. It demonstrates a commitment that goes 
beyond just a lip service. It very much demonstrates an engagement in terms of financial resources. 
[34;30-36] 
73 
... right through until the last few months John Eyles has been on se<:ondment from Alcoa-he has 
gone back to Alcoa now-but he and John Hannagan had worked together in the old days. So there is 
quite a strong network of influence there tl:llll l think reflects their attitude. [53;1l7]1bey employ some 
heavy-duty spin doctors, and PR flaks ... very much a product of the late 1980s and early 19905-that 
economic rationalism view that is brutal in the way that looks at wider aspects of society and the 
economy ... a cynical view of environmentalists--as basket weavers and all that sort of section of 
society ... {Why have they been influential?} Well, they have decided early on in the debate tl:llll it was 
critical and it was a priority issue for them and that they better be getting there. So, they put the resources 
in there--it is a priority for them. [15;192] 
74 {Two descriptions which come up again and again when I talk to other people about the Aluminium 
Council, they say professional but they also say ruthless.} Not these guys. (laughing) The most innocent 
persons in the world.{Yes, but they talk about some other guys that you have on consultancies.} No, 
(laughing) they're misunderstood! {Ibey say these guys are ruthless and like a dog with a bone, just 
won't let it go. They're talking about Hannigan and Bushnell particularly.} Yes, but the AAC have also 
got some very good people in what I'd describe as the technical detail of climate change that I would be 
able to describe that more aptly than a dog with a bone-the concept at the technical level-because 
they're some of the people that know better than anybody else the from industry the technical ins and 
outs of the Kyoto Protocol. In that segment I suppose John Eyles from Alcoa, when we would have 
started this exercise was running the AIGN and was on se;:ondment from Alcoa. Now John, and I'd stake 
any amount of money on it, that he has the best knowledge of anybody in industry about the impacts of 
Kyoto. But ruthless, good heavens no--we're angels. Simply trying to make a dollar. (Laughing) 
[34;126-32] 
" It is not so much to do with the Council secretariat, but more than intloence that people like John 
Hannagan has still. I mean, you would be aware that John Hannagan worked for Alcoa as a senior public 
relations and policy manager there and l think continues to have quite an influence over the Council and 
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influence of industrial heavy-weights or 'aces' at critical times in the greenhouse policy 
debate to get results at the political level-an asset about which they are very tight-lipped.76 
While the AAC prides itself on running a lean, mean operation in terms of its secretariat, 
they arguably have comparatively deeper pocket5 than any other organisation participating 
in the climate change debate in Australia. Through the steadfast support of their board, a 
willingness to deploy a seemingly limitless amount of money and time to winning on 
climate change policy, effective and connected consultants personally committed to the 
cause, broad and deep in-kind member support, and various other means-the AAC's 
resource richness has been at the very heart of their greenhouse response and its 
effectiveness. 71 
probably influences both personnel who are employed and their polides. I m""11 he certainly has a strong 
Liberal party link. {Does he?) Yes he does-and with people like Tony Staley-I think they are 
associated with his firm. He has had an involvement with the party for a long time. And I think that has 
perpetuated a fairly reactionary attitude to greenhouse-whereas other sectors and other companies have 
sort of moved on from that position. [53; IO'f-13] 1 tell you who else could have that sort of influence--
Tony Staley. {Because he is very opinionated on greenhouse isn't he? I have read a couple of his 
speeches on the subject.) He has been influential and there is a connection between the aluminium 
industry and Tony Staley. {'What is that?} John Hannagan who is the public voice or publicist for the 
Aluminium Council has a furm next door to Tony Staley. Saturday afternoons, it is a bottle of champagne 
on the veranda, or chardonnay. [18;669-77] One particular angle on the pressill'(}-{heir lobbying style 
towards government-is that Hannagan, first he claims to have, and makes a habit of dropping names of 
influential people. You know, he claims to have access right through to the PMO (Prime Mini.'ter's 
Office) and everybody who matters in government. '¥/hen I was talking to Arthur (Sinodinos - Howard 
Chief of Staff) last night'-that sort of phrase comes all the time. So I think if you sort of chose to see 
Hannagan in the way that he likes to present himself you might be intimidated by the sort of thing. You 
know, 'if you put a foot wrong, he'll get you later through the Prime Minister'. [2;20] 
76 {Okay. Are there any players in this greenhouse issue that you wouldn't call regular players but 
occasionally they've come off the bench and had an impact at a high level? Usually not something that 
you'd know a lot about but you got a feeling it happened and other people in a similar position to you 
have said 'I've got my aces that I use sparingly but if someone needs to make a call to the PM's office to 
say, 'We've got to knock this thing on the head' or something,' they use them sparingly. Others have 
suggested to me that there are a few people like that that do get trotted out occasionally and I'm 
interested to hear your perspective on that.} I'd agree. There are people like that who get trotted out from 
time to time. {Would you nominate a few people?} Do you want to move on to the next question? 
{Okay, without asking who they are then ·what would be the way that that would work. Is it normally a 
formal situation, where you say 'can you give Tony Nutt a ring and tell him this?' Or would it be (that) 
'you're off to that function in Sydney tomorrow night, the PM's going to be there, if you get a chance 
drop him a comment about x?'} Well it would be when the appropriate opportunity presents itself: It 
wouldn't be a hard and fast way that that would occur. {Would you, in a similar way, have a couple of 
aces up your sleeve that you'd use sparingly?} I'm sure everybody has people like that they can use and 
ways to bring in a different set of players from time to time. [34;33G-40] 
77 All of tlmse people had a lot of money, they've had the resources to do it and understand the issues 
quite well, they're quite sophisticated. They've been to all of the international conferences recently, they 
read the journals and participate in the public debate. And you can't do that without resources. [54;134] 
They saw the need to actively combat-if you llke-sorne of PR work being done by green advocates. 
And to that eK!ent they brought in John Hannagan-you would have seen press releases from John 
Hannagan who was formerly from Alcoa. And, John has his O'Wn way of communicating-some of us 
have always said that John's way of communicating was a bit extreme but that is perhaps because we are 
more analysts than we are PR people. But, by and large, they have ... been a very strong supporter of a 
81 
Meso-level 
A "ide range of factors at the network level have exerted some pressure on how the 
Aluminium Council responds to the issue of climate change. All of these factors have 
encouraged greater rather than less involvement by the AAC. 
Policy implications 
Unlike most of the case groups examined here for whom the policy implications of climate 
change are highly contestable, there is little debate that the AAC's membership stands to 
lose more financially than it gains from Australian and global measures to combat climate 
change.78 
The AAC is uniquely vulnerable for two main reasons. First, the aluminium industry is an 
inherently energy-intensive sector and in Australia that means it is highly dependent on 
access by their energy suppliers to cheap, large, and growing quantities of black and brown 
coal. This makes the Australian aluminium industty far more vulnerable to greenhouse 
policy reforms than in other countries that have proportionally more aeeess to nuclear and 
hydro energy. 79 Second, the Australian aluminium industry competes in a highly contested, 
low margin global market selling a commodity which is made primarily by developing 
countries. At the heart of the aluminium industry's flight from Japan to Australia and its 
continued viability here is access to large amounts of cheap coal. Any significant rise in 
concerted effort. [13;20] A combination of having a clear policy agenda and having the resources to back 
it up. And, in the case of the Aluminium Council probably having some political connections. [53;185] 
78 They saw themselves very early as losers. [2;156] They have a direct financial stake here ... [48;15] 
You see the Aluminium Council it's all negative ... [6;199] l mean they're in a real bind·-if anything 
does happen it's going to hit them. [32;62] And I think their response was a very good representation of 
what their interests are ... they are very exposed, very exposed. [19;1 l] 
79 There's not too many countries in the world that actually smelt aluminium using coal. They don't. It's 
all nuclear or hydro. [23; 1201 RlliionaL .;\.nd it would be one where they were very conscious of the 
potential impacts of competitiveness, vis·a·vis the market competitors. Whether those market 
competitors were in countries that may not be facing Kyoto type targets and indeed within other 
developed countries where there is a different energy focus, notably for example a number of countries 
have got a nuclear option which is not available to us in Australia, and so therefore a lot of those issues 
come forward. [34;24] 
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energy input costs (whether related to carbon content or otherwise) poses potentially futal 
implications for the industry in Australia--or so the industry argues.80 
Of particular concern to the Australian aluminium industry is the prospect that developed 
countries like Australia might respond to climate change in a more aggressive manner than 
the developing countries in which their competitors are largely located. The terms of the 
Kyoto Protocol which require developed countries to make the first significant cuts to 
emissions in the first budget period have added to the AAC perc.eption that the implications 
are extremely dangerous and warrant a strong lobbying response. For the AAC, the policy 
implications have been viewed as unambiguously negative and extreme in nature and this 
has driven much of their activity. 
Many in the policy network agree with the assessment by the AAC of the implications for 
Australia's aluminium sector 51and the message has clearly hit home with influential 
government ministers.82 Most believe that the implications are negative, and can see why 
the AAC might react as they have. Some feel that 1he AAC has overstated the implications 
because they can get away with it-governments simply cannot ignore threats to take major 
projects offshore.53 Others, especially those in the green movement, lose little sleep at the 
80 The Australian Aluminium Council, I guess their response is essentially a defensive one because they 
see themselves as being big losers in this if energy prices go up. [37; 11] Obviously they are a significant 
vested interest, very high energy intensive industry, competing internationally, you know-probably our 
most energy intensive industry and obviously a very strong survival mentality. They are also very reliant 
on competitive energy pricing to be a survivor here: The aluminium industty in Australia was effectively 
relocated from Japan when energy costs became too high in the decades before and so potentially the 
industry's mobile ... So they have been a strong driver ... [13;12] 
81 On top of the list the Australian Aluminium Council has probably been one of the most concerned 
about this of all of those groups in the sense that they, together with a few people from the coal industry, 
have been the ones that have engaged in the tru:tics of denial for the longest because they have had the 
most to lose. [38;21] 
82 The Aluminium Council definitely, because they were big energy users and they simply took the view 
that, 'look, if you go down this track and the price of electricity doubles, we'U move our aluminium 
industries to countries where there will not be any requirements, like third world countries,' and one of 
the things that I think we recognised at the time was, this is pretty damn silly because we do have a very 
clean approach to electricity, even though we are coal dependent to a large extent-70 per cent or 
whatever it is, and what's more likely is that these people Viii! move their electricity industries away to 
third world countries where they don't have any requirements at all to address greenhouse, and the net 
effect on the world would have been negative from a Greenhouse perspective ... The Aluminium Council 
have just pointed straight down the line .. [10;64] 
83 The Aluminium Council's interesting because they operate under threat so they're defending space 
quite significantly but I still believe that leadership makes a difference because even within their spaco 
you can be very defensive, you know: 'piss off government, we'll move offshore if you ... you know,' be 
aggressive, 'don't you touch us and if we get anywhere near emissions trading you guys,' you know, that 
sort of stuff ... [4;114] (said one of the government's most senior greenhouse advisers) ... without a doubt 
they (the AAC) do get listened to by government. [50;18] They've looked at it entirely from the smelting 
point of view and seen it as basically Australia has cheap fossil energy therefore that's tl1e competitive 
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prospect of the industry making good on its threat to abandon Australia if stronger 
greenhouse measures were adopted.84 For them, industries like aluminium make Australia a 
larger part of the problem. For others, however, there is a more strategic problem in that 
Australia's economy is too dependent upon energy and carbon-intensive commodities and 
that this is a danger in the long term.85 
What appears to be uncontested, however, is that the policy implications of climate change 
for the Australian aluminium sector are significant enough to have exerted strong pressure 
on the AAC to respond in the way it has. While this research points to many other factors-
particularly internal forces-as being central to the AAC response, clearly policy 
implications have also been a very powerful influence, and pre-eminent among those at the 
meso-level. 
advantage, therefore that's the advantage we've got to maintain ... equated that more or less with the 
national interest and that's the way they've gone. {Have they been successful in selling that message?} 
Oh, they certainly seem to have been successful at high levels of government, yes. I don't think they've 
been very successful in terms of the community but I don't think that matters to them ... It's been a case 
of just maintaining the political leverage. Some of their arguments we find quite absurd, like arguments 
that they would somehow move offshore. Given that it's very hard to move offshore with these things, 
that by the time they did you would be into a new round of negotiations on Kyoto and probably would 
bring in developing countries and also that they're not going to base investment decisions entirely on 
emissions. They take all sorts of other factors into account which makes Australia quite a favourable 
place in things such as political stability and things like that. [35;11-15] 
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•• .in the end, you've got Clive Hamilton's arguments about how the aluminium industry has been 
subsidised. I mean how long are we going to keep putting up with that ball and chain around our neck, or 
around our ankle if you like, which is the aluminium industry. And they've already got fantastic 
electricity deals. They're not paying their way. [23;120] Well the Aluminium Council, I think, has 
consistently been a force for not doing anything about greenhouse. They've perceived that their position 
as a heavily subsidised user of coal could well be influenced and it could well be to their economic 
detriment if Australia were to sign on to greenhouse targets and be serious about meeting them because 
one of the obvious things you would do if you were going to meet targets is to phase out subsidies of 
fossil fuels and by some margin the largest identifiable public subsidy of fossil fuel use is the subsidy of 
coal fired electricity for the aluminium smelters. Interestingly, they've consistently argued that it's in the 
national interest to continue to smelt aluminium and even dressed it up in environmental clothes by 
saying, for example, it's better for aluminium to be smelted with clean Australian coal rather than dirty 
Taiwanese coal. [9; 10] 
85 {Would you say that the business interest groups that represent those old economy sectors have a 
disproportionate level of influence relative to some of the new economy sectors?} Yes. Again, personal 
view, unequivocally. {And greenhouse is a good reflection of that?} A perfect reflection of the issues in 
the transition. It's a fascinating time in Australia's history frankly, this whole thing of moving from a 
mineshaft and sheep farm to a service based economy at a time when we're seeing such significant 
changes in the world as far as electronic technology is concerned, globalisation. Australia's got this new 
chance to apply its intellectual capital to the whole world through electronic means and yet we're still 
getting policy driven by farmers and miners. [46;244-54] 
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Policy limitations 
Various policy limitations on how governments might effectively respond to climate 
change in Australia have shaped and hardened the AAC's greenhouse response. In short, 
many of the most practicable policy options available to government are also the ones most 
likely to damage the interests of the Australian Aluminium industry. 
For example, measures aimed at the stationary energy sector would address one of the 
fastest growing areas of greenhouse emissions and they are far easier to implement in 
practical terms than those needed to combat more diffuse emission sources-like livestock. 
Measures which target a small number of large stationary energy sources--like coal-fired 
power stations are also viewed as more practical than demand-side policy measures aimed 
at reducing consumption and raising energy efficiency at the consumer level. Regulating a 
small number of large facilities would appear to be far easier from either a bureaucratic or a 
political perspective.86 
As a major user of coal-fired stationary energy, and a particularly energy-intensive sector 
of the economy, this has left Australian aluminium relatively much more exposed to 
government greenhouse policy intervention than other sectors.87 A further limitation which 
does not apply to the same degree to aluminium in some other countries where less carbon-
intensive energy sources like nuclear and hydro are readily available is that Australia's 
energy policy currently limits the fuel switching options for the aluminium sector.88 
Thus various policy limitations have helped to drive the very defensive posture of the 
AAC. Interestingly, however, some of the most senior bureaucrats in the policy network 
"' One of the great advantages from a regulatory point of view of the energy intensive sector and, 
although agriculture is relatively energy intensive, is the concentration. You can move upstream in the 
carbon use or carbon production cycle and you end up with fewer and fewer players that are concerned. 
[54;70] 
87 (As one industry insider noted) ... we pull down 18 per cent of eastern Australia's electricity 
consumption. It's a mir bit when you think there's only six sheds that do it. [34;84] 
89 You've got to recognise just how significant energy costs are to the aluminium sector and then you 
then start to get a feel as to how important greenhouse is when you look at that energy impact. And, 
bearing in mind that all, with the exception of the Tasmanian smelter, the other five smelters in Australia 
are all either pulling electricity out of either a black coal fired power station or a brown coal fired power 
station ... we've dealt with our greenhouse emissions but our problem is the indirect emissions that come 
over the boundary fence of our plant from electricity. [34;84] 
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suggest that in hindsight some of the limitations might have been avoided and this could 
have led to a different response from groups like the AAC.89 
Coalition activity 
The AAC has consistently used its influence to foster greater collaboration between interest 
groups on the defensive side of the policy network. At the same time, it has been 
emboldened to play an even greater role as a consequence of coalition action-recognising 
that it can amplify its effectiveness as part of a group. As such, a self-reinforcing cycle has 
been established through which coalition activity has played a key role in maximising the 
AAC's involvement in the network. The AAC recognised very early in its engagement in 
the greenhouse debate that it could have far more influence on the policy process if it acted 
as part of a broader resources sector, or further still, a business coalition speaking to 
govermnent with the same voice. Aluminium advocates recognised that there was a small 
number of votes in aluminium90-the facilities were energy intensive but not highly 
employment intensive. Therefore, the AAC lacked the political clout of other interest 
groups such as the NFF. Recognising this limitation, the AAC realised that it was in its 
greenhouse policy interest to foster coalition activity on climate change so long as it could 
be steered in the AAC's preferred direction. Through the AIGN, the Energy Users' 
Association, and other groups the AAC has been able to achieve this objective and make 
itself a larger player in the greenhouse debate. 
89 In retrospect if there had been a greater focus by governments on policies and measures, and 
transitional policies and measures that, in particular, did not expose the trade related sector energy-
greenhouse intensive trade related sector-unfairly in the early years of any greenhouse response there 
might well have been a way of getting the Aluminium Council to focus more positively. I just say that 
noting that some of the constituent companies when you meet them and talk to them in an international 
context are far less anti-Kyoto as such. [54;14] 
90 The first response, and I think this has probably been the case in other parts of the world also, the first 
response from those vocal groups is 'shit, the burden is going to fall on us, we've got no friends in 
government, we've got no votes really. You know you might have one marginal seat you can swing, but 
not many. Therefore we have to be highly vocal about this.' And their first reaction has been to say ... 
well, probably to deny the science, then the next reaction is to talk about 'we need a hell of a lot more 
information before we can make a good decision, that we'd be foolish to make decisions at this stage.' 
Therefore, if you like, equivocation and time buying. The third level is probably saying 'push back the 
world, let others lead and we can be followers' and so on. And I would say at this stage, as of today, 
those groups are still in the denial phase that Australia will ever actually do anything. If there was a 
change of government they would have to move into an acceptance phase. But at the moment they are 
able to be in a denial phase. And I think they're able to stay in the denial phase because of the well, if 
you like the leadership Jobn Howard is actually giving. The leadership John Howard is giving is (saying) 
'we're not going to do anything until America has come on board, until we've done the calculations that 
Australia's not going to be terribly disadvantaged and developing countries have come on board.' Which 
is basically saying 'we're not going to do anything until others have moved.' So they can stay in that 
denial phase. [52;95] 
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The second important point is that once the AAC succeeded in fostering coalition activity, 
it has then been able to steer coalition activity, and largely get its way. This is partly 
because, while other members of groups like tbe AIGN broadly agree with the AAC 
position, they are less motivated or inclined to be 'out in front' on the issue. Quite often, 
because of the extremely high priority of greenhouse policy at the AAC relative to that 
given it by other interest groups, the AIGN has let the AAC take the running and be the 
most visible and vocal face of a broader coalition of groups. Because of its relatively more 
strident position, other groups have been able to 'free ride' to a degree on the AAC's 
advocacy-in the media and elsewhere.91 This has suited the AAC completely and allowed 
them to use the combined group's badge to advance its own proposals, recognising that this 
raises the political viability of their agenda by making it look more broadly based.92 
Thus, the AAC's success in fostering and dominating coalition activity has been a very 
important enhancement of their already strong role in the policy network. It would also 
appear that, by magnifying its clout through coalition activity, the AAC has successfully 
discouraged various other players either in or on the edge of the policy network from iaking 
a visible line on the other side of the debate.93 The failure of pro-Kyoto business elements 
to coalesce in any counter-balancing coalition is evidence of the AAC's success.94 
91 In many ways the Aluminium Council has taken on if you like a lot of responsibility for other industry 
groups in a public sense. They have been more willing than any other industry group to be critical. And 
probably also to offer some alternatives ... they are very exposed, very exposed. [19; 15] They have been 
very active-they have been prepared to take the hardline and at times I think they have made others in 
industry feel that they have gone too hard because at various stages-and l don't think so much since Ron 
Knapp has been there ... You know, I think they, of all the resource industry groups, have been prepared 
to take the tougher line and stand up. [13; 12] 
92 (in relation to a specific proposal) It came out of the Aluminium Council but they've been at pains to 
try and sell it into groups to get people to have ownership of it ... AAC don't want it to be called the 
AAC's idea. {Is it something that the AIGN, for example, has picked up now or ... } AGIN indeed has 
been helpful in running it in the cross-seetural group. Other groups have also. AAC has got to be careful 
because this is when we do get egos in from other industry associations so they want to treat them gently 
through that. (Yes, I've noticed there's a few of them.} And you want to try and encourage others to run 
the thing for you. It has a much better chance of survival ifit doesn't have AA C's name on it. [34;424-
32] 
93 He (a senior NFF insider) constantly used to say, 'If need be we'll shut the aluminium industry down 
in Australia (to prevent farmers pay;ng for climate change),' but he's never said that on the public record, 
he's only said that in the background. 'We'll shut the aluminiUlll industry dovm, why should we have to 
pay?' But they've never gone out on a limb on those sort of things, and I think for solidarity reasons. 
[35;75] {I'm interested to know how you think business community has responded in Australia going 
back-right back to say 1988 when it first became an issue.} Well, they have been sceptical. But. is not 
the business community as such-it is just a few people w-ho have a particular vested interest {And of 
those, v.1lo has dominated?} The Aluminium Council has probably done more than anybody else. They 
may have been used by others ... it is very hard to generalise when you say the 'business community' but 
the only voices you really hear are those who have a particular veste-0 interest against it ... A large 
number of groups in the business community that you would believe would have a significant interest in 
the issue ... I would be surprised if on fairly careful examination they didn't come out in support of 
ratification-and they should, and yet they have not. You know, a lot of them don't want to get involved 
because they don't see it as a debate of great si!,'llificance to them. And that is because they have not 
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Related government policy agenda 
At the federal level, there is an entrenched predilection to support the resources sector in 
general and a powerful desire to look after the interests of industries like aluminium in 
particular. In many ways, the aluminium sector is viewed in government (as it is in the 
green movement) as a bellwether industry in terms of the carbon-intensity of Australia's 
economy. In all federal administrations since climate change emerged, though most 
explicitly under the Howard government, the availability of cheap energy is viewed as one 
of the most critical comparative advantages for the Australian economy. 
Australia's capacity to attract and retain energy intensive sectors like the aluminium 
industry is viewed as a very high priority. For the foreseeable future that depends on the 
availability of increasing amounts of greenhouse pollution intensive black and brown coal 
at low cost. The federal government has been loath to accept any measures which might 
increase the cost of this energy. It is important to appreciate that this strongly entrenched 
position applies irrespective of the greenhouse debate and therefore provides a friendly 
context in which the AAC 's greenhouse advocacy has occurred. 
It has been a ready made hook upon which the AAC can hang its greenhouse campaign and 
helped the AAC to effectively equate its interest with the national interest-something 
which outrages green advocates and environment portfolio bureaucrats.95 Arguably, the 
thought about it ... you see that is why Ron Knapp has had so much influence in the Aluminium Council 
because he is saying why sign up if we don't know the full detail? So they buy their effective silence, and 
leave one or two business voices out there which are negative. {But what is it about the issue though that 
has allowed these middle ground groups and the potential winners to leave the ground to be dominated 
by the carbon intensive industries?} They just don't see any particular reason to be involved at this stage. 
And there is definitely a lack of leadership at the business and political level of this issue ... So, there is a 
conspiracy of silence and you are getting that they don't see any particular reason to be involved at this 
stage. [33;40-58] 
94 Well I think over time there has been a significant group of organisations that haven't been ready to 
embrace Kyoto ratification and that goes through the bulk of the industry associations that come together, 
say, under AIGN which includes the AAC, Minerals Council, APPEA Cement Federation, Paper 
Industry Council. There hasn't been a major industry group that has said 'let's ratify Kyoto.' On the 
contrary they've said 'don't ratify it.' And I think that message has stayed with the govermnent. There's 
been a number of my colleagues engaged in that. So it's been that broad collective that's taken it 
forward. {So you think one of the main reasons why they've been successful on that is the ... } Is the 
mainstream major industry or commodity sectors have had a view that says 'don't do it.' [34;216-9] 
95 {And what is it about the AAC and the AGA which has made them effective?} Strong strategic 
positioning and effective lobbying, a well argued case around the interest of their industry which is by 
them linked to the national interest. The idea that what is good for aluminium is good for Australia. That 
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ideology of state governments has also been important. To a large degree the positions of 
the Queensland and Western Australian governments have been sympathetic to the interests 
of the aluminium sector in line with the federal position. Government determination to 
ensure that the Australian aluminium sector in particular and resource processing in general 
remain internationally competitive has encouraged the AAC to push a hard line on 
greenhouse. The broadly held government ideology has been fertile soil upon which to sew 
seeds of greenhouse policy caution. 
Government and/or departmental processes 
There seems little doubt that the AAC would have been a regular player in the greenhouse 
policy network irrespective of government processes. However it is manifestly the case that 
government has provided a steady stream of formal and informal opportunities for the AAC 
to engage on greenhouse po !icy. The AA C has certainly not been shy about ensuring that 
its views are well appreciated by government, missing few opportunities to get its message 
across. They have in fact made submissions to almost every significant consultation and 
stakeholder engagement process conducted by government since 1he election of the 
Howard government in 1996. 
From encouraging AAC engagement in the Greenhouse Challenge and Energy Efficiency 
Best Practice Program96 to accepting submissions from them to all manner of inquiries and 
fora, 97 and their participation in government advisory panels,98 government has created a 
series of vehicles for greater engagement in the policy development process which the 
AAC has enthusiastically seized. This has added to the widespread impression that the 
AAC is an omnipresent player in greenhouse policy whose interests cannot be ignored, 
is their pitch anyway, [27;204] The Australian Aluminium Council have responded very vigorously, from 
our point of view very negatively have taken pretty well an industry point of view rather than a national 
interest point of view and they've defined that industry point of view entirely through the eyes of the 
perceived impact on them, so they haven't even seen 1t as a sort of a alumina versus aluminium, you 
know, like alumina processing versus aluminium smelting. TI1ey've looked at it entirely from the 
smelting point of view and seen it as basically Australia has cheap fossil energy therefore that's the 
competitive advantage, therefore that's the advantage we've got to maintain ... equated that more or less 
with the national interest and that's the way they've gone. [35;1 l] 
96 \Vhich, not incidentally, funded work by Hannagan and Bushnell for the Department of Industry, 
Science and Resources (2000a) into the energy efficiency performance of the Australian aluminium 
industry - another good reflection of the well connected and interconnected nature of the relationship 
between the government, the AAC and its consultants. 
97 For a very small sample of the more recent AAC engagement, see: Australian Aluminium Council 
(1998; l999a; 1999b; 2000; 2002; 2003). 
" Like the Joint Consultative Committee for the Greenhouse Challenge and the Cross Sectoral Working 
Group--Govemment Business Climate Change Dialogue. 
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The AAC's readiness to take advantages of all the opportunities for input presented by 
government has arguably given it an advantage in influencing the internal battles within 
government about the direction of greenhouse policy. It would appear that while a plethora 
of groups devote significant resources to engagement in parliamentary inquiries on climate 
change, far fewer devote anything like the same effort to other less conspicuous 
government processes. 
Parliamentary processes and agendas 
The federal parliament has through its examination of government greenhouse policy 
provided multiple opportunities for the AAC to push for a minimalist response by Australia 
to climate change. The AAC has been a prominent and somewhat divisive political player 
in these fora which are viewed as important even if not particularly likely to result in any 
significant policy wins for the organisation prior to government control of the senate in July 
2005. 
Historically, parliamentary inquiries on greenhouse policy tend to be instituted by MPs 
pushing for a stronger climate change response by Australia and more often than not in 
support of specific policies to which the AAC has been strongly opposed. As a 
consequence, parliamentary inquiries have not been seen as a great stage for industry in 
general and aluminium in particular. 
They have tended to provide more important opportunities for green NGOs and renewable 
industry advocates who might not otherwise have the ear of government or the press 
gallery. For these organisations, parliamentary inquiries provide the opportunity to share 
equal billing with the 'big boys' of industry, and receptive sections of parliament and 
media as an audience. Despite strong support from some conservative members of the 
parliament, for industry these inquiries are often more like a cross-examination and offer 
little in upside. 
Nonetheless, they are taken seriously for the impact they can have on the overall network if 
countervailing views are not put up to balance the green side of the debate. Consequently, 
the AAC has been a consistent and forceful contributor to almost every parliamentary 
greenhouse inquiry since it came into existence. Through their links with other major 
resource industry groups-most notably the AIGN, Energy Users' Group, and even the 
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BCA--the AAC has also tried to ensure a united industry message at hearings. So, while 
parliamentary processes have not offered many wins to the AAC they have helped to 
ensure that their view is impossible to overlook. 
International processes 
The international push to reduce greenhouse emissions through the UNFCCC has been 
followed more closely by the Aluminium Council than possibly any interest group in 
Australia. It has spurred more interest and engagement by the AAC for a range of reasons. 
First, AAC insiders recognised very early that the FCCC, and more particularly the Kyoto 
Protocol (and any agreement succeeding it) arguably had the potential to inflict major 
damage on the modus operandi of the Australian aluminium industry-and its ongoing 
viability. The AAC recognised that the more severe the commitment to reduce emissions, 
the more damage was likely to be in store for Australian aluminium. Second, AAC insiders 
recognised that the Australian industry's position was quite unique. They were totally 
reliant on energy from cheap coal, there was no nuclear, renewable, or even gas option 
available at a competitive price to enable the industry to work around international 
commitments by Australia. Other countries had realistic fuel switching options or were not 
subject to binding commitments. Third, it appears very likely that Australia's aluminium 
industry was very concerned about the mixed reaction of its international cousins which did 
not see climate change as the same threat. For example, in the US in the late 1990s Alcan 
was sufficiently unconcerned that it withdrew from the main American advocate of a weak 
greenhouse response: the Global Climate Coalition (Hamilton 2001:129), and the only 
concern Alcoa chief executive, Paul O'Neill reportedly had \Vith the Kyoto Protocol was 
that it didn't go far enough (Kluger 2001). Lest there be any doubt that the position of the 
Australian industry be misunderstood the AAC has recognised the need to be present at 
international meetings rather than leave it to their international associations and parent 
companies. 99 
Finally, the international process was underpinned by a shared assumption for many 
years--that the developed nations were primarily responsible for the problem of climate 
99 I would tend to class it as a fairly narrow view of their interests. I mean they would rather focus on 
their ,electricity prices to the exclusion of other community values. 'Which, oddly enough, does not really 
reflect the Alcoa story because Alcoa has quite a good reputation internationally for environmental 
issues. [53; 117] {Australians involved in the enterprise become far more parochial about their industry 
council's position in Australia?} There may be a little bit of that. [52; 129] 
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change due to their large share of industrial emissions over the past 150 years and therefore 
had a consequent responsibilily to lead and make the initial steps to reduce emissions. The 
idea that developed countries should take the lead equally implied that developing countries 
should not have to take on binding emission reduction commitments immediately-they 
could do so once developed countries had made some progress. This was a position which 
Australia supported for many years.100 
The Kyoto Protocol, which does not require developing country emission reductions before 
2012, embodies this assumption. For the AAC this presented a massive concern as it 
implied that its main competitors in aluminium production (in developing countries) could 
soon avoid a cost impost from carbon that Australia might impose on its industry. This 
factor, more than any other drove the AAC to expend large amounts of money in sending 
its representatives to the international meetings on climate change: everything from COPs 
to negotiations between COPs to Earth Summit II and many others. 101 
Greenhouse media coverage and public opinion 
Because climate change has never been a major media or voting issue in Australia, public 
opinion on the issue is not a major factor in driving interest group behaviour. That said, 
there have been occasions when the prospect that the issue might ignite strong public 
opinion has driven greater AAC activity. 
In particular, the lead up to major international conferences like the Kyoto Conference and 
Earth Summit II have ignited greater public interest in global warming. To a lesser degree 
public attention has been spurred by major weather events like hail storms in Sydney, 
cyclones in Queensland, droughts and floods. Major international developments in the 
greenhouse debate such as the Bush Administration's decision to renege on the US 
commitment made under the Kyoto Protocol have also sparked greater domestic media 
attention. 
100 In his address to the ACF sponsored Bridge to the Future Forum, then environment minister, Senator 
Hill said: 'Kyoto is an important step in building an environmentally safe 'bridge to the future,' but many 
issues will need to be negotiated post-Kyoto: details of developing country commitments ... ' (Hill !997c) 
In the lead up to the 1997 Kyoto conference, Hill (1997b) also said, ' ... essential, as part ofa long-term 
solution, is the involvement of developing countries. Developed countries may have caused 80% of 
historical emissions, and should take the lead .. .' 
'°1 l mean, you know they have been willing to commit money in terms of taking people to the various 
meetings in Bonn and Marrakesh and all the various other places. [13;20] I would think the Aluminium 
Council have been the main opponents ofratification of the Kyoto Protocol in Australia ... [15;12] 
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For industry, and specifically the AAC, these periods of more concentrated media attention 
to climate change have heightened the perceived risk that government might 'crack down' 
and pursue a more aggressive greenhouse response. The AAC has consistently sought to 
ensure that its interests are covered in the media debate on climate change but has been 
relatively more aggressive in its media campaigning during these periods of heightened 
public interest. 
Greenhouse science 
Continuing lack of complete certainty in the science of climate change-the nature, extent 
and location of the impacts---has provided an incentive for the AAC to be more aggressive 
in its opposition to greenhouse policy reform. While the AAC has been careful for many 
years not to dispute outright the science of global warming, they have certainly used 
scientific uncertainty to their advantage. 
While some recollect a time when the AAC did at least cast some doubt on the basic 
science of climate change102, the organisation is on record as accepting the IPCC's reports 
on greenhouse science and accepting the need for urgent action. 103 For some on the 
sceptical extreme of the debate, the AAC's decision not to dispute the science of climate 
change was viewed as a failing-a symptom of being too soft and compromised through 
too close an association >\1th bureaucrats taken in by 'green religion.' 104 
102 1 suppose another point to make though, Guy, is that with the possible exception from time to time of 
the Aluminium Council on the basic seience, and the Farmers' Federation on the impacts, none of these 
groups seriously contests the science. Some individuals do, they're in the Lavoisier Group which does 
contest the science, but as groups they don't seriously challenge the science. {So, the A.4.C does?} Yes, 
well again, 1 think they push the respectability of the science a bit ... [2;56-60] 
103 For example, David Coutts of the AAC told the 1998 parliamentary inquiry into emissions trading 
'We do not take a view on the scientific debate. We have accepted the conclusions of the IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). It is quite clear there is a rising CO, problem, and the 
industry is not trying to deny that. We as an industry feel that needs to be addressed as urgently and as 
effectively as possible. lt is really a matter of how you do that and what we could contribute to that.' 
(House of Representatives l 998c:349). 
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••• the reason why they haven't prosecuted effectively is because we have this triumph of ideology 
over interest in which the elites of the country, particularly commercial and business elites either believe 
in environmentalism or are incapable of getting up and saying 'environmentalism is sort of one thing but 
this is lunacy!' ... My comment would be that as in a lot of other cases, their capacity to do what l 
thought was sensible, proper, appropriate etc, etc, was constrained by the concerns of the leadership of 
the industry. I mean I'm talking about the chiefexecutive and so on of aluminium companies and not just 
aluminium companies but mining groups like Rio, concerns about their incapacity to take the arguments 
as far as they ought to be taken. Because they don't want to be seen as anti-environmen~ that sort of 
thing ... the thought of being anti-environment was like the thought of being caught desecrating some 
famous church. I keep on putting it in religious terms because that's the way I see it. [49;31-40] 
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However, most felt that the AAC had played the science very effectively. By not blatantly 
contesting the science, but nonetheless taking advantage of the lack of certainty, many 
interviewees felt the industry implied and fostered scepticism without risking being 
marginalised by making it too explicit. 105 Some suggest that the AAC has indirectly 
supported more extreme organisations which do directly dispute the science of climate 
change.106 They have certainly dwelt upon the lack of certainty in publicly available 
submissions to government.107 In this way, the scientific complexity and uncertainty have 
given the AAC a further reason for government not to accept economic costs to sections of 
the economy, especially aluminium. 
Macro-level 
Broad government ideology and culture 
The broad ideology of government has reinforced the AAC opposition to strong greenhouse 
policy by Australia. Over the course of the climate change debate dominant ideology has 
had some important implications for the AA C's greenhouse response. 
First, national governments have been heavily preoccupied with the health of the economy 
in general with particular focus on fostering continued growth and competitiveness in 
commodity exports, increasing foreign investment into major projects in Australia, and 
being sensitive to the political impacts of economic shocks to rural and regional centres. 
All of these features have favoured the AAC in the greenhouse policy debate because the 
105 And their public statements even acknowledge that greenhouse is an issue and they talk about the 
difficulty and the costs of doing anything about the issue. One gets the feeling that they are doing 
everything they can to hold the tide back-that is the only real interest they have in this issue. [7; 11] 
Well our own engagement with the Aluminium Council has been only indirect ... They then had a very-
they still seemed to be somewhat in a denial phase that there was even a greenhouse issue to be faced ... 
basically they've been urging caution on moving towards any form of commitments and certainly 
ratification of Kyoto Protocol. [44;21] They're not denying the science publicly any longer ... quite 
outspoken but their position was totally different now, it's yeah, we have to do something about this .... 
And the Aluminium Council is saying 'yes, we want to work with government.' [38;33] 
106 (The AAC are) indeed the main questioners and funders of organisations which question the science 
of climate change. [15;12] 
101 For example, in their submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) Inquiry into 
the Kyoto Protocol the AAC (2000:5) noted that: 'There is still active debate on the science of climate 
change and global warming. The next report of the IPCC will be available in 2001 and that may help 
clarify some of the uncertainty. It would be highly desirable ifthe scientific reports could provide greater 
certainty as to the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that is dangerous. This might make 
decisions on actions not to exceed those levels easier. But such increased certainty is unlikely in the 
immediate future ... ' 
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organisation represents a globally contested commodity industry which embodies 
significant overseas investment in regional centres. The threat by the industry to decamp 
from Australia because of threatened competitiveness has thus resonated with 
goverrunent108 despite strong suspicions by some senior business and political figures about 
the likelihood that it would ever occur.109 While the aluminium industry views the 
competitiveness argument as reasonable, and the government response as appropriate110, 
others questioned whether the industry is in fact as competitive as it suggests.111 
Second, the depth of Australian government commitment to multilateralism (in trade, 
defonce, and environmental matters) is arguably thinner than it might at first glance appear. 
According to Hawke/Keating government insiders, that administration opted to sign up to 
every new global treaty it could for domestic political kudos knowing fu!l we!! that it was 
never likely to be forced to deliver on its commitments-either because of the weakness or 
timeline of the agreement frameworks or because the government expected to lose, 
especially in 1993. The FCCC was one of many agreements which the ALP government in 
the early 1990s signed up to with great fanfare and apparently significant commitment to 
deliver results. This certainly spooked sections of Australian industry into action (including 
aluminium) because they were not sure of the seriousness of the government commitment. 
"' (As one former Howard government minister said) The Aluminium Council defmitely (loses frnm 
greenhouse pollution reduction measures), because they were big energy users and they simply took the 
view that, look, if you go down this track and the price of electricity doubles, we'll move our aluminium 
industries to countries where there will not be any requirements, like third world countries, and one of the 
things that I think we recognised at the time was, this is pretty damn silly ... You see the Aluminium 
Council ... it's simply saying, if you're heavy handed about this you're going to lose this industry. 
[6;199} [37;64] They have leverage in their mobility and then demonstrated mobility. That the aluminium 
industry left the United States and Cana<lJJ. after the first two oil shocks is evidence that they can do that 
fuirly readily and the government knows that they could de-camp to Indonesia tomorrow. So, that meant 
that they got a ready audience when they wanted it. [2;156] 
109 It's quite a furphy that multi-national companies can easily move their stuff to other countries. 
[52; 135} It is not to say that we cannot continue with the carbon intensive industrieo--it is just that we 
have to generate carbon credits from somewhere else ... The Australian Aluminium Council-[ recently 
spoke with Ron Knapp, the head of that organisation-and he says why sign up on something which you 
don't know exactly what it io--when you don~ know what the full extent of it is. Well, you can keep 
saying that forever. You can always ask for more detail. Again, it is just a convenient argument~and it is 
code to the government-you know, 'don't dare sign this!' And this nonsense about-""'we will take an 
aluminium smelter from Western Australia and put it in Indonesia.' I bet you don't!. .. I bet you do not 
shift that Aluminium smelter. It is a very lumpy shift and you wouldn't put it in Indonesia anyway. 
Because of the political instability in Indonesia you would not take the risk. As a public company you 
couldn't even defend that position.' But it is a great argument and it's great for debates but it is never 
going to be carried through, and a threat which will never be delivered. [33;26-34] 
no The government has chosen to maintain a fuirly rational economic dogma and that is that 
competitiveness is recognised. And that seems to have held back the greater erosion. [34;208] 
111 
••• aluminium smelting is only economically viable in Australia with large public subsidies [9;22] See 
also previous quotes regarding subsidies for aluminium in Australia via cheap energy contracts [23;120] 
and [9; JO] under footnote 84. 
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Under the Howard government, however, there has been a clear shift in emphasis which 
has arguably fuvoured interests like the AAC. Wbile multilateralism has not been 
abandoned, there has been an increasing atmosphere of opportunism in terms of taking 
bilateral approaches where the chance presents, and this is viewed as more politically 
viable than alternatives. This can be seen in Australia's hedging policies on trade 
liberalisation where it has pursued global reform and bilateral agreements in tandem. It is 
also apparent in current defence policy, and in the pursuit of greenhouse agreements with 
the United States and others. 
Related policy networks 
The activity of the AAC in other policy networks has arguably had the effect of 
concentrating the position of the Council as an aggressive blocker in the greenhouse policy 
network. While climate change has been the overriding agenda item for the AAC, the 
organisation has been active in other policy areas. u2 
It would appear that this activity has reinforced suspicion of, and aggression towards, the 
green movement and close collaboration with other energy-intensive industry associations 
and interests opposed to stronger greenhouse policy by Australia. Both of these factors 
have fed into greenhouse advocacy by the AAC which is more aggressive towards the 
green movement and more collaborative with like-minded industry interests than might 
otherwise have been the case. 
International policy environment 
The trend towards much greater scrutiny of the environmental performance of 
multinational corporations has been a marginal but mentionable factor in the AAC's 
intervention on greenhouse policy. Most of the AAC's members are large multinationals 
and consequently their political antennae are finely tuned to potential threats to their 
businesses. 
Climate change has been one of many environmental issues in response to which 
multinationals have raced multilateral responses. AAC sensitivity to public scrutiny of the 
112 Such as trade liberalisation, occupational health and waste reduction issues to name a few. 
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environmental performance of its members has been heightened by the international 
experience of its members--for example in facing campaigns to reduce the emission of 
pefluorocarbons ll3--and this has argnably fed into a more concerted and punctual attention 
to the greenhouse debate in Australia. 
Conclusions 
Whether interviewees liked them or not (and there are strong views on both sides) there is 
across the board acknowledgement of the AA C's strong impact on the greenhouse policy 
network.114 Putting aside the issue of whether their campaign has been in the national 
interest, the AAC provides an impressive case study of an interest group which has been 
very effective. Indeed, the AAC example almost provides a preconditions template for how 
an interest group might expect to become active and influential in a policy network. 
All of the internal micro-level forces in play pushed the organisation to play a central role 
in the greenhouse policy debate. 'Their culture predisposed them to play a vanguard role in 
opposition to green advocates, their leadership was well positioned and in sync with 
conservative elements in the network, their membership was absolutely united, and they 
had almost limitless resources to apply to the issue. 
At the network level, the policy implications of climate change were unambiguously seen 
as bad news for the sector, leaving little need to devote time and effort to reaching 
consensus. Further, limitations on government policy options in the Australian context, 
international developments, government and parliamentary processes, and various other 
forces all exerted pressure on the AAC to be a significant blocking player. Beyond the 
greenhouse policy sphere, activity in related networks and the over-arching dominant 
ideological environment all played largely in the AA C's favour. 
ll3 When the link to Greenhouse was made we dug all of the research out again ... what we determined 
over a period of and there's still some research going on, but it was pretty intensive in the early '90s we 
determined that we could change our control strategies in a way that would significantly reduce anode 
affects, and so by '95 here in Australia all of the smelters bad already started to significantly reduce 
perfluorocarbon emissions and it was I guess that basis, that the industry was one of the first participants 
in Greenhouse Challenge because we felt we had a good story to tel! and some scope to do some more in 
that area. [29; l 7] 
l1
4 The Aluminium Council, as I said, has faced the issues pretty clearly and done probably as much as 
they could do in terms of their interest Whether that's the same as the national interest is an issue. But I 
think they've Uiekled it as sensibly as you could .... [32;62] 
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In sum, a wide range of factors have combined to magnify and concentrate the AAC's 
blocking influence in the climate change policy network. It is significant that this research 
finds not one type of influence discouraging the AAC from playing a strong role in the 
greenhouse policy network. This is unique among the seven cases examined here. They 
have had the motive, money, might and minds-and important membership unity on 
greenhouse policy-all the ingredients of the extremely determined and effective campaign 
we have not surprisingly seen from them. 115 
"' I think it is very influential because it is a powerful, tightly knit, highly focused organisation-for 
whom climate change is one of the two or three vital policy issues that it has had to deal with. The 
companies it represents-there are only about six or eight major corporations-are extremely wealthy, 
politically savvy, they have a lot political clout, they are well-organised, they have understood the issues 
from the outset, and they have decided to do all that because they see energy prices rising from any 
attempt to internalise the cost of greenhouse gas emissions as threatening to their profits. It is a direct 
threat to their profits which are very substantial... they have been extremely influential in the debate. 
(31;23] 
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4 
Case 2-the Australian Gas Association 
Introduction 
The 'old' Australian Gas Association (AGA)-as it existed prior to 2004--provides one of 
the most interesting case studies of a business interest group's engagement in the 
greenhouse policy network, Today, the AGA exists in a very different fonn than it did 
when most of this research was conducted. It is now a certification organisation mainly 
focused on safety testing in relation to domestic, commercial and industrial appliances. 
Energy policy and industry advocacy functions were transferred to the newly established 
Energy Networks Association (AGA 2004:2). The ENA which represents gas and 
electricity distribution businesses throughout Australia has since its establishment been 
led by fonner chief executive of the AGA, Bill Nagle. The ENA has carried on much of the 
AGA's fonner role. The low key, technical AGA today is in stark contrast to the industry-
wide peak body that existed before and sought to represent, and lobby government on 
behalf of gas producers, distributors and retailers. Greenhouse policy provided significant 
representational and policy difficulties that have arguably contributed to the demise of the 
old organisation. This case study relates to the AGA prior to 2004, not the one we see 
today. 
Much of the interest provided by the AGA case study stems from the association's internal 
conflict in relation to the greenhouse issue. On the one hand, the organisation has 
represented a fossil fuel industry and has longstanding associations with other parts of the 
energy sector for whom the climate change issue is viewed as a serious threat. Many large 
AGA members have had large investments in both coal and oil interests as well as in gas. 
However, unlike other fossil fuel industries, important sections of the AGA's membership 
base saw that they could gain significantly from a carbon constrained future, at least in the 
short to medium term. These companies saw an opportunity to improve the competitive 
position of gas-particularly in the domestic energy market-because gas is associated 
with significantly lower greenhouse emissions compared with other fossil fuels. As a result, 
99 
there was a longstanding tension on greenhouse policy in the AGA and this led to a 
'schizophrenic' involvement by the industry in the greenhouse policy debate. 
However, other important factors have played a role in the AGA's response. Like other 
interest groups covered in this research, the nature and extent of the AGA's involvement 
has been heavily driven by internal organisational forces-and not simply by perceived 
group interest. Organisational culture, leadership, membership structure have all played 
very significant parts. Something which makes the AGA case so interesting is that there 
have been major changes in all three, and these changes have had very important 
ramifications for the AGA's involvement in the greenhouse policy network. 
Activity 
The almost unanimous perception among network players is that the AGA's has been 
'schizophrenic' in its activity on greenhouse.116 It was sometimes very interested in the 
issue, and at other times ambivalent and heavily pre-occupied elsewhere.117 Sometimes it 
wanted to take a high profile in the greenhouse policy debate, sometimes it was almost 
invisible. m At times it has appeared to take a mainstream carbon club line on 
ll
6 The Australian Gas association has been much more schizophrenic .. .initially the gas industry-the 
AGA-was not interested in the debate, then they worked out that there was a marketing advantage 
... disinterest in the early days then it got very out of step because it was you know we saw this great 
market advantage [18;52] Having a bob each way because that's the way that their interests direct them 
[2;28] On this issue they're a bit flippy-floppy ... [39;210] 
117 Somewhat ambivalent approach to it. .. [2;24] Perhaps less active than you would expect... [54;26] 
(AGA)Have tended to have a fairly ambivalent association with greenhouse ... don't seem to have a very 
high profile in the debate. [53;1 l] We found them a lot more progressive although obviously still, I mean 
... how would I put it? Still putting their point of view very much from their industry point of view 
which is what you'd expect, but a little bit ambiguous at times. Sometimes willing to step our way, 
sometimes not, so it's been a little bit ambivalent. [35;27] Then there is the fact that in this 1995 to 1996 
area and even up to 1998 where the activity was most concentrated, particularly leading to the end of 
1997, I didn't see them as a potentially big player ... right at this time they are going through the biggest 
thing in their lives-which is that the deregulation of the gas industry and they would have had much 
bigger fish to fry. [47;55] AGA is sort of busy with other things and they just haven't got around to 
seeking out the potential opportunity which greenhouse provides. [39; 132] 
118 Sporadic, and not very effectual...almost invisible [9;30] 
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greenhouse, 119 and at other times it has seemed to deliberately take the greener side of the 
debate. The AGA appeared disorganised, inconsistent, uncertain, and often opportunistic. 120 
For some observers, the AGA was effectively a non-player for most of the greenhouse 
debate.121 This has been a source of significant disappointment for people on all sides of the 
debate. In the environment portfolio sections of the federal government, in green NGOs, 
and among those industry representatives in the pro-Kyoto Protocol ratification camp, the 
AGA has consistently failed to act in accordance with its apparent interests. This has, in the 
eyes of many, been a very unfortunate missed opportunity, given a \videspread feeling that 
the AGA might have played a very important role. That is, they might have 
counterbalanced some of the blocking elements of industry who have successfully 
communicated to government the impression that business generally opposes strong 
measures to reduce Australia's greenhouse pollution.122 
For those on the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AlGN) side of the debate, the 
AGA's sporadic and schizophrenic involvement in the debate was also a source of great 
frustration. Some even view the AGA's eventual withdrawal from the AIGN as an act of 
treachery. There is, however, a degree of understanding that the split interests of the 
membership base made this almost unavoidable--1lomething discussed in more detail 
below. The AGA was generally perceived as recognising that their interest in the issue was 
n9 Almost as if they were embarrassed to be breaking ranks with the fossil fuel industries by portraying 
themselves as a cleaner fossil fuel than coal or oil... [9;34J As far as the AGA is concerned, for a long 
time l think they saw that they were another fossil fuel industry, and they joined with all the others, and 
they were in the AIGN. I think they were rather slow to grasp, as an industry or an organisation that gas 
bad a distinctive role to play in a low emissions energy future as a transitional fuel and so on. [11;42] 
120 A surprisingly low profile. (9;366] !l's got quite an opportunistic view of the world [37;11] Gas 
Association saw a window of opportunity which they're still pushing and their window of opportunity 
was to say, 'well, hey if you really want to improve your Greenhouse Australia get rid of all those coal· 
fired power stations and let's put gas in and they were using this as a lever.' [10;64] (The AGA) were not 
a significant player earlier on, or al least they were not voicing their views ... they have a fairly clear and 
well-defined undersronding of the greenhouse issue and work well as a group ... they have been able to 
coalesce their membership around a certain set of key priorities from a strategic point of view ... .! have 
seen some of the schizophrenia playing out-but what I am talking about is the rump of what is left of 
the Gas Association. Where they have actually zeroed in on a fairly strategic approach. (40;38] 
121 They don't figure prominently at all. [44;45) A big opportunity missed (by the AGA). (45;2831 I'd say 
(the AGA) has not been active at all really ... recently they have actually played a fairly negative role in 
terms of progressing the Kyoto Protocol. In years previous to that, they dabbled in pro-Kyoto Protocol 
stances. [39;24] The Australian Gas Association-a non player in the debate throughout the 1990s. 
[15;28] 
122 J mean I went to visit them two or three times to talk about common interests. And they understood 
what was in their interests hut they just seemed incapable of moving. Now, I don't know the cultural 
history of the organisation-but the culture of the organisation seemed to be like treadd.r-very sticky 
and slow-moving. [31;328] l'd have to say to you that the Gas Association logically should be a major 
industry force around these issues and should be driving what I call middle ground. It's not doing so very 
effectively. [51;102-6] 
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promoting gas as a greenhouse-friendly alternative to coal. However, a broad cross-section 
of those interviewed here felt that the group's actions did not reflect the group's interests 
very well. This is particularly so in relation to the AGA's activities up until about 1999. 
Since that time, and particularly during Bill Nagle's time as CEO there is widespread 
acknowledgement that the AGA was more effective in understanding and advancing its 
interests. 123 The organisation is perceived to have worked hard at promoting gas as a 
greenhouse friendly alternative to coal and oil. 124 While AGA insiders generally 
acknowledge this, they felt that few outside the AGA, particularly in government, ever 
truly appreciated the complexity of their members' interests. This led bureaucrats and other 
players in the network to make flawed asswnptions. 125 For example, some AGA members 
enjoyed partial monopolies and therefore had little vested interest in selling more gas. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, profitability was more important than volwne. 
To a significant degree assessments of the AGA's activity in the greenhouse policy 
network have been based on flawed external assumptions. That said, however, AGA's 
activity on greenhouse policy was sporadic, confused, schizoid, opportunistic and most of 
123 Sort of late players in many sorts of ways .. .! think this is almost directly attributable to their new 
executive director-Bill Nagle. He has been there now for about two and a half years I think. Before then 
they were almost non-existent on this. [19;43] Australian Gas Association has been in a transition really 
since Bill Nagle became the CEO ... Prior to Nagle I don't think they were ever very active. [7;15] 
124 I think they've done a reasonable job [29;37] The AGA sees the opportunity to replace coal with gas 
because gas is less greenhouse gas intensive per unit of energy per joule of energy produced than 
coal...they have been engaged for a long time in this debate and quite actively. Not always the AGA but 
industries associated with the AGA either directly through the association or by themselves. [48;15] They 
are a prospective interim period winner out of this out of this concept of this carbon constrained future 
and Australia has vast resources of gas [30;16] (The AGA) has become much more overt more recently ... 
It wasn't a very noisy player certainly in the early days as I can recall, but of more recent times yes, it's 
been much more up front ... ! think it is very solidly representative of its interests .... has promoted its 
interests and promoted the interests of gas as an effective greenhouse response. I think they've done it 
very well, very effectively [47;260] The Gas Association thinks greenhouse is the best thing that has 
happened for it and so it's been playing that up pretty well. [32;62] They were single issue focused ... the 
argument was gas is good, gas is better than coal, gas will compete for power generation in Australia 
providing the non-market barriers are reduced and they are largely interstate barriers. [6;115] They've 
taken quite a different position of course because they've seen greenhouse as a potential advantage for 
them .. .! think they have in the sense that there is this what I would say is a fairly naive view out there that 
gas is better. So they've been pretty good in getting that message over. [38;37] they were quite keenly 
promoting the idea of gas increasing market share to meet greenhouse targets ... a long standing position 
on it I'd have to say that. [12;23) Very significant role ... the Australian Gas Association began to separate 
themselves out, they ran their own game, they had their own commodity, and before these committees 
and these other things you would have seen them position all of their publicity with a fairly public profile 
in terms of repositioning gas. And they have been pretty successful I would have to say. [13;44). 
125 Very low profile ... (I) couldn't understand why ... they should have been more active trying to promote 
the need to sell more gas ... A GA had also been missing in action and acknowledged that split interests 
and regional monopolies were probably part of the problem there... using greenhouse to promote 
increased gas consumption was a missed opportunity for the AGA when it should have been 'money for 
jarn.'[50;56) 
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the other things which most observers noted. About that there is little disagreement found 
here. 
Analysis of group response 
While influential factors emerge in the macro- and mesa-level categories, the micro-level 
forces appear to have been by far the most significant shapers of AGA engagement in the 
greenhouse policy network. Decisive shifts in organisational culture, membership and 
leadership have been especially apparent in this case. 
Micro-level 
Organisational culture 
There was general consistency in the way interviewees described the culture of the 
Australian Gas Association, and widespread belief that this culture exerted significant 
pressure on how the AGA handled climate change over many years. The influence on 
greenhouse policy direction has come in two main forms: firstly aspects of the AGA culture 
which have been fairly consistent throughout and have had a powerful influence on policy; 
and second, as some aspects of the AGA culture have changed, this has in tum altered the 
type and degree of influence of culture on policy direction. These two types of influence 
are best handled separately. 
There was gener<1l consensus on various consistent aspects of the AGA culture. The Gas 
Association was viewed as being very conservative over many years, self centred, slow 
moving and very suspicious of change. 126 It was aceustomed to doing its own thing, and 
focusing its efforts on looking after the gas sector's immediate interests rather than on 
broader business agendas. 127 Its comfort zone was regulatory issues involving the 
126 
••• the Australian Gas Association was very, very conservative. I'm not talking politically, but 
organisationally they were very slow-moving, they were suspicious of change, they were not 
entrepreneurial in the way they acted, they did not know how to lobby, they did not know how to deploy 
arguments, and research results and so on in their commercial interests. You know they sort of buried 
themselves in these rooms and sort of hardly peeped out ... Now, they had a clean out and sacked some 
people for this reason and they brought in Bill Nagle-and presumably others to try to ginger it up and 
get it moving and I think that they have probably had some success al that. But they are carrying the great 
weight of history. [31;328] The Gas Association, I'd say the culture is a bit underconfident, split you 
know split interests.[39;36, 124-8] 
127 I've been dealing with the Gas Association on and off in areas of energy efficieney and what-have-
you for the best part of 20 years and there's always been a recognition there that they had plenty to offer 
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production, distribution and retailing of natural gas--especially in the domestic energy 
market-and the AGA tended not to stray too far from its comfort zone. 128 
There is also a sense that it was always more comfortable dealing with government behind 
the scenes rather than pursuing its agenda in a public forum. There is an impression held by 
many that the AGA had a tendency to be indecisive and 'fence-sitting' in its policy 
positions, and in favour of incremental rather than rapid change. This is not to say that the 
AGA has been seen as a passive organisation. Indeed observers note that while it has been 
extremely aggressive in pursuing its interests in relation to other issues it has not been a 
'table thumper' on greenhouse policy. 129 
For many, the somewhat narrow, and even reclusive, attitude associated with the AGA was 
a carry-over from the fact that many of its members had origins in the public sector. The 
organisation was a creature of cosseted public utilities, and tended to exhibit a fairly 
bureaucratic culture, which was highly ineffective in the eyes of many. The culture led the 
organisation to focus more on protecting steadily eroding monopoly arrangements, and less 
on taking advantage of new opportunities in a de-regulated policy environment. Public 
but they also faced the challenges the electricity industry didn't, and I won't go into the details, but it 
always struck me as an industry that was perhaps a little self-centred. It set its own standards, it had its 
own controls. The degree of control of the various parts of the gas industry seem to be much more 
rigorous, they seem to be much more collegial in their approach and less dependent on, or less reliant on, 
impressing if you like, the outside world. They're a world almost on their own. {Why is that, partly 
public ownership?} In part and I think it's basically because there has been strong integration in the 
industry, not just sort of the vertical integration that we had with the electricity iudustry but with a lot of 
almost tangential things like Gas Appliance Manufacturers' Association and what-have-you. As I said it 
had its own standard setting processes, it didn't need other people as much. It just struck me as always 
being ... exercising much more control over its disparate parts as an industry. [47;40-50] 
128 In a way greenhouse to the Gas Association was not core business. Core business was the deregulation 
of the power sector and having the same sort of deregulation in gas supply and consumption. [6;125-7] 
(Nagle) inherited a restive membership group mainly because of the national competition policy process, 
although this isn't the thing of your interest, but actually it's fundamental to understanding what the 
AGA is how it takes views on things and consequently why it's been at times schizophrenic on 
Greenhouse policy [17;1 l] 
129 They are not table thumpers in lobbying on government (in relation to greenhouse) but in other 
manifestations of course the gas people are some of the most aggressive lobbyists to government .... 
[2;28] The AGA historically was a representative of the monopoly gas utilities, the companies which 
were either private, AGL or Gas and Fuel in Victoria or various other places around Australia and 
consequently its major membership was what we call gas distribution, gas pipeline and gas retail 
companies with a strong association with gas appliance industries where predominantly as the utilities 
are essentially, setting aside the retail bit, tolling services. Basically they'll make their income from the 
amount of gas that passes through a pipeline from Point A to Point B and then there's retail margins . 
... their major issue was membership is happy ifthe amount of gas being shifted from A to Bin Australia 
is increasing and that's essentially the underlying motivation for the AGA to increase the flow of gas and 
to have that flow of gas shifted in such a way that the tolling charges could be fair and equitable to AGA 
members. That's essentially 99 per cent of what AGA does. [17;1 l] 
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sector history was arguably cultural baggage that held the AGA back.130 Many felt that this 
bureaucratic, narrow focus prevented the organisation from pursuing the gas sector's 
interests in the greenhouse debate for years. 
In some ways the culture of conservatism at the AGA was further entrenched in the early 
1990s by the incorporation of gas producing companies, many of which were also heavily 
involved in producing oil and coal. Many of these companies, whilst supportive of 
privatisation agendas and some aspects of gas industry deregulation were also deeply 
conservative on the issue of climate change because it threatened their other investments. 
As we will see below, these companies exerted strong pressure on the AGA to maintain a 
conservative position on greenhouse policy in line with their perceived company interests. 
As a cmrnequence, the AGA faced a cultural dilemma-reflecting a tension between 
representing the clearly distinct interests of gas as a competitor against other fossil fuels 
and gas as one of the 'fossil fuels club.' 
Thanks in large part to the companies with investments in coal and oil, and with the support 
of some of the AGA's leaders at different stages, the AGA during the mid to late 1990s 
became part of the greenhouse blocking pack in line with most of the resources sector, 
Initially, this collaboration occurred with the BCA131, and later when the AGA signed up as 
a member of the AIGN. For many years the AGA culture exerted strong pressure to go 
along with the conservative side of industry in the greenhouse debate. During this period 
there was extreme reluctance to take a different line from the fossil fuel industry pack. To 
government policymakers and environmentalists alike the position of the AGA stood out as 
a glaring anomaly. The organisation seemed schizophrenic--occasionally making positive 
noises and showing interest in collaborating with green groups to promote gas as a less 
130 Its history is as a utility organisation basically for domestic supply anyway. There has been a history 
of state ownership which means that perhaps there hasn't been lhe opportunity for the industry as an 
industry to amalgamate and coordinate its activities to the extent that it would benefit from doing. [30;16] 
(The) gas industry is not without its problems. The degree of competition h1 the gas market could do with 
an awful lot of improvement, and they know it, but there's still a lot of ... I know in some jurisdictions, 
links, very close links, unholy alliances if you like between industry and government that have got to be 
sorted out, at least if the Commonwealth has its way, they've got to be sorted out. [47;260] 
131 Australian Gas Association-they were quick to get involved when Ian Woodward was leading it. The 
AGA under him were part of the business 'team' at the beginning-(lhey) had not at that smge started to 
identify their own unique AGA separate interest in the greenhouse issue ... The AGA (was) part of the 
unified business position at the end of ! 995 [25;36] This timing of BCA involvement also confirmed in 
[53;35-51) 
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carbon intensive fuel, yet all the while keeping at arms' length and going along with the 
AIGN line. 132 
While some maintain that the AGA has always been a retailer dominated culture, it would 
appear that for a long period the organisation had a more confused culture by virtue of its 
incorporation of many companies with strong and often conflicting interests extending well 
beyond the gas sector .133 
132 (Re: a joint conference with the ACF) Well, that was AGL. That was one company, but we have had 
some discussion about the issue with the Australian Gas Association-some sort of level of quite good 
relations with the environmental movement. J don't think rve done anything jointly with them but you 
know we've discussed things and we probably discussed, for example, senate inquiry submissions, and 
for a while there they were talring quite a positive stance on the Kyoto Protocol and trading. ACF have 
had a discussion for example with the CEO and shared some information and then referred media to the 
Gas Association as an interest group which is supportive of the Kyoto Protocol--but that relationship is 
now made a little more difficult because there is tension ... {Over the North West Shelf1} Yes. So, 
although in terms of increasing gas's share of the electricity prmision market, they could potentially be 
strong allies with us and positive for the Kyoto Protocol, because of the North West Shelf they are now 
in a bit of a dilemma.[39;26-32] (From a prominent green movement figure) Towards the end of the 
1990s there were a number of large companies in Australia wanted to break away from the Aluminium 
Council's approach. And they were even talking about forming in a new business grouping in Australia--
a climate change business leaders' group. And there were some very big names that wanted to do it but 
they could not interest in any of the gas players. It was just extraordinary ... {What was their reaction? I 
mean when you say you would approach these guys and asking for a progressive comment on this what 
were they saying was their motive for not wanting to be involved?} They could not see the business 
interest. {It wasn't a case of not wanting to upset others involved?} Actually-there were really two 
issues. The overriding one was lack of business interest but there was also-and still is l think-an 
unwillingness of companies, major corporations-to step out against what is seen as the prevailing 
political view. And indeed the prevailing business view. 'It is cold out there on your own.' [15;3644] 
"'AGA finds itselfin two camps ... in the camp of the fossil fuel producers and essentially the big end of 
to,vn sorry fossil fuel industry, not producers, I'll clarify that in a minute-die big end of town in the 
dirty fuels business and therefore there are some natural alliances with the coal, electricity, oil and gas, 
chemicals, plastics and mining industries. On the other hand AGA finds itselfin bed with the renewahles 
and the environment movement from time to time and LPG {Liquid Petroleum Gas) industry because of 
the nature of the fuel as a transitional fuel over the next 30 or 40 years to possibly a non fossil fuel future 
... you know hydrogen energy or whatever, and therefore AGA are probably a little more relaxed about 
greenhouse policy because ultimately greenhouse policy should lead to fuel switching. If the price of 
carbon is factore-0 into a product then on relative emissions terms gas will be relatively cheaper than coal, 
it will improve its competitiveness against coal and its penetration into the power generation market will 
improve and that will lead to a ma.'IBive increase in the flow through of gas in pipelines and distribution 
systems in Australia good for the membership. (17; 1 I] I actually suspect that for example the issue of 
competing interests make it harder to form a united view. Everyone acknowledges the role that gas 
producers have in the Gas Association-people \\ithin the industry acknowledge that-there's 
progressives and people who aren't of the view that greenhouse is a benefit so that's the main one where 
there's tension in the different members. [39;258] J have seen some of the schizophrenia playing out-but 
what J am talking about is the rump of what is left of the Gas Association. Where they have actually 
zeroed in on a fairly strategic approach. {You are referring to the schizophrenia because the retailers are 
what is left because the producers left them?} Yes-that is right. The producers' position has generally 
been a reflection of APPEA more than what I call a targeted approach of the current group. So, you 
probably need to draw a distinction in my comments between how the groups are performing now and 
how they have developed historically. [40;38-421 Part of it is because they are ambivalent and a number 
of the major gas producing interests are also heavily into other resource agendas like coal ... the result is 
that there's a certain schizoid chariwter to some of the corporate players. And it depends a little bit on 
which arm of the corporate profile is waving the flag. [51;!02~) {Their) big members have not had an 
easily identified commercial interest in the greenhouse debate one way or the other. The fact that their 
interests have straddled both gas which is potentially the big winner and petrol and coal which are 
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It appears that a culture of over-inclusiveness held the AGA back for many years-that is 
the desire to keep everyone in the tent, and cover as much of the gas sector as possible, 
made it impossible to pursue a gas industry agenda on greenhouse. Under the 
circumstances, this caused the AGA to drift and exhibit schizophrenic tendencies, 
sometimes hinting at a separate gas industry interest, but mainly going along with the more 
conservative line. This was partly because it came naturally, and partly because the more 
conservative members were also the most vocal on greenhouse. 134 
Between 1999 and 2004, however, the culture of the AGA changed in some important 
ways. m The AGA found it was straddling too many cultures and that the interests of the 
producers, distributors, pipeliners and retailers were too divergent to continue to keep the 
membership so diverse. Greenhouse policy became symptomatic of the internal conflict 
between gas retailers keen to exploit what they saw as a climate change opportunity, and 
gas producers (especially exporters) keen to avoid what they saw as a climate change 
policy threat. 
potentially the big losers so that's hamstrung the org-.;nisation for several years {31;338-40]. You see, the 
Gas Association pretended that it represented the whole gas stream-it's still does sometimes. now-you 
know, from production through to retail-but of course it doesn't. And of course, we used to think that 
this was just a sham you know-you know they used to say in all their brochures and say 'we represent 
the entire gas industry-producers right through to gas retailers', whereas in actual ract there was this 
huge tension. Companies like Shell and BP and a whole range of others that originally traveled with the 
AGA started to separate themselves out and l think that in recent times it has become more marked. But, 
those companies' views were that they were better off inside trying to work because they did not like this 
segregation of the market. You know, they wanted to continue, you know, to sell gas to the consumer-
but it was heavily dominated by the retailers and distributors. And their culture was-we are in 
competition with electricity which is largely coal-fired. [ l 3;276] 
134 When you look individual gas producers and exporters who are not the same people, but it's all the 
same industry-you know, the spedal pleading of Woodside and so on--even though they export all of 
their gas. [2;32] But I think the interests in favour of the North West Shelf expansion are stronger than 
the domestic gas provider down south and so that seems to be the main force within the Gas Association. 
[39;26-32] 
135 I would say that in the case of the Australian Gas Association that they underwent a major 
transformation somewhere about 1997 and 1998 ... l tllink I have known most of the chief executives of 
the Australian Gas Association--we had regular dealings, and meetings, and they seemed to be able to 
pick people who were good networkers. You know, they would invite you along to their dinners and all 
the conferences and all that sort of stuff-but as to an effective political force, I would say no, they were 
not. And, they would essentially only engage with you on--from my selective memory, if I go back to 
those early years--they would mostly pick up the phone and put a flea in your ear over what I would 
mostly regard as trivial issues-not the big stmtegic issues. Whereas, I think it has been vastly different 
since about 1998--and they have taken a whole new strategic direction. Really---in the early times they 
were just folded into this sort of broader umbrella of the energy industries-there was no differentiation 
of interest around their greenhouse intensity. They were a fossil fuel and they just folded in with other 
fossil fuels ... the gas industry has undergone a huge change. [27;28] 
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In l 999 the pressure reached boiling point (wi1h greenhouse policy only one area of 
contention among a few) and 1he AGA split, with the gas producers leaving to be 
represented by the APPEA. ll6 If the AGA was not retailer dominated before in its culture, it 
certainly was afterwards. 137 Rapid changes in AGA greenhouse policy followed v.ith the 
organisation withdrawing from the AIGN, developing a very distinct gas sector line on 
greenhouse policy, and commissioning its own consultancy work to shore up the proposals 
it took to government. To former AIGN colleagues, the AGA's new position was shallow 
and opportunistic.133 However, 1here is little doubt that the position of the AGA has become 
far clearer, and the organisation has been more determined to pursue its own line 
irrespective of peer pressure. m 
"
6 The major headline issue that created a fracture in the relationship was greenhouse policy because the 
gas producers are more oil producers than gas producers and many of them produce ... they're much 
more closer to Australian Industry Greenhouse Network and the coal and oil interests-very much so .... 
Nagle spent the first year or so in this job trying to come up with an agreeable greenhouse policy for !he 
organisation and realised it was probably not possible because !hero's su.ch a widespro.ad range of 
interests. [17;15] They used to represent both the domestic supply people and the export producers and 
there is clearly a conflict between the vested interests of those two groups. But, because they did have 
that conflict ... {I uuderstand and the export producers left?) Yes, because the export producers were 
already represented through APPEA whereas the gas Association was the only association representing 
domestic suppliers. [7;15-23] 
m The AGA up until the middle of last year tried to present itself as the representative body of all of the 
gas industry it never was, but it tried to present itself as such. But it was a retailer-driven body and 
always was. You kuow, a couple of companies like AGL drove the AGA. So you had a retail-driven view 
oftbe market. So, you had a retailer driven view of the market. Retailers always want to sell more. The 
moment they hived off upsrream gas tbey had a different view of it. But then the other !bing that 
happened is that the line between being a gas retailer and an elec-tricity retailer has become very blurred. 
You know, AGL is uo longer Australian Gas and Light-it is Australian Gas & Electricity--that is how 
they now want to bill themselves. Companies like AGL and Origin have begun to realise that if they 
promote gas on the one side of the equation they are actually running contrary to their electricity interest 
on the other side of the equation. So, tbere is be<;oming a much more balanced view. All of a sudden they 
are starting to see themselves as energy retailers not as gas retailers. And as energy retailers you have a 
slightly different view of the world. [18;60] ... since mid 2001 AGA have gone back to saying who they 
were originally which is a representative of the downstream part of the gas industry which is pipelines, 
gas distribution, retail and gas appliances. [l 7;15] 
"' See previous quote [10;64] under footnote 120 describing perceived AGA opportunism about 
replacing coal-fired power generation with gas for greenhouse reasons. 
Since Bill (Nagle) has taken over I think they have been quietly chipping away at gas as the solution. 
[19;43) Australian Gas Association is an interesting player in this because it's got quite au opportuuistic 
view of the world It sees itself as potentially . . . it sees itself representing a bunch of people who are 
potential winners, and to a certain extent the gas industry is. [37; ll] They believed that if they moved 
market share from 10 per cent which they might have had in the energy market at that time (and I am 
talking in hypothetical figures) up to 30 or 40 per cent of market share then Australia's Kyoto obligations 
would be met. And consequently I think opportunistically they were using greenhouse as a lever for their 
commercial interests. [12;15] 
139 Aud I'd have to say that in the period since Ian (Woodward) left there's been a gradual shift in the 
Gas Association to a position of promoting gas as a greenhouse efficient energy alternative. [51;94] The 
Australian Gas Association, well they changed sides, or in fact got out of the A!GN, I think more 
recently are pushing the case for takiog positive action on climate change. [23;300] 
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The general consensus is that the AGA culture long constrained it from pursuing its real 
interests in the greenhouse issue more vigorously. This is acknowledged by AGA sources. 
However, as the culture of the organisation narrowed with the departure of large parts of 
the AGA membership base, the cultural hurdle to pursuing a gas industry agenda on 
climate change policy was removed. This was reflected in a much more pro-active and 
independent stance by the AGA albeit supported by fewer major companies .. 
Membership structure 
The membership structure of the AGA has been a critically important part of the story of 
how and why the organisation has responded to climate change. Superficially, it appears 
that greenhouse policies which are likely to promote greater sales of natural gas would be 
in the interests of the Australian gas industry. However, as we will see, for many reasons 
the interests of the AGA have been more complex-mainly because of the nature of the 
AGA's membership base, and the nature and extent of the respective investments of 
member companies. 
The AGA has always been seen as a retailer driven organisation possibly subject to too 
much influence from large gas players like AGL from time to time.140 However, the widely 
held assumption about the AGA was that it had to be in favour of selling more gas into the 
domestic energy market. While it sounds logical, it misses crucial changes in the make up 
of the Australian gas industry in the 1990s. With the deregulation of the industry and 
privatisation of state owned gas utilities the nature of the industry changed rapidly in the 
1990s and the decision was made to expand AGA membership coverage to include 
companies which were both oil and gas producers. 141 In most cases, such companies 
"
0 They have been quiet for a year or two, whereas individual companies or at least one of them, the big 
one, AGL-has taken an increasingly active role. [31;215] You know, a couple of companies, like AGL 
drove the AGA. So you had a retail-driven view of the market. [ 18;60] The Gas Association has a very 
diverse structure of membership and my impression tllough is tllat in their case it's probably been the 
larger members that have tended to have the resources w influence the Gas Association views, so you 
might say that their structure may lead to a bias towards representing the interests of the bigger members. 
[29;145] I don't know how many gas suppliers tliere are around but certainly they'd be dominated by a 
very small number. [7;159) The Gas association was dominated by AGL. Not so much now, because 
there are lots of new and different gas players in the Australian market so AGL does not dominate so 
much. [19;47] A lot of these industry associations I think tend to try and generally work on a consensus 
basis so that, if it is a large member and it's very strong in taking a particular position that the sort of 
minority can rule the majority in terms of coming to a position-I suspect there might have been a bit of 
that. [11 ;45-<5] 
141 Deregulation initially broadened the AGA membership b1rne. In the early 90s, around about when 
greenhouse policy first started kicking off ... the AGA decided for various reasons to broaden its claim of 
membership to also incorporate gas producers. Now if you're a gas producer in Australia you're an oil 
and gas producer, oil is your main game and gas is your residual product in many respects. They 
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produced more oil than gas. So, while the AGA had always represented a sector which was 
inescapably fossil fuel based, this membership change dramatically enhanced the extent of 
the connection. 
Similarly, with the oonvergence of the gas and eleetticity industries, the AGA also found 
that it had an increasing number of member companies who were owners of electricity 
generation, mostly coal based. In many cases, AGA member oil, coal and coal-based 
generation interests were larger than their gas interests. As a consequence, due largely to 
the balance of where gas producer member companies had their investments (in other fossil 
fuel industries that would be damaged by aggressive measures to reduce Australia's 
greenhouse emissions) during the mid to late 1990s the balance of interests of the AGA's 
membership diverge<l sharply from the intere1>ts of the gas industry. 
This presented a vecy difficult problem for the AGA. The gas producers were among the 
largest members of the organisation, they were also some of the most active on AGA policy 
committees and determined on the greenhouse issue, and they were generally vecy strongly 
in favour of the AJGN line. There was strong opposition to any suggestion that the AGA 
should leave the pack and run a different line.142 Meanwhile the organisation also had gas 
distributor members who couldn't care less whether greenhouse policy reforms by 
government meant they could sell more gas. With cozy regional monopolies, they were 
interested in profitability, not throughput and so were little concerned with the supposed 
greenhouse driven gas sales expansion opportunity. So, the core group of retailers and 
pipeliners interested in a more independent AGA line were largely neutralised by a group 
of powerful diversified energy industry players who were either ambivalent or strongly in 
favour of the AJGN line. The consequence was a deep set mixed interest dilemma for a 
sector which on the surface appeared to be a big winner from greenhouse. It was a dilemma 
(producers) came into the membership I think formally in about 94 !(>-.they were always associate 
members of some form but they became full members in about the mid 90s ... From the AGA's point of 
view it goes back to the fact with the onset of national competition policy the break-up of gas utilities 
into stand-alone retail, distribution and transmission businesses and the privatisation of those businesses 
... I think the Board and the CEO at that time took a view that there was a vacuum in the representation 
market in Australia for natural gas and that natural gas as a fuel was obviously as important an issue for 
gas producers as it was for people who moved the gas and so AGA took on the gas produeers as a full 
membership [!7;15] 
142 And certainly, I think as they've been caught up by producer interests as well, it made the push a bit 
more difficult. [23;300] 
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which some in government suspected but few really understood--a source of some 
frustration to AGA insiders. 143 
The dilemma was made even more difficult because unlike interest groups representing 
many other sectors of the economy, the AGA did not have a monopoly on representing its 
potential membership base. Oil and gas producers had other options, with many holding 
parallel membership in the Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP) and the Australian 
Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA). For those with strong 
interests in electricity, a proportion which increased through the 1990s, AGA membership 
was in many cases held in parallel with membership in the Electricity Supply Association 
of Australia (ESAA) and the Australian Coal Association (ACA). Importantly, all four of 
these c-0mpeting interest groups were prominent members of the A!GN. Climate change, 
then, represented an issue which always held unwelcome potential to create rifts in the 
organisation. 144 For some, this mixed interests problem largely explains the AGA's 
reluctance to run its own greenhouse policy agenda for many years. 145 This is an 
assessment which this research supports to a strong degree. 146 
143 The AGO and (Robert) Hill and his staff never, ever, ever understood the subtleties of the natural gas 
rnarkel. Tiley assumed that they A GA spoke for the gas producers and that we c-0uld actually tell 
producers what their views were and the fundamental point that AGO and the ministers never understood 
was that the natural gas producers in Australia didn't necessarily want to sell more gas and therefore they 
were not interested in what appeared to be capitalising on a major policy benefit for them, i.e. 
Greenhouse. It doesn't matter how many times I've told Hill and his fucking stupid ... adviser. .. and 
even some of the AGO people who should have known better, they just wouldn't understand that point, 
and if you understand that fundamental point then you understand how tl1e A GA position was 
compromised. l mean AGA were definitely compromised, there's no doubt about that. [l 7;59-671 
144 They can see that they can both \\in or for lose out of Kyoto and so they have~so that gives them a 
somewhat ambivalent approach to it. [2:24] {What do you put that lack of activity down to?} I would 
imagine internal contlicting interests, short and long term within the group. {The fact that some of their 
players have got coal interests as well as gas and that sort of thing?} Yes. [54;32-8] 
145 One of AGA's problems is that it is wedged between gas and coal interests. [57;21] Ithink in all those 
cases they are generally sensitive to the interests of their members and that can be actually debilitating 
when yon have the diverse range of interests which they are trying to represent-that is very common in 
industry associations-if you have a diverse range of interests you are often better off not to say anything 
on a particular issue because you cannot arrive at a consensus position. [53;121] The fact that their 
interests have straddled both ga' which is potentially the big winner and petrol and coal which are 
potentially the big losers so that's hamstrung the organisation for several years [31 ;338-40). 
146 The Gas Association is only one part of how the oil and gas industry is represented in Australia. 
There's also the Australian Petroleum Institute {A!P) and APPEA (Australian Petroleum Production and 
Exploration Associat:ion) with 'Jonesy.' (Barry Jones) So through their various organisations, not just the 
Gas Association, there's been ... that part of the economy has been well represented in this debate. It's 
had a particular focus in tenns of LNG exports ... where we're selling into an export market where 
there's an internationally determined price, our main competitors are typically not from developed 
countries. [29; 197] {I understand and the export producers left?) Yes, because the export producers were 
already represented through APPEA whereas the gas Association was the only association representing 
domestic suppliers. [7;21-3] The pipeliners have left and set up their own association. [19;51] The 
producers' position has generally been a reflection of the APPEA more than what I call a targeted 
approach of the current group. [40;42] 
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tntimately, the AGA had to concede that its membership coverage could not be so broad. 
The gas producers walked out, the pipeliners set up their own organisation, and the AGA 
went back to being more retailer focused. 147 As it happened, however, greenhouse policy 
was not such an unwelcome rift after all. Indeed, it gave both the AGA and those 
companies which left, a convenient reason to point to, when in fact while there was 
disagreement over greenhouse policy, it had not been the main reason for the split. 
Nonetheless, what the departure of the producers and others did was to enable the AGA's 
policy position on greenhouse to more accurately reflect an agenda to promote greater sales 
of gas into the domestic energy market. It made greenhouse policy advocacy easier for the 
AGA to pursue.148 In fact, AGA insiders also suggest it helped to soften the APPEA 
greenhouse stance as well. 149 That said, it would appear that the increasing convergence of 
electricity and gas created its own complications. tso 
147 Until recently three of the biggest gas producers in the country were also three of the biggest 
coalminers of the country-you know, Santos had coal interests in Queensland, Exxon had c-0al interests 
in the Hunter Valley, BHP still is in gas and coal. Jn fact, of the big gas producers only Woodside and 
Origin are the only two which are pure gas producers. But not all of those tensions were showing up. 
They were showing up at one end of the equation, but not neeessarily in public policy. Which is why in 
the end the producers walked away from the association ... All of the gas producers have walked away 
from the association-they are no longer part of the AGA .... the AGA is now totally a downstream 
retailers' organisation. And the debate over greenhouse was one of the reasons why they walked away. 
Because there was no synergy. [l 8;64--8] 
148 I think probably the pipeliners going off and getting out of the Gas Association itself and making up 
their own association helps the Gas Association itself to have just those retailers and producers, and so 
they've got a much less diverse problem and part of the problem with the pipeliners of course being in 
their association was that there's an obvious conflict between these guys trying to earn a quid 
transporting the gas and the retailers, and when the deregulation was happening about access to pipelines, 
and that's a very big struggle ... So I think the change of the Gas Association becoming more focused on 
wbo its members are and what the issues are probably helped them. [19;239] {Just on the Kyoto issue 
though, preswnably the idea that there might be greenhouse tariffi; imposed by say the EU and Japan and 
others should the thing come into force, if the tariffs were to apply to Australian exports of LNG, that 
doesn't affect you now does it, because your producers aren't in the AGA? That's more of fill issue for 
APPEA.} Yes defmitely. I mean it's an issue for the country, the issue that is a major export venture, but 
certainly not an interest for us, we don't care. From an AGA point of view we don't care. l have a strong 
personal view that the LNG producers are producing a very positive outcome for the whole world and I 
have an interest in their interests, but from an institutional point of view no, we don't care, it doesn't 
affect us one way or the other. [17;69-71] {Since the producers have gone, do you think that that 
liberated the AGA on greenhouse?} Yes, yes, basically AGA's policy which was around when the 
produeers were in is still flexible enough to ... every single point in there can be applied a little more 
liberally or more conservatively. {And in speeches and docwnents that AGA have put out since then has 
there been a tendency to tweak them in that direction?} Yes, yes, definitely. There's never been any 
concern about getting hit by AGA's membership anymore. No chance of somebody standing up in the 
conference saying, I am a member of this organisation and we absolutely dispute that. [17;49--551 
149 (AGA's) long term Machiavellian view which seems to be right ... if they pushed the gas producers 
back to (APPEA, then they would have) sole responsibility for growing the gas market for gas, because 
now that we had competition between gas basins occurring as gas pipelines were built, suddenly the 
monopoly situations of Santos and Esso BHP are now becoming unstuck .... If there are other operators 
in it or if we're thro"Wn in competition with another monopolist like Santos, suddenly the big plan about 
how tn maximise profits rails apart. So ... mutualise APPEA's greenhouse and regulatory stance and the 
only way (to) do that was have them pick up the gas producers and for the gas producers to realise they 
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In short, structural change in membership to expand coverage in the early to mid 1990s 
caused AGA greenhouse policy to stray from gas industry-specific interests while structural 
change to constrict membership after 1999 allowed the AGA greenhouse policy to better 
reflect gas industty-specific interests. Who the AGA has represented has to a large degree 
shaped the greenhouse policy of the organisation. 151 
Leadership 
Its leadership has been a very important influence on the AGA's response to climate 
change. Whilst it is tempting to attribute it to the AGA's various leaders, much of the 
organisational vacillation on greenhouse policy has been driven by other forces beyond 
their. Nonetheless, AGA leaders did have had an impact-~in some cases by not seeking to 
make an impact. 152 
The AGA had four main since climate change became a major policy concern-Ian 
Woodward, Peter Daikin, Greg Evans, and Bill Nagle. Under the leadership of Ian 
Woodward, who is widely regarded as a very competent and effective advocate the AGA 
was essentially 'part of the pack' in that it was closely aligned with those business 
associations that would eventually form the AIGN. Woodward, was a former ministerial 
had to actually ... the gas producers had to speak more loudly in APPEA and had to start talking about 
how to grow the domestic gas market ... So wha! we're seeing actually ... They won't ever admit this 
because Barry Jones will never admit this, but their views on regulatory and greenhouse policy have 
softened because AGA flicked them the gas producers and I run absolutely convinced that that was the 
reason and the gas producers have softened as well because suddenly Esso inherited the PNG pipeline. If 
they want to get the PNG pipeline built they can only get the PNG pipeline built if natural gas wins 
significant coal power generation off the Queensland coal industry and that gives you a head-to-head 
debate on greenhouse. It was the first time they've had to worry about that. [17;43-7] 
150 AGA have other pressures on our greenhouse position coming ftom an entirely different direction 
which is the fact that all AGA members now own electricity distribution and retail vice versa. Gas and 
electricity are converging and ESAA which is AGA's slsier organisation on the electricity stage is a very 
strong member of AIGN or has been because moS! of their members are coal fired pmver stations, brown 
and black coal. [17;55] 
"' The Australian Gas Association's approach to greenhouse probably reflects from time to time 'WTIO it 
considers it's representing [l7;ll] Well in the Gas association we have talked about Woodward and 
Nagle and I think they did have significant effects-but it was simpatico \.Vith where their members 
wanted to go .... (So itis largely preordained by the interest of the membership?} Yes [!3;296,302-4) 
152 It's been a high turnover. High turnover of CEOs certainly-and I've only ever met with the CEO 
level [39;136] I don't think many people have resourced someone to be on top of greenhouse policy. 
AGA had it in the hands of a chief executive but the turnover there killed that, killed the potentially very 
productive response or certainly neutered it. [45;253) 
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Liberal staffer153 with good links into the party. He was seen as having a very conservative 
outlook but at least according to some, he was well focused on promoting the interests of 
the gas sector. However, while there are indications that the AGA under his leadership 
recognised the opportunity presented by climate change to promote gas as a greenhouse-
friendly fuel, there is little evidence that the AGA was aggressive or effective in pursuing 
that opportunity. It appears that pressure from two directions prevented Woodward from 
taking the AGA in a more pro-active direction: the personal and professional links he had 
into the AIGN and its precursors, and the strong pressure from gas producers (then still a 
powerful voice in the AGA) not to break ranks from the mainstream resources sector policy 
position. 154 
153 The following political connections are listed in Mr Woodward's profile on the Columbia Business 
School website: 'Chief of Staff, Premier's Office and Director, Cabinet Office, Government of Tasmania 
(Hon Ray Groom); Chief of Staff, Office of the Minister for Minerals and Energy , Government of New 
South Wales (Hon Neil Pickard); Senior Policy Adviser to the Premier of New South Wales (Hon Nick 
Greiner); Mr Woodward subsequently ran for preselection for the federal seat of Mitchell in 2004--see 
West, Andrew 'Delay retirement, Cadman obeys,' Sydney Morning Herald 29 Feb 2004 
154 Australian Gas Association were quick to get involved when Ian Woodward was leading it. The AGA 
under him were part of the business 'team' at the beginning had not at that stage started to identify their 
own unique AGA separate interest in the greenhouse issue. AGA were part of the unified business 
position at the end of l 995. Their switch away from being part of the pack came later ... [25;36] The 
person that I have a lot of respect for who was the executive director of the Gas Association for a number 
of years was Ian Woodward who subsequently went on to AGL I think it was ... a very bright guy. He 
came out of some very interesting US background experience. He played a very subtle game of staying 
within the tent but constantly keeping the door open on their interest and it was players like the Coal 
Association, the Aluminium Council, Minerals Council, who lent quite heavily on them not to break 
ranks with the other major resource interests. And Ian chopped and changed accordingly as that pressure 
was applied, that was my perspective of it ... My sense of it is that the Gas Association in Ian's period 
was a key plank in the industry generational position and the period since his time I think they've been 
more marginal. [51;9Q-4] You see Woodward was very outspoken, young, aggressive, and public 
relations oriented. He had a need personally to have a presence in the media. That is how he lived. He 
liked to measure his success in column inches. That is OK for the head of an industry association. 
Though he wasn't a jerk he was a different style of leader to what the AGA had previously had-that is 
for sure. And, had he stayed he would have not necessarily made all of the right moves but he certainly 
would have been very outspoken. He would have had them having to take a position-and as the 
opportunities for the gas industry in the greenhouse debate matured for them to act as a responsible fossil 
fuel industry. [45;275] (When you say that they all failed in their own way? How did Woodward fail?) 
Woodward failed because he left without seeing the emerging opportunity. I think it was too hard for 
him. All of a sudden greenhouse comes along and he did not think it through-it was a wonderful 
opportunity for him. [45;293-5] I personally think that the Association has not regained the credibility 
that it had with Ian. [ 51; 102] Ian Woodward who was there in the early l 990s-you know, he came from 
a political background ... from the Liberal Party-and he had worked for various state premiers in 
Tasmania and went over and worked in the White House for a bit-he was very well connected in NSW 
Liberal circles. In fact he stood for preselection at the time in North Sydney-but I think he is now 
earning too much money at AGL that he wouldn't wanna do such a thing. Because he is the general 
manager of corporate (relations) in AGL. But Ian is very good value-he is smart, a good advocate, 
polished, and I have always had very very good relations with Ian. We have had our differences but it 
was extremely professional. We knew exactly where we were going, we had some cross-members-and 
you know he is just a good bloke to work with. [13;48-52] 
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After Woodward's departure, the AGA hired Peter Daikin. According to most observers it 
was a very strange choice that did liitle to advance the AGA's interests. He had no 
experience at leading an industry association, no experience in the gas sector, and his 
previous employment had been with the highly secretive Office of National Assessments. 
Most interviewees who ventured an opinion felt that the AGA's greenhouse policy drifted 
under Dalkin's leadership. He appeared to make little attempt to advanee the gas sector's 
interests in relation to climate change. More broadly, his apparent lack of understanding of 
the industry, and a marked reluctance to make timely contributions to public debate on 
greenhouse issues are seen both within the AGA and externally to have rendered the AGA 
ineffective during this period. For some insiders, the drift and lack of prominence under 
Daikin was hardly surprising given his career background, which involved trying not to be 
visible. Following Dalkin's departure, the AGA had an acting CEO in Greg Evans. While 
there are certainly some indications of progress towards a clearer AGA greenhouse policy 
position under his leadership, it is generally felt that this was a time when the AGA 'trod 
water' on greenhouse policy and more broadly.155 
This was to change dramatically with the arrival of former ALP ministerial staffer, Bill 
Nagle, as CEO. Nagle's appointment heralded some significant and much more rapid steps 
'"It was the one in between the ex-spook-·l can't remember his name ... (Woodward) was followed by 
the appointment of a senior statesman whose entire professional career had been involved in not being 
seen. It was such a change of style. The head of public relations for that organisation left fairly soon after 
the new fellow was appointed. His name evades many-he was so forgettable, he was so good at making 
himself forgettable. (So there was nothing to do the PR guy?} N()--{lothing to do, it was nothing that the 
fellow wanted done. He would sit on copy of draft press releases for three days and it would be overtaken 
by events. Things like that-he could not bring himself 1D be exposed willingly to the public eye. And 
even at public speaking events which were all in-house it was the same .... the change of style between 
those two leaders was just astounding-from Woodward to whats-his-name: the forgettable spook who 
managed in making the organisation invisible! [45;275] Peter came in for about a year and a half and was 
obviously not the man for the job for a whole range of reasons. I don't know what his position on ArGN 
was ... (AGA) sacked him and then there was a sort ofa gap for twelve months where they had somebody 
else acting in the position. It was in chaos for about twelve months ... Peter's approach to things was 
secretive apparently. {He's the ONA guy isn't he?) Wherever he came from, ONA or ASIO or wherever, 
and his position was ... he was here from the end of ... about fifteen or sixteen months, end of 97 to 
beginning of 99, then there was about an eight months' gap ... and AGA had one of their people (acting) 
and he picked up the greenhouse issue and his approach was just basically roll along and don't apply too 
much intellectual grunt to any issue. He's since been moved on as well. fWhat was his ruune?} Greg 
Evans. So Greg started going to A!GN and , .. and again I don't want to be critical of Greg or these guys 
because AGA aligned themselves with AIGN, the world had radically chllnged and they hadn't 
reassessed where they were going ... so the AGA fell into a bit of a hole. [17;!03-15) The Gas 
Association had three leaders during the 1990s. Forget who they had in between because he was such a 
non--0ntity ... the next guy I cannot even think of his name now-before Bill Nagle and he was from 
ASIO or from the Office of National Assessments or somewhere like that Now, this guy-! could never 
understand why they appointed him. And he was just totally out of his depth and he lasted about two 
years. And in the period, the AGA went into a malaise-they had no effect, no clout, and I mean this guy 
was a nice guy but he just did not know this game. He did not know how to lobby, he did not know the 
cut and thrust and the need to build alliances of influence ... And a lot of this stuff is done behind the 
scene~where we never saw him. So for probably two or three years they went into this sort of malaise 
really. And they finally decided and they sacked him. And then they brought Bill in [13;41\--57) 
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forward for the AGA in terms of defining and pursuing its greenhouse interests. However, 
this would not have been possible had it not been for his determination to resolve internal 
conflicts over just whom the AGA represented. Nagle recognised that differences in the 
membership were irreconcilable but had to be dealt with if the organisation was to become 
effective. This led to the fracturing of the membership base, and most glaringly the 
departure of major gas producing companies. It was not pleasant, but Nagle was well suited 
to the task. He is widely viewed as having 'sorted the AGA out,' as being a highly 
competent, a canny operator, not afraid of a stoush, and very strategic. His decision to 
remove the AGA from the AIGN and send the producers to APPEA reflects these qualities. 
It also reflects a degree of decisiveness and imperviousness to peer pressure not previously 
seen very often at the AGA. 
Having taken less than a month to publicly announce that the AGA was 'suspending' its 
association with the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, the AGA soon afterwards 
produced a detailed AGA Greenhouse Gas Abatement Policy, called for a federal 
government policy integrating energy and greenhouse issues, and made submissions to the 
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Inquiry into the Kyoto Protocol in August 2000, 
supportive of the Protocol's implementation. The AGA went onto the front foot on 
greenhouse policy and became far more united about its interests in the debate, and 
thumbed its nose at the AIGN pack. 156 The interview data collected here suggest that 
Nagle's leadership was a powerful catalyst for membership and cultural change at the 
AGA. 157 However, alongside this evidence, it also seems that leadership at the board level 
was moving in this direction, 158 and Nagle merely accelerated the process. 
156 They started to make the rest of us people in the resources industry a bit uncomfortable and we didn't 
actually believe in fighting amongst ourselves in public. {You mean there was a practice in the past of 
tending to sort out your differences behind closed doors?} Yes-it was certainly a preference. [13;24] 
His appointment coincided with a time when the AGA was trying to reassert a role in this area ... they 
have certainly taken a higher profile again with Bill there. But a pretty hard line profile too [13;60-4] 
157 See previous quote [19;43] under footnote 123 on the AGA being 'late players' prior to Nagle's 
arrival. 
Nagle showed up, grabbed it by the throat and said 'this is what we are doing everybody.' And, indeed 
he's abandoned parts of his industry-part of his association in a sense has left. He has discarded the 
pipeline industries I think. The upstream producers and pipeliners too. (So it is pretty much a retailer's 
organisation?} Pretty much a retailer's organisation-yes [45;287-9] (How has it changed?} Well I think 
Bill is probably a bit more engaged-has seen greenhouse is a bit of the strategic issue. And different 
leadership within the AGA would also deal differently with the influence of the coal industry on the Gas 
Association board-because there's a lot of coal producers on the gas board ... Bill is more politically 
savvy, more of a politically strategic thinker. In Bill's words, he said to me 'basically, whatever the 
community wants, it usually gets. It might take a while, but they eventually get it.' [39;2 l ()-22] {Would 
you say they have been effective since Bill Nagle took over?} Oh, I think they have been effective in the 
different position they have taken-yes-as far as I can see they are out and around there and they have a 
distinctive voice and they are seen as being very important. [l 1;51-4] The Australian Gas Association 
has been in a transition really since Bill Nagle became the CEO. He, like Minister Hill, and the AGO see 
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Resources 
It appears unlikely that the prevalence or lack of resources has been a very significant issue 
in the AGA response to climate change. The Association was viewed by outsiders as being 
comparatively well resourced, and that remained true even after the loss of producers and 
pipeliners. 159 The AGA had multiple offices and a relatively large staff in comparison with 
other industry associations. It on occasion participated in funding expensive consulting 
research on greenhouse issues~something it would not have been able to do without 
gas as a transition fuel and therefore he is quite actively involved and is very open and cooperative with 
us and is trying to promote his industry through us and through other channels as part of the greenhouse 
solution. [7;1 l]] Bill knows the game, he is a political hack, I mean he has come through a lot of the 
same pathways as us-and he is pretty effective. [13;60] 
158 
••• it was in fact with Grant King coming to be the chair and Bill Nagle being the Executive Director. I 
can't remember the exact chronology, but am pretty sure Grant King was key in getting the organisation 
to change. [II ;42] The Australian Gas Association-a non player in the debate throughout the 1990s 
... Now, it has changed with Bill Nagle coming in [!5;28-36] {And what has been the change since he 
(Nagle) has come in?} well it has got a bit more organised, They have decided that their best interest lies 
not ·with the Aluminium Council's side of the argument but in pursuing their own business interests by 
pursuing a transition to decarbonise. [15;62-4] l can't remember the exact chronology, but am pretty sure 
Grant King was key in getting the organisation to change. And from my recollection, there were a few 
fights inside the organisation and some splits which were not altogether to do with greenhouse. I think 
there was-I may be ·wrong about this---about two or three years ago--there was a big falling out on the 
issue between the producers and the distributors and the retailers and certainly the role of Shell and or 
Woodside inside the organisation was rather key in holding back from taking a more advanced position 
on greenhouse [l 1;42] l think they have bad some savvy individuals on the AGA Executive Board ... {It 
is just interesting to hear it the way you have put it in terms of micro-economic reform being the 
explanation for the transformation in the AGA whereas a number of other people have painted it very 
much as this individual story with Bill Nagle coming into the organisation and ever since then it has 
undergone this revolution,} It starts before Bill Nagle, They were off down that road-there was a guy-
! cannot remember his name now ... they have had several people who l think have not been particularly 
effective chief executives. You know, they have been perfectly nice and affable people. But if you go 
back four or five years they have actually had chairs of the board who were much more savvy-I can 
remember going to an AGA national conference about four or five years ago and they were taking a good 
hard look at their strategic planning and they were right on all about where tl1e interests were for this 
industry ... ! don't think it was particularly effectively prosecuted then you know by their chief executives. 
[27;36-52] 
159 I think the big side of town is very influential, they have the money to buy the services, the analyses, 
the economic analyses and the like, so you have the Aluminium Council and the Gas Association and the 
Forest Industries and the Farmers Federation, (all) well-equipped. [30;260] Gas Association I don't think 
put serious resourees into it .. , and they had serious resources [6;183-·-7] ... when I have chased them for 
information that l want or information tl1at we were sharing or detail on specific issues, both have had the 
sort of expertise available ... Gas Association in particular because it's bigger and has a technical unit in 
Melbourne as well as a research unit and political unit and statistical unit here. has usually been able to 
be more thoroughly responsive .. , The Australian Gas Association, a lot ofits members or some of its 
members are very, very big obviously but there are also an awful lot that aren't and it's somewhat more 
diverse in its membership. There is probably a need for, shall I say, greater mental power in the 
Secretariat ... [47;210-16] Gas Association l would assume is reasonably well resourced but probably not 
like the Aluminium Council. [7;171] 
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significant resources. Some suggest that the AGA even had a tendency to waste resources 
on consultants. 160 
The AGA did not laek the resources required to be a significant player in the greenhouse 
policy network. Certainly the organisation has had the necessary resources to prepare 
comprehensive AGA submissions to a range of greenhouse related government processes. 
While other industry associations have been content at times to allow the AIGN to speak 
for them on the issue, the A GA devoted additional resources to ensure that its own message 
was communicated to government and the wider community. The development of policy 
documents, media statements, conference speeches and various other public documents on 
greenhouse policy suggest that money was not an issue. 
That said, there does appear to have been some latent constraint on the organisation's 
engagement in the policy network over the years because of the relatively large share of 
resources provided by those members more inclined to support the AIGN line. As some 
observers noted, the gas producers and pipeliners provided a large share of the AGA's 
money and clout. Therefore, the possibility that they might leave--thereby cutting 
resources-may have made a more pro-gas position harder for the AGA to adopt. Some 
certainly imply this in interviews here, suggesting that the eventual departure of gas 
producers and pipeliuers took significant money and power with it. 161 
Another important element of this is that it was the gas producers who provided much of 
tbe in-kind resources so critical to the AGA during tbe mid-late 1990s. While AGL has in 
the eyes of some dominated the AGA's agenda, there is acceptance that this waned. 
However, in terms of the committees which decided the AGA's greenhouse policy, it was 
the gas producers who dominated proceedings and decisions prior to their departure from 
the organisation. As insiders point out, these companies were far better equipped to devote 
resources to ensuring that staff spent time on important policy issues and attended 
meetings. Most AGA companies, by contrast, were too small or too 'skinny' to devote such 
resources. It also appears that within the AGA, while they had the resources, they did not 
160 (The AGA) had a lot of money and they threw a lot of money at consultants ... They had someone 
relatively junior working on it part-time. Tiley spent their money by tnrowing money at consultants. 
[18;322) AGA have offered money to ABARE to do some work on some of the regulatory stuff nothing 
to do with greenhouse. They've stopped asking for money on greenhouse. AGA just don't have the 
resources to pay out that sort of money anyway. [I 7;155] 
161 He has discarded the pipeline industries 1 think. The upstream producers and pipeliners too. (So it is 
pretty much a retailer's organisation?} Pretty much a retailer's organisation-yes. The thing about that is 
that there was his strength too··-the firumcial and political and big bucks. [45;287-91) 
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devote them to the extent they might have. 162 Clearly the organisation felt that other issues 
were higher priorities, and a consequence of this was that the AGA appears to have lacked 
the staff resources to get properly across the issue. 163 In this environment the gas producers 
had little problem filling the vacuum. Prior to Bill Nagle's decision to withdraw the AGA 
from the AIGN it would seem that they effectively dominated the organisation's decision 
making on greenhouse network engagement. 164 
Some viewed Nagle as an important resource in the organisation's response.165 The AGA 
continued to devote resources to the issue in defiance of the AIGN, 166 and appeared not to 
be constrained in their lobbying by the loss of the revenue which had come from the 
producers and pipeliners. Some felt the AGA could and would eventually acquire an 'icon 
162 Whereas the AGA don't put resources into it so they don't get much out ofit. ... So, whereas the AGA 
might have the resources if they chose to apply them ... [39;266-8] 
163 I'm not aware of there being policy officers or people who can inform their involvement in things like 
greenhouse through research and stuff. I don't think they've got anyone-I mean I wou!d have met 
them-I would have been told, 'you should ta!k to so and so .. .' [39;136] The reason the Australian Gas 
Association has been so schizophrenic on greenhouse is be<:ause, no one within the organisation bas had 
enough intellectual clout to force the members to confront the realities of what we are talking about. .. 
They (AGA} had someone relatively junior working on it part-time. They spent their money by throwing 
money at consultants. Consultants give you the answer you want. Other groups have vigorous in-house 
brawls. Tuey might spend days when we are in and out of that boardroom drawing on a whiteboard--and 
saying, hang on, doesn't it mean this? Doesn't it mean that? And the short answer which they have come 
to is that you cannot raise the price of coal higher to make it less attractive than gas and still have 
customers. And you have to split the energy market into the export gas market, the domestic gas market, 
and the alternative fuel market. And then domestically. you have to split it again between electricity and 
process heat. Tuey are all different markets. And the price signals are different. Until you actually get 
down and start saying look-this is nothing more than a price signa!--how does the price signal affect 
each part of the market? And then you can have a debate with your members. And when a member says 
to you very simplistically-'yes, but gas is clean and green-we wiU just sell more gas?' The first thing 
you say to him is--'yes, but how much actually will the price of gas rise relative to the price of coal-
how high does the price of coal actually have to rise before your product is competitive. What is the price 
of electricily when you do that? Will you still have customers out there in the market?' And it is not to 
acrually go down that line that you actuaHy start getting sensible debate. {And presumably-how much 
more can coal lower its own price iu order to compete with a subsidised gas sector?} If you force more 
gas into the market you have more surplus capacity for coal, and they start marginal e-0st pricing gas-if 
you force enough gas into the market you start to find the price of coal-fired electricity actually going 
down. Not up. Until you start understanding those loops-you have no hope. [18; 316-20,322-8] 
164 They are also prepared to recruit out of the political network. I guess that's e-0nsistent with a lot of 
industry associations at the moment. There's a lot of movement at quite senior level between government 
or politics and organisations and back again and I think the reason for it is the maintenance of those close 
links and the importance that they attach to having the ear of government for wmking hand in hand with 
them. {So if you look at the response of say the AA C and the AGA it's a sort of Canberra insider culture 
which has been significant, would you say?} I would [47;144...Jl] 
165 A prime example where the lead proponent on behalf of that industry association has a good 
understanding of the bureaucraey~Bill Nag!e and others.,. yes"-they understand which buttons to press, 
how to press them and they press them. [30;228] 
166 And that the way they did it was not only to announce that they were defecting, but then to 
commission a few studies from reputable consulting firms proving the environmental advantages of gas 
and putting them out there. And then you found that the coal lobby ended up commissioning their own 
work to try to attack the AGA's work ... [31;215) 
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status' which would be a resource to reinforce its greenhouse policy influence.167 In these 
ways, resources issues had a marginal influence on the AGA's greenhouse policy response. 
Meso-level 
Policy implications 
Unlike some of the interest groups considered in this research, climate change-as distinct 
from policy aimed at combating it--does not pose significant good or harm for the gas 
industry. Its resources are almost entirely unaffected by increased temperature, higher sea 
levels, more frequent and intense weather events and the other likely consequences of 
increased global warming. However, the issue does present major policy implications for 
the gas industry because policy measures which aim to reduce greenhouse emissions have 
the potential to provide a major short-medium term boost to the industry. In short, if 
nothing is done in response to climate change it is a status quo situation for the gas 
industry. However, if much is done by government in response to climate change it could 
be very beneficial for the industry. 
The main reason why gas companies stand to gain is that greenhouse response measures by 
government could act as a powerful incentive for fuel-switching to gas from more carbon-
intensive energy sources like coal and oil. With a rising population and rapidly increasing 
demand for energy Australian policymakers have to find ways to make major cuts in the 
carbon-intensity of the economy. In the absence of nuclear power, and with coal geo-
sequestration a distant prospect, gas is one of the most obvious energy sources which could 
play a role in reducing emission intensity (along with renewables and energy efficiency). 
Gas is significantly less emission intensive than coal and oil, and also more competitive 
than most renewable options. It is widely appreciated that gas could, and arguably should, 
play a much greater role in the domestic Australian energy market. 168 
167 The Farmers' Federation are well resourced and are able to fight when they need to fight on different 
things but do not have a particularly clear focus. The Gas Association has, has its money and the rest of 
it. So, I think there are some iconic industries here which have influence by virtue of their history and 
status ... Gas not so much, but it can and it will, it is a newer industry. [30;264] 
168 Initially the gas industry-the AGA-was not interested in the debate, then they worked out that there 
was a marketing advantage-or they thought there was a marketing advantage--that greenhouse policy 
would drive coal out of electricity generation and more gas would be used and this was great for 
marketing and development. [18;36] Just on the basic combustion processes, yes, there's big advantage 
of gas over coal. .. the gas industry have been much more positive in saying this is presumably to our 
advantage. They were not denying the science, what they were saying really is that there needs to be a 
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As well, Australian gas could, and seems likely to, play a much larger role in helping the 
world to respond to climate change. Australian LNG resources--particularly from the 
North West Shelf--are likely to be in much greater demand. In part because of the risk 
perceived by other governments about continued reliance on coal and oil, Australia has 
succeeded in locking up some impressive LNG contracts in recent years. In this way, 
Australia's gas industry is in a position to benefit financially from assisting to reduce the 
greenhouse intensity of our trading partners. Notwithstanding the significant emissions 
associated with the production of LNG for export, it would appear to be clearly in the 
interests of the Australian gas industry to have stronger rather weaker international policies 
in place to reduce greenhouse emissions. 
In principle, the gas industry should be a net winner from policy measures which aim to 
reduce greenhouse emissions in Australia. A 'cap and trade' emissions trading system, for 
example, would be likely to encourage greater use of gas over alternatives as a means for 
industry to reduce their emissions whilst accommodating greater production. State or 
federal government mandates for the use of gas would be likely to increase the market 
share of gas in the energy market. Gas, particularly when combined with co-generation 
options has also demonstrated it is reasonably cost competitive against other sources in 
emissions reduction programs. The increased pressure to consider greenhouse implications 
in environmental approvals of major industrial projects would also appear to favour gas. 
Likewise, the more attention there is to the need to reduce greenhouse emissions, the more 
likely ii is that overall energy policy will take climate change into account--'!>omething 
which on the surface would appear to favour gas. 
All of these implications have been clearly recognised by the AGA over many years-
something which is confirmed in various statements by the organisation. They have been at 
the heart of the AGA's varying degree of enthusiasm for greenhouse response measures by 
the Australian government. However, it is generally accepted that the response of the AGA 
is not a good reflection of these policy implications. That is, there appears to some to have 
been a marked disconnect between the implications of the issue and the response of the 
AGA. We have already seen that there were significant cultural, membership, and 
leadership issues which constrained the AGA from pursuing what would appear to have 
been its greenhouse interest. These issues added a layer of complexity which effectively 
growing gas industry to meet the existing (demand) in a more environmentally conscious way and to 
meet demands for reductions of emissions. [38;33] 
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clouded and distorted the interests of the gas sector at difforent stages. However, there were 
also major policy limitations which restricted the AGA response and these are discussed 
below. 
Policy limitations 
This research finds that there are three main ways in which policy limitations contributed to 
the AGA's greenhouse response. There were limitations associated with the split 
interests-with significant AGA members standing to lose from policy measures otherwise 
in the interests of the gas sector. There were physical limitations on the gas infrastructure 
which made it less practicable for opportunity to be translated into beneficial policy. 
Finally, there have been major policy design limitations which have made the AGA's 
policy preferences less achievable and problematic for the organisation to advance. 
As we have seen already, the AGA broadened its membership in the early 1990s to 
encompass gas producers. With this broadening, and with the privatisation and 
diversification of gas companies, far more AGA members had interests extending beyond 
the gas industry. For many large companies, their interests in coal and oil were significantly 
larger than their interests in gas. These companies had split interests on the climate change 
issue. Whilst recognising the opportunities in gas from the point of view of greenhouse 
policy reform, they also realised that the benefits available to gas came almost entirely at 
the expense of coal and oil. For these organisations, which also dominated the AGA's 
greenhouse policy direction for a Jong time, the overall interest ·was to put the brakes on 
greenhouse policy measures. 169 
Another major limitation for the AGA on climate change has been resource location and 
infrastructure restraints. For example, Australia's largest and most promising gas resources 
are not conveniently located near to Australia's largest and most fast growing centres for 
169 Interestingly, it is not unambiguously all winners in the case of the gas industry. There are some losers 
there too. [19;55] not really out there pro actively trying to take market share from coal ... [39;36] I think 
their (the AGA's) approach is much more calculated-they can see that they can both win or for lose out 
of Kyoto and so they hav~ that gives them a some.,,'hat ambivalent approach to it. [2;24] 
See also the previous quote [JI ;46] under footnote 140 regarding the potential for AGA's large members 
to dominate group behaviour. (The interviewee went on to say) I think they had these members-who 
would have thought at that stage that they were fill industry which would be disadvfil!taged by agi,,'Tessive 
policy actions on greenhouse. [ 11 ;46] 
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energy demand.170 Some argue that most of the gas is in the far north west of the continent 
while the demand is by and large in the south east comer. Partly as a consequence of the 
distance. the gas industry has little choice but to focus on the LNG export market. Because 
gas in the north west is not connected to the national grid and because the cost of building 
pipelines across the continent is not deemed cost-effective, there is an unavoidable physical 
limitation on the scope for the Australian gas industty to meet projected national energy 
demand to the extent it might like. These exporters also have concerns about the significant 
greenhouse emissions associated with the production of LNG. For such companies, 
therefore, there is little interest in expanding the domestic gas market when their biggest 
opportunities are disconnected from the opportunity. 
Similarly, due to the nature of the Australian gas network, there are regional monopolies 
which have for many years meant that the pipeliners are fo~-used on profitability rather than 
throughput. The lack of competition in regional markets has made some of these members 
ambivalent on the greenhouse policy agenda. 171 Ambivalent exporter and pipeliner voices 
within the AGA, along with outright hostile producer voices, have combined to severely 
limit the scope for the AGA to pursue a greenhouse-friendly gas promotion agenda. 
The likely desigu of policy mechanisms which would benefit the gas industty is also an 
issue which limited the capacity of the AGA to pursue its greenhouse policy interests. As 
insiders have noted, it is not inevitable that greenhouse emission constraints would benefit 
170 But I haven't seen it much of late even though I think they are but I haven't followed it very closely 
but there's been some talk of a pipeline that comes from the west and comes over to the east, It reminds 
me of Rex Connor, But the question in my mind was simply well I can see why they want to do that, is it 
going to be cost effective. I just don't know. I mean lhere V-'llS a lot of talk in the Connor days about it 
being a very costly thing so it's really a question since nobody in the things that I have read has put out a 
cost benefit analysis of the pipeline and in the time of Rex Connor you didn't do that kind of analysis. So 
I suppose I was interested in reading about the pipeline but now we're still waiting for the ne>."t shoe to 
drop which would have been somebody saying this fits economically as well as sounding lilre a great 
idea. [32;74) You have east coast and west coast, but not the two connected, that we are dependent much 
more on costly infrastructure than electricity-transmission infrastrru:ture-and in that context the gas 
industry is fragmented along state lines to a large extent. [30; 16) you know you hear these statements like 
'We have 200 years of gas supply in Australia.' Yes, well we do, but it is all up in the North West Shelf 
and the gas market in Australia is in the south east and unless we huild Rex Connor's trans-Australian 
pipeline you actually have potential gas supply deficiency in the south east and the north west is all about 
a gas export market it is not about a domestic gas market. Gas in electricity is a fact in WA, in SA and in 
the NT it is at least half of the electricity generation in those jurisdictions, but in the eastern seaboard, in 
Qld, NSW and Victoria, it is down around 2 per cent. In Tasmania it doesn't matter it is the other way 
around it is mainly hydro and the marginal electricity supply is going to be ga.,._.it is a re-write of the 
French situation-when you put more gas into Tasmania you're actually getting an increase in 
Tasmania's greenhouse gases, [18;56] 
t7t I mean the Gas Association were fairly narrow in their application. I mean they were pushing the line 
that gas was better than coal and a key impediment to gas V.'llS the la£k of a competitive market 
nationally, that there were barriers to trade betwem1 the states and that that bad to be broken down. That 
tended to be their main line. [6;27] 
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the gas industry. For example, it is conceivable that an emissions trading system might 
actually hurt the gas industry. It is also demonstrable that programs which fuvour 
renewable energy sources can be detrimental to the gas industry. Policy design is all 
important. 172 
However, what is clear is that policy measures which would benefit the gas industry would 
also hurt the coal and oil industries. Conversely, measures which would not constitute a 
cost to these sectors would be of little benefit to the gas industry. The Australian 
government has demonstrated that it is unwilling to compromise the availability of cheap 
energy-{)specially coal. To a degree the gas industry risks being squeezed by policy 
designed to protect coal interests whilst being seen to support renewable interests. There is 
also a feeling among some in the network that the window of opportunity for gas is limited 
anyway.173 The industry also faces policy design problems at the international level. With 
the departure of the producers from the AGA, the organisation became ambivalent about 
whether the Kyoto Protocol should be ratified and what that might mean for exporters. 
In summary the main policy measures which might benefit gas would also financially harm 
the interests of companies with major investments in coal and oil. Governments in 
172 Greenhouse is not necessarily good for gas unambiguously. It may be or it may not be. You could still 
introduce an emissions trading scheme now that screwed gas and rewards coal. So saying you're in 
favour of an emissions trading scheme doesn't necessarily get you anywhere. Saying you're interested in 
ratification doesn't get you anywhere. You can introduce an emissions trading scheme in the way that 
actually is a big win for gas, particularly gas transmission and power stations. Gas plpeliners, ·gas 
distribution businesses who are AGA's major members wiio run little gas pipelines through cities, you 
don't run power stations off them you run them off the big pipelines which go from the producers' basin 
across the countryside. They're interesied in power stations, AGA's other members aren't because you 
don't run the power stations. It's only good for the major projects. But anyway, have a look at those. You 
have to kind of understand the gas market to understllnd the AGA position. [17;163] 
173 We're used to say this to them--that, for example, the renewables mandate measure that came in--
which has announced the end of 1997 and was implemented a couple of years later-we used to say to 
them-'you know, coal is not the one that is going to be backed out of this, it is gas penetration into 
marginal electricity power generation that is going to be backed out of this. You know, you are the losers 
here-not coal. You know, coal will continue to provide the base load.' [13;40] The natural gas industry 
is playing a slightly dangerous game in its clean green approach to the world-it's a fossil fuel like coal. 
{What do you mean by that, that sooner or later they (the greens) will turn their attentions to gas?} Well, 
l mean, if in the fullness of time quite draconian measures are taken against coal, and I frankly don't see 
that happening in any timeframe that matters, but if they were then natural gas is just another fonn of 
fossil fuel, it's a lower emitting one but it's not a non-emitter and of course once you start factoring in the 
C02 that's squelches out to the atmosphere at the wellhead, which is the little one that tends to get 
forgotten, you're starting to have rather a lot ofC02 involved in it. [37;11-15] One of the things we kept 
on saying to them is-and l think we are starting to see that now-is that there was a sequential approach 
on the part of the green lobby at times to-their first target was coal, '(we) don't like coal, so let's have 
coal out, but we can't have nuclear--but let's have no coal as well.' You know, it is ridiculous in 
Australia's context. But, they were trying to fonn an alliance with the gas industry and the gas industry 
saw some benefit in fom1ing an alliance with the green groups on the basis that gas is cleaner and this is a 
transitional fuel. Well we kept on saying--'Look, guys as soon as they think they have knocked off coal, 
you will be knocked off as well. You will then be the worst.' {You will be next?} Yes [!3;40-44] 
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Australia have demonstrated a strong disinclination to do anything which hurts the coal 
industry in particular. Yet without such policy intervention, gas is either not cost 
competitive or is physically not available. Gas seems unlikely to be competitive in the near 
future unless there are: significant cost penalties incorporated into the energy market for 
carbon content (by emissions trading or other mechanisms), significant government 
subsidies both to make gas more competitive and more available, or mandates introduced 
which require a certain proportion of electricity to be sourced from gas (as has occurred in 
Queensland). Because there is such clear government reluctance to pursue these measures, 
and because there is such strident opposition from industry (including companies with large 
investments in the gas industry) these policy opportunities are severely limited. For much 
of the period since greenhouse has emerged as an issue, these limitations made it extremely 
difficult for the AGA's members to be united behind an agreed policy position. 
Coalition activity 
Compared with other groups studied here coalition activity has been especially relevant to 
the waxing and waning involvement of the AGA in the greenhouse policy network. The 
impact of that coalition activity has varied over time mainly because the AGA has been 
under such heavy pressure to align itself with both sides of the debate. The AGA has been 
lobbied repeatedly by green NGOs and by the environmentally sympathetic elements of the 
federal government to play a leading role as a business voice in favour of stronger 
greenhouse policy measures by Australia. 174 For many, the AGA ought to have been at the 
forefront of any business push for Kyoto Protocol ratification and stronger domestic 
greenhouse policy. Meanwhile, the AGA has been under consistent pressure from the fossil 
fuel indust1y and resources sector more broadly, not to break ranks from its traditional 
allies.175 For many years, the A!GN was very effective as a coalition in keeping the AGA 
174 As far as I can see they are out and around there and they have a distinctive voice and they are seen as 
beiag very important. But I think that's assisted by--there are a lot of other groups out there who want 
them to be effective as well. So it has worked the other way round as well. I think there are a lot of them 
beating on their door and saylng 'c'monjoin ;;ith us' that kind of thing. [11 ;54] 
115 (For example) Dick Wells had cause to take Bill Nagle aside and say 'you know you pursue this 
hardline and you scratch the coal industry too much harder and they will come out and we will start 
talking about nitrous oxide emissions, methane emissions, or pipe leakages-you know there is a lot of 
health issues around burning gas particularly in these unflued burners in Victoria which contributes a 
lot.' And Dick said to him 'we know this is your Achilles' heel--don't do it~because if you do it we'll 
have a big brawl between the energy industries in this country in the public arena which won't do 
anybody any good.' And you know I remember someone saying 'Geez, Dick, you were tough on Bill that 
night,' And Dick said well, 'I just don't believe in this sort of crap. Sure you can leverage yourself up, 
advocate your strengths and go for it. And !f you are that good, you will win.' {But not by putting others 
down?} No, this leveraging down, he just thought it was nonsense that because you know, there is room 
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'inside the tent' even though there was recognition that the gas industry had an interest in 
the debate somewhat different to its 'carbon cousins' in the coal and oil industry. How the 
AGA has come to terms with this constant tension from suitors on all sides of the policy 
network has been an important part of this case study. 
In the early years of the climate change debate, the AGA was a very different type of 
organisation. It consisted largely of state owned utilities. Because of the clearer distinction 
between these entities and the companies most prominent in the oil, coal and minerals 
processing sectors in this period, there was perhaps less affinity between the gas sector and 
their counterparts in the broader resources sector. This may help to explain the initial 
enthusiasm of the AGA in seizing what they saw as an opportunity presented by the climate 
change issue to sell more gas (Dixon 1989). However, with privatization, deregulation and 
national competition policy, the distinction blurred as gas utilities merged into companies 
many of which had interests in other fossil fuels-most notably coal and oil. Under these 
circumstances, and with the AGA expanding its membership to accommodate these new 
entities it seemed more natural to align the AGA with the broader industry coalitions being 
formed around the climate change agenda. Given that much of that agenda was happening 
overseas where international negotiation processes were occurring, it made sense to share 
the resources of others in monitoring it as it developed. Against this background the AGA 
became 'part of the pack' in the BCA's work on greenhouse, and subsequently as a 
member of the AIGN when this was set up. By all reports the AGA was a passive member 
of this coalition, never taking a prominent committee role. It went along with the decisions 
made by the broader group. 
According to AIGN insiders, the AGA recognised that it had an interest significantly 
different from those of other members of that coalition, but was reluctant to push that 
agenda. Personalities were a significant factor, with the then AGA boss, Ian Woodward, 
being accepted both professionally and personally as 'part of the club,' or 'mafia' as senior 
AIGN figures liked to call the operation. 176 Woodward would occasionally look like 
in the market, and energy markets are going to double in Australia in the next JO to 15 years. We're 
gonna need every energy source we can get ... There is room for everybody in here. [J 3;60-4 
"' Roger Beale who heads the Environment Department and Barry Jones who heads APPEA-in 1975 
(they) had offices next door to each other in the same government agency. And their boss V.'llS Michael 
Keating who used to be the Secretary of the Prime Minister's department. (Is that right? It is a small 
tuwn.} It is a small town alright In some respects that cross culture, that thinking, that peer group 
relationship, that knowledge of the bureaucracy, that is what distinguishes the top two (groups on your 
list) --the Aluminium Council and the Gas Association-from the rest of that list of ease studies. When 
Robert Bain was there-at NAFl-he was part of the mafia-he was the fom1er head of ABARE·-but 
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asserting a more forceful AGA line which was not in sync with the rest of the group and 
would soon find himself under heavy pressure not to stray too far. The impression gained is 
that belonging was more important than pursuing a separate AGA interest on the issue. 
After his departure the AGA was directionless 011 greenhouse policy and by all reports 
remained part of the AIGN largely as a result of inertia. 
However, with the Kyoto conference outcome and the steady change in the shape of the gas 
industry, it became increasingly more difficult to stay in the pack. 177 The AGA found it 
harder and harder to ignore its distinct interest. 178 It began to develop its own distinct 
greenhouse policy, started to refuse to sign AIGN statements, and ultimately, as we have 
seen, the new CEO, Bill Nagle, made the decision to formally take the AGA out of the 
AIGN. This fractured the resourees sector solidarity on greenhouse policy unlike anything 
which had previously occurred. It infuriated many, 179 went against strong pressure from 
the others there have been entirely different .... (they} have not been played into the Canberra system. 
[18;256] 
111 Back in 93, 4, 5, 6. It was a relatively comfortable ride to be a member of the AIGN or whatever they 
were then called because you had the opposition, you had part of government and you had most of the 
departments and all the industry groups in a position of extreme scepticism. We were all greenhouse 
sceptics, the science was still a bit unclear ... It would have been a natural move for the AGA to align 
themselves with the AIGN and the gas producers and all of that because it was a sort of irrelevancy for 
the gas companies at that time because they weren't competing wilh each other. They were lazy, cashed 
up utility businesses where the debate over their income streams was sort of hidden in state budgets and 
stuff ... once competition policy came through and started cutting the tariffs that they were permitted to 
charge, suddenly they had to be worried about how much throughput there was. Before that, again, the 
throughput was the throughput, you just charged whatever ... [17;91] 
178 {You think the A GA has moved from a position of being in step with what we would broadly refer to 
as the carbon lobby or would you just say it was disinterest in the early days?) No it was disinterest in 
the early days then it got very out of step because it was you know 'we saw this great market advantage 
and greenhouse was going to lead to more and more gas going into the market.' [18;50-2] 
119 According to friends of mine in the Mining Council, this was fairly short-sighted and the Mining 
Council should never have let that gap appear between the 'coalies' and the 'gasies' ... [10;64] When 
AGA took a brave decision to pull the AGA out of the Australian industry Greenhouse Network ... the 
response was absolutely furious from most of the gas producers who threatened to v.,reak revenge of 
some kind, retribution. So that was a big issue. The rest of the membership either didn't care or thought it 
was about bloody time AGA did that, not because there was a very strong greenhouse view in the 
membership downstream, but ... there was this issue about ... members and other people outside the 
organisation kept saying, 'why was the Gas Association in the AIGN,' and it was a good question. 
[17;27] The Australian Gas Association was a member of the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network 
when John Eyles first took it over, but I think about after a year that ... the Gas Association decided that 
they didn't want to continue to be a part of the nelwork and although the explanation given was that they 
didn't feel that they were getting enough to justify the cost to them, I think they actually used the 
opportunity of leaving the network to try and make some other political points and get a bit of media 
focus for themselves at the time, which from my point of view was a bit disappointing. I had no problem 
with any member of the network who felt that in tight budget times, which everyone has~·they could do 
better with their money, that was fine--but yeah it was a bit political at the time. [29; 13] 
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senior AIGN members, and led to various threats of revenge. 180 However, Bill Nagle was 
not one to be deterred by this significant peer pressure. 181 
Conversely, it gave a great deal of heart to sections of government and the environmental 
movement who were on the look out for business voices in favour of a stronger greenhouse 
policy response by Australia. Organisations like the ACF, and other 'green business' 
coalitions sought to build relationships with the AGA. While cooperation did occur, it was 
limited, and no significant coalition between the AGA and green interests ever developed. 
In fact, the AGA and its more prominent members declined some important opportunities 
in this area leaving the impression that they remained firmly on the fence in the debate.182 
Nonetheless, the departure of the AGA from the AIGN has not been without consequences. 
It helped to bring on the split between the gas producing members of the AGA and the 
remaining members. With their departure from the organisation (in favour ofrepresentation 
mainly through the APPEA) and the establishment of the Australian Pipeline Industry 
Association (APIA) the AGA became a much more retailer dominated interest group. 
While some argue that this rendered the AGA less influential because it could not claim to 
represent the gas industry as plausibly, it certainly enabled the AGA to take a line on 
greenhouse policy which was noticeably less dependent upon the position of the 'pack.' It 
"
0 The AGA started to depart from that probably in about 1993 or 1994, and accelerated that a few years 
after to the point that they were sort of advocating that gas was a transitional fuel to a non fossil fuel 
based economy which we all thought was dishonest... the Australian Gas Association-they 
progressively started to separate themselves out from the rest of the industry. Whilst it used to stay in the 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network for example, it was never really a core member. And in fact, 
they never sat on the AIGN board-really they were there to glean information and to understand where 
people going rather than to be too far out of it. [\3;36] AGA had co-signed a submission off ... which 
Nagle's predecessors had co-signed, a submission off to some senate inquiry on greenhouse, signed off 
an AIGN submission and Nagle read it and thought, 'why would we want to sign that, you know-
seriously? Even if we were still relatively comfortable with being in the AIGN, AIGN had some sort of 
democratic processes that at various times members were given the right not to sign off on submissions.' 
So I think the next submission that came up AGAjust refused to sign it and the AIGN people said, 'Yes, 
we understand that. We're surprised you've been signing our previous submissions.' And Nagle thought, 
well there you go ... this is crazy ... [17;39] 
181 In relation to the significant peer pressure, see previous quote [\3;24] under footnote 156 describing 
the prevailing strong preference among resource industry groups to keep their differences for debate 
'behind closed doors.' [13;24] Nagle came along, and within weeks was making armouncements that 
were directly at variance with those of the coal lobby. In fact, I think the AGA then left the AIGN which 
was a very significant move, and it caused a lot of ructions within the gas industry. And, they basically 
sidelined those companies which had split interests and focused just on the ones that were predominantly 
gas. [31;215] Just who the AIGN represents is to me pretty clear and the fact that when Bill Nagle 
resolved his issues he saw it as an organisation that he could not remain a member of, and we've had 
some very interesting experiences with the AIGN too where they've clearly been lobbying against the 
interests of some of their members. [7;211] { ... so Bill Nagle is not part of the mob?} No. [18;354-{)] 
182 See previous quote [15;36-44] under footnote 132 
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also appears that the AGA made a judgment about the longevity and relevance of the pack 
in their decision to take an independent line. 183 
~vermnent and/or departmental processes 
Non-parliamentary government processes have had only sporadic influence on the AGA's 
level of engagement in the greenhouse policy network. There is little doubt that 
government officials worked hard to try to encourage greater AGA involvement. 
Environment portfolio bureaucrats saw the AGA as 'good guys' in the greenhouse debate 
and ·wanted very much to see greater engagement. m The AGA at times appeared to 
respond to government overtures-as with their involvement in the National Greenhouse 
Advisory Panel in the mid 1990s (Environment Australia 1996:4), the AGO inquiries into 
emissions trading, the Greenhouse Challenge, and the Business Dialogue. There was an 
increase in responsiveness after the Kyoto conference and after the Howard government 
announced the 'Safeguarding the Future' measures in 1997. This responsiveness increased 
further following the AGA's departure from the AIGN in 1999. However., as the interview 
comments here reinforce, the involvement was usually sporadic and unconvincing. 
It has been a source of longstanding frustration to many government officials that the AGA 
appeared uninterested in what appeared to be a clear opportunity to use climate change to 
push for greater gas sales. However, as we have seen, the complexities of the AGA's 
membership meant that government made some mistaken assumptions on this issue. ms 
183 The changing of the guard might be just about to happen. You know, if the BCA managed to get 
through a reasonably sympathetic greenhouse policy and if Mitch Hook continues to run the Business 
Coalition on Greenhouse Strategy, then the AIGN and those people are irrelevant. {And you think that's 
what's going on?} Yes, and it has to happen eventually. I've been a runner in the g-=e for ten years or 
whatever and l think that's really ... that's why there's so much strong kickback and they all have this 
quite arrogant chuckle amongst themselves about (how) 'Mitch doesn't even know what no regrets 
means.' I mean who gives a fuck what no regrets means? Policy's not going to be on the basis of whether 
or not you actually understand all the obscure greenhouse science terms. [I 7;379--83] 
'"The Gas Association is influential in the sense that they're good guys and they're open with us and 
they help us to understand issues. Aluminium Council is influential in the sense that they're basically bad 
guys because we see them as trying to obstruct everything we ever want to do, but they no doubt have an 
effect in being effective blockers, [7;183] 
185 {Presumably within the bureaucracy there are some trying to egg AGA on?} Yes, there was a strong 
view I think in the Greenhouse Office and Environment Australia that AGA seem to have been doing 
things against their own interests on greenhouse policy and that the AIGN was the bette-noire of the 
Greenhouse Office. Everywhere Greenhouse Office turned the AIGN were putting up roadblocks, and I 
think your previous friend, Senator Hill, was very critical of the AGA or maybe he never thought about 
it, but certainly some of his staff members were quite critical of the AGA's approach and couldn't 
understand it, and I was reasonably sympathetic to that. I think that they didn't understand the subtleties 
of the market as well as they thought they did and therefore I think some of the criticisms were 
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Also, while the green bureaucrats were friendly and strengthened compared to earlier eras 
especially after the establishment of the AG0186, the traditional AGA links were into the 
old Department of Primary Industry and Energy.187 
Parliamentary processes 
Parliamentary inquiries have had a marginal impact on the AGA in terms of its greenhouse 
network engagement. In the late 1980s at the very beginning of heightened attention to the 
issue of climate change, the AGA as we have seen was one of the first active interest 
groups. It appears that this engagement was largely driven by Bettye Dixon-then the 
Research Manager-Environment at the AGA. Dixon (1989) had been an active speaker on 
greenhouse issues, was among three witnesses who gave evidence at the first Parliamentary 
Inquiry into climate change in 1991. The inquiry gave the AGA an opportunity which it 
took enthusiastically to promote the potential of the gas industry to assist in reducing 
greenhouse emissions in Australia-in large part by increasing its market share in the 
domestic energy market over other fossil fuels. 
However, as we have seen, after an initially high degree of enthusiasm and independent 
advocacy, from the early 1990s and right through until the Kyoto conference the AGA 
tended to cede the responsibility to respond to government requests for industry comment 
to broad industry coalitions. Prior to the establishment of the Australian Industry 
Greenhouse Network, this meant supporting the position of the Business Council of 
Australia. However, once the AIGN established a more formal industry network, the AGA 
regularly signed off on the positions adopted by the broader resources sector. 
However, following 1997 with the announcement of a major federal government policy 
package aimed at addressing greenhouse emissions, and with the successful outcome to the 
Kyoto conference, the AGA began taking a more independent line when it came to 
unjustified, but I tbink tbe main point was well made. So that's why AGA pulled out of tbe AIGN. 
(l 7;35-9] 
186 The strengthening of green elements of government has indirectly bolstered AGA resources: the 
AGO, by absorbing industry department people and others, it was still like a bit of a honey pot for the 
green, enthusiastic sort of officials but it had a bit of otber injections in it so the work's been a lot more 
rigorous than it used to be before (like when a) cabinet submission in 1995 went up with a greenhouse 
tax which was just kind oflike 'back of the envelope' sort of stuff. [l 7;131] 
187 Two groups which I have most dealings with on the list are the Australian Aluminium Council, and 
the Australian Gas Association. [47;16] 
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parliamentary processes.188 In these submissions the AGA took a far more pro-gas line than 
is to be found in joint industry submissions to which the AGA had been a party in the mid 
to late 1990s. 
International processes 
The AGA's greenhouse policy position ha~ been influenced by the direction and 
momentum of international climate change processes. The AGA's initial interest in the 
issue came on the back of international concern about it in the late 1980s, and the 
organisation recognised quite early the potential opportunity for gas presented by 
Australian participation in an international greenhouse emission reduction effort. In the 
early J 990s with the establishment of the FCCC and numerous follow-up meetings, the 
AGA participated in broader industry work to monitor the progress of international 
greenhouse processes. However, in this era the international process was not taken too 
seriously.189 
However, with the prospect of a binding agreement coming out of the Kyoto conference in 
1997, and Australia's success agairmt the expectations of many to obtain support for its 
differentiation policy and its 108 per cent emissions target, the international greenhouse 
process became a lot more serious for the country and for the AGA. 190 The organisation 
began to devote much more attention and resources to greenhouse policy than had 
previously been the case. AGA statements began to reflect recognition of a much more 
distinct interest for this industry than the broader comments corning from the AIGN. The 
AGA became an advocate of Australian participation in the Kyoto Protocol and supported 
188 For example, the AGA made its own submissions to the 1998 House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on the Environment and Heritage Inquiry into EmL'8ions Trading, to the Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties' Inquiry into the Kyoto Protocol in 2000, and to the Senate Committee on the 
Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References Committee Inquiry on 
Australia's Response to Global Warming. 
'"" Ros Kelly's commitment basically was swept away as being a bit of an embarrassing joke. The 
government never really thought they were committed to the 20 per cent reduction by 2005, ever ... and it 
was only in the early 90s when, after the reality of the 20 per cent cut one was enshrined in the Rio 
doctrine that people began to think, 'shit, we could be here and responsible for implementing this!' [41; 
233, 183] 
'
90 It became a much bigger issue when this government came in with the Kyoto Protocol and all of that 
sort of stuff and the science became irrefutable as well so you should say that somewhere between the 
Woodward era and the Nagle era in the muck or the mess that we had in the AGA for a while the science 
came to ground when in fact the scientific ... even me who started off being very, very sceptical about 
greenhouse was convinced by the late 90s that the science was pretty firm. And the governments 
irrespective, it doesn't matter how conservative they were, they were going to continue to ratchet up 
gree:nhouse policy ... [17;13] 
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the use of flexibility mechanisms allowed for under it including Joint Implementation, 
Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism. These were viewed as both 
vehicles for delivering least-cost abatement outcomes as well as ways of promoting the 
contribution of natural gas exports by Australia to reducing greenhouse emissions globally. 
Given the rapid growth of LNG as an export industry, the producer members of the AGA 
were very enthusiastic to ensure that the flexibility mechanisms were designed in such a 
way as to give credit for emission reductions achieved abroad as a result of the use of 
Australian-sourced natural gas. 191 
The fact that the Kyoto Protocol does not meet these expectations, however, has led to 
significant ambivalence-even opposition-to it from Australian gas producers. It is 
important, however, to note that most of these companies also have strong interests in coal 
and/or oil, and have left the AGA in recent years. As a consequence, while AGA insiders 
recognise some national interest in the arguments of these companies, they are now largely 
ambivalent about the international process in terms of its impact on gas exporters. The 
membership split in the AGA also made the international process irrelevant in the eyes of 
senior players. The inadequacy of Kyoto rules and the prospect of 'Kyoto sanctions' on 
Australian LNG exports, as a consequence of Australia's non-ratification of the Protocol 
should it come into effect, was of little concern to the AGA.192 The companies for whom 
these issues are a concern had left. 
However, despite the departure of the producers from the AGA, the organisation remained 
a supporter of Australian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol193 until the decision first by the 
191 Think about the China deal, Qatar and Indonesia are the two alternative suppliers for that China 
contract and there are greenhouse emissions associated with producing the product ready for export. The 
C02 that you strip out and the compression liquefaction process ... we're the producer, (Australia) invests 
energy and emissions in producing a product which then when it's used in another country gives rise to 
savings. Gas, because it can replace coal... so it's another problem I guess in the protocol framework that 
is based on IPCC. [29;197] ... a very simple dilemma if you find more natural gas. Natural gas is 
supposed to be good for the environment and for greenhouse. But you're creating a massive amount of 
carbon dioxide simply by freezing it so that you can put it onto the tankers and send it around the world 
to people who will use it... So I mean I remember when they came back from Kyoto where I think the 
diplomats did a magnificent job, whatever you think of the conclusion, and then they said well that's fine 
and the first time they find another bloody find of natural gas we're in trouble. And it was only about a 
year later we found another find of natural gas. If they sell that we're in big trouble. [32;359] 
192 
see previous quote [17;69-71] under footnote 148 regarding AGA ambivalence about the prospect of 
greenhouse sanctions or tariffs on LNG exporters. 
(With this in mind, the interviewee went on to say) On Kyoto ratification I'm completely neutral and I 
dodge this for a number of reasons because I don't think it really matters if we sign or not and we don't 
have to put all the caveats in that, it's somebody's else's responsibility. 
193 The AGA accepts that while the Kyoto Protocol is only the first step toward stabilisation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, it is a most important step. Uncertainties and difficulties associated 
with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol should be expected and should not diminish government 
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United States not to ratify and the similar step by the Howard government soon after. The 
apparently final deeision by the US and Australia to opt out of the Kyoto process reduced 
the organisation's enthusiasm to the point of ambivalence. The decline in Australia's 
participation in the international process has also reduced AGA enthusiasm for the prospeet 
of emissions trading which the AGA previously viewed as 'inevitable and desirable.' 
194Because the AGA's support for trading was conditional upon program design issues, and 
most importantly upon an international trading regime also being finalised, Australia's exit 
from the Kyoto Protocol commensurately reduced AGA enthusiasm for emissions trading. 
Greenhouse science 
Greenhouse science has been a noteworthy factor in the evolving response of the AGA to 
climate change. While the AGA has not publicly disputed the science underpinning the 
global push to reduce greenhouse emissions, the industry's association with other members 
of the fossil fuel industry over a long period suggests a sympathy with the sceptical side of 
the greenhouse debate. According to AGA insiders, in the early 1990s the vast majority of 
industry players in industry were highly sceptical about the reality of the climate change 
phenomenon.195 
However, by the late 1990s, and particularly in the lead-up to the 1997 Kyoto conference, 
the reality of climate change began to gain much more widespread acceptance. Long time 
sceptics were starting to come around to the view that climate change was a real problem. 
~While there had long been a recognition of the opportunistic reasons why the AGA might 
support stronger greenhouse measures by government gas industry players acknowledge 
that during this period they became much more convinced themselves about the legitimacy 
of the science. This made it easier for the AGA to take a more pro-active position, and this 
is reflected in the material produced by the AGA. 196 The more the scientific consensus has 
strengthened since this period, the stronger the advocacy of the AGA has become. 
and industry commitment to work towards real reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. (AGA 2001:10) 
... the AGA believes that ratification of an appropriately finalised Kyoto Protocol (with the caveats set 
out in this submission) and the introduction of concomitant national strategies and programs are needed 
to curb greenhouse!!'"" emissions growth in Australia. (AGA 2002:2) 
194 AGA Submission to the AGO on Emissions Trading Discussion Paper No.4 - Designing the Market 
2000, p.4 
'
95 See previous quote [17;91] under footnote 177 
196 See previous quote [38;33] under footnote 168 
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Macro-level 
Broad government ideology and culture 
Government ideology has been an important force of change at the AGA, with implications 
for the organisation's greenhouse policy response. Over the same period as climate change 
has emerged as au issue there has been a general trend by government towards privatisation 
of government owned utilities, deregulation of energy markets, and the strengthening of 
national competition policy. These trends have dramatically transformed the nature of the 
Australian gas industry-the companies involved, the culture of the gas industry, the 
degree of autonomy, the level of competition between the players. 191 
There has also been an increasingly powerful view which has gained steadily greater 
currency in the federal bureaucracy and senior levels of the government that reliable access 
to cheap energy is a critical competitive advantage for the Australian economy which must 
be protected aud enhanced. This view has in some respects left the gas industry in a no-
man 's land. 198 While climate change and other imperatives have led to a reluctant 
acceptance of the need for the renewables sector to be encouraged, there is a determination 
on the part of government that the coal industry not be compromised in any way. There has 
been consistent opposition to incorporating greenhouse considerations into energy policy 
going right back to the late 1980s and it has not waned to any significant degree. 
The consequence of these two important aspects of government ideology has been that the 
gas industry has been squeezed. It now operates in a far more competitive market and can 
rely on much less government support. Under the circumstances, it has recognised a need to 
197 Gas production in Australia has been essentially a monopoly game, in eastern Australia, not western 
Australia but eastern Australia, for quite a few decades where Santos and Origin essentially control the 
supply of gas to Sydney, Brisbane and Adelaide and Esso/BHP supplied gas to Melbourne until recently 
when there's been ... the national grid's filled in a little bit, and as a monopolist classic economic theory 
says you don't have to expand your sales to aetually increase your profitability and so constraining sales 
is not a problem for Esso/BHP and Santos into the east coast gas market whilst they were not competing. 
So using the greenhouse stick to try and ran1p up the sales of gas for power generation was just 
something that they weren't interested in. They were more interested in ensuring that their net back for 
the gas markets in eastern Australia were maximised and therefore they aligned themselves v.ith large 
gas consumers to screw gas pipeline owners and gas distribution network o\\ners .... [17;23] 
198 And we have seen a slow retreat of the gas industry to saying: 'gas for direct heating, yes: gas for 
cogeneration, yes: gas for distributed energy, yes: gas in gas to hydrogen one-day in the future, yes.' 
These are all greenhouse opportunities but not big large chunks unless someone interferes and mandates 
energy shares in a way which no government in this country has been prepared to do for the last twenty 
years then gas does not gel an automatic marketing advantage as a result of greenhouse. [18;36] 
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advance its greenhouse interests much more vigorously. It cannot rely on the coziness of 
the market structure, it cannot rely on the fossil fuel industry, and it cannot rely on the 
support of government. 
Related networks 
The AGA's engagement on climate change has been affected by the organisation's 
involvement in other policy networks. For much of the 1990s, the AGA was heavily 
focused on the deregulation of the gas industry and the introduction of National 
Competition Policy (NCP). This involved massive change for the industry~-the end of state 
owned and run ga5 companies, the erosion of some monopolies for gas producers, and the 
proliferation of gas retailers. This process consumed significant AGA resources and 
relegated issues like climate change further down the agenda. Other deregulatory processes 
in the electricity industry, and the establishment of the national electricity grid also carried 
important implications for AGA members and this too diverted attention as the organisation 
worked to manage the disparate interests of its members through a very difficult time, As 
AGA observers and insiders alike have noted, the interests of gas industry players were 
often in conflict and this made consensus almost impossible. 
This research finds strong evidence to suggest that it was irreconcilable differences 
between producers, pipeliners and retailers in the deregulatory policy debates which 
ultimately led to the splintering of the organisation. ln terms of how this relates to the 
AGA's greenhouse response there are two major points worth making. First, the 
preoccupation in other policy networks-especially gas industry deregulation and NCP-
was viewed as by far the most important priority and meant there was far less attention paid 
to the climate change debate. The second implication of this activity elsewhere, however, is 
that it precipitated a split in the AGA membership base which in part enabled the 
organisation to take a less ambiguous position on greenhouse policy. As AGA sources 
confirm, while the difference between producers and retailers on greenhouse policy is often 
blamed as the reason for the split, in actual fact it was a proxy reason-a more publicly 
acceptable reason than the competition policy differences which members preferred not to 
air. 
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Conclusions 
The 'old' AGA (prior to 2004) provides one of the most interesting case studies in this 
research. Perhaps the over-riding lesson is that it is almost impossible to separate out the 
causal importance of different behavioural pressures which are so often mutually 
reinforcing. It is clear, for example, that changes in the AGA membership, leadership, and 
dominant organisational culture were extremely powerful factors in shaping movement in 
the AGA's greenhouse policy network engagement. These forces were also closely 
connected. With the changes also came significant shifts in the interests of the majority of 
the organisation's members on the issue of climate change. Under the circumstances it is 
hard to say where causality lies-whether it is the micro-level changes, or the change in 
vested interest. More likely, it would appear that macro-, meso- and micro-level factors are 
inextricably linked and it is not possible to pinpoint causality with great confidence. 
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Case 3-the National Association of Forest Industries 
Introduction 
The National Association of Forest Industries (NAFI) claims to represent the interests of 
the whole forest products industry, including plantations. In practice, it is dominated by 
timber harvesting and milling interests in the native forest sector. It is an important case 
study-not so much for what it did in the greenhouse policy network, but for what it did 
not do. As with other sectors of the economy, the implications of climate change itself and 
the policies aimed at combating it are mixed for the forestry sector. The issue is further 
complicated for forestry because the sectoral greenhouse implications are much harder to 
determine in a technical sense than for other industries like, for example, large scale 
electricity generation. 
Climate change has presented Australian forestry with potential problems and potential 
opportunities. For most of the period in which climate change has been a prominent public 
policy challenge, the response of NAFI on behalf of the forestry sector has been relatively 
slow and generally pessimistic. As we shall see, many of the most important opportunities 
were missed by NAFI. While the organisation has met a perceived obligation and made 
submissions to formal government processes, it has not been a consistent or strategic player 
in the debate from day to day. Where it has acted of its own accord, its involvement has 
been characterised by an occasional focus on a few key technical issues which are either 
irrelevant to the 'main game' or have not captured the interest of government or the policy 
network. Deliberately or not, NAFI has missed opportunities and taken a position on the 
periphery of the debate. 
The NAFI case study is interesting for a few reasons. Their response to climate change 
provides a good example of how powerful a driving force leadership and membership 
structure can be in bringing about rapid change in the position of an interest group on a 
major policy issue where the sector's interests are mixed. It is also an impressive example 
of how pervasive and immovable cultural inertia can be in framing the way interest groups 
respond to issues. In the case of NAFI, it seems clear that over a long period the 
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organisational culture prevented a more balanced, proactive, and broadly appealing role by 
the forestry sector in the greenhouse policy network. NAFI's position on climate change 
has altered dramatically in recent years and the metamorphosis has been driven almost 
entirely from within as a result of new leadership, and a changing culture. As such, the 
NAFI case heavily reinforces the importance of micro-level issues as having a very 
powerful role in distorting perceived group interest, along with group behaviour. At the 
same time, the case study illustrates how significant external meso- and macro-level 
pressures can be in reinforcing or shifting the positions of interest groups. This case 
highlights the powerful influence that one policy network can exert on group behaviour in 
another, and the power of government policy decisions to reinforce group behaviour. Both 
of these external forces discouraged greater NAFI engagement and recognition of 
opportunities by NAFI in the greenhouse policy network. 
Activity 
The general consensus among those involved in the Australian greenhouse policy network 
is that NAFI has not been a major player.199 It has been perceived as being sporadic in its 
activities and somewhat opportunistic.200 There is a feeling among most observers that the 
NAFI has been focused on a much higher priority over a long period-the Regional Forests 
Agreements (RF As) and survival of the native forest logging. The impression gained is that 
NAFI consistently opted not to dedicate the resources or focus required in the greenhouse 
debate to be more than a fringe player.201 
199 
••• never played an active or significant role [51;118] NAFI have not been very engaged ... they have 
been more worried about the immediate things. [48;23] (I) don't see them as being as engaged as perhaps 
and they should be [30; 16] NAFI were not a strong player I should say in the whole ... they did not 
always attend ... just a bit peripheral. [6;187) Precious little contact. .. vicarious contact ... fairly muted 
input [47; 16] wouldn't pick them as a prominent player in the mainstream of greenhouse. [II ;62] If you 
asked me to make a list of people who were involved in greenhouse they wouldn't sort of instantly spring 
to mind. [37;15] 
200 
••• their principal area of interest is opportunistic. [37; 15] They were only ever really interested in that 
forestry sinks issue. [13;344] 
201 NAFI was never really at the table ... sporadic on the margins. [13;344] (I) have not heard any coherent 
position come from NAFI ... (it's been) bits and pieces ... [40;46] Probably been busy dealing with 
regional forest agreements and a whole lot of other shit. [23;308] ... they've been almost obsessed 
through much of this period with the RFA process and I think that has taken a lot of their energy. [54;38] 
NAFI-that have not been very engaged. NAFI I think has been more concerned about the RF A process 
and all of those nuts and bolts issues for itself than they have been about greenhouse. [48;23] NAFI every 
now and again would attend industry forums on these matters, but it never played an active or a 
significant role. [51;10] 
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As is discussed in more detail below, NAFI has regularly made submissions to government 
processes and participated in them where hearings and meetings are involved. NAFI has 
also participated in conferences dealing with greenhouse issues, particularly where there 
has been an emphasis on Land Use Change and Forestry (LUCF) issues and the potential 
for the forestry sector to benefit from the increased use of greenhouse sinks for carbon 
sequestration.202 
The public record confirms the impression of many observers that NAFI flirted with the 
idea that climate change may actually present a major opportunity for the forestry sector-
particularly the possibility that foresters might gain financially from contributing to 
increased carbon sequestration. However, as the discussion below shows, NAFI came to 
this view slowly, and their focus was generally on expanding plantations and using 
sequestration as a way to improve the environmental image of the industry. The 
opportunity missed was to strongly advocate emission trading and a role for forestry in 
bioenergy policy--concepts that appeal to sections of the green movement and government 
and could enhance industry profits. Having consistently found itself on the opposite side of 
environmental issues to the green movement, the almost reflexive position of NAFI over 
many years towards climate change was generally sceptical and uninterested. This helps to 
explain why opportunities were missed.203 Eventually, as we will see below, NAFI became 
somewhat enthusiastic about greenhouse opportunities, but only after major organisational 
changes. 
The initial positive NAFI interest in climate change as an opportunity for the industry was 
not sustained or effectively pursued. This research confirms that NAFI became ambivalent 
on the basis of an assessment by its leaders that technical aspects of the Kyoto Protocol in 
relation to sinks were designed in such a way as to ruin opportunities for financial gain by 
foresters through sequestration. As we shall see this dissuaded NAFI from taking any 
significant interest or active role in the debate. 
Just as international developments scnttled N AFI interest in the greenhouse debate, 
domestic policy developments have generally done the same. One good example has been 
202 \\-'hen plants absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere they 'sequester' carbon in the process. This 
carbon is released back to the atmosphere gradually as the plants die and decay. The more vegetation 
there is sequestering carbon, the greater the greenhouse 'sink.' These sinks provide a way to offset 
greenhouse emissions from industrial facilities through the trade of 'carbon credits.' This presents 
significant opportunities for the forestry sector. 
"" They don't want to line up with the greenies on anything ... just full of hatred for the greenies ... they 
weren't operating like a good professional industry body.[31;244] 
139 
the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) introduced by the Howard government. 
Initial optimism about the possibility that the MRET might create a financial opportunity 
for NAFI members has largely led to disappointment. Decisions by government to 
postpone emissions trading have had a similar effect. NAFI has invested some resources in 
these and other aspects of the greenhouse policy debate, but a cycle of disappointment and 
indifference has followed. 
Part of the explanation appears to lie in NAFI's tendency to act alone (rather than in 
partnerships) and to focus almost entirely on technical and/or obscure aspects without being 
part of the mainstream of network activity. Unlike interest groups that have been more 
consistently involved, it is not as easy to position NAFI on one side of the debate or the 
other. NAFI was involved in the early days of the AIGN-with then leader, Robert Bain, 
considered part of the pack by AIGN members-but NAFI did not join and was never 
heavily involved. However, there is a clear sympathy for AIGN's objectives and NAFI is 
perceived in the policy community as having a generally pro-carbon-lobby disposition on 
the issue when it has been active. 
It is important to note, however, that while this was true for most of the period in which 
climate change has been an issue, it has changed significantly under new NAFI leadership. 
In recent years NAFI has moved away from an ambivalent and somewhat negative posture. 
The NAFI position by the time this research was complete was much more supportive of 
reducing Australia's greenhouse emissions, and more inclined to view climate change seen 
as a net opportunity for the forestry sector.204 That said, NAFI still tends to go it alone 
rather than taking up opportunities to pursue its agenda in partnership with stakeholders 
with shared interests (for example, the environmental movement on emissions trading and 
bioenergy). 
Analysis of group response 
The interviews add to our understanding of how and why this organisation has responded to 
climate change. They also reveal a dramatic change in the NAFI's approach and the 
reasons for it. 
204 I think that the National Association of Forest Industries, in fact forest industries generally, have 
responded really badly to greenhouse--to the opportunities. And I think it's amazing to me that an 
industry that is probably one of the very few industries that is a net winner-from (their opportunity for) 
ending up in a carbon trading arena and (us) taking greenhouse seriously as a nation-( and yet) it doesn't 
have a policy as a industry! [4;13] 
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Micro-level 
Micro-level pressures were all-pervasive in the case ofNAFI in discouraging sustained and 
serious engagement on greenhouse policy. All four factors explored below acted to 
discourage NAFI involvement in the network. Interestingly, however, major changes in 
leadership, culture and membership in recent times have been mirrored in NAFI' s approach 
to greenhouse policy. 'These changes appear to foreshadow a much greater and possibly 
more strategic kind ofinvolvement by NAFI. 
Organisational culture 
The organisational culture of the NAFI is seen by a large majority of greenhouse policy 
network members as a very constraining force.205 The culture is highly defensive and 
reactionary-almost a siege mentality-something which many see as the direct 
consequence of years of intense political battles against environmental groups t.o ensure 
that hardwood logging in native. forest continues. 206 NAFI is viewed as taking a virulent 
anti-environmental stance on issues almost as a reflex rather than as a result of a careful 
case by case weighing of its interests. The aggressive nature and tactics ofNAFI against the 
green movement is well appreciated.107 This, in the eye.s of many, has led to it being fur less 
2°' NAF!-to the extent of their organisation was responsive to the forest debate--that is it was fonned 
by the forest debate in its current fonn-that obviously was the baggage that they brought to the 
greenhouse debate. All that general forest stuff and the high emotional content of the way they represent 
themselves and their interests {You mean that they tended to see things in black and white?} Yes. 
[2;244-8] The debate that they have been having has been much more I think directed towards you know 
the logging debate, rather than other issues. And that has perhaps diverted their focus from what is 
effectively a very major issue for them. [30; 16] 
"'"' ... the industry spends most of its time responding to threats, not embracing opportunities ... 
defensive ... you would have to say the industry has not won too many battles over the years ... they 
perceived that that was the way to go--to put up the barricades shall we say. [4;22,86""· 112, 154] They're 
not proactive, they're a reactive group. That's been my experience with NAFI all the way through ... they 
see themselves defending themselves against an aggressive external world ... you see this in that jobs and 
investment in that sector of the forest industry has been falling since the second world war, well it peaked 
just after the second world war with the housing boom and it's been coming down ever since, say the 
early 50's. They always seek an external force to blame this on ... And they've maintained this go to the 
barricades and defend yourselves attitude while the industry's crumbling beneath them basically. So 
that's been l think been the problem. [44;209-13] When you start to run through a list like that Forest 
Industries perhaps is another one where they are embattled so they feel embattled. They have a lot to feel 
embattled about and they are, to an extent, a victim of the fact that we live in a telegenic age and large 
piles of chips juxtaposed with beautiful forests and so on, or clear felled areas, is a very hard thing to 
contest on television. [37;183] 
201 
... it's a little club that have hung out together for years ... quite aggressive--quite nasty-the there's a 
couple of them and they've all sort of been in that nasty warlike envirorunent for a long time. So they're 
a bit snarly-that's the kind of impression you get [39;144--52] NAFI was the hardest, most hard line 
141 
active, less cooperative, and less influential than it otherwise might have been--on a range 
of issues.208 
Thus, it was perhaps inevitable that NAFI would view the issue with scepticism, seeing it 
as a threat rather than an opportunity, and seeking as if by reflex to take the opposite side of 
the debate to the environmental movement.209 An important aspect of their approach (which 
has led it to miss opportunities in the debate) has been to view climate change with no real 
sense of urgency. To a large degree this was the position adopted by them for the duration 
of the 1990s and the culture is confirmed to have been a major influence on this response, 
by outsiders and NAFI insiders alike. 
There has been a significant change in the organisational culture of the NAFI in recent 
times coinciding with the leadership of Kate Carnell. There has been an almost complete 
turnover of staff with less emphasis in recent times on a forestry industry background and 
more capacity in government relations and media relations.210 The culture has moved 
quickly from inward-looking, conservative, and reactive to outward-looking, more open to 
industry organisation operating in the entire country and certainly the one which would attack journalists 
most frequently. Right through to calls for our sacking ... But they-this might be of interest to you-it 
seemed to me, that they had a network of supporters or members of the industry who as a reporter I 
generally got into issues that they were interested in-and they would monitor across the country every 
single word uttered on radio or television. And the minutest mistake the minutest problem-would lead 
to an avalanche around the country of NAFI members demanding that the [network] act. {Were you 
singled out do you think?} Yes I was singled out back in those days.[15;68-76] I have the impression 
that NAFI were involved simply because NAFI hated green groups and if green groups thought that 
climate change was a serious problem then they'd have to be countered ... But I think they believe that 
anyone who is standing up to the green groups, they want to be seen along side because they want other 
people to stand up to the green groups when they need help with logging the forests. So it's partly 
ideological and it's partly being more concerned with other priorities like regional forestry agreements. 
[9;50,58] 
208 As one environment industry player noted with some disappointment, 'I would have thought they'd be 
allies.' [23;304] 
209 
... tbe greens wanted to shut down their industry and were absolutely unswerving. There was nothing 
they would tolerate except the end of the industry and they understood that. So it was unlikely they 
would tend to accept any guarantees from the greens about 'well we'll let you grow umpteen million 
acres of trees,' for they wouldn't buy it. .. it would go against their experience. Because they had been 
doubled crossed there was always a final deal you see. Every time they did a deal, agreed to something 
under duress that just became the next stage for their next set of demands. And they've been living with 
that for 20 years. [49;144-8] 
210 No one comes from the forestry sector except the deputy. Phil is actually a resource economist, so 
he's not a forester but he has worked in forestry related areas over a number of years although he is quite 
young, so obviously (NFF) needed someone who was solid on what the industry really looks like. {He 
didn't work in government at all?} He worked in AFFA (Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries Australia) 
for a little while but was always perceived to be ... He's one of those people who was always overly 
enthusiastic and always running off in various directions and stuff, so he suits ... this organisation I think 
fairly well. [4;280-86] 
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embracing change, and more pro-active m its dealings with government and the 
community. 211 
This change in ethos has been reflected in the significant shift in NAFI's approach to 
greenhouse issues. The organisation has deliberately kept its distance from the AIGN side 
of the debate on the basis of perceived interest rather than ambivalence. It has identified 
climate change as a clear opportunity on balance for the forest sector, and is actively 
seeking to advance the policy process in a direction mutually beneficial to its members and 
to the push for a relatively stronger greenhouse policy response by Australia. 
Membership structure 
Membership structure of NAFI has been a significant influence on their response to climate 
change. Throughout the 1990s there has been a concentration of the membership of the 
organisation as the paper industry and the plantation industries have progressively moved 
away from NAFI to establish their own interest groups. One consequence, ac.cording to 
many, has been to further narrow the agenda of NAFI to those public policy issues with 
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•• .ifs a very enthusiastic culture (now). I mean it's very, quite driven I think. I think NAFI's probably 
less, certainly less focused on the science and more on the image, public relations, policy. {You've 
described the staffing now as having a pretty open mind on the issues facing the industry?} Oh, yes, the 
staff now are very ... I suppose very much in the same ilk I've just explained, very much seeing the 
future as ... The sum up of the conference probably is a clear way to put it that we need number one to 
change community attitude towards our industry, that means we need and will get a national basically 
'wood is good' campaign. We need to be part of the environmental solution not the problem so we need 
to be heavily involved in the environmental planting, salinity, greenhouse issues. We have to be part of 
the water debate, not fighting against it and we need to be sure that the industry has a single voice. {That 
sounds very proactive and very outward looking, doesn't it?} Well I mean, when you think about it if 
you came into an organisation like this what other options are there for this industry? The reason we get 
done all the time is beeause the community generally thinks cutting down trees is bad, so if governments 
lock up more forests or they do something bad to plantations or whatever, the majority of people in this 
country think that's good. If they c-0uldn't get the wood for their t1oor they would think that was bad. The 
continuum of knowledge isn't there. They want their wooden floors and they'd actually like it to he 
Australian hardwood, they don't particularly want it to be out of Indonesian rainforests so they want it to 
be from Australia, they want to be confident that the forests are being sustainably managed, they want to 
be confident that the government's regulating this. I know this, we've done all this research, I know what 
they think. But you have to actually push them to think that way because emotionally they respond to 
forestry really badly and it's really interesting because there is no more environmental industry really and 
people become foresters because they love trees and they love nature and they love eeology, so they 
become foresters. People who work in forest industries have a very long term view on things because 
trees take so long to grow and so their involvement in the ecology with how the forest grows and all 
those sorts of things is fundamental to who they are and where they are going, but that's not the 
perception, so we can't solve the problems for the industry unless we start solving the perception 
problem out there in the community or the pollies will keep doing us. {And in order to do that you have 
to be proactive and outward looking and yet if I was to characterise [the old] NAFJ... it's the exact 
opposite, it's inward looking and reactive?} Yes, and I suspect that is the reason we lost a lot, and not to 
he negative to them but ... {You ean't change perceptions can you if you have the barriers up?} No ... 
the industry has got to change just fundamentally, stop being defensive .... [4;258-78, 86] 
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clear relevance to the hardwood native forest logging sector.212 Arguably the awareness of 
the NAFI to the v.ider policy environment has deteriorated. This narrowing membership 
base in part accounts for the sporadic part-time involvement of NAFI on greenhouse for 
much of the period covered by this research. The focus was heavily restricted to instances 
where there has been a clear threat or opportunity identified for the native forests sector in 
the public debate over greenhouse.213 
While the departure of the paper and plantation elements of the industry was not caused by 
NAFI's greenhouse policies, it has meant that the potential benefits associated with 
greenhouse in terms of opportunities for abatement and carbon credits in any future trading 
system have been largely missed.214 
The NAFI membership base has also included a relatively significant proportion of public 
and semi-public sector organisations. However, there is a trend towards commercialisation 
212 
... they have split into two separate industry associations... with PTAA (Plantation Timber 
Association of Australia) effectively talking about the promotion of plantations. I think NAFI's position 
on plantations is inherently negative because tbey see the threat of plantations being tbe alternate to 
native forest loggers. They are increasingly becoming the native forest industries lobby. [12;235-9] 
... NAFI increasingly over the years from the lale eighties to the mid to late nineties were increasingly 
representing a declining segment of the Forest sector-<>ld growth logging forest companies~and 
abandoned the plantation companies who started to start their own industry association because they 
were so is dissatisfied with NAFI. [31 ;244] 
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... NAFI has had some tough times because they are basically shrinking their industry base-their 
constituency is increasingly just the hardwood native forest loggers. The plantation people are off doing 
their o>Vn thing-diey are much more savvy. [27;60] Ten years ago NAFI represented virtually everyone 
in the game-then the paper manufacturers walked, and then a rift developed between the plantation 
owners and the native forest owners, and another rift developed between woodchippers and the 
sawmillers. And yet the automatic assumption one makes as to NAFI being a player in the game is that 
they are the biggest forest grower-you know, they are the sinks guys--they are the guys who would 
have the most to gain out of sinks. Then, you actually look at the fractured nature of the industry-the 
sawmil!ers who had the power in NAFI did not O>Vn the trees so they gained nothing. The pulp and paper 
people wiw had a totally difrerent view had walked away from the association already. The big 
woodchippers and to some extent the big plantation owners when they actually sat down and analysed 
their vested interest realised that they had lots of old trees and very few new trees-and new trees are the 
only thing that matter in the game. So, the pereeived interest that NAFI is the biggest tree grower in tl1e 
country-in fact it wasn't in the interests in NAFI. And NAP! has never been a player. {And for the 
plantation people, the only way they would benefit is if they planted on new ground anyway?} It is only · 
if they planted on new ground after 1990-land which has previously been cleared. {And the plantation 
people aren't very powerful within NAFI anyway?} I think the plantation people now have gone off and 
formed their own association. So, you have the plantation people in one area-you have your pulp and 
paper people in another area. And, NAFI is now virtually a forest products association. {And mostly 
native timber?) And a lot of it is nativ~yes. [18;72-84] 
214 (Do the think the non·policy on greenhouse---Oo you think that was a contributor to the split?} Look 
no I don't, I don't. I think the split was personality driven as most splits are-itnd a perception that NAFI 
was spending too much time focusing on the issues surrounding the greens and the native forests and all 
of that sort of stuff and not enough on say softwood and plantations, so I think the dilemma for 
greenhouse in the NAFI environment is bocause it's not a threat as such, it's actually an opportunity as I 
said, I very much see thar for forest industries, that the industry spends most of its time responding to 
threats, not embracing opportunities. [4;22] 
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and corporatisation of state owned entities.215 Nonetheless this does make the NAFI 
significantly different from other interest group case studies. For some, this public sector 
connection in part explains the reluctance ofNAFI to take a strong role in the greenhouse 
debate-particularly given the differences in government opinion on the issue-between 
state governments, for example, and between the Commonwealth and states like NSW 
where the department responsible for state forests has played a very proactive role in 
promoting emissions trading.216 
Leadership 
Leadership has been a critical influence on the direction of NAFI in its engagement on 
greenhouse. There have been three leaders of the NAFI during the past decade: Robert 
Bain, Warren Lang, Kate Camell.217 Their leadership at NAFI has had a significant bearing 
on the organisation's response to the greenhouse issues. One of the questions routinely 
asked of interviewees in this research has been whether it is conceivable that a leader of the 
organisation could have taken the group in a direction significantly different from that 
which has occurred. In most cases, the perceived scope for a leader to strike out in a 
markedly different direction on greenhouse has been seen as limited, particularly in cases 
where there is clarity and unity of interest among a small group of members (for example, 
the AAC). However .• the leadership of Kate Camell has demonstrated very clearly that a 
significantly different direction has been possible, at least in the case of NAFI. This is 
something which many interviewed suspected was possible.218 
215 See Owners and managers of Australia's forests, The Australian Forestry Standard, 
http://www.forestrystandard.org.au/publications/pdllafs _paper_ 03.pdf 
216 Once again the forest industry is part public ownership, part private ownership-I think perhaps the 
majority has been in public ownership for a long time. And, this is again somewhat ftagmented. [30; 16] 
217 Kate Carnell was replaced in 2005 by Catherine Murphy, formerly an adviser to Howard government 
minister, Brendan Nelson. Her brief time as CEO is not covered in this research. 
218 Yes, you might well find a leader emerging who had a slightly different perspective in terms of the 
priorities that the organisation fuced: greenhouse has greater priority, greenhouse response rather has 
greater priority, \Ve have a story to tell here, we're not getting much of a run so we're going to push bio 
fuels and we're going to push forest development in some way or other ... Look, it may happen. [47;!94-
200] ... NAFI could just as well have played a major role if they had a different individual leading al the 
time ... {\Vhere the interest is less determined the variability from leadership is greater?} Yes. The NAFI, 
for example, when it finally engaged in greenhouse issues, and this has been a little bit of my own 
thinking about bringing Kate Carnell in. [44;221,247-9] (Pre-Carnell) They have had negative 
leadership. If they got it and understood it, they could be promoting positive leadership on native 
plantations. [ 56;245] 
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Robert Bain preceded Brian Fisher in running the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resources Economics (ABARE), and the NAFI approach to climate change under his 
leadership is by most observers to have been similar in tone and content to the ABARE 
line--sceptical, negative and largely in synch with the AIGN side of the debate.219 
Interestingly however there is significant evidence that Bain saw some opportunities for the 
forestry sector thanks to the spiraling growth in industrial greenhouse emissions. He felt 
strongly enough to have NAFI (1997) issue a press statement pointing to the opportunities 
during the period of heightened media attention surrounding the Kyoto FCCC conference. 
However, Bain does not appear to have viewed greenhouse policy in general or emissions 
trading in particular as a priority.220 While there was passing interest, he concentrated 
primarily on defending existing turf in native forest battles.221 Because of Bain's personal 
power in the organisation his treatment of greenhouse as a low order issue was not 
significantly opposed.222 
Lang's approach was generally cynical about the opportunities for forestry, and pessimistic 
and sceptical about greenhouse science and the need for urgent action to reduce 
emissions.223 Lang was also known among key players in the network to be extremely 
suspicious about any perceived opportunities for the industry from greenhouse policy. It is 
also likely that his position as Acting Executive Director limited his capacity to take the 
219 I don't think Rob Bain ever used the word greenhouse apart from when he was doing out the back of 
his house. I don't think Rob was really involved in greenhouse policy. I don't think NAFI really ever 
were. [l 7;283] My understanding was they were tempted, of course, by the idea of getting into the 
sequestration game but Rob Bain I think always thought it was very high risk ... [49;144] 
220 Interestingly, Bain later spent 5 years as secretary general of the Australian Medical Association 
(AMA). The AMA has long advocated action to reduce climate change, and continues to do so. 
However, even though Bain was active in the public domain on a range of other issues, this research 
could not locate one instance of Bain publicly backing the greenhouse policy push by the AMA. Instead, 
the organisation's public advocacy on greenhouse policy has instead been conducted by successive 
presidents including Kerryn Phelps, Keith Woolard, David Brand and Bill Glasson. 
221 It was before my time and ... and remember that Rob had been there for a long time and he knows 
every thing there is to know about this industry, but the issues that Rob was having with ... you made the 
comment about people's comments about it becoming very introspective and very native forest focused 
and whatever, that's what people say. I wasn't here but ... and Rob certainly ... I mean that was at Rob's 
time they perceived that that was the way to go-to put up the barricades shall we say. [4;152-4] Rob 
Bain and I-we used to talk about it all the time, but I just felt that they had other things on their 
agenda--survival basically. [13; 80] But you see Rob Bain was much more focused on some of the other 
threats-the perceived threats to the forest industry at the time. [44;61] 
222 (NAFI's) early days was dominated by Robert Bain, he was NAFI and I think almost Robert Bain led 
and the industry followed. And I worked a lot with Robert and we fought and we got on well together. 
There was a real mix but it was clear that he was way out in front leading the industry. [44; 197] 
223 They had a general interest under Lang and it was a very, very sceptical interest. [2;52] {What is it 
about NAFI that you think would explain their very narrow response to greenhouse?} Ideology more 
than anything else. They have a couple of key players there-Warren Lang was one of them-who are 
ideological rather than business driven. [l 5;90-2] 
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organisation in a direction on greenhouse radically different from Bain's.224 To have done 
so would certainly appear to have gone against his own persona! views. 
Though NAFI has sought not to be cast as a sceptics in the public debate, its position has 
until the appointment of Kate Carnell been indistinguishable from the that of the 
mainstream sceptics. Both Lang and Bain were seen as sympathisers with the A!Gi"l side 
and deliberately steering NAF1 away from climate change (and specifically greenhouse 
emissions trading) to other more traditional hard core native forest issoes.225 
The ambivalence and somewhat negative position taken by NAFI in the past under Bain 
and Lang has since been completely jettisoned in favour of a much more proactive stance 
in which NAFI is treating climate change as a very important opportunity from which its 
members could benefit. The NAFI has become far more engaged than it ever was under 
previous leadership-.for example , it chaired a committee within the federal government's 
business dialogue process.226 There is a more clearly established NAFI interest around the 
224 Warren-you have to accept that Warren was acting in the job, he didn't actually ever want the job, 
he didn't apply for it but NAFI ended up in a hiatus. {Why was that? Bain left?} Because the industry 
couldn't decide which direction fo take and so Rob's '21C', Warren, stepped into the job and basically 
kept ... I mean I don't say Warren didn't work hard he did, but you know Warren's job wasn't ... I don't 
think Warren would have seen bis job as to lead the organisation particularly. {He wouldn't have?) No I 
don't think w, not 'lead out the front on the white charger' type stuff. I think he would have seen his job 
was to do things that had to be done and keep on 'steady as she goes.' {Autopilot?} Well a bit of ... 'a 
steady as she goes' approach to life. {But he was warming the seat for an awfully long time.} He was, 
and that was the reason that NAFI ended up ... it wasn't Warren's fuult, it was actually the board's fault 
for leaving it in that hiatus for as long as it was left {Would that have been different were he in the top 
job do you think?} Could have been but he didn't actually want it from what l can gather {Why is that?} 
Don't know, he Just didn't want that aggravation. [4;12!}-46] 
225 (Lang) is a realist. And he could see that there were a lot of people out there spruiking about sinks but 
that it was really a load of rubbish and he wasn~ going to let his association get tied up with 'spivs' and 
whatever. So, I think he was very careful to ensure that his members and his association did not get 
labeled as opportunists. And that might be part of the reason why they kept their heads down ... Warren 
and their association spent a lot of time with DFAT (the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) and 
the industry departments whatever and the Environment Department trying to make sure that the mies 
were right. And, I think they just got a bit frustrated that they kept getting all these political decisions 
about the rules that did not have much scientific basis. Or they were made up for reasons that everyone 
could agree to. And so, the rule that says-for example-we detennine that a[[ the emissions happen 
when the tree is cut down-just made no sense to them whatsoever ... ! think there was a bit of caution 
about making sure that they did not get labeled as peddling all these crazy schemes. [19;63,67,75-9] I 
would put it this way-with both Warren Lang and Robert Bain, they had a strategic view, an 
understanding of the gains and losses for the Forest industries from being outside the debate. In 
particular, on the sinks side-they understood more about growing trees than the government ever did, 
the Commonwealth government that is ... You basically had an executive director, and then an acting 
executive director at NAP! who had a vision and an understanding of it but no real driving interest-the 
NAFJ guys never managed to get a vision. So, it was Warren and Robert who both had some 
understanding and knew that if they didn't try to set some of the rules you would have idiots doing it. 
Sorry, you would have been uninformed doing it-and they got involved in carbon accounting but that 
was it. [18;100] 
226 I thought it was fairly interesting when the government set up its dialogue process that in the land and 
agriculture chamber shall we say, the one that NFF and NAP! basically run, initially NAP! had to take 
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issue, and a greater determination to invest the time and effort required on the issue to be an 
effective player. The new leadership is markedly different in having largely abandoned the 
siege mentality, scepticism, pessimism, and ideological sympathy with the AIGN side-all 
of which is perceived to have characterised the previous leadership.227 The focus ofleading 
NAFI figures like Phil Townsend on renewable electricity and wood-based biofuel 
opportunities since Carnell's departure suggests that the process continues. The impetus for 
change appears to have been driven to a significant degree at board level, suggesting that 
the path by which Kate Carnell has shifted NAFI's direction has been paved by others, not 
blazed by her alone.228 That said, it also appears that leadership at the board level drifted 
significantly after the exit of Bain, before Carnell's appointment.229 
Resources 
As with any interest group response, resource allocation between competing priorities has 
been a significant factor in NAFI's response to greenhouse.230 However, it has not been 
the chair because they couldn't get NFF to be in it. Now it was just illogical for NAFI to take the chair of 
the chamber that was land and resource management, I mean it's theirs. [4;306] 
227 Leadership is everything because you can take that siege mentality and say 'it's all crap' and all that 
sort of stuff or alternatively you can actually be very proactive and both approaches are quite reasonable 
and can be defended. Kate obviously has a view on which one's more sensible ... I mean Warren is a 
great bloke but Warren has a tendency to be hard line scientist and of course Kate's not. Kate just looks 
at it that this is ... regardless of what the science is behind greenhouse-and Warren you see would 
disagree that greenhouse is real, and so if you come at it from that perspective you're going to end up in a 
different spot. Kate just looks at it that she doesn't actually think it matters whether it is or it isn't 'It's 
real, it's happening, the outcomes of us embracing a greenhouse approach is good for the environment 
generally. Ifwe reduce emissions, that's got to be a good thing generally for the environment, regardless 
of what we think about greenhouse science. It's happening worldwide, it's happening in Australia, 
therefore we need to be part of it.' This is Kate's approach which wouldn't be Warren's approach. 
[4;114,78-82] 
228 A number of the principals got together and decided that they had to make some pretty definite 
decisions here on what they wanted to do with NAFI and I think the decision was that it had to become 
more involved in the debate, you know not just the 'punch up the greenies' debate. To some extent that's 
not an overly useful use of time, effort, energy and money, but I think forest industries have just got 
extraordinary opportunities-taking into account the environment around the world, the resource 
availability particularly in the Asia Pacific arena, environmental services-if we're not defensive, we're 
progressive. It's the opportunity ... and the fact we all love wood, we actually love wood, as people. We 
like it on our floors and we like it in our furniture and we like using it, we just have a tendency not to 
associate wood with trees. [4;92-102]' 
229 They (NAFl's Board) just let it sort of crumble and they'd decided not to put new people on, I think 
because they weren't sure where it was heading and so they kept on putting off putting new people on 
until they had a new CEO. {How long was (Lang) acting?} 18 months!. [4;246-250] 
230 
••• with Rob Bain they were into the whole question of logging and wood chipping and all this type of 
thing and really had their hands full. [51;114] ... they didn't contribute outside of their sector at all so I 
suspect again they had other agenda items that their resources were going into. [6;187] To what extent do 
you think resources has been an issue over the years in NAFI's response to greenhouse?} Oh it's huge, I 
mean it's still NAFI's hassle. There is a limit to the amount of time they can spend on any one issue. 
{But the change that you have talked about, going from dropping the ball, not identifying that NAFI's a 
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decisive in tenns of influencing whether or not they played a major role in the greenhouse 
policy network. NAFI had built up considerable fighting funds with which the timber 
industry has engaged in political battle through the RF A process and previous battles over 
World Heritage listing. Given their strong record of amassing resources when the need is 
identified, most do not see resources as a significant factor in their greenhouse activities. 
The consensus view is that had NAFI viewed climate change as a priority it would have 
found the money it needed to engage and pursue its agenda with government and in the 
wider debate.231 
NAFI insiders confinn that lack of financial resources has never been a major issue for the 
organisation.232 What has been a problem, however, is indecision and procrastination in 
deciding how to allocate resources. 233 This largely explains the apparent lack of human 
resources at NAFI over many years-a problem which some observers mistook for a lack 
of financial resources. For a substantial period NAFI operated its secretariat with between 
one and three staff. This made it very difficult for new issues to be dealt with in addition to 
those already dominating the time of the limited personnel, and perhaps fostered an 
opportunistic and 'only when we absolutely have to' approach by NA.FI to greenhouse 
issues. 
This resources issue was largely overcome with the appointment of Kate Carnell as CEO 
and the hiring of a significantly larger number of staff at the secretariat 'With a much 
broader skill set than before. Ibis also coincided with unprecedented unity at board level 
winner, not being active on it really to now being quite proactive on it, have they suddenly had treble the 
budget to enable them to do that?) No, it comes back to just using your resources differently l suppose. 
{So, it hasn't been a decisive factor in whether or not NAFI's involved?) No, but I must admit I think 
NAFI should be more involved than it is at the moment [4;184-202] 
231 I think the big side of town is very influential, they have the money to buy the services, the analyses, 
the economic analyses and the like, so you have the Aluminium Council and the Gas Association and the 
Forest Industries (Association) and the Fanners' Federation well-equipped. [30;260] I think NAFI don't 
put extra resources in so the way they respond and the impression you get from is that it's kind of knee-
jerk. In policy forums they try to engage but they really don't have time to do the research because there 
isn't really one person on it full-time. [39;266] 
232 Warren had left and he'd been working three days a week for a while, Don McKay who used lo do the 
PR had left, the accountant had left, so all those positions were empty. In fuct the PR was being done by 
Don's old PA, so Kate had Don's PA, Warren's PA-there are too many PAs in this organisation-the 
PA for the accountant, and that was all, so NAFl had three PAs... {Was the main reason for that 
budgetary restraints at the time?} Lack of direction, we had lots of money. {NAFI's now obviously got 
some money to be able to go out and get some new staff?) Well, it was the same money that Warren 
hruL. [4;234~50] 
233 I would like to see NAFI more proactive than it is, but there is a limit to what NAFI can do inside the 
budget, inside the resources that they have got. {So there's been a reshuffling of priorities?) Yes, very 
much so.{Whafs dropped off the end?) It's an interesting question because I'm not sure that anything 
has, maybe just working harder,., [4;184-202] 
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on the allocation of financial resources. There was finally a vision for an organisation 
which had drifted for many years under a the board that had found it difficult to decide 
where to spend its money. Early indications are that the increase in resource allocation has 
partly facilitated a qualitatively and quantitatively greater level of engagement by NAFI on 
greenhouse policy-however, resources have been less influential than have cultural and 
leadership change. 
Meso-level 
At least half a dozen meso-level factors have exerted various pressures on NAFI as it made 
decisions over many years on the nature and extent of its involvement in the greenhouse 
policy network. Four of these factors contributed to less NAFI engagement on climate 
policy. The two factors which drove more activity were both government-related. On 
balance, network level forces acted to discourage NAFI involvement. 
Policy implications 
NAFI's interests in the various implications of climate change are numerous and 
conflicting, and this has driven group indecision, hesitation and inconsistent policy network 
engagement.234 On the one hand, NAFI has an interest in opposing emission reduction 
measures which would interfere with the ability of their members to harvest native forests. 
This is true of potentially increased operating costs which might result from additional 
carbon-based imposts on fossil fuel use. It is also true of restrictions which might be 
applied by government on harvesting of Australia's stocks of existing greenhouse sinks-
native forests-as a way of reducing total greenhouse emissions nationally. 
On the other hand, some of NAFI' s members have potentially a great deal to gain from 
policy decisions that expand carbon sinks in Australia-for example, through additional 
incentives for timber plantation development. This is true not only for softwood plantation 
companies, but also for the increasing hardwood plantation sector. In many cases, 
234 
••• they are generally sensitive to the interests of their members and that can be actually debilitating 
when you have the diverse range of interests which they are trying to represent-that is very common in 
industry associations-if you have a diverse range of interests you are often better off not to say anything 
on a particular issue because you cannot arrive at a consensus position. [53; 121] We talked about NAFI 
and the fact that there was the division between the plantation people and the logging part of the forest 
people which led to a fissure. But I think wbile they were together it meant that they didn't speak with a 
coherent voice and so the membership meant that they weren't able to have a clear and coherent and 
focused view. [9;238] 
150 
companies in the timber industry have overlapping investments in both. Taking this into 
account, and given the strong push by government to increase plantations and to make 
Australia a net exporter of timber, NAFI presumably has a significant starting interest in 
promoting the carbon sequestration business, and ensuring that policies implemented in this 
regard are in sync with its members' best interests. It is certainly an interest which 
government promoted. As former forestry and conservation minister, Wilson Tuckey 
(1999) put it: 
As a result of the Kyoto Protocol, there is now clear potential for a new tangible 
benefit to arise from plantations and farm forestry, one that may benefit rural 
communities directly. I'm talking about the possibility that farmers will one day be 
able to receive some financial reward for the greenhouse benefits their tree crops 
provide through soaking up carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. It's a new field of 
opportunity, one that is only just opening up, but I'm pleased to say it is gathering 
momentum all the time. 
On the surface, NAFI has had a strong interest in the establishment as early as practicable 
of an emissions trading system in which there is adequate scope to allow the trading of 
carbon credits. If the sequestration capacity of trees is quantified, accounted for, and 
approved for trading as part of a national (or even international) scheme, sections of the 
forestry industry could potentially enjoy a significant gain. Some companies have entered 
into arrangemenis assuming that national emissions trading is an inevitability in Australia, 
and it has become reality already in New South Wales, with the prospect of a nationwide 
system implemented by state governmenis now a real possibility. 
However, while carbon credit markets would seem a win-win situation for the broader 
forestry industry, it is so clear cut for NAFI, which has been dominated by a relatively 
small number of large companies that focus on two practices for which may not benefit 
from carbon trading: 1) the harvest of native forests; and 2) the clearing of native forests to 
establish plantations, both of which are excluded from the 'Kyoto forest' definition. As a 
consequence, the economic gains available from carbon trading in the timber industry 
would accrue more to members of other organisations like the Plantation Timber 
Association of Australia (PTAA). Other recently established companies that invest in 
permanent forest plantings would also benefit, and while they are potential NAFI recruits, 
the are not currently members. That said, some NAFI members still stand to gain, and 
increasingly so as its members diversify more into plantations, and as NAFI deliberately 
seeks to represent forest growers. However, it perhaps explains why NAFI (1998:2) once 
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told a parliamentary inquiry into emissions trading that even though carbon trading may be 
inevitable, NAFI was not promoting the idea . 
. . . development of a market in carbon credits in parallel with development of 
mechanisms for emissions trading may be inevitable. Our competitive advantages 
in forestry suggest that Australia may be well placed to become a credit provider 
in a market for carbon credits. ·while this may increase investment in plantation 
development, NAFI is concerned that growth of trading in carbon credits may 
have the potential to distort the economics of the timber industry and cause 
significant disruption. 
The concern not to do anything which was not in the clear interest of the core members of 
NAFI-for whom native forest logging remained the main focus-may have driven NAFI 
to overlook a major opportunity in emissions trading. While the opportunity has certainly 
been recognised and encouraged by some players in the Australian forestry sector and in 
the wider network, the policy implications have done little to drive NAFI engagement on 
greenhouse issues until quite recently. Throughout the 1990s, and until the arrival of Kate 
Carnell, NAFI was only rarely and temporarily hopeful about the greenhouse opportunities 
while being consistently concerned about the negative implications it perceived in relation 
forestry production costs, continued access to native forests, and the relative economic 
power of core NAFI members in the industry .235 This stance has since changed 
significantly, but NAFI still doesn't publicly support emissions trading or the Kyoto 
Protocol.236 
235 They were fairly ... as I said they were fairly reactive although they were also ... I mean the person 
there ... certainly with NAFI I remember when we looked at the role of forest plantations and planning 
basically forests as an alternative to crops in some parts of the country, and they were actually quite 
supportive of exploring things like that so the person there did play a role beyond just the negative of 
what's the impact on a farmer going to be, it is what ... and so someone who was narrower could have 
actually been more reactive. [6; 123] You know--Oiey don't want to know about it really. But, when it 
became apparent that there might be money in sinks---you know, they started to be a lot more 
interested ... Then, they started to realise that there might be some money in forest plantations and they 
started to get interested in it except that the plantation bodies had drifted away from NAFl-but yet on 
the other hand the state forest management agencies-they were taking a strong interest in plantations, 
particularly the New South Wales forest and Western Australia, and Tasmania to some extent. [31;244] 
We did have a discussion very early in the piece between the again I've forgotten the name of the 
organisation, but it's the plantation industries representation and NAFI had asked them, and a couple 
others on what the true greenhouse best options were. That was actually called by the plantation people. 
And it was really trying to get the plantation industry to look at what the threats and opportunities were. 
NAFI plays a fairly neutral role in that I've provided input into NAFI and I've been invited to speak at a 
nwnber of their meetings and workshops they've called-again to assess where Kyoto is, what the 
interpretations are and what this means to the forest industry. Again I've noted a strong caution 
especially I think Warren Lang is essentially a cautious person all around and that's the way he's tended 
to play. [44;57] 
236 See previous quote [4;82] under footnote 227 reflecting this change. 
I won't say we'll get al! the rules the way we'd like them to be but I think that from a government 
perspective the benefits of having emissions trading of some description, that it linking into 
environmental services and salinity credits and all those sorts of things and for it to be done in a way that 
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Policy limitations 
There are at least four policy limitations which have played a significant role in the NAFI 
reluctance over many years to take a stronger interest in greenhouse issues. 
The first relates to carhon accounting. While there is little practical difficulty (as opposed 
to economic and political problems) with measuring greenhouse emissions from stationary 
energy sources like power stations, the same cannot be said of the forestry sector. 
Throughout the 1990s a good deal of disagreement existed ahout the measurement of 
carbon sequestration, and this has meant that the incorporation of carhon credits generated 
in forests as part of emissions trading schemes has not been as readily adopted by 
government as many advocates would have liked. Instead, government has allocated 
resources to shoring up carbon accounting knowledge and practice. This has contributed 
'wait and see' attitude among some in the forestry sector and may have dampened the 
enthusiasm ofNAFI to get more involved.237 
The second main policy limitation is the rules which have been settled upon for carbon 
accounting under the Kyoto Protocol provisions. As is discussed in more detail below, 
NAFI's view has been that these rules are both scientifically flawed and to the disadvantage 
of the Australian forest sector-particularly native forest saw-millers and plantations 
established pre-1990. This significantly reduced NAFI's enthusiasm, especially given the 
concentration of its membership base around these sections of the industry.238 
encourages investment in our industry is very likely. So from my perspective, as long as we get the rules 
and regulation right and the taxation structures right and all that stuff it will be very good for us. [ 4;526] 
237 I mean one of 1he problems with 1he farmers and the forests is the least accurate predictions are in this 
sector because of the uncertainty of released carbon I mean and there's all sorts of technical issues ... 
They could see that they might play a role but the whole role of forests and the role of plants if you get 
away from just straight clearing ... If you clear a forest and you put bitumen or you put development on 
that that's one issue, but you clear a forest and you put pasture there the greenhouse implication of that is 
tricky, it's nor at all clear cut. You could in fact get a win in a greenhouse sense. It might be bad from a 
salinity or from some other sense and because 1hat debate still hasn't been totally resolved but that was 
really raging at that stage, this uncertainty in the whole agricultural &-ector. [6;123,1&7] 
m I mean, NAFI represents the old growth forest industry largely and the plantation industry. They have 
a problem in that their members' holdings are forests in 1990 and therefore don't get any advantages for 
sequestering carbon 1hat post 1990 forests get. And so they have a very specific policy interest and 1hey 
are mainly active in promoting that specific policy interest. [7;27] ... there was never anything in the 
Kyoto Protocol for people logging old growth forests. There was something in there for plantations-you 
know, industrial scale plantations established after 1990 ... whether it is going to be a commercial gain-
that is another matter. {It is something about when the carbon counts-it is wunted today as if all of the 
carbon returns to the atmosphere the moment it is logged-that was Warren Lang's impression.} Well, I 
think that is probably right-but there is still carbon stored for the period while the tree is growing and 
that is obviously where your discount is. {It means there is not as much of an incentive in Lang's view for 
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The third policy limitation relates to the forest industry's connections with the woodchip 
and paper industries. It is widely acknowledged within the industry that Australia should 
manufacture more paper with its own woodchips rather than exporting woodchips and then 
importing paper manufactured overseas. However, the energy and carbon intensity of local 
paper production is high. Consequently, measures to reduce Australia's emissions could 
compromise local paper manufacturing-a limitation about which NAFI cannot help being 
mindful.239 
The fourth main policy limitation which has restrained NAFI's engagement in greenhouse 
related issues has been the strong green opposition to the use of carbon sequestration as a 
primary means of offsetting emission debits. Opposition by environmentalists is based on 
the concern that sinks would be used as a loophole--preventing policies from forcing 
power generators and transport sector companies to reduce their own emissions.240 Planting 
trees is seen by many as avoiding the problem and postponing action. 
For NAFI, this somewhat reduces the incentive to be involved in greenhouse abatement 
advocacy. If green opposition to carbon sequestration by forests is likely to undermine any 
public kudos to the industry for contributing to an environmental solution, engagement on 
the issue is less attractive than would otherwise be the case. Without recognition and 
incorporation of sequestration investment into an emissions trading system-something 
which green opposition makes harder-there is less reason for the timber industry to get 
involved. It would seem that this has been a significant but perhaps not well appreciated 
consideration in NAFI's case. 
the foresters.} Well, I think that is probably right. It is good in a way because there are so many lobby 
groups putting their emphasis on sinks which are never going to be more than a short term option. 
[31 ;248-{)2] 
239 Some of the more challenging issues for us ... one of the things that needs to happen in Australia at the 
moment is we need to build a couple of paper plants because we export all these woodchips and import 
all this paper which is very bad for the industry because we get into trouble for exporting woodchips and 
it looks horrible, but we use a Jot of paper so we really should manufacture it here and we don't. I mean 
we have a few paper plants but not many. The dilemma of the paper plants is they're significant 
investments, billion dollar operations, but they're also high energy users so a few balls in the air on a 
couple of our significant investment opportunities/challenges that exist. We've just got to make sure that 
they're done right. [ 4;526] 
24° For example, Friends of the Earth Australia (1998:2-3) told the parliamentary inquiry into emissions 
trading: 'Whilst increased vegetation cover in Australia is commendable, a result where fossil fuel 
oxidation was traded for greater vegetation cover would: I. entail high monitoring costs; 2. be limited by 
land capacity; 3. only delay the time when fossil fuel use must be reduced; 4. not deal with the immediate 
increase in carbon dioxide due to the delay between production of carbon dioxide and its absorption by, 
say, a tree. Thus, discrepancies in the description of carbon credits between the energy sector and the 
natural resources sector make trading between these two sectors inviable (sic).' 
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Coalition activity 
Coalition activity by NAFI in the greenhouse policy network seems not to have occurred 
apart from some sporadic participation in AIGN meetings, but witb no formal 
commitment.241 At no stage did NAFI seek to capitalise on tbe opportunities presented by 
climate change by forging coalitions with other organisations. Whilst tbey would go against 
he grain of the NAFI culture, such coalitions might have greatly enhanced the effectiveness 
of NAFI's advocacy on Bioenergy (including wood waste for renewable electricity, and 
wood-based ethanol). NAFI tended to act alone and coalition activity certainly did not lead 
to significant ongoing engagement. 
However, it would be wrong to dismiss coalition activity on tbat basis, because it has 
contributed to NAFI inaction. In effect, coalition activity in the form oftbe AIGN has acted 
to discourage greater NAFI engagement in the policy network. This effect has occurred due 
to a combination of factors. First, there is a close cultural and historical association between 
the leadership ofNAFI and some of the people most prominent in the work of the AIGN. 
The connections in NAFI and AIGN with the federal industry portfolio in general and 
ABARE in particular are one example, the prominent role of tbe paper industry (NAFI 
members for much of the 1990s) in the AIGN is another. The shared experiences and 
similar world views-particularly in relation to issues involving resources and 
environmental issues--have without doubt meant that NAFI has been quietly sympathetic 
and almost reflexively supportive of the positions adopted by AIGN in response to climate 
change.242 
This is reinforced by tbe somewhat 'altruistic' position taken by NAFI in public on behalf 
of other sectors of the economy represented by AIGN. For example, even though NAFI 
(House of Representatives l998b:315) claimed that its members were 'not a large user of 
energy' it expressed deep concern for the interests of industries which were larger users of 
241 They have never been big players in what you would call the industry greenhouse lobby. [18;100] 
... up until about six months ago anyway we would have a six monthly meeting between representatives 
of the AIGN and representatives of these other dozen or so industry associations~which by the way it 
included the Farmers' Federation and NA.FI ... Just to have a general discussion about what was going 
on, and what did they think about it? Just to share infonnation. [29; 103-07] 
242 {And would you say that part of their culture is a predisposition to take a defensive stance on any 
environment related issue?) That's been my experience up until the last couple of years [44;209] 
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energy. For example, in its submission to the parliamentary inquiry into greenhouse 
emissions trading NAFI said: 
... a system for trading in emissions may seriously affect the competitiveness of 
energy intensive Australian industries and impose substantial transaction and 
compliance costs. Any decision to establish such a system should therefore be taken 
only after proper testing of the economic concepts and thorough consideration of the 
cost impacts on industries and consequent effects on the Australian economy. (NAFI 
1998:3-4) 
These types of stances and other evidence found here suggests that NAFI supported the 
AIGN in all but paid up membership243, and that NAFI were viewed as ideological allies 
(especially under Bain's leadership) by both the AIGN and more extreme sceptical 
elements of the greenhouse policy network.244 There was at times a tendency to support the 
general direction being taken by industry players more closely involved in the coalition 
activity of the AIGN-a sense at NAFI that the issue is being taken care of by others. This 
has led to a feeling that there is Jess need for NAFI to take an active role in the central 
debate.245 
243 NAFI-were both invited in and refused to take it up. [18;344] NAFI have not been part of that AIGN 
set-up. {I gather they were part of, sort of the initial group ... } Yes. { ... but when it crune time to chip in 
the membership fee they baulked and ... } That sounds about right. [37;23-31] AIGN evolved from what 
was initially a loose association of companies and associations that used to meet, not even on a regular 
basis to share information and talk about issues and so it wasn't funded, they didn't have a secretary of 
its own that was pto\1ded by one of the associations and in fact that was provided by the Business 
Council in the early days so back at that stage the membership of the network was anyone who wanted to 
be and NAFI was part of it at that time. When the BCA restructured and decided tho! this was really 
consuming a lot of their resources and other organisations perhaps needed to share the burden, it was set 
up on the basis ofits own executive dire;,1:or and a funding requirement from the members of the network 
and it was at that stage that NAFI no longer continued to be a member of the network. {What, they didn't 
want to pay the membership fee?} Yes, but they were happy to be part of sharing information and 
participating in debate and so on, but in terms of ... All associations you'll find are on very tight budgets 
and their call was 'no, they didn't want to contribute to the network.' {Was there a flat fee for 
membership?} There was a fee that was, and the structure is similar today, that there's a fee for 
associations and a fee for companies. {ls there a flat fee or is that sort of more ... ) Yes, it was a 
differential strueture, a lower cost for company membership than association membership. {But 
presumably substantial enough to scare off someone like NAFI from ... } Oh no, not huge by any means, 
but as I say, you'll find that associations operate on very tight budgets so ... [29;41-57] 
244 See previous quote [18;256) under footnote 176 in which Robert Bain is described as part of the 
greenhouse 'mafia' during his time at NAFI, and is ABARE background is mentioned in support of that 
view. 
NAFI I mean I used to talk to Rob (Bain), the guy who went to the AMA, Rob Bain. I always valued his 
judgment and so on. [49;145] 
245 
••• tend to sort of hunt in packs with the other industry association groups and I think that NAFI 
particularly ... have not necessarily looked at their real interests in terms of these issues. They have I think 
tended to just go with the Business Council, the Minerals Council, the Aluminium Council and people 
like that. It's the sort of ... the coterie of business associations which tend to go together on issues where 
they're not out in front. I mean when you're out front in an issue ... [35;37--9] 
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Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the coalition activity of the AlGN has acted to 
discourage any inclination NAFI might have had to take a position 011 the greener side of 
the climate change debate. Clearly, NAFI's members have had an interest in promoting 
carbon sequestration through forest sinks and the recognition of the value of this via 
emissions trading. However, for NAFI to have taken a strong role in advancing these issues 
would have meant contradicting the position and direction of the AlGN. It would have 
meant running an agenda opposed to various traditional allies, risking good personal 
relationships, and adopting a position more in synch with traditional enemies. This clearly 
held NAFI back on greenhouse. 
In combination, coalition activity in the form of the AIGN was not sufficient to encourage 
NAFI participation--in that NAFI never joined AIGN. However, it acted as a significant 
'scarecrow' by discouraging any thoughts NAFI had of taking a position on the green side 
of the debate. Certainly, coalitions with possible green movement allies have never been 
seriously collSidered. In more recent times, NAFI has begun to act in loose coalition with 
the NFF and >vith the plantation industry on greenhouse issues. The extent to which this 
may amount to a reduction in the 'scarecrow effect,' and a changing of direction is 
uncertain. There certainly appears less inclination for rejoining the AIGN.246 
Related government policy agenda 
Government policies on greenhouse related matters have had a very significant influence 
on the low degree of NAFI interest and engagement Notv,ithstanding recent strong 
patronage ofNAFI by the Howard government in relation to Tasmanian forest policy, and 
signs of movement towards greater access for wood waste under the MRET, a series of key 
energy-related federal government decisions have gone against the interests of the forestry 
sector. This is true of the government's decision not to introduce emissions trading in the 
foreseeable future, it is true of the accounting rules which the Australian government 
agreed to in Kyoto, and it is also true of the treatment of timber until now under the 
MRET.247 The same can be said of the government's policy towards liquid biofuels, 
246 Oh look, there's no doubt there's a club and a club at a different level between the group of career 
association e><ecutives that have moved around and perceive they know how this is done. That sort of 
stuft'. But you always get that in any deal. Again this will sound really cynical. I think the leadership in 
these groups tend to come from the groups that have the most to lose because they're the most 
aggressive, the most out there, which is not a really good outcome but it is my narrow experience that the 
people who are the most vocal and push the agenda the mosL, [4;426] 
247 If there has been a colle<:tive failure, if you looked at their interests and then looked at outcomes 
perhaps the most disappointing outcome would be the treatment of wood (referring the treatment of wood 
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another area in which the timber industry has expressed an interest in becoming a player 
(NAFI 2003).248 Arguably, the government's decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol also 
goes against the interests of the Australian forestry industry.249 Government policy has in 
part reflected a concern about green arguments that the greater the forestry industry role in 
reducing greenhouse emissions, the less attention will be paid to industrial sources and the 
transport sector-the areas of fastest emissions growth. Continued 'losses' for NAFI on 
various issues that are crucial to its interest in the greenhouse policy network have reduced 
the incentives for it to play a larger role. Interestingly, the recent turnaround by NAFI 
under the leadership of Kate Camell is less focused on group interest and more on 
resignation that the agenda is inevitable so there is no point in opting out.250 
Government and/or departmental processes 
Processes established by the federal government have had some effect in encouraging 
greater NAFI engagement. However, the impact has been insignificant relative to most 
other behavioural pressures discussed above. NAFI has participated over the years in 
government greenhouse processes and programs such as the Hawke/Keating government's 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) consultation process, the National 
Greenhouse Advisory Panel (NGAP)251, the Co-operative Research Centre (CRC) for 
in renewable energy legislation), both plantation and otherwise in the Democrat process (i.e. negotiations 
between government and the Democrats). The process for minimum renewable certificates in the 
electricity sector where the treatment of wood in that legislation is quite irrational and difficult to 
administer. Essentially because it ended up having to be a compromise between the interests of each of a 
number of parties for that-senate parties to that process. {But it ended up only allowing wood waste?} 
That's right. And it is ambiguous. What does wood waste mean? Why shouldn't you be able to use wood 
as a biomass in the way that you use other products, particularly from plantations or even from RF A 
forests. {Which are genuinely renewable forests?} Yes. But because it got caught up with the forest 
debate, and it certainly hasn't come out in a direction that is easy to administer or particularly logically 
internally consistent. Now that must have been a significant blow if you like, or failure if you like, from 
NAFI's point of view. Now, maybe nobody could have done any better than that given the commitment 
of many single interest groups to passionate views on the forests and given the composition of the senate. 
Who should they have worked harder on? I suspect the Labor Party. If they'd got a more rational view 
out of the Labor Party. The government wouldn't have had to dealt with the independents. [54;46] 
248Also see comments by NAFI deputy executive director, Phil Townsend, on the potential for 'the 
establishment of a sustainable wood-ethanol industry in the near future.' (Forest and Wood Products 
Development Corporation 2003:2) 
249 I mean what is our national capacity for generating carbon credits? I think it's incredible--! think we 
could buy ourselves years, decades even, but we have to be in the game in order to do that. [33;54] 
250 See previous quote [4;82] under footnote 227 on the more recent NAFI view that it doesn't matter 
whether climate change is real or not, it has to be addressed, and NAFI can't ignore it. 
251 One of them was keeping the size of the panel reasonable at the same time as making it representative 
and in fact I think if! remember correctly both the Gas Association and NAFI came in later. That is they 
were ... at the first meeting there were discussions as to whether the panel that had been selected was 
sufficiently broad and I think we agreed to extend it by a couple and I'm sure that's when ... I know 
that's when forests came in ... They were fairly ... as I said they were fairly reactive although they were 
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Carbon Accounting252, the government's Business Dialogue process253, and the review of 
the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET). NAFI's participation has generally 
been characterised by sporadic attendance at meetings and occasional submissions on key 
issues. Prior to the change of leadership to Kate Carnell, which saw them take a stronger 
role as chair of one of the committees in the business dialogue process, the organisation had 
been a reluctant participant in government processes established for the purpose of 
fostering greater engagement by interest groups on greenhouse issues. That said, it is 
certainly fair to say that government processes have succeeded in fostering greater NAFI 
interest than would otherwise have occurred. 
More broadly, government processes indirectly related to greenhouse have fostered greater 
attention by NAFI to greenhouse issues. For example, the federal government's policy to 
dramatically expand forest plantations, Plantation 2020, has been enthusiastically supported 
by NAFI, and the greenhouse implications of a policy to expand plantations have long been 
an important consideration. Under the program which seeks to treble the area of Australia 
under plantation timber there is clear potential to contribute to a better greenhouse outcome 
through the capacity of trees to sequester carbon dioxide. This has been well recognised 
and promoted by the federal government and by NAFI to a lesser extent. The program itself 
appears to have heightened interest within NAFI about the potential for greenhouse to 
present commercial opportunities to its members. NAFI for a time promoted farm forestry 
to the rural community as a means of diversifying, a defensive investment to help ride out 
the highs and low-:s of the agricultural economy. So it seems likely that government support 
for plantation development has at times fostered greater interest in greenhouse issues by 
NAFI. 254 However, as we have seen, NAFI disappointment with the carbon accounting 
rules of the Kyoto Protocol scuttled initial enthusiasm for some time. 
also ... l mean the person there ... certainly with NAFI I remember when ·we looked at the role of forest 
plantations and planning basically forests as an alternative to crops in some parts of the country, and they 
were actually quite supportive of exploring things like that so the person there did play a role beyond just 
the negative of what's the impact on a faimer going to be, it is wilat ... and so someone who was 
narrower could have actually been more reactive. [6; 19, l23] 
m The CRC now has Kate Camell on the board as a rnember--<1gain trying to bring through other skills 
that Kate has--but also to have a link with the forestry industry through NAFI. [ 44;57] 
253 [ 4;394-402] 
254 For example Robert Bain (NAFI 1997) said in a press release: 'NAFI welcomes the shift in emphasis 
in the greenhouse debate to focus on the capacity of Australia's vegetation management policies to offset 
the growth in greenhouse gases from other sectors of the economy. The recently announced 
industryiguvemment Vision 2020 plantation program could not be better timed. Already C02 removals 
by sustainably managed production forests and plantations account for about two thirds of Australia's 
C02 removals. (There is) enonnous potential for forestry and land clearance policies to significantly 
reduce or eliminate the annual greenhouse emission groV>1h factor whicn has caused criticism of 
Australia's greenhouse policies both here and overseas ... The key to offsetting the growth of greenhouse 
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Overall, NAFI has been a marginal player and government processes have had only modest 
success in getting the forestry sector more involved. Government players have sought at 
various stages to get NAFI more engaged, recognising that the implications of the issues 
under consideration were of relevance to the forestry sector. To the disappointment of 
bureaucrats NAFI was largely unresponsive to requests for input when it mattered255 and 
petbaps wide of the mark in other cases.256 One of the consequences has been that 
important polk')' decisions have been taken without NAFI input-at times to the detriment 
of NAFI interests. While there is disappointment within government at the lack of NAFI 
involvement, there is little sympathy that NAFI has missed its own opportunities.257 
Parliamentary processes 
While parliamentary processes have not led to any sustained role for NAFI in the policy 
network. they have elicited public positions from the organisation every couple of years. 
NAFI has been an occasional participant in the various parliamentary inquiries held on 
greenhouse related issues.258 As well as being a regular contributor to parliamentary 
emissions from mining, power generation and other sectors of the economy lies in the expansion of 
plantations and a reduction in the rate of clearing of forestlands for pasture or other non-forest!non-
plantation uses.' 
255 It is hard to grab a hold of them and sit dovvn and ask them what are their views. What do you have to 
tell us-that kind of thing .... in the nm-up to Kyoto I remember picking up that ball and trying to get 
involved with the industry associations and you could not get access to NAFI-they just did not 
respond ... [27;60] 
256 1 mean everyone is always busy, you're always busy. I reckon you could spend in these sorts of jobs 
an inordinate amount of time writing submissions to government, but having been in government I know 
what happens to most of them. Sol think maybe once upon a time we spent an inordinate amount of time 
writing submissions on everything kno\.\11 to man, but actually not doing anything. {With NAFI 
correspondence to government in the past-four or five pages was not uncommon?} ... in fact less than 
that would have been uncommon. (The) approach was you put it in writing and get somewhat aggressive 
about it, often. {Very detailed'/} And very scientific and all the rest of it and maybe I just have a view, 
having been in government I have a view that regularly that doesn't actually do much, assuming it is 
going to government ... I think that we need to be part of things like the (business) dialogue and we need 
to be quite overtly part of that and the business coalition and we need to be putting our position more 
overtly on a number of these issues. (We gave evidence) before the senate committee on renewable 
energy on Friday and our submission for the renewable energy (bearing) was three pages long and it 
should not have been longer. We said what we had to say and got on with it I think, but maybe once upon 
a time that would not have been the case. [4;202-14] 
257 
... a couple of times sinee when I bumped into Warren Lang, I very nearly said, 'well where were 
you-you fucker-when it mattered. We wanted advice from you and you didn't give it to us so don't 
come complaining to us now about the contents of the Protocol. Besides, we did a pretty good job for 
you.' {Would that be a case where you would say that they have not adequately recognised their 
interests?} Exactly right. They basically relinquished that to government. .. [27;60,56] 
258 They made submissions in l.991 to the senate inquiry into reducing the impact of the greenhouse 
effect, in 1998 to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on the Environment and Heritage 
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inquiries, NAFI has become more engaged on climate change policy in relation to specific 
federal legislation. The most significant example has been legislation relating to the MRET. 
NAFI has endeavoured to promote timber as a 'renewable fuel' in the context of the 
government's push for additional use of renewable energy sources for electricity 
production in Australia. At various times, NAFI has lobbied the federal government to have 
wood waste included in the definition of renewable sources in the legislation. On the whole 
these activities have not succeeded in securing significant advances for the forestry 
sector-at least not in the terms that core NAFI members would like. This has reinforced 
the inclination of the organisation not to invest greater resources in the policy area.259 
International processes 
International processes have played an important role in NAFI's response to climate 
change. In the 1990s, NAFI was initially enthusiastic about the potential for the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change to deliver a new opportunity for the timber industry in 
driving new plantations to enhance Australia's greenhouse sinks.260 They saw greenhouse 
forest investments creating a whole new business for the timber industry and potentially 
boosting the value of the existing enterprise for their membership.261 
However, this enthusiasm turned to 'anger and bewilderment' as NAFI became convinced 
that the existing rules governing carbon accounting at the international level are such that 
there is no benefit whatsoever for the timber industry from emissions trading.262 And, while 
climate change is still recognised by NAFI as potentially being an important opportunity 
given appropriate incorporation of sinks, the current position of the NAFI is Juke-warm at 
best because of its understanding that international provisions under the Framework 
Inquiry into Emissions Trading, and in 2000 to the Inquiry into the Kyoto Prot0<:-0l by the Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties. 
259 See previous quote [54;46] under footnote 247 
"'° (NAFI 1997). 
261 Forests should be considered as 'factories of greenhouse goods.' They are the most sustainable rural 
industry in Australia. [8;18] 
262 We (NAFI) were angered and bewildered at the !lawed Kyoto rules relating to carbon sequestration 
an forestry. Warren Lang puts this down to atmospheric scientists rather than biologists writing the 
Kyoto rules. [8;17] As Lang told one parliamentary inquiry: ' Under the protocols adopted by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the IPCC, timber harvested is e<mnted as an actual emission 
in the year of harvest, and that is how the national greenhouse gas accounting inventory is actually 
calculated in Australia. What that means is that anyone who accumulates a credit by planting and 
growing a tree will extinguish it in the act of felling it. As long as that convention applies, I find it a little 
difficult to see how forestry can take part in an active system of carbon credits trading ... {a) mistake has 
been made by the IPCC.' (House of Representatives 1998b:303) 
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Convention remove most of the perceived incentive for foresters to establish new 
greenhouse sinks in Australia.263 
The crux of the NAFI case is that IPCC scientists have made a determination early in the 
climate change negotiations that timber is counted as an emission as soon as it is harvested 
(thereby ignoring the reality that much of the carbon involved is in fact not released back 
into the atmosphere but retained in the timber products for which the wood is used). Yet 
when a tree is left to grow, die, and decompose, say NAFI, the scientists do not count it as 
an emission. As a consequence, there was no perceived incentive for the timber industry to 
invest in plantations as a means of gaining carbon credits for industrial and other emissions 
because it only exposes them to a liability for the carbon emitted from the plantation the 
year after it is felled. 
According to NAFI this also ignores the reality that once plantations are harvested carbon 
sequestration continues on the same location as new seedlings are planted. However, some 
scientists question this notion, claiming that in fact because some of the planting techniques 
used such as 'deep ripping' result in more rapid carbon emissions from the soil, it can take 
up to 10-20 years for net carbon sequestration to actually begin. If this argument is 
accepted, it adds to NAFI's ambivalence (and presumably would-be investors) on the 
greenhouse benefits of plantations as it implies that i) sequestration will happen too late for 
the first budget period under the Kyoto Protocol (2008-12); and ii) that there is no point 
buying carbon credits now for the next 10 years because carbon sequestration may not be 
credited. 
NAFI, particularly under Warren Lang's leadership felt the scientists were wrong in their 
carbon accounting rules which could produce perverse outcomes. It was suspected that 
government was only interested in increasing plantations in so far as it raises the national 
stock of greenhouse sinks-in other words, free riding on the forestry industry.264 NAFI 
263 This ambivalence is well reflected in comments by Warren Lang (NAFI 2000b:3-4) to the secretary 
of the parliamentary inquiry into the Kyoto Protocol: ' ... we have taken all available steps to bring these 
anomalies in the treatment of forestry and wood products to the attention of Australian and international 
authorities. We can report that we have been listened to, but that we have made no worthwhile progress 
in securing a more rational treatment of forest management or wood products ... As an industry we have 
some regrets about this situation, because what it means is that the greenhouse-friendly nature of what we 
do remains largely unappreciated and more importantly, unharnessed ... On the whole, the industry we 
represent has a strong sense of being largely un-engaged in the greenhouse drama, as the benefits of what 
we do remain almost completely outside the spotlight of current policy.' 
264 [8;11]; Also note comments from Warren Lang that ' ... it is important to understand that the rapid 
expansion of the plantation industry currently taking place in Australia has no direct relationship to 
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representations, half-hearted as they were in relation to emissions trading failed to secure 
any significant greenhouse incentives for plantation development. Some in government 
also believe that representations cmne too !ate.265 Having felt ignored by the federal 
government on the critical technical point, NAFI V.'l!S inclined to view plans to treble 
plantations by 2020 as a massive industry gift to the Commonwealth (because of its 
potential contribution to improving Australia's National Greenhouse Gas Inventory) for 
which industry would receive no reward, and little or no recognition. As Warren Lang 
wrote (NAFI 2000b:3-4): 
There seems to be a widespread expectation in government circles that the industry 
will rush out and plant tens of thousands of hectares of trees for the sake of carbon 
credits. We do not expect that this will happen. We think the industry has a 
sufficiently clear understanding of the way the rules have been written to appreciate 
that carbon cre.dits represent only an opportunity to expose itself to risk ... 
This approach is in stark contrast to the more positive stance taken by NAFI in recent years 
to the international policy environment as it applies to their interests.266 
Greenhouse science 
Scientific uncertainty has discouraged greater NAFI involvement in the greenhouse policy 
network in two ways. First, the lack of clarity on the impacts and timing of climate change 
has been used at times by NAFI leaders as a reason to be sceptical about the entire 
greenhouse agenda. For example, a large part ofNAFI's submission to the JSCOT inquiry 
into the Kyoto Protocol focused on the perceived inadequacy of greenhouse science. It 
included, mnong other statements: 
greenhouse, and is certainly not premised on the sale of carbon credits. It may, nevertheless, yield a 
greenhouse benefit for Australia because plantations established on cleared agricultural land since 1990 
will be able to be counted by the Australian government towards its Kyoto target, offsetting emissions 
from land clearing, fossil fuels, etc, .. .In view of the inhospitable nature of the current policy and 
regulatory regime at the national and international levels as far as the forest industries are concerned, 
these plantations represent a significant benefaction from those industries to the government, given 
without encouragement or reward, and received largely without acknowledgement. (NAFI 2000b:2) 
265 See previous quote [27;60,56] under footnote 255 and 257 
266 {So would it be fair to say that from your point of view whether you're in Kyoto or out of Kyoto that 
the forest industries can nevertheless be a winner?} Yes, well that's why I said [ think we are a net 
winner. If we are not in Kyoto and we have an internal carbon trading approach, or an emissions trading 
approach~-it might be in sync with the US or whatever~it gives us an opportunity to hopefully change 
the rules a lirtle bit to make them a little bit more scientific and sensible, which is good for us. So you can 
... there's good bits whichever way we go as long as we grab ho!dofthem and we see it that way I think. 
[4;68-70] 
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In relation to conflicting scientific theories on global warming, we do not have the 
scientific expertise to do more than acknowledge that there are conflicting theories, 
there is uncertainty and some of this uncertainty has probably arisen from the 
successive revision of forecasts generated by computer-based climate models. We 
have no easy means of assessing the adequacy of the climate modeling ... models of 
all kinds produce results than cannot be relied on ... we won Id consider that climate 
models suffer the same disabilities as economic models--they are invariably better at 
predicting past events than they are at predicting tomorrow. .. (the absence of 
knowledge) it seems to us, might tend to reduce the confidence that can be invested in 
the various prescriptions for urgent action that are on the table already, and are being 
added to steadily. (NAFI 2000b:l-2) 
By to a degree accepting the arguments of greenhouse science sceptics, NAFI has on 
occasion been able to play down the need for the Australian forestry industry to be very 
concerned about the issue. This has made it easier for NAFI leaders to overlook threats and 
opportunities linked to climate change. It has made it easier to devote resources areas other 
than greenhouse policy on the basis that climate change is not yet shown to be a real 
concern.267 It also undennined NAFI's own arguments to government-for example, in 
support of using more wood waste for renewable electricity in the MRET. 
The second important way in which scientific uncertainty has been an obstacle to NAFI 
involvement has been the lack of clarity and consensus about carbon accounting in the 
forestry sector. While policymakers involved in greenhouse policy development universally 
accept that soil and vegetation are a significant part of the world's greenhouse emissions 
cycle, there has been less unanimity about measuring emissions from what is referred to as 
the Land Use Change and Forestry (LUCF) sector. 
For Australia, given the rapid decline in tree clearing since 1990 (which constitutes a net 
reduction in emissions from this sector), incorporating LUCF emissions into the National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory (NGGI) is critic.ally important. However, while Australia has 
succeeded in persuading the other parties to the FCCC to accept the validity of emissions 
from its carbon sinks, until quite recently accurate assessment has been a significant hurdle, 
especially for broadly based emissions trading. This complexity and uncertainty 
contributed to the accounting principles which significantly compromised advantages 
which NAFI had hoped to secure for Australian foresters. This, in tum, contributed to 
NAFI's low profile on greenhouse policy.2611 
267 
see previous quote [4;82] under footnote 227 on Lang's alleged scepticism about greenhouse science. 
268 I don't know that it is necessarily Kate Camell that•s made the difference. l mean as Kyoto has 
become more settled. And at COP 6 (Sixth Conference of the Parties to the IJNFCCC) we got the 
agreement that forests that are chopped down in the period 1990-2008 don't count as a debit or Kyoto 
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Macro-level 
A small number of macro-level factors have also had a powerful influence on NAFI's low 
profile and sporadic involvement in the greenhouse policy network. 
Related policy networks 
NAFI's involvement in other policy networks has discouraged more engagement in the 
greenhouse policy network in various ways. 
First, and most obviously, NAFI has been heavily committed to other policy networks 
which have been traditionally viewed as higher priorities for the organisation. The long-
standing battle ¥1ith environmentalists over access to native forests for timber harvesting 
has been a predominant issue for NAFI over many years. This issue has drawn 
disproportionately on NAFI's resources. The emergence of the RFA framework across 
Australia during the 1990s and early 2000s heightened the focus of NAFI on the native 
forests logging priority. 269 To a lesser degree NAFI has been engaged in other policy 
networks dealing with issues seen as a greater priority for members. This includes issues as 
diverse as water, salinity, land clearing, native vegetation regulation, bushfires, imported 
timber, and the treatment of timber in building codes to mention just a few. NAFI's heavy 
focus on other issues deemed a higher priority has inevitably meant that climate change has 
often slipped off the agenda. 
forests chopped down in that period don't oount as a debit l guess as the rules have become clearer they 
have been less able to do anything on this specific issue. {So, they have become more ambivalent?} 
Yeah I think so. [7;43-7] Maybe they just feel overwhelmed by the complexity end the difficulty of 
deciding how to really engage with the science oommunity to increase their knowledge about what might 
actually impact on them and also some of these things, ofc<mrse, are out of their hands. [38;61 J 
269 NAF1 was preoccupied "'ith getting access to logs over that period-the second half of the 1980s and 
the first half of the 1990s were essentially a bloodbath over forest security and access [27;56] I mean 
certainly what dominated NAFI' s activities seemed always to be forest policy itself, very much focused 
on the future of the National Forest Policy Statement, very much focused on what was going to happen in 
tetms of the Regional Forest Agreements and much less so obviously about what might be an ... I would 
describe in fact the greenhouse issue as pretty incidental to their activities (21 ;37] I suppose the other 
obvious observation to make that all the other environmental issues and non-environment issues for 
NAFl-they are always going to come third or fourth behind the overwhelming issue of native forest 
logging [!1;274]: 
165 
However, more important than their distractive aspect, other policy networks in which 
NAFI has been closely involved have shaped the culture and outlook of the organisation, 
which as we have seen above was heavily laden over many years with a disposition to take 
the contrary position to the environmental movement. On a wide range of policy issues, 
NAFI failed to build workable Jinks 'With the green movement. Efforts by the forestry 
industry to promote the environmental advantage of timber over alternative products such 
as steel and plastic have rung hollow v.ith the green movement and led to little tangible 
support from government.270 Efforts to promote timber as a source of renewable energy and 
biofuels, and as a contributor to solutions to salinity, erosion and biodiversity loss have 
arguably gained similarly little traction. As a consequence the organisation has developed 
an almost reflexive opposition and highly suspicious and cynical attitude to environmental 
policy issues as they emerge. 'Ibis experience in other networks has steadily reinforced a 
detached, lone, sceptical and negative approach by NAFI to climate change and contributed 
to a low profile by the organisation in the greenhouse policy network. Notwithstanding the 
positive opportunities presented by climate change for the Australian forests sector, the 
organisation seems culturally unable to build the bridges required to take advantage of its 
opportnnities. Arguably, this has led NAFI to respond with too little, too late, too often in 
its sporadic involvement in climate change policy. 
Conclusions 
In summary, the NAFI has not been a serious player in the greenhouse debate in Australia 
despite its apparent interest in policy direction on the issue. This research finds that NAFI 
has been heavily constrained by internal organisational factors from pursuing its interests in 
an effective manner. It has been heavily influenced by leaders predisposed to take a 
cynical, sceptical and generally reactive line on climate change. It has been constrained by 
an organisational culture obsessed 'With battling envirorunental NGOs for survival, and by a 
shrinking membership more and more concerned with less and less---in particular the battle 
for access to native forests. While NAFI has been a regular participant in government and 
parliamentary processes where fonnal submissions are involved, the organisation's 
involvement in the day-to-day operation of the network has been sporadic and largely 
270 This is reflected in a comment made by Warren L<mg in correspondence with David Harrison, special 
adviser to the Australian Greenhouse Office in relation to a recent AGO discussion paper on emissions 
trading. In the letter dated 18 November l 999, L<mg tells Harrison, 'I am grateful for the 
acknowledgement, albeit somewhat tentative, that wood products are 'greenhouse fiiendly ,' and !hat this 
could give rise to some advantage in the marketplace in relation to competing products. As far as I know, 
this is the first time that an official publication dealing with greenhouse has aeknowfodged that wood 
products, the end result of timber harvesting, represent an environmental good. 
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inconsequential, This has led to the organisation pursuing its interests on greenhouse 
related issues too late and with little effect. Opportunities have been missed211 and a series 
of 'black eyes' received on greenhouse related issues, reinforcing a generally disinterested 
and negative NAFI stance. In recent times, however, these factors have been transformed 
by what appears to be a conscious decision by the NAFI board to renew the organisation, 
its culture, its resources, and its leadership. The new NAFI position is markedly different as 
a result and suggests that this sector could be a much more significant player in the policy 
network in future than it has been in the past. There is, however, a long way to go from 
cultural change to tangible impact. 
m {The factors that help to drive group behaviour other than vested interests and from what you've said 
it sounds like most of these other factors have been decisive?} Yes. { ... because it doesn't sound like 
true vested interest has been a real driver of the group's behaviour on greenhouse?} No. [4;104-10] 
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6 
Case 4--tbe National Farmers' Federation 
Introduction 
The National Farmers' Federation (NFF) is the peak organisation representing the 
Australian agricultural sector. That sector is chosen here for various reasons. Agriculture 
remains one of the most significant sectors in the Australian economy generating 
approximately 400,000 jobs and about one fifth of Australia's exports. lt also a significant 
contributor to Australia's greenhouse emissions and potentially one of the sectors most 
vulnerable to the projected impacts of climate change. 
The NFF is well resourced, and accustomed to dealing with a wide range of environmental 
challenges at the national level. Relative to other interest groups it is more diffuse, 
representing such a wide range of rural industries whose interests can often be in conflict 
with one another. 
Its membership is primarily state-based or industry-based farming associations. Individual 
farmers are not members, except via their state based bodies, affiliate organisations or 
commodity councils. The full time secretariat of the NFF is based in Canberra, and its work 
is assisted by a management committee which comprises four separate committees one of 
which deals solely with environmental issues. 
Activity 
The NFF is viewed by the majority of those in the greenhouse policy network as having 
been a very inconsistent, reluctant and at times schizophrenic player in the debate272• From 
both sides of the issue, there is disappoin1ment at the lack of attention by the NFF over the 
272 the National Farmers Federation-has basically seemed to be a bit schizophrenic in terms ofreflecting 
the view in the Ag sector that farmers are not responsible. [40;54] ... they were non-players. [15;7] 
... greenhouse has not been a big priority for them ... a bit reluctant ... focused on other issues. [2;7] 
... pretty marginal ... waxed and waned ... never brought a well developed and well thought through 
position. [51;58] ... they have drifted a bit [4;320] ... the NFF has never engaged willingly ... sporadic on 
the margins.[13;7] 
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past decade.273 On the one hand, the green movement views the NFF's lack of engagement 
as a serious lost opportunity for a major industry group to have identified a strong interest 
in policies leading to large cuts in greenhouse emissions.274 They believe that such a course 
of action would have to a degree counterbalanced the dominant position of energy intensive 
interests lobbying against action. Senior figures in government share this opinion and view 
the NFF lack of engagement as a problem with the network itself which they repeatedly 
tried to overcome.275 On the other hand, the AIGN and those trying to keep the brakes on 
greenhouse policy in Australia also view the NFF's track record with disappointment 
because they believe that industry's opposition to greenhouse measures would have been 
even more effective had the NFF been more visibly on side. This is because the NFF's 
involvement would have significantly broadened the scope of industry opposition.276 
Across the spectrum, there was a strong consensus that the 1'.'FF was not actively pursuing 
its interests in the debate.271 The organisation only ever seemed to be active when pushed 
273 (As one of the most senior advisers on greenhouse policy in the Howard government said) the NFF 
have been absent without leave on greenhouse. [50;24] 
274 (From a green activist) I think they've actually got theiranalysls all wrong ... And I tbink the NFF has 
really failed its members seriously because they have focused on what they see as the short term damage 
from measures to reduce greenhouse gases emissions and completely failed in their role of educating 
farmers and heightening awareness of the threat of climate change represents ... with the National 
Farmers' Federation for example, it is not obvious that it should oppose greenhouse policies. That could 
easily have taken a very different position on it which would have had a major influence on the politics 
of climate change in Australia. [3 l ;27,336] They just seemed to identify Ideologically with other big 
business interest groups and lobby groups rather than thinking through, 'okay, why are we different from 
resource extraction industries'? Why are we different in terms of the impact climate change will have on 
us? Why are we different in terms of the way greenhouse might provide opportunities as well as need for 
change?' So you wouldn't actually see them in many places ... [39;48] And, once again it is a curiosity to 
me because it seemed like they were providing a disservice to the members on climate change by not 
having this as a priority issue. !~from the actual climate impacts, 2 to adapt their product to adaptation 
to those climate impacts, and 3: to be opportunities that can come from helping to offset climate change. 
None of those issues are alive as issues within the NFF. [15;104] 
275 The NFF has been very difficult to engage on greenhouse issues. Not terribly interested ... I find it 
bard to understand why they are not more involved because there are potentially some serious issues 
involved for the fanning sector and I would have suspected they would have been more interested. 
[7;51~5] So, it was sort of intermittent, fragmented involvement. We have actually had structures in 
place from the AGO over the last year or two. I think things are becoming more effective in involving 
these people in the strategic agenda ... there has been a lot of interest and engagement at what I would 
call a superficial leve[~ .. superficial in that the right buttons are being pressed but it doesn~ go to a very 
deep and strategic level in their engagement. [27;76] 
276 (From senior AlGN players who unsuccessfully sought greater NFF engagement) ... they (the NFF) 
opted out ... NFF were invited in (as AIGN Members) and refused to take it up ... And what they really 
opted out of was the debate. [34-0-42] ... the NFF has never engaged willingly ... sporadic on the 
margins. [ l 3;7] 
271 (From two central figures in the debate) ... maybe there might be some credit opportunities available 
for them hut even that doesn't seem to have got them too excited. [29;85] They've to my mind not really 
exploited some of the potential there which may come from things like carbon sequestration in soil 
carbon. {Some of the opportunities?} Yeah some of the cropland and grazing land management which is 
now an area approved for sink activity under the protocol and I don't think we've seen those 
opportunities fully explored yet. And the NFF doesn't seem too active in pursuing those interests. 
[53;19-23] 
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by others, and then most often only when the government or the parliament sought their 
involvement in a greenhouse-related process.27& There is little evidence of a clear NFF 
policy position or of any deliberate and coordinated campaign for particular policy 
outcomes on greenhouse. This is confirmed by interviews with their representatives. 
Analysis of group response 
Micro-level 
The interview data confirmed that the NFF's response to the issue of climate change was 
driven heavily by internal forces. All four micro-level factors covered in this research were 
active in leading the NFF to respond to climate change in a cautious, intermittent, strategic, 
independent, low key and even schizophrenic manner over many years. However, 
observers may have over-attributed the NFF greenhouse stance to some of these 
organisational fuctors, not properly appreciating the degree of strategic calculation by the 
Federation. This is explored in more depth below in the meso-level discussion. 
Organisational culture 
The NFF culture is seen by the m<\iority of those in the greenhouse policy network as 
inextricably linked with that of the National Party and to a slightly lesser extent with the 
Howard government. Some referred to the NFF as a wing of the National Party 
organisation, though most opinions were not this strong.279 However, despite its close links 
to the conservative side of politics, the NFF also has had good working links the ALP 
opposition. 280 
278 
••• when the federal government has inquiries into any issues that potentially have relevance to the 
farming community, NFF make.s a response, so quite a lot of NFF's responses on greenhouse tended 
actually to be driven by whether there was a government inquiry going on or whether the Business 
Council or someone was being particularly proactive on the issue at the time rather than it being driven 
from within ... [36;33] 
279 
••• the Farmers' Federation, I think for the same reason, are a very sueeessful lobby group when there 
is a coalition government because the National Party is basically the National Farmers' Federation 
political wing, the same way the Labor Party used to be the Trade Unions' political wing. [9;230] 
2
"' ••• part of their culture is a very close affinity to one side of government which gives them a level of 
confidence that perhaps others don't have.} Well, ... the NFF has also been quite powerful at times with 
the Labor Party as well which now holds many more not federally, but at a state level, many more seats 
than it has done in the past. [54; 114] 
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The culture is also seen as being very in sync with that of the Canberra bureaucraey-
particularly with the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.281 Following the 
internal battle over agricultural tariffs which was ultimately won by the trade liberalisation 
side, the NFF is also viewed as being closely in syuch with the mainstream economic 
agenda of the Treasury and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The conservative 
tag which many apply to the NFF has masked their close involvement in quite radical 
policy shifts in Australia in the past 20 years. Nonetheless, in spite of its important role in 
reducing agricultural protectionism, for example, and in other 'economically rationalist' 
policy agendas, the NFF is without question constrained by a highly conservative 
constituency. For many, in recent years, the organisation bas suffered from 'reform fatigue' 
and has retreated to a degree from radical economic reforms. 282 It is less involved with 
other Canberra interest gtoups and more focused on winning clear gains for its rural 
constituencies. In a sense, however, the NFF culture remains more conservative than ever. 
With the mainstreaming of their economic rationalist positions, their approach has become 
the mainstream approach of the government. The NFF culture is the Canberra 
establishment culture. 
An important part of the culture is also self-confidence in the grass roots and political clout 
of the NFF relative to other interest groups-a sense that they can get their way if 'push 
comes to shove' better than most associations in Canberra. This is acknowledged as a 
potent force within the federal government and in the wider greenhouse policy network.283 
2
'
1 (As one former frontbencher in the environment portfolio said) Don't forget a!so NAFI and the NFF 
are basically-well the perception is that as industry interest groups, they would have had much more 
c-0ntact with their Minister for Primary Industries and Energy on the one hand and with the Minister for 
Resources as opposed to myself on the other hand. [21;37] Well, the interest groups I think have 
traditionally tended to work through the portfolios which are established to managed their constituency. 
So, I think to a great extent ... NFF through AFFA, [30; 156] 
ru I believe the National Farmers' Federation over the decade lost its way. They used to be very much in 
concert with ... groups like us on issues like long-tt'Tm reform-trade reform, industrial relations reform, 
exchange rate reform, economic reform-about improving the competitiveness of this country. And, in 
the latter part of the nineties in my view, they started to realise that they had reform fatigue--their 
members were seen to be losing that urge-competition reform was seen as being damaging to farmers 
'this rationalist approach you bastards took is costing us-we can see the costs, but we cannot see the 
benefits.' So, their constituency put a lot of pressure on them and to my mind they started to become 
more mercantile in the sense that they had a lot of political clout particularly at election time to go and 
gamer lots of money for the rural areas-it does not make a lot of economic sense a lot of it. But, that is 
what the NFF and the National Party have managed to do. And, ok-that is the game. But, what that led 
them away from was being a viable partner for us at times on these longer-term rational frameworks that 
we are looking for. So, the 'N"'FF drifted off in my view. {So-they used to be part of the pack you are 
saying?} Yeah. They were part of the reform pack-but on this issue of greenhouse they were always 
really on the margins saying 'don't expect farmers to bear the cost of you guys.' [13;!52-6] 
'" (For example, from a senior Howard government adviser) NFF have the political clout to lobby 
government effectively ifrequired [50;24] The NFF in and of itself and of its nature in the psychology of 
Australia and the psychology of the coalition government is an organisation of influence anyway ... So, I 
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There is a strong work ethic at the NFF, a high degree of staff commitment to the 
organisation's objectives, and a close affinity between most staff and rural interests. 
However their culture is also seen as being somewhat bureaucratic-many of their staff are 
ex-bureaucrats, and the organisation is driven by government agendas rather than the other 
way about. This is bureaucratic style is manifest in the NFF tendency to 'pace' issues 
without great haste in many instances-taking its lead from government. It is also apparent 
in the organisation's tendency to stick to a limited range of major issues within its comfort 
zone---like trade liberalisation and native title issues. 
These cultural characteristics are viewed by many to have had a strong impact on how the 
NFF has played climate change policy. Their natural conservatism has led the organisation 
to be suspicious of the greenhouse phenomenon itself-in relation to the science.284 There 
has also been a tendency to lean almost by reflex towards the blocking side of the debate, 
seeking to reduce the pace of any policy response.285 In principle, agreement with the 
general AIGN view of greenhouse most of the time is one reflection of this conservatism.286 
Another is uncritical faith in ABARE as a source of information on greenhouse over the 
environment portfolio287 even though it is recognised by NFF leaders that the ABARE view 
is probably not objective.288 
The NFF conservatism is also apparent in their perceived reluctance to publicly take 
positions which run counter to those of other major business lobby groups. While they 
think there are some iconic industries here which have influence by virtue of their history and status. 
[30;120,264] ... they've been effective not because they're are a tightly knit well-organised body focused 
on this issue, but because they represent a very powerful an influential segment of Australian society .. .I 
mean they are well-organised, they are powerful, they are electorally influential. [31;27] 
284 I guess partly we didn't do too much because there was a fair amount of scepticism that greenhouse 
was a real phenomenon, within our membership. {So why act?} So why act, yes, so why do anything? 
We've got a million other issues to deal with, so let's deal with something that's real. [5;20-32-66] 
285 So they've been a bit reluctant-their natural conservative bent has applied itself solidly to the whole 
sort of climate change debate. [2;68] 
286 I think some of the information that has come out on the costs to agriculture offactoring in the private 
carbon prices and things, it just means our costs of production will go up, and given that we're not really 
subsidised generally compared with other countries, it just makes it harder. [5;104] 
287 Brian Fisher used to come out and talk to us periodically-probably trying to get us on side and things 
but generally we didn't have much problem with the sort of thing that they were saying and doing. {Do 
you think that their work's been influential? I mean it's been a pretty predominant source of 
information.} Yes, I think it has heen very influential, because it's been credible and they've got good 
credibility and a good record ... {Would you have expected the same results if you had a bureau of 
environmental economics based in EA (Environment Australia) doing the same work?} No, I wouldn't 
have expected the same results and people would have thought they were probably a bit 'suss' anyway I 
think. {You wouldn't have thought them credible?} No. [308-20] 
288 {Do you think that where they're located in the structure of government has any impact on their own 
culture and their ... } I suspect it does, yes, I suspect you can't get away from those things [5;330-32] 
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proudly promote their independence and lack of fear of other interest groups, some 
observers believe that this bravado is not backed up by the NFF's actions. The impression 
gained is that the NFF is concerned not to move too far away from the 'pack.289 ' This is not 
to say that the NFF will not follow its ovm course-indeed, both insiders. and outsiders 
confirmed that the NFF will 'catch and kill its own.'290 However, while they will identify 
their own interests, there is a tendency not to vocally oppose the pack, especially where 
other groups are seen to have clearer interests involved. Greenhouse has been an issue in 
which NFF has long perceived that other sectors are more exposed. As a consequence, it 
seems, they have been reluctant to take an 'out front' position, and even more reluctant to 
take a position 'out front,' opposing the pack.291 The same appears to be true of their 
dealings with government There is a great reluctance to oppose government policy 
direction. Because of the close relationship with the Howard government in particular, NFF 
reluctance to oppose government direction has reinforced greenhouse policy direction--
with the arguable exception ofland clearing in Queensland. 
For many advocates of a stronger climate change response by Australian policymakers, an 
'anti-green mentality' has been another consistent part of the NFF's apparent gut 
conservatism-ultimately to the agricultural sector's detriment.292 There is deep suspicion 
289 Well they have, and I've heard others in the farming community. One that springs to mind is Bruce 
Lloyd, he's the Chair of ... the Landcarc Council. He constantly used to suy, 'if need be we'll shut the 
aluminium industry down in Australia,' but he's never said that on the public record, he's only said that 
in the background. 'We'll shut the aluminium industry down, why should we have to pay?' But they've 
never gone out on a limb on those sort of things and I think for solidarity reasons. [35;71-5] 
290 
••• those tactics essentially were, as I say, 'we can catch and kill our own.' [37;55] 
291 
••• the reason NFF had a strong name and a strong reputation was that we did actually protect the 
name. We didn't use it and get excited about something or come out and argue against something unless 
we really needed to. So we sort of protected the brand or whatever you wanted to call it. We didn'tjump 
into everything. We picked our fights, we picked what was important to us so it wasn't a big cab off the 
rank to us, but we had other things that were more important to us. [36;129] { ... you get the sense where, 
as opposed to salinity where they can be out the front and not look over their shoulders, with greenhouse 
there's much more of a concern about scaring the other industry horses?} That's right, yes. It's that sort 
of hunting in packs that they do on some issues, particularly around trade issues and such ... I think part 
of the reason why they instinctively go with the herd is the fear of regulation though---the fear that there 
will be some sort of a regulatory response to climate change and that inevitably they'll end up the losers. 
It's almost like a broad ideological opposition to further regulation of their industry no matter what. .. 
where the NFF hasn't necessarily looked at the issue per se, hasn't looked at the way it really affects its 
own clientele but has seen itself as an industry association and has acted like it thinks an industry 
association should react to issues like this. {So part of the culture of the NFF is to not deviate too far 
from the pack?} That's what I would suspect, yes, on issues where it doesn't necessarily have a front 
running [35;61-67,279-83] 
294 
••• the problem with NFF this is that their views are dictated by conservative ideology-...! mean the 
Aluminium Council, they are just dictated by commercial interest-it is all pretty straightforward. And 
that is fine. But NFF has this anti-environmental, conservative ideology and climate change has this sort 
of caffe latte tenor, an environmental issue-you kn.ow-which is crazy, because farmers-primary 
producers are going to be the most effectively affocted by it. They have shot themselves in the foot 
because they are so preoccupied with the anti-green and also been tettified of anything that might see the 
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that while the NFF has collaborated with the green movement on some issues, the affinity 
goes against the grain and is skin deep. The NFF greenhouse response reinforees this 
suspicion as do comments from their own people. This was strongly denied by NFF 
insiders during their interviews293, however, the overall impression gained is that they are 
not comfortable with more than a very pale shade of green. 
The NFF's self-confidence in their political clout also appears likely to have been behind 
their arms-length approach to the issue.294 NFF insiders confirmed that the organisation had 
some 'get out of jail cards' up its sleeve which it could use with government on greenhouse 
but has never had to use them.295 Some of the more centrally active players in the network 
also recognised this strategic calculation by the NFF.2% 
It also appears that greenhouse fell uncomfortably outside the zone of issues which the NFF 
was used to handling. As the above would suggest, they tended to act when the politics 
came to the crunch and their interests were clearly threatened. They also tended to prefer 
issues upon which they could deliver short term tangible benefits for their members--this 
was clearly not easy to achieve with greenhouse.297 Climate change presented a long term 
price of petrol go up-so-Nl'F has played a really negative role which has been contrary to its own 
interest•. But, now some of them are starting to wake up to this--they are starting to say 2500 scientists 
can't be wrong---we are in deep shit. [31 ;232] 
293 { ••• I mean for example is there an inherent scepticism of environmental issues or things like that?} 
Not particularly, no, because I had a bit of an environmenlll! background, Anwen (Lovett) did too .... and 
Rick {Farley} had been there before and Anwen's off-sider certainly was very green ... and then we did 
that salinity thing {with ACF} ... and I mean I've known Don Henry (of ACP) for twenty years so I 
think we could see that environment was an important issue so I don't think their (NrF' s) staff 
particularly came with a philosophy one way or the other. [5;198-228] 
294 Again, on the culture thing, the NFF, I think the judgement that they have the clout to deal with the 
issue when it becomes an issue is probably not a bad judgement, they sense that they can pace this a little 
bit. They don't have to be strongly against or strongly in favour. They C""1 be more like a government if 
you like, or a major political party. They've got to look at it, balance, intervene to deal with their 
conception of property rights to do what the NFF has always done. Sort of privatise gains and nationalise 
losses. [54; 114] 
295 {A lot of other organisations say that about the NFF. They say, look those blokes know that if they get 
into real strife they can go straight to the top. We can't do that, we've got to go off and hire ACIL and 
Allens and others and plug away building up the case and constantly knock at the door.} Yes, you can do 
it but you can't do it too often. {But would you concede that they do have a few get out of jail tickets that 
other groups wouldn't have?} Yes, I think that's right, and didn't use it very often not on greenhouse I 
don't think. {And you didn't really have to use it on greenhouse?} No, it never got to a point where we 
had to. [5;218-28] 
296 They do not beli<:ve that governments ·will do anything with respect to greenhouse and farmers. 
[48;23} 
297 
••• a lot of their members really have their backs to the financial wall so they're driven by the short-
term needs of trying to stay in business. it's mainly perception of shon tenn commercial interests. 
!9;70,80-2] 
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problem with too many opaque political pressure points, complex and diffuse implications. 
It was not the sort of problem which the NFF culture was geared to handle.298 
Greenhouse was not an issue for which there was any great empathy in the NFF's broader 
culture-the agriculture sector. Assuming no government policy attention on agriculture to 
reduce emissions, there seemed little natural support in agriculture for the NFF taking the 
greener side of the debate either. On the contrary the safer position was to be at arms' -
length with a leaning towards the 'carbon club' view--so long as agriculture is not singled 
out for attention. This was particularly the case during Pauline Hanson's ascendancy.299 
Membership structure 
The membership structure of the NFF is seen as having had a real influence on the 
organisation's response to greenhouse. This influence has occurred at a number of levels. 
The membership of the NFF covers a wide range of different industries. In a sense, the NFF 
is not a sector-specific interest group but arguably more of an umbrella organisation. Its 
membership is made up primarily of other interest groups which cover particular areas or 
industries (for example, cotton and cattle). This means that it is more difficult for an 
organisation like the NFF to establish unity of opinion and purpose in response to major 
public policy challenges-particularly where the particular issue poses different 
ramifications for different rural industries. This appears to have been the case with climate 
change and is confirmed by NFF insiders.300 
298 I think the same would be true of the National Farmers' Federation for the reasons that I gave earlier 
on, that the culture of that organisation is very much focused on the key issues that have driven them for 
God knows how long, that is trade, specific agricultural commodity issues and they are the things that 
take up 99 per cent of Farmers' Federation time ... They' re just finding it hard to come to grips with it I 
think. Their big strength is in trade and in commodities. [18;231-5] I don't think the National Farmers' 
Federation is really geared up particularly well to deal with these long-term issues. It does deal with 
some issues which are pretty long-term like trade issues very effectively. You can actually pinpoint sets 
of activities that you need to be involved in-it is pretty straightforward~you can pinpoint who the 
winners and losers are out of those things. For example with lamb exports-and restrictions on lamb 
imports in the United States--you can pinpoint who wins and loses. And you can say to a group of 
farmers-listen, you will get it in the neck unless we do something about it. Wheroos with greenhouse it 
is much more diffuse and difficult to deal with 100,000 farmers out tl1ere--who are your constituents--
on greenhouse than it is on lamb exports. [48;75] 
299 And l think the stronger Hanson became the more adamant the NFF became that they adamantly 
opposed stopping land clearance without massive compensation. And there is a relationship in that-no 
question. There is no greenhouse constituency in rural Australia-so if rural Australians are going to bear 
tile price of land clearing policy for greenhouse, then they are going to have to be paid big. And if they 
didn't get paid big more seats would get Jost from the notional party to Hanson. [18;132] 
300 NFF took a very narrow economic interest view and they also had trouble in just getting their 
membership focused on the issue. [18;116] ... agriculture is so diverse underneath the NFF and it's 
interesting because I think unless you get into agripolitics you do what a Jot of people do, say, well we' l1 
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In tenns of the possible policy measures which might involve the wide range of agricultural 
pursuits-that is, the NFF membership base-the options are complex and their 
implementation seems very problematic by comparison to a focus on energy and transport. 
Conducting the analysis to arrive at a well founded NFF position which all members could 
support is resource-intensive compared with other interest groups. One advantage for the 
NFF is that its head office did have a good deal of flexibility to pursue agenda items which 
it deemed important in spite of lack of member interest.301 This had been the case 
previously on issues like the GST. However, in the case of greenhouse the vast majority of 
the membership base viewed greenhouse as a very low priority, and the NFF tended to 
follow the masses where there the feeling at HQ was ambivalent, which it was in this 
case.302 The pressure to satisfy the masses in what was a strongly membership-driven 
organisation was very heayy. 303 This was seen by many as an important factor in the NFF' s 
decision not to pursue with great vigour a policy area which was not viewed as a priority by 
most members. 
Because the NFF is an umbrella organisation, the member groups have arguably even more 
scope to pursue their own greenhouse agenda where the issue is deemed a priority-
thereby making NFF engagement even less likely. There are also potential 'red flag' 
questions such as a widespread sensitivity to the related matter of land clearing which mean 
that climate change has at times generated more perceived irritations than opportunities for 
work with the Farmers' Federation because that's the fanners' interests and we'll deal with them as a 
sector. The sector is an incredibly mixed bag, as soon as you go down one layer, so that had a big 
influence on our greenhouse policy beCllllse we had to be in the game because we' re a federal political 
lobby group, it's on the goverrunent agenda, we have a heap of mixed agendas happening underneath us 
but we've got to be at the table. [36;89] ... smaller, tighter group membership means that there are less 
obviously dissenting voices and they have a clearer collective focus of where they are going. By 
definition, a dispersed membership means there are many more issues to deal with. Farmers cover the 
whole spectrum of farming and the whole spectrum of geographic locations. [30;252] 
'"' ... one advantage being in Canberra because you didn't actually have the elected members in your 
office every day like they do in the state organisations. It's actually a bit more independent. [5;252] 
302 
... the work it (the NFF) did on the GST (Goods and Services Tax) is a classic example of that where 
there wasn't a strong grass roots push for GST but strategically engaged very actively on it. If it's not 
convinced about how important an issue is it will do whatever the masses are saying. If the masses are 
saying, well, you know the rural community decline, telecommunications, native vegetation legislation, 
taxation are our big issues, that's what the organisation will work on. It won't chase something that 
fmmers are rating about 11 or 12, which is where greenhouse was sitting, be<:ause to an individual farmer 
you still can't tangibly tell them how greenhouse will impact on them and that was always the problem 
widi it. [36;33] 
303 (Noted a prominent greenhouse network leader from an interest group representing major companies): 
Wendy's (Wendy Craik - then Executive Director of NFF) communications task was extraordinarily 
difficult. She had to be in tbe media more. She had to communicate by an e-mail or a fax every night. 
She had 160,000 farmers out there, so she needed to be in the media about it. So, a very much more 
difficult task. [13;152] 
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the NFF.304 As a consequence, the mixed interests problem is viewed as one of the reasons 
why NFF has not addressed climate change as strongly as it might even though some 
members see opportunities-for example, in greenhouse sequestration.305 The consequence 
is a very general NFF position deliberately avoiding the politically tough detaii.306 
An important membership structure aspect that allows the NF F to take vague industry wide 
positions on difficult issues is that the organisation has no serious competition as the peak 
body representing the agricultural sector. The NFF has a near representative monopoly 
coverage of its potential membership.307 There is therefore, unlike with other interest 
groups operating in different industries, no real danger of members disgruntled with the 
greenhouse policy position switching to another federal body. 
At a regional level, the scientific evidence on the impacts of climate change in different 
parts of Australia also varies significantly, with major adverse consequences in some 
locations and potential benefits in other areas. There is no uniformity of impact by region 
or agricultural sector. Within sectors, there is a lack ofunifonnity. As a result, the urgency 
of feeling amongst farm organisations varies too greatly to easily establish consensus. 
There have, conversely, been other issues with which the NFF has found a broad consensus 
among its membership base straight forward- for example, native title, free trade, tax 
reform, drought relief and so on. This has meant that greenhouse which is seen as having 
complex impacts ou agriculture, and potentially even more complex policy implications, 
304 
••• you've got this potential tension in the J\.'FF policy, because what the NFF policy actually does is 
remain general so that it can continue to meet the interests of all of its stakeholders, so at the time the 
Queens!anders were saying, 'we have the tree cleating debate under control, we don't want NFF wading 
into it and we don't want J\.'FF doing anything that might compromise our po,;!ion.' So NFF's never 
taken a strong poslt10n on tree clearing in Queensland. {So the more mixed the interests the more general 
the view?} Yes ... here you don't go into the detail be<:ause you might upset another interest group 
because on one hand you've got the pastoralists in Queensland fighting tooth and nail in the tree clearing 
debate but you've got peopie like the rice growers who have a methane problem saying, 'well we 
actually want a pretty clean green image and if there's something we can do in our production system 
that will help us to control this problem we'd like to be able to do it.' So the umbrella group's policy 
remains ... [36;81-85] 
sos 'l get the impression that while there are some in the industry who are very keen to foster the idea of 
forest sinks, some see it as a potential disadvantage or cost. So, maybe this sort of' ambivalent attitude 
does reflect their mixed interests. The National Farmers' Federation have again got mixed interests; they 
are certainly very cautious about suggestions that there should be significant reductions in land clearing. I 
think in principle they support !hat notion but they can't go too far v.ithout running against the interests 
of some of their members ... mixed interests' [53;19] 
306 
••• you've got to be able to have a policy that everybody can function under. [36;85] National Fanners' 
Federation have again got mixed interests they are certainly very cautious about suggestions that there 
should be significant reductions in !and clearing. l think in principle they support that notion but they 
can't go too far without running against the interests of some of their members. [53; 19] 
307 With the NFF, I think at the national level they have a fairly unassailable role--! don't think there is a 
competing group. [39;262] 
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has tended to fall into the 'too hard basket.' Arguably, as well, the diversity of the industry 
has been a very powerful defence mechanism for the NFF on the issue of climate change. It 
has made the task all the more difficult for policy makers tempted to target the sector. 
Finally, the structure of the organisation with its reliance on internal committees has made 
it very easy for individuals to thwart NFF attention to greenhouse. This is confirmed in 
discussions with NFF insiders who recall how one person was able to consistently forestall 
a more prominent role in the debate by the organisation.308 
Leadership 
The leadership of the NFF has been a noteworthy but not strong influence on the 
organisation's response to climate change, in the view of most greenhouse network 
participants. There have been four main leaders of the NFF over the last decade: Rick 
Farley, Don McGauchie, Wendy Craik and Anna Cronin. In terms of their response to the 
issue of climate change, there has not been a significant difference between the tenures of 
these NFF executive directors. However, the leadership of the NFF is nonetheless viewed 
by many as being an important factor-mainly because they identified philosophically 
more with one leader over another and firmly believe that the NFF response would have 
been different had their preferred leader remained in the position. 
Within the green movement and some sections of the bureaucracy some believe that had 
Rick Farley been Executive Director of the NFF in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was 
formulated that the organisation would have been far more amenable to more rigorous 
government emission reduction measures. Farley, they feel, would have more strongly 
supported ratification of the Protocol and the NFF would have taken a lead role on the 
greener side of the debate, alongside other established industry groups like the Australian 
308 Those committees have about 18 to 24 people on them and they tended to have people on them who 
had a personal agenda, otherwise they weren't attractive to them. So each individual sitting around the 
table tended to have a passion for an issue and our New South Wales farmers' rep had a passion for 
complete disbelief for anything to do with climate change and did not believe it existed and would 
regularly come to meetings with all of the counter views. So it was very difficult to have a reasonable 
discussion about greenhouse because this individual would wade straight into the debate and just say, it 
doesn't exist. When you've got a roomful of people who aren't passionate about greenhouse, because 
let's face it, it's not really very interesting, it's not affecting their day-to-day lives, they're very easily 
and quickly influenced by the individual view, so the decision would be to keep watching ... that made it 
very difficult to do very much at all on greenhouse because there wasn't a strong signal from the 
committee at all that this was an issue ... [36;33] 
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Gas Association. 3® This position is of course totally speculative and appears to ignore the 
fact that Farley was not a significant player on greenhouse policy and did not demonstrate 
any serious interest in the issue during his time leading the NFF--something which even 
'old hands' in government and the green movement acknowledge.310 Nonetheless, the view 
is confidently held that he would have done more later on, and that this constituted an 
opportunity which was missed by the NFF under Wendy Craik's !eadership.3ll For some, 
the opportunities seen to have been missed by Wendy Craik have since been to a limited 
degree picked up by Anna Cronin. 312 
Others give Wendy Craik credit for identifying that AIGN interest groups (with whom the 
N'FF has customarily cooperated on other issues) had a deliberate agenda: i) to rope in the 
NFF so as to make their own opposition to greenhouse measures look more broadly based; 
and ii) to draw government's policy attention away from themselves and on to agriculture 
instead. This impression suggests that but for the capacity demonstrated under Craik' s 
leadership to identify a distinct group interest at that time, the NFF could have been drawn 
into a dangerous position against the interest of its members. Some put this reluctance to 
'
09 {But, going back to people Hke McGauchie and Farley and co., there is no sort of glory days when the 
NFF was positive about greenhouse?} Well~! can't remember them really engaging on the greenhouse 
issue. I am sure that if Rick Farley were there the President now or Executive Director, he would take on 
a much more progressive stance because he was thoughtful and courageous. Characteristics which 
Wendy Craik has never had. But, he was too early for this issue-··they didn't really engage until more 
recently. [31; 236-44] l've got a feeling had Rick stayed there again it may have ... we may have got 
round to dealing with those issues (issues relating to climate change). [35;59] 
310 See previous quote [47;196] under footnote 218 regarding the potential for markedly different 
leadership by NFF on greenhouse policy. 
{W11at about Rick Farley?} Yes-Farley had some interest it. But it was whal I would call a nominal 
interest-the words were right but there Wllli not any carry-through. [27;60-76] Actually l can remember 
way back even talking to Rick Farley on greenhouse. {Any recollection of what his response was.} Well, 
look from memory ... I think it was sort of like, 'it's too hard mate, it's ... you know, we've got enough 
problems to deal with, it's not on our radar yet. .. ' [35;59) I meait-if the National I' armers' Federation 
sat down and had a strong leader or President or Executive Director-who said 'well look, climate 
change is the biggest long-term threat fadng primary producers in Australia and we have to be part of the 
solution, not part of problem', worked with the organisation to turn around-and then gone to the 
National Party and the government and said 'we are really worried about this--have got to be part of a 
response', it would have completely split !he coalition and completely changed the way it would have 
worked. Now, whether this one person would have done this it is hard to judge. If you had a Rick Farley 
for example. Depending on who it was, on what the stare organisations are doing, but it could have been 
quite different had there been a strong leader with a progressive position. [31 ;336) 
31t 'Wendy Crail< has always really amazed me because I've heard that she's been involved with the 
Lavoisier Group and I've really been surprised by that because Wendy has been very good on a lot of the 
other issues. We were able to work with Wendy on issues.' [35;55] I don't think that Wendy Craik has 
played a sensible role in any of this. She has just been pulled this way and that way-she doesn't know 
what she thinks. {Has the leadership been different on climate change with the NFF going back-or has 
there been a pretty consistent pattern of behaviour throughout? Or has been srop--start'I} Oh--yes I 
think so. My understanding is that they have taken this sort of sceptical stance for a long time and as I 
said I think this is breaking up [31; 236-44} 
312 (Detail impossible to quote without compromising confidentiality) [4;314-22] 
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join the AIGN pack down to Craik's career background, which was different from that of 
many of the AIGN members. The dissatisfaction of some in the AIGN towards Wendy 
Craik seems to add to the credibility of this interpretation. 
Interestingly, just as greener elements would have preferred to see Farley leading the NFF 
on greenhouse in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there is an equally strong implication from 
the other side of the greenhouse network to suggest that the NFF would have taken an 
strong position on the AIGN side of the debate had other previous NFF leaders like Don 
McGauchie been in charge.313 The most extreme elements of the policy network hankered 
for strong NFF scepticism on greenhouse science, hankered for leaders of yesteryear, but 
also expressed some faith in the leadership of Wendy Craik, whilst being much less 
enthusiastic about Farley.314 Ironically, some of the strongest proponents within the AIGN 
viewed Rick Farley as someone who was previously 'part of the pack,' the hint being that 
they too saw him as a potential ally on greenhouse policy.315 
One way or another, there appears to be broad consensus that the NFF could have taken a 
very different position on greenhouse policy depending on who was leading it. There is no 
support for the view that the position of the NFF on climate change is in any way 
preordained. Due to the very mixed interests associated with climate change impacts and 
greenhouse policy measures relevant to agriculture there is significantly more flexibility 
than is the case in other interest groups for the leader of the NFF to take the organisation in 
a range of different directions. For some, however, the flexibility lessened with the onset of 
313 A different fonn of leadership, a different fonn of power structure, and the NFF and NAFI could have 
gone in very different directions. {what is conceivable? In terms of the direction that they may have 
gone?} Both of them would have been part of the pack. [18;264-8] One of the sadnesses for me as I said 
earlier is that you know they had such strong leaders-in their presidents from McGauchie to Blight 
through the 1980s and 1990s-they basically challenged the convention sort of rural socialism that was 
around and said 'all this protectionism and these subsidies and these sorts of things are damaging you.' 
And they had a huge job in changing that lobby around. With all the refonn fatigue in the 1990s, the 
grass-roots started to retreat with this 'put on the brakes' stuff. [13;284] 
314 He (Don McGauchie) was good (on greenhouse). Don was good, Don was very sound ... {Wendy 
Craik?} Wendy Craik. She became a good ally (on greenhouse). McGauchie was across it better than 
anybody else .... I had a fair bit to do with McGechie and I was very impressed with him. {What about 
Farley?} ... Well, Farley always was a Greenie. I don't know what Farley did during his reign as director. 
[49;60-80, 114-140] 
315 
... ever since Rick Farley left the NFF-they too have not been played into the Canberra system. 
{Would you have considered Rick Farley part of that group?} Farley was part of that group for other 
reasons-he had very good connections on the trade side. And also on the native title side. Farley was 
well plugged into the minerals Council and other places on native title. Rick had left the NFF before 
greenhouse really became a big issue. So, that is the most important cultural difference. [18;256-60] 
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reform fatigue at the NFF.3t 6 Interestingly, this is also readily acknowledged by NFF 
insiders-however, they point to other sources of leadership beyond the Executive Director 
of the NFF.3 t 7 
'There is strong consensus that the NFF has lacked leadership on the specific issue of 
climate change. This view is consistent across the spectrum from the green movement, 
across pro-Kyoto business players, to government and political observers, through to those 
on the AIGN side. Interestingly, however, the criticism of the NFF leadership appears not 
to take into great account the very deliberate strategic direction of the organisation which is 
revealed here. When this is taken into account, particularly in relation to Wendy Craik's 
time leading the organisation, it is difficult not to see the leadership factor in a different 
light.3t8 
Resources 
While the NFF' s relationship with the federal government was a powerful latent and 
intangible resource which played a strong part in the organisation's decisions about its level 
316 
•• .it is a very very complex array of issues to manage in the NFF ... the Executive Director's in these 
organisations exercise quite a lot ofleadership and push on the agenda of the body ... {the example about 
reforming the NFF's reliance on protection in the farming lobby is a good example?} Yes-that's exactly 
right. So, you could argue that under different leadership you might have got a different set of priorities. 
But, at the end of the day unless you can actually convince your members to go along a certain pathway, 
you're only ever making short-term aberrations on this. You know, and in my experience there is no 
doubt that you can-because we are professionals at it--you can raise their consciousness and get them 
going in a certain direction for a while, but it if it is not in their hearts or in their business interests, they 
will meander away from it ... You know, and then the furmers as I say I think it was again the leadership 
started recognising that their constituency was troubled, and they had other issues on their plate--and 
you go and talk to farmers and start talking about greenhouse when they are going out backwllrds and 
cannot afford to do anything else, and you will be shouted down. So, it is a significant effect. 
[ 13 ;284,292-96] 
317 {V.'bat about leadership? The question I'm interested in here is, if leadership was different in the 
organisation, do you think that it could have taken the group in a different direction on greenhouse?} Oh, 
undoubtedly. If one of the sort of senior elected people had really been going hot about greenhouse then 
they very much could have influenced the direction that it went, particularly the president or the 
chairman of the environment committee or something. {In either direction do you think?} Yes, either 
way. {So they could have been vet)' gung ho on the benefits and the need to sort of head off the 
environmental adaptation problems, or they could have been part of the carbon pack saying, we've got to 
protect the price of diesel and that sort of thing?} Y cs, oh yes, I think either way it could have influenced 
the debate quite a bit, or if someone on the staff had been particularly strong about it. [5;23o-44] {fa it 
conceivable that the organisation could have gone in a significantly different direction on greenhouse or 
would you say that the position of the organisation is preordained by the interests of the membership on 
the issue? ... I mean if Rick Farley were there instead of Wendy Craik in the late 90s is it conceivable 
things could have gone in a different direction?} Yes, it's c-0nceivable. [36; 163] 
318 My perception is that Wendy Craik had enormous influence behind the scenes on the Hill. It was her 
style of operation-she didn't have to deal with things up front. [ 40;527] 
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of engagement on greenhouse issues, financial and human resources are only seen by NFF 
insiders and observers as having a minor influence. 
Difficulties in allocating limited financial and staff resources across a wide range of issues 
relevant to the agricultural sector have been a perennial challenge. It is certainly cited by 
various interviewees as a factor in the NFF's sporadic involvement in the greenhouse 
debate. The NFF is not as well resourced as many people appear to believe.319 The 
organisation did not have the sort of spare money available to be able to contribute to 
expensive consultancy reports on the impacts of greenhouse. Instead, there was a tendency 
to participate in fora rather than fund research. Some NFF insiders suggest that the 
organisation has a hard and fast rule not to accept government funds because it can create 
the perception of conflict. This position was seen as being very applicable in the case of 
greenhouse policy.320 However, there is evidence to the contrary-that the J:.ffF did seek 
financial resources in its dealings with government on greenhouse. Specifically, the level of 
interest in the issue rose where they perceived an opportunity to obtain additional financial 
resources via government funding programs. When these opportunities came to naught, the 
interest apparently waned.321 
31
"we were invited to invest in some major consultancies that they funded on the influence of greenhouse 
on industry and there were quite a number of them and we didn't go in beeause we couldn't afford it. I 
mean they were talking anywhere between $40,00IJ.......$50,000 a group to make these consultancies 
happen. We weren't even in the ballpark. {36;97] We were continuing a presence in environmental issues 
because we knew we had to be there but it's an organisation that runs on a very sma.11 amount of 
resourcing and tries to make a Jot of noise with it so it will trade off, so it was funny because at times the 
government was sort of going, well why is NFF not responding or not doing anything on !his? Well the 
reality was we didn't have the resol!fces to do it. We were diverted in all sorts of other directions. 
[36;101] A couple of times we were asked to give l\'FF's views, I guess you've got here late '97/'98 for 
which we would kind of cobble things together to do, but I think also it's probably important to point out 
that at the end of '96, I think it was, native title happened and for the next however long it was. and I 
can't remember how long it went on for, that really did occupy an incredible amount of time and energy 
of the whole organisation. [5;36] { ... Now resources. Prevalence or lack of resources. Are there any cases 
there where that's been a big issue in determining whether they've been active or not on greenhouse?} 
Oh, well I think that would be part of the reason for the National Farmers' Federation. [19;265-8] 
"'
0 We didn't like to have people seconded into the organisations funded by government In fact NFF's 
Constitution is that you don't take government funding of any kind at all because we're an independent 
lobby group and anything like that compromises us. So if we'd said, oh yes, let's have a project officer 
from AGO at NFF working in greenhouse it's almost a tacit endorsement of government policy on 
greenhouse and it's almost us saying, oh yes, greenhouse is important to agriculture. We weren't 
convinced it was, so you actually then decide not to engage be<:ause as soon as you engage a name like 
NFF it gives a tacit endorsement to whatever you're engaging in ... [36; 185] 
m ... we were trying to get some money out of AGO. It was after we held this day-long workshop, trying 
to get some money out of AGO to actually put a project officer on or something to actually do something 
and I don't recall that we ever actually got it, got the money, and so I guess we kind of did what we could 
in that whole area. [5;52] 
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However, limited financial resources have been a secondary or reinforcing factor rather 
than a decisive one in relation to greenhouse policy. The bottom line has been that 
greenhouse has been seen as a secondary issue and a doubling or trebling of financial 
resources would not have made a significant difference to the amount of time and effort 
which the NFF devoted to the matter.322 Lack of financial resources therefore cannot be 
seem as a major reason for lack ofNFF involvement. 
Human resources have been cited by some as a minor factor which did make it more 
difficult to engage on greenhouse matters. The complexity of the issues presented for 
agriculture by climate change meant that they arguably presented relatively higher barriers 
to engagement in the network than for other sectors. The staff devoted to dealing with 
environmental concerns were not extensive at all, and this to a degree may have limited the 
capacity of the organisation to pa.rtlcipate.323 The background ofNFF leaders-and lack of 
exposure to greenhouse related issues-may also have compromised the human resources 
of the organisation on greenhouse. 324 However, the overall impression gained is that lack 
of human resources was not a major factor. The NFF did have staff on hand well equipped 
322 {(In specific reference to the NFF) when you go down their list of priorities industry associations can 
only deal with the top 10 per cent of their priorities properly and if the issue's not in that top IO per cent 
then it falls oft'. {But it's not that they don't have the resources, it's ... } They devote them somewhere 
else. {If they had ten times the resources would they get to greenhouse?} Probably. {What about twice?} 
No ... Probably not. No, I think it's a fuir way down the list. [19;268-283] l think the judgment that they 
made out of that is that they weren't going to put a lot of resources into this. [29;89] 
323 
'{NFF only really had one person handling the environment stuff, was that Anwen Lovett?} That's 
right. {And so she would presumably have a stack of other issues?} That's right, she had to do other 
things, so it was all . . . and she did chemicals as well so trying to fit ... greenhouse was just one of the 
issues that you had to deal with and it's whatever's important at the time, [5;54-60] 
324 Pretty much all of players in the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network at the association level have 
worked on greenhouse from a public sector perspective. So, they are pretty much sensitised to the 
issue ... they are aware of the issues and the issue at some stage in the past 10-12 years has been 
something which they have worked on. Whereas, if you look at the National Farmers' Federatio11c-
Wendy Crail< l know quite well-had not worked on greenhouse in any of the public sector organisations 
that she had worked on. So she wasn't bringing a set of perspectives on greenhouse to the organisation. 
And I think you'll find in most cases while we all go off and develop our business plans and work out 
what are the priority issues for our organisations, the content of the business plans is often driven in part 
by the perceptions of the Canben-a based organisation--or by the Executive Director of the 
organisation-in part through past experience ... You know, if someone has worked on trade policy 
issues in the past but not on greenhouse and they haven't necessarily made the conne.ction between 
greenhouse and trade effects-and \Vbat might flow on from the World Trade Organisation and 
environment debate-they may not see greenhouse as an issue but they may focus pretty heavily on the 
trade dimension ... if you had someone who was highly attuned to greenhouse as an issue and was able to 
garner some support for tackling the issue in the NFF - {\Vhat sort of response would you have expected 
to see?} l would have expected to see much more engagement in the debate, a greater and growing 
awareness within the sector of where the greenhouse pressures were going to come and how they might 
be dealt with. [40;194-214] 
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and well disposed towards a stronger greenhouse role by the organisation.325 As ,,.,;th 
financial resources, it is highly unlikely that additional people with a strong background in 
greenhouse policy would have made a great deal of difference to how the NFF played the 
issue.326 
However, if 'resources' are defined more broadly to include the NFF's relationships with 
government (which were certainly seen as one of the most important resources of the 
organisation) it seems very likely that they did in fact greatly influence on the NFF's 
approach to climate change. That is, they markedly reduced NFF engagement in the policy 
network. NFF insiders acknowledge that their strategy took into account that its 
relationships with the government constituted a powerful deterrent against government 
attention to agriculture on greenhouse, and that this was an effective 'get out of jail' card in 
the event that there was an effort by the Greenhouse Office or the AIGN to direct policy 
attention towards agriculture. In thls broader sense, resources did have a powerful impact, 
and arguably, the NFF decisions on resource allocation have been both in keeping with 
their strategic approach to the issue and vindicated by subsequent events.327 
325 
... all of this is about relationships and personal agendas. I mean NFF would bavc paid even less 
attention to greenhouse than it did if Anwen Lovett hadn't been there because she was really the only 
person who wanted to know about it and thought this might be something that NFF needed to be 
involved in out ... {What was it about her agenda though? Where did she come from that gave her that 
insight?} Oh well, she's slightly green. She actually thought that climate change existed and when she 
saw maps (showing) that the grain belt was going to move this way into the more arid country she 
actually believed that we would get an effect climatically in Australia that would adversely affect 
agriculture, so her personal perspective was that she was e-0ncemed about it. [36;273'--77] (From a senior 
green movement figure) l think we were about to succeed through concerted efforts of good people in 
NFF but whenever we've nearly got somewhere those people have left. {Really? Like who?} Rob Hadler 
earlier on and then, what was her name who recently left? These are staff members I'm talking 
about. .. Yes, Anwen (Lovett), people like that. [35;43-51] 
326 
•• .it was an issue very much managed by us within the NFF office because part of our charter was to 
be there and identify things that were occurring at a political level that could impact on the industry even 
though the industry wasn't particularly concerned about it at the time. We sort of had a responsibility to 
track that and if an inquiry or something came forward on it then we had a responsibility to answer it. But 
how much effort we put into it was dictated by the fact that the masses weren't terribly concerned by it. 
[36; 33] 
m With greenhouse there was no one of our organisations sa}ing, we 're in real trouble here, this is 
something we really need to get involved in, there's big concerns here for Australian agriculture. No one 
was really that concerned about it. It was really that the council would sort of say, look, this is a game 
that's operating on an international level, government seems to be throwing lots of money at it politically 
to deal with it, we've got to be there so we don't miss anything, we've got to respond when it's required 
but it's not something we're going to be proactive on because we really don't need to, And I mean if you 
think about it in tenns of efficient use of resources and where greenhouse is at the moment, I'd almost 
argue that it's probably the smart thing to do. [36; 133] 
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Meso-level 
Most of the prominent forces at network level which affected NFF activity resulted in less 
rather than more NFF involvement. The veiy mixed policy implications of climate change 
appear to have necessitated some ongoing interest and involvement, and various 
government processes catalysed closer analysis of the issue by the NFF328 as did the 
realization that at the political level the issue had to be dealt witb.329 However, most meso· 
level forces led to a more cautious response and to less priority being placed on the issue. 
Policy implications 
The policy implications for agriculture are mixed and complex. Complexity more than 
anything else has resulted in the poliey implications of climate change having a somewhat 
ambiguous impact on NFF behaviour. In a nutshell, the complexity of the issue for 
agriculture has necessitated relatively more involvement by the NFF at times in order to 
adequately assess the sector's interests. However, assessment has on the whole contributed 
to less NFF activity in the policy network. In order to appreciate how, it is necessary to 
consider the policy implications in more detail-first the policy implications of agriculture 
as a source of greenhouse emissions, and second the potential damage to agriculture from 
climate change and policies aimed at dealing with it. 
Agricultural greenhouse emissions come from two main sources. Firstly, emissions of 
methane from livestock are a significant c-0mponent of Australia's total greenhouse gas 
emissions (partly because methane's greenhouse forcing potential is some 20 times that of 
carbon dioxide). The seeond major source of net emissions comes land clearing. According 
to the most recent national greenhouse gas inventory data, agriculture is contributes some 
18 per cent of Australia's greenhouse emissions (AGO 2003:1). Unlike the stationary 
328 Quite a lot of NFF's responses on greenhouse tended actually to be driven by whether there was a 
government inquiry going on or whether the Business Council or someone was being particularly 
proactive on the issue at the time, rather than it being driven from within. [36;33] 
329 My recollection is that we knew it was an issue but we really didn't spend a lot of time dealing with it 
in the early years., .. but it became clear I guess . , . I guess just looking at this it must have been in 1998 
some time that whether or not members of NFF regarded greenhouse as a real phenomenon the volume 
of paper that we were getting in about the subject in NFF meant that it was actually a political issue and 
the way we kind of reintroduced it to our environment committee was to say, well look, this is the 
volume of stuff we get to deal with, it really is ... it really is a political issue even if you don'tthink it's a 
real environmental issue, we are going to have to find a way to deal with it and so I guess that's where 
we started. We talked to the AGO and we talked to AFFA and we held this greenhouse workshop. 
[5;!2,36) 
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energy category ( + 3 7 .2 per cent) or the transport category ( + 28. 8 per cent) sectors which 
experienced large growth in greenhouse emissions in Australia between 1990 and 2003, 
emissions in the agricultural category increased by a relatively modest 4 per cent. 
This puts agriculture in the advantageous position of being able to argue that theirs is the 
only sector of the Australian economy meeting the Australian target set at Kyoto. However, 
due to the extent of growth in other sectors, the NFF has long harboured concern that 
agriculture may not be forever immune from emission abatement pressure. Attention is also 
likely to focus on agriculture because of the land clearing issue which has a very significant 
bearing on Australia's net emissions total. However, aside from land clearing, the NFF has 
made a judgment that significant attention to agricultural emissions is a long way off, and 
further that they have the political clout to prevent any major adverse policy attention. 
In terms of environmental impacts on agriculture, the implications of climate change are 
negative on balance: while changes in temperature and rainfall may assist some individual 
farmers and regions, increases in severity of weather events and the expanded range of 
pests and disease could cause significant economic losses. Losses are also probable due to 
permanent changes in weather pattems--especially a shift to hotter and drier conditions-
which would make large areas of agricultural land and river systems even more marginal. 
These likely impacts have become steadily clearer with subsequent IPCC reports.330 
On the surface, it would appear that farmers would have much to gain from government 
policy aimed at minimising this damage. They might even benefit financially if they are 
able to gain carbon credits in the context of an emissions trading system for adopting 
farming practices which result in a net increase in carbon retention on their land--either by 
reducing land clearance, planting more trees, preventing erosion or generating additional 
topsoil. At least in theory these opportunities could result in it being more cost-effective 
than existing practice for some farmers to make emission reduction their primary farming 
activity. 
330 I don't think they have seen that they are part of the issue and that the impacts on them are potentially 
quite severe. I think there is now a recognition that agriculture in Australia will be affected by climate 
change according to the scientific projections. And that is starting to have an effect on their 
understanding of the significance of this issue. I don't have to go into the details, but essentially wheat 
belts are going to be affected, they may benefit in the short term but in the long term they will be 
affected-drying out in places like various vineyard areas in Australia-the marginal lands, contoured 
agriculture really shrinks back towards the coastal zone within 70 odd years-so there are farmers who 
are going to be severely affected by this-the stonefruit industry-I think that it is starting to be made 
understood to them. It has come about as a result of the Third Assessment Report findings. [30;32] 
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Conversely, however, existing fann practice is potentially vulnerable to greenhouse policy 
measures. Imposts on the cost of energy (especially for on-farm diesel use and transport of 
farm product to markets) could significantly affect the agricultural sector were government 
to impose a substantial cost on carbon emissions. Similarly, any attempt to rapidly impose a 
cost on methane emissions or require their reduction is viewed as posing inevitable costs on 
the sector.331 These possibilities had (to the extent that the NFF constituency even focused 
on climate change) served to generate significant resistance to a greener position. 332 
For the NFF the implications are a mi.xed bag for the sector. Farmers have a lot to lose from 
climate change, but it is likely to be a longer term impact. They may gain from some 
measures to reduce emissions; however, the benefits are not clear and they may take many 
years to accrue to farmers. As we!~ farmers could be vulnerable if other more aggressive 
emission reduction measures are pursued in agriculture. This is deemed more likely if the 
NFF takes an aggressive stance in the greenhouse policy network, campaigning for a focus 
on other sectors where emissions growth is higher. At the same time, there is a strong 
degree of confidence that no government will target the agricultural sector.333 Under the 
circumstances, and with a range of competing policy issues to deal with, the optimal 
position for the NFF appears to have been judged to keep a close eye on the issue but keep 
the head below the parapet. 334 
l'olicy limitations 
Vatious policy limitations have further discouraged a prominent role from the NFF. 
Perhaps the most obvious policy limitation for the agricultural sector is that the emissions 
which will cause most damage to their sector are already in the atmosphere. That is, any 
331 I think some of the information that has come out on the costs to agriculture offactoring in the private 
carbon prices and things, it just means our costs of production will go up, and given that we're not really 
subsidised generally compared with other countries, it just makes it harder. [5;92-106] 
"' There were still groups there who saw this as a major threat to the farming community. They were 
being dominated by people who thought that there was going to be a tax on every cow, or every time a 
cow farted or burped they were going to get charged X dollars. {That view was prevailing?} That view 
was still around, I won't say it was prevailing but it was very strong in certain sectors. [44;85-89} 
333 They were not getting pressure from below or not a huge amount of pressure ... Wendy Craik knew 
drunn well there wouldn't be a cow tax. And that was the main fear,{So why risk dividing the 
membership over fill issue where the government's not going to put any pressure on?} Don'! put time 
into something which there's not much to win and not a lot to lose. [44; 103-9] 
334 My sense again is that they have basically stepped back from the overall debate and said the debate's 
being led powerfully enough by the anti groups, whether they be coal or aluminium or elsewhere, that we 
can actually duek our heads down quite nicely and concentrate on the other things which are going to hit 
us more earlier. [30; 15] 
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policy measures implemented to reduce greenhouse emissions will not reduce the damage 
to be borne by the Australian agricultural sector. If Australia reduced its emissions today by 
even the most aggressive policy programs being promoted, the impact on Australian farms 
by 2050 would be negligible, Further, there is no guarantee that if Australia greatly reduced 
its emissions that other 11Jltions would follow suit. Indeed, there are strong signs that the 
opposite would occur. Therefore, for the NFF, there is an argument to say that the die is 
cast for agriculture, and adaptation will be more important for them than emissions 
reduction. Under the circumstances, however, there is deemed to be plenty of time for 
adaptation so urgent policy attention seems less appropriate. This reasoning has played a 
part in the lack of priority consistently placed by the NFF on the issue. 
Another policy limitation which has led to less NFF involvement has been the technical 
difficulty in reducing greenhouse emissions from the agricultural sector.335 For example, 
while methane emissions from livestock are acknowledged to be potent greenhouse gases, 
they are not rapidly growing (hence limiting the policy urgency of dealing with them 
relative to other fust growing sources). There are also significant technical and practical 
problems in reducing these emissions.H6 Nonvithstanding advances which have been made 
335 If you want to control methane emissions from pig production or from livestock or from carbon in 
soils you have problems of understanding scientifically very diffuse sources of emissions. No 
immediately ready mechanism. So the exclusion of the agricultural sector hasn't been uniquely an 
Australian experience, it's been more of a global experience while you get to grips with some of those 
practicalities. And, as you say it's not a great growth sector. The area in which there's been most focus, 
with respect to agriculture has been on land clearing as you know .... part of the reason thatthere were 
not any measures in '97 the focus on agriculture is that it's very hard to see what are the early simple 
measures that you C"11 !alee. It is more complex because the emissions are more diffuse. In many cases 
the science is less well understood and the instruments and intervention look as though they all have high 
transaction costs. That can include political transaction costs. [54;68-74] I think they've got, and the 
government has, a very difficult management issue in tenns of how you deal with greenhouse on farms. 
It doesn't readily lend itself to carbon trading. It doesn't readily lend itself to projects to reduce 
greenhouse gases. Three-quarters of our emissions from the agricultural sector come from the animals 
side of the agricultural sector-when our economy is booming and our export opportunities are there the 
beef and sheep herds go up and by definition the emissions go up. We are the world's largest beef 
exporter-that means that we generate the emissions onshore even though the benefits are gained 
offshore--it is a commodity which is very greenhouse intensive in its production but there are no 
greenhouse emissions associated with its use, so it is a difficult one ... we need to work on how we deal 
with the farming fraternity and emissions generated from ffil'llls in a different way to other areas of the 
economy because it is not easy to allocate, whether that is by administrative allocation or otherwise, an 
emissions allowance to this industry. [30;20,28] 
336 In fairness to them, although they were a significant part of a national inventory, it's not a 
significantly growing part so, yes, I think it's the mixture of both those scenarios that you painted (first 
that the NFF's inaction flowed from a lack of understanding, and/or second that they understood it we!! 
but calculated that they had the political clout to head off any damaging government policy) and a view 
that somewhere down the road they will be<:ome interested if someone comes up with a package that 
looks like it really has some benefits in it for them and I think you may see something in the area of 
revegetation, salinity control, land degradation might start to come together in the coming years, but ... 
{\'11th some dollars presumably.) Yes, and of course there's a bit of a cross linkage for the land clearing 
issue. [29;89] 
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in pursuit of dietary and pharmaceutical solutions to cutting methane emissions from 
livestock, the practicality and costs associated with implementing these advances would be 
high by comparison with measures targeted at other sectors.337 Consequently, agriculture is 
sheltered by the low level of growth in the sector's emissions, the diffuseness of the farm 
business types, and the practical and technical limitations on policy options available to 
govemments.338 This has led the NFF to treat climate change with Jess urgency and to take 
a less central role in the network.339 
Another problem confronting the NFF was that in areas seen as possible opportunities for 
the agricultural sector to win from stronger greenhouse policy (especially carbon 
sequestration) there were also significant limitations. The uncertainty and ambiguity of the 
policy environment on issues like emissions trading--complicated further by technical 
measurement issues, and by the uncertain international policy environment-made NFF 
less confident about the potential upside of greenhouse engagement.340 
331 
••• there were no technical solutions on the cards that people might propose or embrace that would 
represent a real threat. But they didn't see they needed to do very much. [51;60--74] At the end of the day 
some of the other stuff about drugs for ruminants to stop the farting and all the rest of it that's being 
worked on in CSIRO and all these other sorts of things but I mean I think it looks more like window 
dressing and I'm sure that most farmers out there in the bush with 30,000 sheep or whatever think 'if you 
think I'm going to give medication 1-0 all my 30,000 sheep!?.' [13;180] You can see this across the board 
happening if you look at greenhouse politics was that, altllough agriculture was identified as important 
because it was 14 per cent of emissions, it V.'lli> quite often in the too hard basket and you see, we weren ;t 
under a great deal of political pressure to do much about it either, so we weren't under pressure by our 
constituencies, we weren't under heavy pressure either from the politicals because the evidence son of 
said that a lot of agriculture's emissions are diffuse, they're uot point source emissions so it's much 
harder to actually get any ... l mean how the hell would you get compliance on cutting emissions? 
[36;37] 
338 {So the fact that by comparison to other sectors in terms of response measures agriculture was very 
hard in a way it protects agriculture from attention?} It does, and the fact that you're dealing with a very 
large number-like NFF used to say we represented 130,000 farm businesses-you're dealing with a lot 
of small businesses whose each individual contribution was very small. [36;38-45] 
339 {She (Wendy Craik) said at the time, look I know they'll tum their attention to us sooner or later ... ) 
But it's not on us now. I mean if you look at where politics has gone you could argue it won't come back 
on agriculture for years and years. I mean there will be heaps of other things that come over the horizon 
at us .. , I suppose it became increasingly evident, say three or four years ago, that our potential strengths 
in avoiding anything that might come on as a cost to the industry was the fact that we had a lot of obtuse, 
smaller businesses. [36;97, 127-9] 
3
"" We talked to the AGO and we talked to AFFA and we held this greenhouse workshop. {Yes, I saw 
that I think !' ve got the proceedings here.} Yes, we spent a day trying to work out what the NFF could 
actually realistically do, and I guess a lot of where we came out at was that Kyoto had illustrated there 
migllt be potential benefits for farmers in carbon trading, there may be potential benefits, but the rules of 
that trading weren't at all clear and it stnu;k us that that was the sort of issue that sort of held potentially a 
load of traps for people if they really thought they were going to invest in growing a swag of trees and 
make a zillion dollars out of it. That if they were interested in going down that track they were much 
better off to do it for other reasons and regard any greenhouse benefits that might come out of it, 
financial benefits, as an added extra. So do it for environmental reasons or do it for shelter reasons or do 
it for timber reasons or whatever you want to do but don't do it, unless you're really careful, don't it on 
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Coalition activity 
As the AIGN example demonstrates, the formation and operation of coalitions can spark 
greater interest group activity. Without the AIGN's information sharing, organisational and 
campaigning enthusiasm, numerous groups may have been less active in this policy 
network. For other interest groups the AIGN's activities have had no apparent impact on 
their level of involvement. However, the NFF provides a very interesting counter-intuitive 
case. It seems probable that coalition activity generally and the AIGN in particular resulted 
in less NFF involvement in the policy network rather than more. 
As has been discussed above in relation to the NFF's culture, there is a disposition on the 
part of this interest group to take an independent line but not to be out front in opposition to 
the pack where other sectors are deemed to have greater interests at stake. The NFF' s 
interactions with the AIGN provide a perfect illustration of that dynamic at work. The NFF 
found itself consistently wooed by members of the AIGN who were pursuing a very 
deliberate effort to broaden their coverage.341 The people running the AIGN identified early 
a vulnerability in their campaign to keep the brakes on greenhouse policy development in 
Australia-they saw that it looked too much like a defence of a narrow set of corporate 
interests dominated by energy producers and energy intensive industries like aluminium. 
As a consequence, the AIGN worked hard to get more mainstream and representative 
support for their position and collaborative activity. They succeeded to a degree with the 
BCA at times, with certainly with ACCI342 and the AIG. However, agriculture, which 
AIGN figures saw as crucial to their broadening efforts, proved an elusive and reluctant 
member. 
the basis of getting money for greenhouse credits or something like that. And so I guess that was the line 
we ran which was reasonably accepted by our constituents. [5;36-40] 
341 {Were the NFF ever part of the AIGN?} No. No-they never joined. {Were they ever asked?} Oh-
many times. In fact when Dick Wells was chairman of the AIGN it was his task a number of times to try 
to get them in. Because AIGN had an objective of broadening the base-so that it wasn't just resources 
and energy ... [13;126-33] 
342 
... we definitely had a strategy of broadening it, and as I have said, when the ACCI came into the 
game in 2000 of after a direct representation from Dick Wells to Mark Paterson, that was a very 
significant shift for us because all of a sudden now we had a broad group of 300,000 small businesses in 
Australia represented by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry -- and they were now saying 
this was their number-one priority issue ... (They) stood up and said 'we do not think this (the AIGN 
position) is resources biased at all.' [13;348,440] 
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The NFF was involved early but not all that often in meetings of the AIGN and AIGN-
associated fora. Reasonably positive cooperative links were in place between many AIGN 
players and NFF leaders following collaboration on issues like trade liberalisation and tax 
reform. While it had a reputation for doing its own thing-or 'catching and killing its own' 
the NFF was no stranger to coalition activity, and no stranger to the AIGN leadership. 
Indeed, there was a strong record of working in coalition, though it had been fading 
somewhat as 'reform fatigue' set in amongst the rural constituency and the 1'.'FF strayed 
from the pack.343 However, it became apparent that the AIGN's motive in courting the NFF 
was not altruistic, to put it mildly. Rather, the NFF came to realise that i) AIGN was 
looking to use the NFF to broaden its own appearance; and ii) the AIGN sought to also 
broaden policy attention to take the burden off associations representing the most energy 
intensive and rapidly growing emitting industries (including electricity, coal, mining and 
minerals processing, petroleum, and transport). 
The judgment made by NFF leaders was that they were being conned into a trap by the 
AIGN and that their engagement in this coalition activity would be likely to result in more 
greenhouse policy problems for agriculture, not fewer.344 As a consequence, the NFF 
decided not to par!icipate in the AIGN. That said, they did have sympathy for the AIGN 
position, and acknowledged that other sectors had a great deal at stake in the greenhouse 
debate. At the same time, they found that the cost of AIGN membership was prohibitive. In 
keeping with their cultural reluctance to take the lead or to oppose the 'pack' where others 
had more at stake, the NFF decided to take an independent, but back seat role in the 
network.345 This, of course, only reinforced the perception among the more pro-Kyoto 
elements in the debate that the NFF was very pro-AIGN at heart.346 
343 
... NFF has a history if you look at things like indu;'trial relations and taxation, of working with other 
business groups to really get leverage for resources because it's a pretty resource--poor organisation, so it 
tends to try and participate where the big boys are playing, the big end of big industry are participating, 
so they'll often send someone like that. They don't do it so much anymore but they did back then. 
[36;17] 
344 Look---Oie NFF can be summed up in a quote of Wendy Craik's. 'If you bastards think we are going 
to bear all of the costs you have another think coming.' {When did she say that?) Oh--about three years 
ago. {What would make her say that when they were not even part of the Prime Minister's package?} 
Because Wendy is no fool. [18;104-112] Wendy used to say things like 'don't expect the farmers to bear 
the cost of your people and their activities.' [13;144] 
345 In terms of the other industry groups, because Wendy Craik used to go along to the regular executive 
directors' meetings here in Canberra and I guess the other influencing factor was that you had 
org-"11isations like the BCA, you had the Minerals Council, and they were all members of AIGN, which 
NFF had dropped out of quite early for financial reasilns. {ls that right?} Yes, NFF were in there before, 
perhaps very early on, bm dropped out because they didn '!have any money and the view was, 'well, we 
were taking the lead on other things because we also had waterfront and tax and a few other things. We 
were taking the lead on other things so we'd leave them to run with greenhouse and we'd just kind of 
trail along and pick up where we needed.' So that was sort of where NFF ... {That's kind of a 
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It was a clear case of coalition activity discouraging an interest group to act-as it seems 
highly unlikely that the NFF would have been so bashful on greenhouse had the AIGN or 
equivalent pack not existed. It is as if the AIGN's presence acted as a 'scarecrow' of sorts 
for the NFF. This is in keeping with the frustrated view of advocates of stronger 
greenhouse policy who viewed this dynamic as opernting not only with the NFF but the 
business community more broadly. It is uncertain to what extent, but seems likely that 
many business interests thought twice and ultimately shied away from contesting the 
greenhouse turf which was already dominated by a very strong and committed business 
coalition taking a particularly adan1ant blocking line. The NFF is perhaps the best example. 
Related government policy agenda 
The evolving position of the Australian government on greenhouse policy has steadily 
reinforced a minimalist level of engagement by the NFF. As mentioned above, the NFF has 
long been confident that it would be both unlikely and difficult for the federal government 
to direct significant policy attention to reducing emissions in the agricultural sector. Vv'hile 
there are signs that the NFF at times felt they may finally be singled out for some attention, 
their confidence in the judgment that agriculture would not be touched in an major way has 
been consistent and increased over time. It has been reinforced hy a national policy 
approach to climate change over successive governments which has become steadily less 
ambitious. 
This began with a federal coalition commitment in 1989 to reduce Australia's greenhouse 
emissions 'by at least 20% by the year 2000' (Liberal Party 1989: 2; Pnplick 1989). Later 
that year, state and federal environment ministers met to consider the possibility of cutting 
emissions by up to 40 per cent--a figure which the federal ALP minister Senator 
prioritisation issue as well isn't it because if it's important enough you find the money?} That's right, 
and the time. Like the amount of time it takes on waterfront, NFF really did put the hard yards in. [5;60-
68] 
346 Well, the Farmers' Federation are definitely in the A!GN camp but I'm buggered if I know why. 
Because Australian farmers are going to bear the brunt of climate change and regional rural communities 
would also bear the benefit of expansion of sustainable renewable energy. So that's always been a 
puzzle. [23;316] I mean if you look at one set of logic you'd think that they would point back at the 
energy side and say, look, it's not farmers' problems, it's been done by industry, it's being done by blah, 
blah, blah, but they haven't because I think they fuar pointing back at other industry associations. It's a 
sort of a strange solidarity thing. [35;67] They just sort of climbed on with this ideological opposition. 
Because that's what all the other big guys in town did--! think it was as much about the Canberra 
lobbying scene. You know they hang out with all these other, mainly mining, and resource industry 
lobbyists ... [39;48] 
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Richardson told parliament 'does not frighten me all that much' (Senate Hansard 
1989:4004). In October 1990, the ALP then adopted an interim planning target 'to stabilise 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1988 levels by the year 2000 and to reduce emissions by 20 
per cent by 2005' (Senate Hansard 1990:5133). 
Since this early of bipartisan commitment there has been a steady backing away on both 
sides of politics. The ALP position moved into line with the Rio stabilisation target in 
1992, and by 1995 the '21C' policy of the Keating administration approximated to limit 
growth in emissions to 3 per cent (Kay, P 1997:6). At the 1997 Kyoto conference, the 
Howard coalition government had ac<:epted a still weaker target of plus I 08 per cent (itself 
non-binding because of Australia's refusal to ratify the protocol). It is also important to 
appreciate that ever since the interim planning target there has been a qualification attached 
to Australia's position that 'the government will not proceed with measures which have net 
adverse impacts nationally or on Australia's trade competitiveness in the absence of similar 
action by major greenhouse gas producing nations' (Hamilton: 2001 :33).347 As well as 
reducing Australia's ambitions to cut greenhouse emissions, there has been a consistent 
focus on non-agricultural sources in terms of policy responses. Under the circumstances, 
this research finds that the direction of government policy has provided the 1'.'FF with no 
increased incentive for greater involvement in the policy network, in fact quite the reverse. 
Government and/or departmental processes 
Certain ministerial initiatives have also received support from the NFF and led to some 
additional involvement. There are examples of this under federal governments of both 
persuasions. For example, under the Hawke/Keating governments the ]';'FF contributed to 
the work of both the ESD process as it related to greenhouse348, and also as a member of 
the National Greenhouse Advisory Panel where it was reputedly a very active and positive 
contributor. 349 Under the Howard government the NFF has also participated in various 
processes initiated by ministers-most recently the Business Dialogue. Also, as has been 
stated previously, the 1'1'FF made a judgment (partly based on their discussions with 
341 A condition, the development and intention of which is confinned by various interviewees and 
explored elsewilere in this research. 
34
' If you go back to the Hawke era with the ESD process-there was a whole ESD sector covered on 
Agriculture--and I know bceause l actually sat on that working group---it was chaired by Roy Green lllld 
the NFF was there. [2;76] 
349 NFF if! remember were octually alternates (on the NGAP) ... the NFF was always there ... I mean 
they (the NFF) were quite vocal and quite a good force for moving things forward. [6;51] 
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ministers) that the Howard government in particular was unlikely to target agriculture. This 
research suggests strong scepticism within the cabinet about climate change, and also that 
industry lobby groups were readily able to use cabinet processes to undermine the 
environment minister and portfolio on greenhouse policy. National Party and Liberal Party 
ministers (especially those involved in the Greenhouse Ministerial Council) were routinely 
engaged by industry to head off greener policy proposals.350 There were instances where 
the NFF's perceived interests on greenhouse were advanced by ministers without NFF 
involvement.351 Under the circumstances, it seems likely that the cabinet measures further 
encouraged the NFF strategy based on an assessment that there was no need for them to 
engage. 
Similarly, the NFF did also get more active on greenhouse policy where it was requested to 
by departmental officials as part of new programs and/or consultative initiatives. For 
example, the NFF agreed to work with the Bureau of Rural Sciences (BRS) on running a 
joint workshop to raise awareness in the agricultural sector about the issue of climate 
change and the potential implications for farmers. There were various other examples of 
collaboration in response to departmental requests. However, among NFF insiders there is a 
strong view that departmental level processes were not as high a priority as those initiated 
by parliament (for example, senate inquiries) or requests from the government or specific 
ministers. The latter were treated as much more serious in general-and in particular with 
greenhouse matters. Aside from anything else, NFF staff felt they were invited into far too 
many departmental processes to realistically accept-so prioritisation was inevitable.352 
They also found that government engagement on greenhouse often seemed to tie up 
350 {I mean they were the only ones left out of the Prime Minister's package in November 1997-so you 
think they made the calculation that they thought that they can fix it ifneed be?} That is right. I mean we 
will come back to talk about the operation of the ministerial committee at some stage and the operation 
of that but the National Party ministers who were on that ministerial committee were always very very 
strong, great sceptics. {Did I hear Truss on it?} Oh yes. But I mean-and Tuckey is a Liberal! But from 
John Anderson as well. You name it-and if we wanted to put a spoke the wheel of Robert Hill or 
whatever we could do it pretty quickly! {Through the Nats?} Oh-easy, easy. I remember many many 
times-we reverse-managed that ministerial (greenhouse) committee so many times. [13;158-168] 
351 
••• you know to some extent Tuckey acts as a sort of representative in government for the farming 
lobby and or for the farmers. And he's always been hostile to (greenhouse policy) although it's never 
expressed as hostility-he's always been palpably hostile to plantation development for carbon purposes. 
And generally the farmers have been neutral to hostile on carbon sequestration options. [2;64] 
352 NFF are involved in so many government committees. Whenever there is a government committee on 
any bloody thing, they need someone from NFF on it. Now they are not they are a much bigger 
organisation than us but they are not huge. They have about thirty employees, thirty five, so if you end up 
on lots and lots of government committees and there are some issues that are really pressing like water 
and salinity. [4;310-22] 
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resources with little clear benefit out of the exercise for the NFF.353 Nonetheless, 
departmental officials did target the NFF to engage agricultural interest in climate change 
succeed which they saw as being very important-and in some cases this succeeded in 
eliciting greater NFF interest.354 
Parliamentary processes 
The NFF has contributed to numerous parliamentary inquiries on greenhouse related 
matters over the years, particularly since the Kyoto meeting in 1997.355 It is apparent from 
interviews with NFF insiders that these inquiries caused the organisation to apply some 
resources which would otherwise never have been directed towards climate change.356 
Parliamentary inquiries are cited by NFF staff as being one of the main catalysts for NFF 
from time to time rethinking its interests and policy positions on climate change. While 
there is a clear link, therefore, between the level of NFF activity and parliamentary 
processes, there is little indication that these processes have led to any significant shift in 
the !\'FF position. At best, parliamentary processes have led to more l\l'F activity in 
refocusing on the issue. However, they have had no discernible impact on the main 
conclusions drawn by the organisation. 
353 Sol guess it was just looking at this in 1998 and '99 we did actually put quite a reasonable effort into 
it all and we tried to deal with the Greenhouse Office but we found that reasonably unsatisfactory I think 
you'd have to say. {Why was that?} I can't remember the precise reasons now but we seemed to spend 
hours in meetings not getting anywhere and we just didn't have the resources to put a lot of effort into it. 
We had a bit of me and a bit of someone else to put into it and the sorts of things they were requiring 
were really requiring almost a full-time person, which we just didn't have the resources to do. {Lots of 
processes were there?} Yes, that's right. {Expert groups on this and that and the other.) That's right' 
[40-52] 
354 
'So you tended to get this rather spasmodic involvement. At times it would be more intensive-if you 
gave them a structured framework they would be involved with you.' [2;76] 
"' The record confirms NFF submissions in the following three parliamentary inquiries: 1998 House of 
Reps Standing Committee on the Environment and Heritage Inquiry into Emissions Trading (tabled 
2518198); Joint Standing Committee on Treaties-Inquiry into Kyoto Protocol (Incomplete - commenced 
June 2000); and the Senate Committee on the Environment, Communications, Information Technology 
and the Arts References Committee-Inquiry on Australia's Response to Global Warming (November 
2000) 
3
"' NFF is in Canberra is to lobby and influence the federal government, so when the federal government 
has inquiries into any issues that potentially have relevance to the furming community, NFF makes a 
response, so quite a lot ofNFF's responses on greenhouse tended actually to be driven by whether there 
was a government inquiry going on or whether the Business Council or someone was being particularly 
proactive on the issue at the time rather than it being driven from within because from within it wasn't 
really convinced whether or not this was a big issue or not because we had a very strong counter-voice, 
we had limited resources and we had a multitude of issues to cover. [36;33] 
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International processes 
There is some evidence to suggest a greater NFF involvement in greenhouse policy 
following the Kyoto conference in 1997. NFF insiders confirm that it became clear with 
Kyoto (and also with the federal government's response just in advance of that conference) 
that climate change was going to continue as an important domestic and international 
issue--largely as a result of the international attention. NFF leaders made the assessment 
that even if there was scepticism within their constituency about the greenhouse science, 
the issue would remain a political issue and was sufficiently important to justify the NFF's 
keeping a watchful eye on developments.357 That said, while the international policy 
environment sparked closer NFF attention, particularly after Kyoto, since that time 
disengagement from the Kyoto Protocol by the Australian and US governments has 
confirmed the NFF assessments that there is no urgency for them to engage in greenhouse 
activity. 
Greenhouse science 
The sporadic response of the NFF to climate change, and the low priority placed upon the 
issue has been partly due to a deeply entrenched, but rarely expressed, scepticism about the 
science underpinning concern about the greenhouse effect. The NFF has not publicly 
denied the science, and they have consistently supported the government position 
acknowledging that there is sufficient evidence to warrant concern. They have also 
conceded repeatedly that the agricultural sector could be relatively more vulnerable than 
most to the damage associated with climate change, and that Australian farmers have cause 
for concern. However, behind the rhetoric there is a high level of scepticism. 
NFF observers and insiders confirm that there is a strong streak of disbelief that the threat 
from climate change is nearly as real or strong as the green movement would have them 
believe.358 There is even a good deal of confidence that international authorities (like the 
IPCC) and the Australian government are over-stating the problem and being alarmist. 
There has been a feeling among senior NFF players-and they believe among their 
357 See previous quote [5;36] under footnote 329 regarding the necessity to address greenhouse policy 
notwithstanding NFF member scepticism about the science ... [5;36] 
358 There seemed to be these competing healthy debates about whether or not it actually exists, whether 
or not the scientists are right, and then there's this big sort of international sort of bandwagon going on 
and it really seems to bear very little relationship at all to again what someone's doing on their farm in 
Australia. [36;33] 
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membership-··that climate change is not real and that they ought to focus on real issues. 
There has also been a tendency within the NFF at times to flirt with the more extreme 
doubters in the greenhouse policy network-something which has been greatly appreciated 
by those parties and frowned upon by govemment.359 While the NFF maintain their 
objectivity and defend themselves against allegations of extremism and scepticism, there is 
evidence to suggest sympathies in that direction. There is also good support found to 
suggest that the lack of scientific clarity on the nature and extent of damage likely to be 
associated with climate change at the regional and sub-regional level has been used as an 
excuse to postpone closer attention to greenhouse. 
Macro-level 
A wide variety of factors beyond the greenhouse policy network had an impact on the 
NFF's decisions in relation to the extent and nature of their activity. Most importantly, all 
of the factors at the macro-level contributed to a lesser role by the NFF in the greenhouse 
policy network than would otherwise have been the case. 
Broad government ideology and culture 
As we have already seen, the NFF is well connected to government--at both the political 
and departmental levels. The party has good connections with both sides of politics and a 
uniquely influential relationship with the Coalition, and particularly the National Party. The 
NFF also represents an 'icon' industry and has carefully built the impression that they 
represent farming fami!ies360-hence giving them electoral and media clout greatly 
exceeding that of most industry associations.361 As such, as has been discussed, there has 
consistently been great confidence within the l\'FF that they could head off any significant 
effort to impose greenhouse related restrictions or costs on agricultural activity. Further, 
359 
••. NFF went to a seminar put on by the Lavoisier Group, that's right ... Tony Staley spoke and Ray 
Evans and, who else? I think Donald spoke for Nl'F, I think Donald McGauchie but I know Wendy Craik 
got rapped over the knuek!es by Roger Beale and Robert Hill for going. 'Surely you don't believe in 
them?' (they said). Which was interesting. Wendy said, 'we've got to listen to all points of view, you 
know' and certainly Nl'F had ... [5;92-106] 
3Ml 'NFF was very, very protective of its independence and it' appearance of being bipartisan and 
independent and representing the farming family. They didn't really want to be seen as a big business 
organisation, they were there for farming families so that was very important to them' [36; 153] 
361 
'I think the NFF bas at times focused on this and thev've been effective not because there are a tightly 
knit well-organised body focused on this issue, but beea;,,,e they represent a very powerful and influential 
segment of Australian society. [31;27] I think there are some iconic industries here which have influence 
by virtue of their history and status---aluminiurn, farmers ... [30;264] 
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however, the NFF has been in a powerful position to both read and influence government 
policy. As very senior ministerial advisers noted, the government and the NFF 'walk and 
talk in the same way.'362 They have also-enjoyed some of the most privileged access to the 
highest levels of government and the strong support of portfolio departments. Under 
governments of both persuasions, but especially under the Coalition government led by 
John Howard, the broad government ideology and culture have been very favourable to the 
agricultural sector. This operating environment has given the NFF sufficient confidence to 
play a 'part-time' role on greenhouse, knowing they can head off any problems but are very 
unlikely to have to use precious 'get out of jail cards.' 
Activity in related policy networks 
The NFF has similarly been dissuaded from being too concerned about climate change by 
both the demands placed on it by other networks and the political signals it has received 
through its activities in those networks. The NFF is involved in a very broad array of policy 
networks-ranging from trade to water policy to land management to telecommunications 
to greenhouse. Under these circumstances, it has a better than average feel for the political 
winds-something which is acknowledged across the political spectrum. The interviews 
conducted here suggest that the NFF was encouraged in its hands-off greenhouse response 
by what it saw in other policy networks. Across a wide range of policy fields the NFF has 
seen positive support from the federal government for the interests of agriculture. In its 
efforts to promote trade liberalisation, its general support for agricultural industries under 
stress, through drought and flood assistance, and in defence of farmers on land clearing and 
water charging, the trend of government policy has been consistently in sync with the broad 
goals of the NFF. At the same time, the NFF knows that the government is well aware that 
the agricultural sector has its back against the wall in many other policy fields (for 
example, water and trade liberalisation) as do the communities in which they operate (for 
example, indifferent telecommunications and loss of services). In a sense, continued rural 
hardship and close political patronage are seen to immunise agriculture from greenhouse 
policy attention. Both of these factors reinforce NFF confidence that it faces no immediate 
policy pressures on greenhouse policy. At the same time, the heavy demands on NFF 
362 
'NFF can pick up the phone and get through to anyone they want, the NFF president can get an 
appointment with the PM pretty quick, no problem. In short, the government and the NFF walk and talk 
the same way on most things and this does assist them.' [50;24] 
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resources from its involvement in these other networks has made it even more difficult to 
devote time and attention to the greenhouse network. 363 
Level of bipartisanship 
1he strong degree of bipartisanship on most political matters relating to the interests of 
agticultural industries (notwithstanding the efforts by both parties to create a perception of 
difference) has been another factor reinforcing NFF inaction on greenhouse. The 
organisation has been confident that neither party will target agticulture in its greenhouse 
policy--though to a lesser extent with the ALP, particularly on the issue of land clearing. 
However, perhaps one of the most fortuitous aspects for the NFF has been the bipartisan 
alarm at the rise of Hansonism (and to a lesser extent Katter and other independent 
members of parliament) in rural and regional Australia. In both major parties this has 
engendered a determination to stop further encroachment by extreme and/or independent 
elements in these constituencies. The prospect that greenhouse policy might create further 
angst against the major parties is viewed as reason enough to keep away from 
agticulture.364 The NFF realises this and they have taken advantage of this situation in 
making their assessments that they need not devote significant resource;; to the greenhouse 
debate and policy network. 
363 NFF also had some very big campaigns going on. Over the years I was there we had the native title 
debate which ran for 2Y, or 3 years ... we then got onto the GST, had a bit of a battle on the waterfront at 
the time as well, so that's where the resources were going. We were continuing a presence in 
environmental issues because we knew we had to be there but it's an organisation that runs on a very 
small amount of resourcing and tries to make a lot of noise with it so it will trade off, so it was funny 
because at times the government was sort of going, well why is NFF not responding or not doing 
anything on this? Well the reality was we didn't have the resources to do it. We were diverted in all sorts 
of other directions. I mean NFF generally runs on a staff of about 15 or 16 and we cover everything, so 
we trade off. [36;101] 
364 
... historically farmers have always had disproportionate political influence in Australia, particularly 
when there's a coalition government because the National Party has an influence that's out of all 
proportion to the numbers it represents. But probably whoever is in power now, since people are so 
spooked by the One Nation vote that any government is going to be very reluctant to do anything that 
looks unpopular in the bush. So, it may have been an accurate political judgment that they can quarantine 
whatever is going to happen. [9;86] And I think the stronger Hanson became the more adamant the NFF 
became that they adamantly opposed stopping land clearance without massive compensation. And there 
is a relationship in that--no question. There is no greenhouse constituency in rural Australia-so if rural 
Australians are going to bear the price of land clearing policy for greenhouse, then they are going to have 
to be paid big. And if they didn't get paid big more seats would get lost from the National Party to 
Hanson. [18;132] 
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Conclusions 
The NFF's response to climate change has been a source of confusion for many players in 
the greenhouse network. This highly conservative, well connected, and uniquely influential 
interest group has in the eyes of many played a role that on the surface at least appears to 
be slip-shod, sporadic, and symptomatic of not properly considering its interests. For some, 
this is in keeping with a perceived anti-green mentality and reflexive tendency to take the 
highly conservative side of the debate. To the environmental movement, to many within the 
bureaucratic and political sphere, and to some pro-Kyoto elements in the business 
community, the NFF has misjudged its interests and missed an opportunity to play a 
forward looking part in the greenhouse policy network. However, the role that the NFF has 
adopted has also caused more than a little angst and disappointment on the blocking side of 
the debate, which would have liked to see the NFF as a clear player in the AIGN's 
approach to putting the brakes on greenhouse policy. 
What this research reveals, and what most observers of the NFF position on greenhouse 
policy in the past decade or so do not take into account, is that they followed a very 
deliberate strategy to play a marginal part in the debate based on some important 
assumptions. First, they reckoned that for technical, practical and political reasons it was 
unlikely that agriculture would be the subject of major greenhouse policy attention. Second, 
they judged that in the unlikely event that this first assumption was wrong the NFF had the 
political clout to deal with it later. Third, they recognised significant scepticism about the 
science of climate change among their membership-a scepticism which was deeply 
ingrained in the conservative culture of the agricultural constituency. Finally, there was 
sufficient doubt about the policy context surrounding many of the potential greenhouse 
benefits promoted for farmers (like carbon credits for sinks) as to make the upside 
opportunities not worth pursuing with any vigour. 
Under the circumstances, the NFF leadership was convinced that an arms'-length watching 
brief was the right way to deal with the matter. They distanced themselves from the AIGN 
pack, kept their statements at the general level, contributed where their views were sought 
under government processes, and kept in close contact with their allies in government to 
head off problems, and kept abreast of the debate without getting visibly very involved. 
Ultimately the merit of the NFF's role in the greenhouse policy network comes down not 
just to their assumptions but also to the accuracy of their perception of the Australian 
200 
agricultural sector's interests in the greenhouse debate. If the assumptions made by them 
are ultimately vindicated, then the organisation's response to the issue is arguably one of 
the more strategically well considered and executed. However, if the NFF's assumptions 
about climate change and policies to combat it turn out to have been wrong, then those who 
have strongly argued that the organisation should have taken a prominent role on the 
greener side of the debate will be vindicated instead. 
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7 
Case 5-the Tourism Council of Australia 
Introduction 
The response of the Australian tourism industry to climate change is a neglected subject, 
particularly given the industry's already very significant and rapidly growing role in the 
economy as an employer and generator of export income. The greenhouse issue is highly 
relevant to the tourism industry in Australia for two reasons. First the industry relies 
heavily on natural assets (for example, national parks and particular ecosystems and 
species) and is therefore uniquely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.365 Secondly, 
some parts of the industry are relatively energy intensive (for example, hotels, aviation etc) 
and might be vulnerable if energy costs rise as a result of government policy efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change presents an even more complex 
challenge to tourism because the industry is so diverse. As a consequence, both the impacts 
of global warming and the potential costs associated with efforts to reduce emissions are 
very unevenly and unpredictably spread across the industry. 
The Tourism Council of Australia (TCA) is chosen here as a case study for tourism's 
response to greenhouse because it was, until its collapse in December 2000, the national 
peak tourism industry organisation. It claimed to represent more than 30,000 members and 
affiliated organisations nationwide. The TCA, and Australian tourism more generally, have 
effectively been non-players in the Australian greenhouse policy network despite the 
issue's apparent relevance to the sector. As a result, this case study focuses heavily on how 
and why the TCA chose over time to play such a marginal role in the network. Contrary to 
what their level of involvement might suggest, this research finds that senior personnel in 
the TCA clearly recognised that the interests of the Australian tourism industry were best 
served by a strong policy response to climate change aimed at reducing greenhouse 
365 The level of concern in the industry internationally is well reflected by the decision of the World 
Tourism Organization (WTO) to host the first l" International Conference on Climate Change and 
Tourism in Tunisia in April 2003. See also the WTO paper on the issue (Todd 2003). There has long 
been recognition within Government authorities in Australia of the implications of climate change for 
tourism. For an early example, see section 7.8 on Tourism and Recreation in ANZEC (1990:62). 
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emissions. However, aside from one media statement in 1999, this recognition was not 
backed up by any committed or consistent action. The TCA decided to 'sit this one out' 
against its own perceived interest. 
This research reveals that a wide range of factors Contributed to the TCA's non-
participation in the policy network. These factors are examined in detail below. Perhaps 
most telling among them was a crucial misjudgment by the TCA leadership that after the 
Kyoto conference, ratification by Australia and a greener policy response in line with 
tourism's interest in the issue would be faits accompli. As the evidence provided here 
demonstrates, this political misjudgment had its roots in the TCA's culture of over-reliance 
on government and naivety about the political process. 
Activity 
The general consensus about the TCA among those interviewed is that it has consistently 
been a non-player in Australia's greenhonse policy network. The interview data strongly 
reinforces this.366 Where the TCA was noticed, it was only nominally involved and never 
taken too serionsly by others.367 
There has long been a recognition by others of tourism's interests in the greenhouse policy 
debate, however, this recognition has been far from consistent within the tourism industry. 
It is interesting to note that from the very beginning of the emergence of the climate change 
issue, the potential damage to tourism was apparent. For example, the Greenhouse 87 
Confe.rence included three lectures highlighting potential damage to two major tourism 
icons: the Great Barrier Reef and the Australian Alps (Galloway 1987; Hopley and Kinsey 
1987; Baker 1987). 368 The ESD process pursued under the Hawke Government in the early 
1990s highlighted the potential concerns about climate change for Australian tourism and 
"
6 (Interviewees dismissed the TCA's involvement on greenhouse with comments like): seen nothing of 
them ... [2;68] ... no involvement. .. [25;40] ... next to nothing really ... [53;173] ... haven't been actively 
involved ... [7;7lj I have not see much evidence that the Tourism Council has been seriously involved in 
the debate ... [48;23] (Said one senior Environment portfolio bureaucrat) I never recall anyone from the 
tourism sector knocking on my door and saying you've gotta do something about this. [54;78] 
367 (The TCA was described as) sporadic on the margins ... [13;84] (and viewed by other players in the 
network as having) pottered around the periphery on this issue ... they tended to float in and float out 
again. [37;63] 
368 For other relevant Australian research during the mid to late l990s see also: (Slater 1995; Whetton et 
al 1996; \Vhetton 1998). 
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recommended specific industry responses.369 The coral bleaching, alpine and more general 
threat to tourism posed by climate change was publicly acknowledged by the Australian 
government during the 1990s. 370 
Many invitations by government to participate in processes highly relevant to national 
greenhouse policy development have been ignored or declined by the Tourism Council 
over the years. m This research suggests that both sides of the debate lobbied the tourism 
industzy in general and the TCA in particular to become more involved on their side of the 
debate.372 However, it would seem that these overtures were ignored by successive leaders 
oftheTCA. 
The lack of involvement left many policy network players with a confused impression of 
the TCA on greenhouse policy. For some, the lack of action was simply a failure to identify 
consensus internally on their interests in relation to climate change.373 For others, the 
inaction of the TCA reflected an organisational tendency to focus on the short term.374 
369 Recommendation 31: Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Groups Final Report -
Executive Summaries, {Commonwealth of Australia 1991a:236). 
370 For example, see relevant sections in Australia's Second Report under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change {Commonwealth of Australia 1997) acknowledging the danger posed by 
reduced snow cover to the tourism sector (87); concern about the threat of coral bleaching (90); and 
broader tourism industry-wide concern (94). 
371 For example: an invitation to participate in the National Greenhouse Advisory Panel (Environment 
Australia 1996:79) confirmed in (6:55], the Greenhouse Challenge, various Parliamentary Inquiries, and 
government consultation processes. 
311 We were sort of putting together the AIGN we actually talked to them (The TCA) suggesting that they 
had interests that were at stake, But when it eame to actually contributing to the membership fee they 
didn't come on board. {That's interesting. On what basis were you going to them on the basis that their 
key inputs like fuel might become more expensive down the track?} Well, at that stage that was our 
prime sort of ari,'Ulllent {So, they weren't biting from approaches from either side of the argument?} No. 
[53;35--43] (Said another prominent AIGN player) In fact they have been seen to be opportunistic with 
all this business on coral bleaching with Greenpeace for example I used to say you know, 'listen guys, 
transport in the tourism industry is a huge proportion of your costs. You know, and so fuel usage and the 
efficiency of fuel usage in these businesses is a big number so you guys really ought to be involved.' But 
they just wanted to stay away from it. (13;188] (From government) I think again there was simply a 
discussion that was an area that was lacking so an invitation was made but the fact they said no-we just 
moved on. [6:55] 
313 Essentially, they are schizophrenic about the issue. [37;63]. I mean, again, I think it is a case of mixed 
interests. I think they did see some value in Australia's clean green image, but they also were concerned 
about the eost of airfares and internal transport and things like that which meant that they couldn't really 
identify a clear interest one way or the other. [53; 47] 
374 (According to one prominent greenhouse scientists there was an organisational tendency to be 
preoccupied with immediate issues) I guess l would say that they were an industry that went through very 
rapid growth in the 1990s and so that may have been preoccupied with others short-term issues linked to 
the rapid gro"th that were going through. [I 1;86] (They were) simply not gripped with the relevance of 
the agenda, [ 51; 34] (According to a senior bureaucrat) 'Ihere was a lack of any strategic thinking ... a 
concentration on short term issues ... reactive ... especially to short term stimuli. [47;!08] 
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Senior political figures spanning 15 years of greenhouse policy development agreed-
particularly with the latter assessment.375 
1be TCA's involvement when it eventually came was largely restricted to a few nominal 
measures in the last few years prior to the TCA's co!lapse in 2000. They supported 
involvement in the Greenhouse Challenge, but via the Australian Hotels Association and 
via the airlines. 316 With a grant provided by the New South Wales Sustainable Energy 
Development Authority (SEDA), the TCA participated in awareness raising activities in the 
clubs sector.377 However, there was only one instance of the TCA making a clear effort to 
participate in the climate change policy debate. This occurred in July 1999 immediately 
follmving the release of a report by Greenpeace called 'Climate Change Coral Bleaching 
and the Future of the World's Coral Reefs.' The report found that: 
... even under moderate projections, current and future increases in sea temperature 
are expected to have severe effects on the world's reefs within 20-30 years ... The 
expected costs of these impacts will range well into the hundreds of billions of 
dollars per year ... The World Heritage listed Great Barrier Reef will be seriously 
affected over the next 2 or 3 decades, seriously reducing its attractiveness as a 
tourist destination, and as a habitat for fish and other conunercial species and as a 
protector of the Queensland Coastline from tropical cyclones. (Hoegh-Guldberg 
1999:23-4) 
In its release of the study, Greenpeace Australia (1999) predicted that: 'The vast majority 
of the Great Barrier Reef will be dead in around 30 years unless projected levels of climate 
change are stopped.' The Greenpeace report came soon after another alarming report by the 
US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) which predicted that the Great 
375 (In general, political leaders from both sides viewed the TCA in the same dismissive way. According 
to one senior ALP MP, the TCA were) ... non-players as fur as I was concerned. [21;61] (A senior 
Coalition .MP felt that the TCAjust) ... have not thought about iL [33;50] (On the few occasions they did 
get interested, their involvement was, acoording to one of the most senior government staft) ... piecemeal, 
always fairly shallow, no clear moral compass, short tenn, platitudes. [50;26] Climate change was 
probably 'too long tenn. I suppose the Tourism Council thinks 'are we better to pressore the government 
for an expanded advertising campaign or is it better trying to bully them into doing something on 
Kyoto?" [33; 66] 
316 That year we decided that we'd set up meetings between the Greenhouse Challenge office and the 
Australian Hotels Association and try and get the AHA to sign an agreement with the Greenhouse 
Challenge. So then at least we were doing some greenhouse work in the accommodation sector. {Why 
was it that you were thinking along the lines of the AHA doing that rather than the TCA?} Because 
Tourism Council Australia was the peak body, it had about 30 different associations that were members 
and so the AHA has direct day to day contact with the 3, 4 and 5 stllr hotels whereas we only could 
contact them via the AHA unless they were a gold member. So the gold members we had direct 
associations with and they included the AHA. So it was much better in terms of keeping our members 
happy if we went through them. [38;4 l-45) 
377 [38;137""61] 
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Barrier Reef could start crumbling within 50 years (Hogarth 1999). The TCA's response to 
the new Greenpeace report was swift: a press release issued the same day. According to the 
TCA's statement (1999) which quoted then CEO Phil Young: 
... the report's findings show the Great Barrier Reef could face severe bleaching as 
a result of global warming. The tourism industry takes this report very seriously 
and will be studying its contents closely and taking appropriate action. The Great 
Barrier Reef is one of the nation's leading tourist attractions with around two 
million visitors each year generating more than $1.5 billion-so the Reef is critical 
to the industry's future success. Tourism operators are acutely aware of the need to 
protect and sustain this wonderful natural asset ... 
However, despite the concerned rhetoric, there is almost no evidence that the Tourism 
Council took any action in response to this report. It was not for lack of opportunity. In the 
months following the TCA statement there was heightened coverage in the Australian 
media, and around the world of the threat of coral bleaching and other dangers posed for 
tourism (Benson 1999; Viner and Agnew 1999; WWF 1997). Indeed, less than 6 weeks 
after the TCA's press statement, the senate launched an inquiry into Australia's response to 
global warming. Yet, no submissions were made by the TCA even though that inquiry 
specifically sought input from the tourism industry on the 'projected affects of climate 
change on reef systems, alpine areas and wetland areas.' 378 Nor did the TCA make any 
submissions to other contemporary Government inquiries on greenhouse related matters as 
far as can be established.379 It would appear that no more press releases were issued on the 
matter by the TCA prior to its eventual collapse and various TCA insiders have confirmed 
in their interviews for this research that there was no real follow up action.380 This lack of 
follow-up by the TCA is seen by observers as typical of a general lack of focus in the 
organisation, a tactical short-term approach to issues rather than a strategic long term 
378 See list of Submissions and witnesses (Commonwealth of Australia 2000). 
379 No TCA submission is listed in the Parliamentary Treaties Committee Inquiry into the Kyoto Protocol 
conducted in 2000 and 200 I. 
380 I think we did have a responsibility (on greenhouse) and we had many other responsibilities and 
unfortunately that one dropped off. [1;116] ... there was no change, you know effectively. Well what 
happens is this is all about agenda setting and when you have the potential to agenda set in a PR context 
then you'll follow that line but that doesn't necessarily ... policy action doesn't necessarily follow from 
agenda setting ... {And you think the fact that it then went on for another year before collapsing with no 
action whatsoever after that is just a reflection that there was no real change of policy?} Yes, I think 
that's right. {OK, so there's nothing that I've missed here as far as TCA activity on greenhouse that I 
should be aware of?} No. [1;105-21] It wasn't at the top of the tree in terms of ... if we looked at the 
five top priorities for the industry like this year there was no one that was going to say, well you've got to 
come out with a 200 page document on Kyoto rather than fight the GST battles. [14;141] 
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approach. The press release by the TCA was a 'knee jerk' reaction which was forgotten 
once the newll cycle passed.381 
This rather harsh analysis was by and large accepted as fair by former TCA officials 
interviewed as part of this research. It is also reinforced by the documentary evidence 
available. For example, a 1998 letter presenting the TCA's response to the 
Commonwealth's Oceans Policy Issues Paper, discusses ecologically sustainable marine 
tourism but contains no reference to climate change, despite the clear policy linkages.382 
While this preceded the Greenpeace paper on coral bleaching of July 1999, there was by 
that time growing evidence to concern Australian tourism about the implications of climate 
change. 383 In 1999 the TCA's National Policy Manager wrote to the President of the World 
Travel and Tourism Council (WITC) on issues pertaining to the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) focus on sustainable tourism and 
the main issues for Australia. The seven page submission contained no reference to climate 
change impacts on the Australian tourism industry, nor any comment on the implications of 
greenhouse policy direction for the industry.384 While the TCA did have a formal 
Environment Committee, as late as May 2000, the objectives and work program of that 
committee contained no reference to climate change or its potential impact on Australia's 
tourism industry (TCA 2000:1). 
Analysis of group response 
In order to appreciate what drove the TCA's lack of activity and influence on the 
greenhouse debate, it is necessary to look at the behavioural pressures at various levels. 
Micro-level 
At least four micro-level forces shaping group behaviour dissuaded the Tourism Council 
from being active players in the greenhouse network. 
381 (fhe TCA) were not big on long term visions or scenario planning. [27:92] I think they behave very 
tactically, not strategically. [29; !05] 
"' Letter from Stephen Albin, TCA National Policy Manager to The Marine Science and Technology 
Plan Secretariat, Department ofindustry, Science and Tourism, 6 July 1998 
383 Including the University of East Anglia and NOAA studies cited above. 
384 Letter from Stephen Albin, TCA National Policy Manager, to Geoffrey H. Lipman, President of the 
W1TC, 12January 1999 
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Organisational culture 
The culture of the TCA was an important factor in preventing effective engagement. It was 
first and foremost a promotional organisation rather than an advocacy organisation. This is 
an attribute recognised by insiders385 and outsiders386 alike. Public relations and promotion 
were seen as the most important skills among staff and successive leaders, and this tended 
to dominate the activity of the organisation.387 It was the 'here and now' issues which 
mattered-today's crisis rather than longer term issues, matters which could be tackled, 
advanced or otherwise dealt with via a press statement or media comment. Under the 
circumstances, there was a tendency not to get too involved where issues looked highly 
complex or as though they could cost significant resources over a longer time. 
Second, the TCA had a very 'Sydney-centric' focus. While it had a Canberra headquarters 
for a time in addition to its Sydney office, there was always pressure to move the principal 
base to Sydney-a pressure which ultimately prevailed. Those working in Canberra felt 
that their advocacy and policy priorities were not well appreciated by the senior 
organisational figures based in Sydney-that their agenda came a distant last behind 
promotional and fund raising activity.388 This lack of focus on Canberra meant that the 
TCA was not a regular and effective part of the network of interest groups operating in the 
capital.389 Opportunities to be part of effective coalitions of organisations on key issues 
385 
... what you've got is, you've an industry that's hell bent .on a product without any policy substance 
behind that product, if you know what I mean ... They all see eco tourism resorts and eco tourism 
destinations whereas they didn't quite understand the bigger picture. [1;29,45] 
386 
••• you have to look at the fractured nature of the tourism industry, the fact that the Tourism Council of 
Australia always saw itself as a tourism promotion body rather than industry body, that a Jot of people 
did not understand the connections between energy and industry. [18; 144] {So presumably theTourism 
Council could have taken a much more proactive role?) If one of them had seen greenhouse as an issue 
rather than seeing the prime role of the Council as tourism promotion-yes. [18; 270-2] With tourism, 
well, they've probably got the culture that they've got to be out there marketing. [46;274] 
387 It was very politically motivated short term. Press coverage. {Rather than looking at the Jong term, the 
really important Jong term strategic issues ... ) But that's reflective of the industry. The tourism industry 
is a short-term focused industry. And trying to get them motivated on environmental management was 
just like bashing your head against a brick wall because none of them could see the long term. {So 
they're interested in the bed tax today or the reef tax or whatever?) Exactly. Because of the turnover of 
businesses and the rate of failure of businesses in tourism, like there's such slim margins. So the 
association is going to be reflective of the businesses within the industry. [16;265-80] 
388 When Bruce (Baird) was there the Sydney office was a very opportunistic type office, quite shallow 
and the office in Canberra, which was the policy office, was very sort of caring, it was policy focused so 
I would say we used to take the higher ground and had to battle with the Sydney office to try and get any 
depth and meaning into anything. So that was quite frustrating. People got sacked regularly in the Sydney 
office, but there was a low turnover, probably none at all in the Canberra office ... (The Sydney Office) 
had a totally different culture to the others which is just about generating news. [16;241, 261] 
389 
... the Tourism Council. .. they too have not been played into the Canberra system. [l 8;256] 
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were missed by the TCA as a result. With th.e final closure of the Canberra office, in part 
due to financial problems, and in part to the Sydney forces ultimately prevailing on the 
location issue, TCA became an even less effective force in Canberra. It was no longer in 
the loop for meetings with other interest groups, and it either fell off invitation lists for 
government run meetings or could not attend when it was invited. More important though, 
according to former staff, the TCA lost the informal networking of the Canberra scene 
which could be so valuable in building effective relationships 'illith government and the 
departmental officials-it no longer could rely on the regular 'bumping into people in the 
corridors of power' which it had had in the past.3w In short, promotion prevailed over 
policy advocacy in the TCA culture, and Sydney prevailed over Canberra. Both of these 
cultural factors are key to understanding the failure of the TCA to be an effective player in 
climate change policy. 
Another very important cultural a.~pect of the TCA was a tendency to have its own agenda 
and activity driven heavily by others. For example, many of the environment related 
activities to which TCA policy staff devoted their time were directly linked to grants or 
programs driven by government rather than from within. In large part, this situation was a 
consequence of limited resources. Without grant money from government it was impossible 
to support much policy activity .391 Most of these grants came from the federal Department 
oflndustry, but these were bolstered with others from the SEDA in New South Wales, and 
by grants from the Australian Tourism Commission (ATC). Partly as a consequence, the 
390 We argued to Broce that we needed to stay there on the ground in Canberra because I could just go 
dov.n the road to the Greenhouse Office or over the bridge to the (federal tourism) depanment. {Go and 
have cups of coffee.} Cups of coffee with them and we said it's vital that we stay down here and have a 
presence but it was a financial decision, they wanted to sell it and they wanted to consolidate everything 
in Sydney and I think it was just another bad decision that was made. I used to try and get down there 
about once every two weeks but it just wasn't the same. {No. So wbat were the ramifications of that? Do 
you think TCA lost it's ... } I think it left Canberra and Canberra doesn't like it when people leave it. 
~wen you1ve left us now, well blow you then, we won't invite you over for this meeting, we won't invite 
you to that.' I tried to keep on top of it as much as I could but just by virtue of location you'd just get left 
out. {So if other industry organisations were organising ad hoc meetings on particular issues that crune 
up you probably would not get an invite as regularly as you used to?) Exactly. So that was a very bad 
decision. But they made a lot of bad decisions which is why I left because I could just see it all 
crumbling. [16;337-89] 
391 We received about three or four grants from the Commonwealth government. {Mostly the Industry 
Department?} It was all through the Industry Department through their National Tourism Development 
Program that they ran and also later on that turned into the Regional Tourism Program. {And would you 
say that those grants guided your direction in terms of what !he priorities for foousing your time on 
were?} Yes ... [16;33-41] (Applying for grants was) the only way l could do anything. {Yes, because 
you couldn't rely on the membership to provide you the funds to do the work?} That's right. If I wanted 
to do this work I had to get grants so I had to have good relationships wilh government and I had to know 
what was going on around the traps and I had to know where all the different pots of money were in 
Canberra. {Which in a way partly restricts your flexibility on what work you focus on if you're restricted 
by what the grant is for?} A little. [16;325-33] 
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TCA environment agenda was driven by government. Even their internal workings were 
partially government driven given that their board included two government 
representatives.392 One consequence of this very close arrangement is that the TCA's 
environmental agenda was dominated by ecotourism. Another was a sense of complacency 
on their part to rely on government to do much of the work.393 A further consequence was 
that this relationship left them exposed when inevitably the priorities and resources within 
government for tourism policy changed. With the change of key staff and decline in 
departmental resources for tourism policy, particularly environment related tourism policy, 
the TCA lost its resources and lost its way on environmental issues.394 
The TCA readily acknowledge that this was a contributing factor in their lack of attention 
to greenhouse policy.395 This research, however, suggests that the over-reliance on 
government extended to a broader cultural tendency to 'leave things to others.' A number 
of greenhouse policy network players suggested that the TCA had a track record of 'free-
riding' in policy debates where their interests were being pursued by others.396 
392 Because the ATC (Australian Tourist Commission) were a sponsor of the scholarship and also sat on 
the TCA's Environment Committee ... {So government had representation on TCA ... ?} Yes there were 
two government reps. One from the department and one from the ATC. {All the way through, going right 
back?} Yes. [16;209--15] 
393 It's an interesting little case study. You know also it's intimately linked with tourism's sort of 
ascendancy within the bureaucracy as well. You set up the Commonwealth Department of Tourism and 
you've got the government advocating on your behalf and these massive government resources and you 
use them to advocate your case, you start to get a little bit lazy. Yes, there were great personalities within 
that department and great personalities within the division. You had someone like Cathy Parsons for 
instance who was the Assistant Secretary in the Department of Tourism looking after the environment. 
She was a sensation. So there was really no need for the industry really to do much work at all and they 
kind of rested on those laurels. The thing is that our removal from the debate coincided also with the 
Commonwealth government's realigrunent of priorities for tourism. [1;235] 
394 So there was a big heavy focus on environment and tourism from the government's perspective back 
then. Like they had a national ecotourism strategy, so the balance and the shift between the government 
spending time on it and the association spending time on it was very much 'okay if you've got IO people 
in the department doing it we don't really need to do anything especially because we've only got three 
people in the office.' {And you think the relationship was that good?} It was very strong. {You felt 
comfortable enongh to leave things to the department?} Oh yes ... {You weren't standing there saying 
well how do we know they're going to get it right if we don't do it ourself.} No because they ran 
everything past us. {So a really tight relationship?} A very tight relationship. And they had the best 
interest of the industry and the environment at heart and it was just quite disappointing I guess towards 
the end when it went from a Department of Tourism to an Office of National Tourism to a division 
within a department, and also the person who headed up that department towards the end, when it was 
the Sport and Tourism division had no interest in the environment at all. So it really dropped off and that 
was quite disappointing. {So how does that affect your work at TCA if that relationship's been so much a 
part of being effective?} It was bad because the good people in that division working on environment left 
as well because they had no patronage. [16;185-237] 
395 
••• you see one of the key issues is when you actually cede your powers of policy development to the 
government, you'll get a government response. [l; l 7,37] 
3% •• .it is certainly in keeping with their record. For instance when the battles were on to save the Great 
Barrier Reef to get it world heritage listed and protected-and the same for the rainforests in Queensland 
the green groups got no support from the tourism industry at all. The same with the Franklin River. And 
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Membership structure 
The membership of the TCA was also another significant impediment which compounded 
the lack of involvement by the organisation in the greenhouse debate. Membership 
constraints operated in a number of ways. 
First, the 'representative' nature of the TCA made it harder to achieve consensus. The TCA 
was founded upon the top of state based tourism associations which in turn had thousands 
of members of all shapes and sizes-varying from bed and breakfast operators to 
international hotel chains and airlines. So, in addition to the various state and territory 
Tourism Council branch organisations the TCA had some 30,000 individual members with 
hugely diverse circumstances. 
As a general rule, therefore, it was difficult to establish unity of interest among members 
around public policy challenges.397 This was also the case in relation to the climate change 
issue.398 In contrast to difficult public policy concerns, the one thing that always had 
unanimous member backing was more tourism. Therefore, promotion became the easiest 
and most popular activity for the national offices in Sydney and Canberra.399 Since the 
yet they are now all heavily promoted by the tourism industry. I think tl1ey are opportunistic and that they 
will ride on the coat-tails of other people doing the hard yards on those sorts of issues and benefit from 
them but not want to put their neck out. It is a very conservative industry. {Do you think that they are 
short-tennist in their approach?} Well, obviously. That is the corollary of that because there is no doubt 
in my mind that if their fundamental asset is de,troyed then their business goes. l could talk a long time 
about the tourism industry and its failure to show leadership, even in protecting its own self-interest. 
[12;39--43] 
~- -"'' 397 ( ••• here you've got 30,000 or so members, all very differe!lt iind very, very hard to create unity 
around issues and therefore it's less likely that greenhouse is going to take off as a consistent priority'?} 
Oh yes that's right, and it wasn't a threat In all of these organisations the only way you actually sell your 
advocacy wins is by the intensity of interest and the level of threat that it offers your membership. If 
you've got 30,000 members, clearly the intensity of threat is dispersed so you're not going to make the 
same impact. [l;l 79-81] 
398 lt may be that there are divisions within the tourism industry. For example you would expect reef 
tourism and ski tourism to be very concerned about climate change but people who run four-wheel drive 
adventures in Kakadu would be very concerned about likely responses. So it may be reflected by the fact 
that the industry can't speak with one voice. That there are winners and losers. [9; 122] Well, we talked 
about the Tourism Council and the fact that its membership is very diverse and that would mean that they 
wouldn't be able to agree on anything, even free beer at their annual meeting. [9;238] 
399 We were always starved of resources and you always have to deal with what's in the media today and 
there certainly was . . . certainly my role was very focused on making sure I raised the profile of the 
organisation and I did get a lot of press and so l think that was an achievement I was quite proud of, so 
there's no doubt we did have a sort of a day-to-day practical focus on the media side, the debate gets 
down to where you 're going to make your members money. You're going to make them money on 
product and so you focus in terms of the product side and that's the reason why we're not as strong on 
greenhouse as perhaps we should be •.• there was no intensity of interest in it. This was not a thing that 
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culture of the organisation was receptive to this-that is, most staff came from a public 
relations backgrnund400-there was an easy match and a pattern of behaviour developed 
which was hard to break. 
While in some cases like seeking exemption for tourism from GST, or opposing bed taxes, 
and reef taxes, member consensus was achievable, in most cases as a few interviewees put 
it, it ¥1as 'like trying to herd cats.'401 This problem was compounded by the necessity to 
work in ·with the agendas of 8 different state based organisations and their own executives 
and priorities.402 
members believed would impact on their business-like it was an agenda that was being pursued by 
governments but at the end of the day there was no way that it would actually impact on the profitability 
ofyourbusiness. [1;70, 181] 
400 {And did most people working in the TCA come from a tourism background?} A lot of tourism 
students, yes, done tourism degrees ... then there was marketing and PR, journalism type backgrounds. 
{But it's funny that you mentioned tourism, marketing, PR, journalism, you couldn't single out 
professional backgrounds that are more naturally short-term. Marketing is very much about getting the 
result quickly, same as journalism is getting the story tonight?} Yes that's right {So that's consistent 
with the culture?} Yes. [16;275-89] 
""' ... with the Aluminium Council it is a bottomless bucket of money for this-they are fabulously 
wealthy, they can spend all the money they need to, their members are tightly organised, and they all 
know each other, and this makes it very easy to make decisions---whereas in the Tourism Council it is a 
bit like trying to herd cats. You know, they are all over the place--they all have different interests and 
keep wandering off in different directions-trying to get to focus on an important issue is very hard. 
{And they are mostly small as well?} Yes-that is right-<1bsolutely hopeless---you are on a hiding to 
nothing if you try to get the Tourism Council to do anything-unless it is a particular campaign that 
immediately affects everyone like a bed tax or something. [31;353-48] {Some people have said to me 
that the TCA would have been like trying to herd cats when you've got such a diversity of membership 
base?} Oh, it was! {It would be impossible?} Oh, it was silly. [14;303-9] {People have said to me it's 
got to be like trying to herd cats.} Yes, you can only do what you can do ... I think an overall comment 
on that from a policy perspective, it was very difficult to develop policies that were really specific which 
you could do if you were in aluminium for example. So by the time we finished a policy paper it became 
very general and you'd think oh-what's the use. {You don't want to say anything that's going to piss 
off one section?} Exactly. So when there was an inquiry into the aviation services and stuff we had 
Sydney airport breathing down our necks and airlines breathing down our necks and we couldn't piss off 
anyone. So it puts you in a very difficult position from a policy perspective. If you've just got a small 
number of members who have virtually got the same interests, well it's much easier to lobby and 
probably get something for them. So you always have to contend with. ... {So (in the case of TCA where 
you don't have that advantage) you end up being very general ifat all?) There was always the do-nothing 
option. [16;299--313]. 
4
°' Now turning to the Tourism Council, the way that functioned was we were a membership 
organisation, we were the peak body. There were other bodies like the Hotels Association, the Events 
Association and so on and we were like the peak body so all of those bodies were members of us plus""' 
had our 01'n direct members, our own direct clients and we had offices in every state and we had 
therefore state issues and national issues. The national issues we tended to manage through Stephen 
Albin's department, through the policy department He was also responsible for helping and liaising with 
the states on related issues and so we responded to state governments in the states with our own 
organisation on their environmental issues and we responded on national issues to the federal 
government with our organisation ... (Other tourism interest groups) were looking at us with great 
jealousy and there was always this vying and I must admit I didn't like that very much. And the states 
too. I mean remember there was even competition because they saw Phil Young's salary. You know he 
was getting paid a chief executive's salary and they're on a fraction of that and they're saying to 
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The second way in which membership structure was a major disincentive to TCA 
involvement was the high degree of competition for coverage of the potential membership. 
Unlike most other case study organisations in this research, the TCA competed against 
various interest groups to represent the industry. While the TCA identified itself as the 
nation's peak tourism organisation, it was in direct competition with other national 
representative organisations including The Tourism Task Force (TTF), the Inbound 
Tourism Operators' Association, the Australian Hotels Association and others. These 
competing organisations had a distinct advantage which contributed to TCA' s downfall-
they were much more niche focused and therefore had less difficulty finding consensus and 
engaging in effective advocacy. 
In the TTF's case it tended to take the cream of the cro]}-·the larger players-and because 
they were narrower in their membership base they could more easily generate unity of 
purpose around issues and then advocate them effectively with government and in public. 
The pressure to hang on to members against these competitors was a constant problem for 
the TCA. It created a self.reinforcing cycle-obsessive preoccupation with membership, 
fund raising, promotion, short term tactics--in essence, survival. Under the circumstances, 
strategic long term challenges such as climate change were even harder for the organisation 
to focus on. 
The third way in which membership structure contributed was the low level of member 
interest in lobbying on environmental matters. Though there were some exceptions such as 
the reef tax, and charging for national park entry, environmental policy was traditionally 
not among the areas in which there was strong member·driven interest. This was especially 
the case where the issue did not present significant short term implications for member 
business bottom lines.403 Under the circumstances, the organisation's interaction with the 
Commonwealth was traditionally dominated by taxation, aviation, and promotion issues.404 
TCA veterans were quick to cite their successes over the years in other policy fields 
themselves, well you know, the balance isn't right you see, so we had all this sort of ... a lot of political 
swirling going on. [14;17,181] 
4-0
3 {So why is it that that wasn't reeognised in the mid 90s?} Because there was no intensity of interest in 
it. This was not a thing that members believed would impact on their business. Like it was an agenda that 
was being pursued by governments but at the end of the day there was no way that it would actually 
impact on the profitability of your business. [l ;67-9] 
404 Issues dominant on the TCA agenda were mainly: tax, frequent flyer programs, transport and aviation 
issues, and the Sydney Olympics. [43;37] 
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areas-where short term wins were achieved405 -and many observers shared the 
assessment that the TCA had scored some significant wins over the years.406 
The fourth way in which the membership structure drove the TCA's low level of 
engagement has to do with the uneven way in which the implications of climate change 
relate to the very diverse TCA member base. Impacts like those predicted for the Great 
Barrier Reef are very different from those anticipated in the Australian alps, and different 
again from those expected at Kakadu. In some areas, a warmer climate may even be seen as 
beneficial from a narrow tourism perspective. So, the impacts on the sector are far from 
uniform. Under the circumstances, it was an even more difficult issue than most around 
which to effectively generate TCA membership unity of purpose. 
In combination, the heterogeneous nature of the TCA's membership made the task of 
achieving consensus for lobbying on greenhouse issues extremely difficult. With 
continuing pressure to retain membership against stiff competition, short term achievable 
wins which resonate with member priorities were seen as essential. More esoteric, strategic 
priorities like lobbying on greenhouse policy matters were judged by the TCA to be a 
luxury the organisation could not afford.407 Because of its size and diversity, the task of 
405 On the policy side though we had these strategy committees and we did have an environment 
committee. We had lots of others too, you know business and infrastructure, tax. Tax was a huge priority 
at the time because ... we looked at things strategically in terms of their impact on the industry at the 
time so we had big issues like the Olympics, the GST, and that's where we focused a lot of our attention, 
particularly the GST and we achieved a huge amount, we got through things that other industry sectors 
couldn't get through with very little resources. So issues like the environment, while some of us felt 
strongly about it, in practical terms you just didn't have all the resources in the time I was there to debate 
... It was like aboriginal issues too, that whole sector which I tried to move along too, that indigenous 
tourism sector, I tried to make that more cohesive and there's a Jot in our history that you can look up 
that we tried to make a contribution there. [14;141] 
406 I mean the tourism Industry has again been one of those lobbies that has been quite successful over 
the years when they are in crisis they have been able to tum to government for money. You know, 'give 
us another promotion program.' You know, they get big licks of money. [13;188] They are a very 
powerful lobby if they set their mind to taking on a particular issue. [29;97] 
407 See previous quote [89-97] regarding the crowded TCA agenda and the impact this had on 
greenhouse as a priority. (fhe interviewee went on to say) So, a CEO has a tough job I must admit in 
terms of balancing the immediacy of particular interests versus pursuing a longer-term interest. 
[1;97,125] 
Yes, you could say our priorities were certainly on survival and the fact that we didn't survive suggests to 
me that we had the priorities in the right place, it's just that we weren't able to pull enough rabbits out of 
the hat to make it happen .. .I mean I've painted the picture. Our focus was to try and survive and at the 
same time to try and keep all the balls in the air satisfactorily, which meant that we didn't have the 
resource base to really get into these sorts of issues. They were ... in terms of our survival the most 
important thing to do for our members was to get membership and keep the revenue rolling, keep the 
shows going, keep all the contributions coming in, then making sure the GST impacted us favourably 
because that was a long term major impact from a business point of view. It's a sort of a third tier 
consideration ... {So it wasn't a sort of here and now reef tax type/bed tax type issue?} No, there weren't 
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mobilising members around any particular issue was inherently likely to be more difficult 
than it would be with a small group like the AAC. In the greenhouse case, it was doubly 
difficult and ultimately judged not worth the effort. 
Leadership 
Leadership has been another important organisational influence on behaviour in the case of 
the TCA, in that it constrained the potentially very significant role which they might have 
played in the greenhouse debate. This is true of both of the most noteworthy leaders of the 
Tourism Council in the mid to late 1990s--Bruce Baird408 and Phil Young.409 
Baird is considered by most internal and external observers to have not been very interested 
in environmental policy issues during his time as Executive Director of the TCA.410 He 
was, according to some working closely with him, aware of the climate change issue, 
appreciative to a degree that tourism's interests lay with the green side but did not consider 
the issue a sufficiently high priority to warrant much attention by the TCA.411 The Sydney-
centricity of the TCA was most concentrated under Baird's leadership. This too is 
considered a factor in the their failure to play a significant role greenhouse policy role. 
Young presided over an increasing focus within the TCA on environment policy issues. 
Indeed, according to a few who knew him well, Young had a close personal interest in 
environment policy, was quite passionate about it.412 However, it would appear that the 
people putting up their hand saying, hey pay attention guys, so it's the old squeaky wheel you know. [14; 
129-33, 161,225] 
""'Between his political careers in the NSW and fuderal parliaments respectively. 
409 Formerly an executive with P&O (Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company). 
410 (Said one former senior TCA official) Bruce had a predisposition against protecting the environment. 
{So fairly sceptical about environmental issues?} Yes. [1;137-41] Baird also came from a petroleum 
industry background with Shell. [1;165] 
•ll Unless you've got a protagonist and a supporter for the cause then you're not going to go anywhere 
\\1th it and effectively I don't believe that there was that sort of support out there for our involvement and 
it seemed to lack the support from the directors and the CEO. {So what you're saying seems to suggest 
1hat without a patron who was strongly in favour of getting on board this issue, which l presume was the 
CEO which at the time was Phil Young, right?} Bruce Baird ... Yes, it was Bruce. {Without that it was 
never going to really fly?} Without that it won't happen and there wasn't that sort of coalition of support. 
The industry also had a whole hunch of other issues that it W'<IS confronting at the same time. [!;73--89] 
We had a vested interest in maintaining it (the environment) and Young personally comes from an 
adventuring background. He's a qualified diver, he's dived all over the world, his younger son wa.' s-0rt 
of canyoning and working in that area, so he's a bit greener than the normal chief executive and he did 
feel quite strongly about some of these issues. l!4;l7] 
412 Phil had a predisposition towards the environment . ., [!;141] 
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main environmental concern at the TCA under Young was eco-tourism---or using 
environmental credentials to better package a tourism product-not with advocacy on 
specific threats like climate change. 
One of the ironies, which is little appreciated by players in the greenhouse network, is that 
contrary to popular belief, Young also well appreciated the relevance of greenhouse to 
tourism. There is no doubt that he saw the TCA's clear interest in the issue and totally 
supported the government's position coming out of the Kyoto conference on climate 
change in 1997. 413 However, his pro-environment disposition as leader of the TCA did not 
translate into effective leadership on climate change policy.414 Nor was his decision to keep 
the TCA out of the greenhouse debate a case of 'masterly inactivity' as might be surmised. 
In fact, he appears to have made a critical error in taking Kyoto Protocol ratification by 
Australia for granted. It is an error which is readily acknowledged today by TCA 
insiders.415 
While this miscalculation is not well appreciated across the wider policy network, it does 
validate a widely held belief among other players that leadership was probably a crucial 
reason for the TCA's non-response to climate change.416 It confirms that there was 
413 In terms of the Kyoto issue we supported the Kyoto agreement, Young and TCA felt it made sense for 
Australia to participate. [14;21] 
414 You've got to have a champion for a cause. If there is something that is so long term, unless you can 
prove in a quantitative sense what the impact to the industry will be you need a champion and an 
advocate to ensure that they can push the agenda and really translate that into policy. Now that wasn't 
there .... Phil had a predisposition towards the environment but actually didn't know what his 
predisposition was, if you know what I mean. So it had gone from the sublime to the ridiculous but that 
was basically, that was how you could characterise it. [1;129,141] 
415 In terms of the Kyoto issue we supported the Kyoto agreement, we felt it made sense for Australia to 
participate ... We actually thought the government was on side to support Kyoto at that stage. {Having 
put so much work into it to get that 108 per cent total?} Yes, and it was somewhat disappointing to see 
that the government did oppose it and I'm still not sure why it has ... [14;21,57-61] It wasn't a 
controversial issue that we needed to necessarily get up and bang the table on because everyone assumed 
the government would go along with Kyoto at that stage ... I mean Kyoto happens and then I think we 
were under the impression when I was there that the government, there might be a little bit of debate but 
we should fundamentally support the Kyoto agreement and we thought that would be where they ended 
up. Well they didn't end up there ... {So it came as a pretty big surprise to you that the government 
backed off Kyoto?} Not close to the decision because I heard their line before that, but certainly if we'd 
have gone back in time now to '99 or in 2000 and ... if Stephen (Albin) had said, 'the government's not 
going to fuckin' ratify this, we'd better do something about it,' we would have been a lot more focused I 
think on it. {So (hindsight) it's 20120 isn't it?} I think we were thinking at the time there was a risk that 
that might happen but it was very faint, it was very slim. [14;129-133, 271-77] 
416 
... the impression I get is that they really have been plagued by organisational and institutional 
problems for years you know-they go broke-they are very influential for a while, and there is such 
competition within the tourism industry to represent them that they are always fighting each other to 
represent tourism operators. And, you know, they get these big personalities along-they seem to love 
people who love grandstanding heading them up. {Chris Brown and Bruce Baird?} Yes-exactly. Big, 
tough blokes--you know. But, that doesn't work terribly well over time and tourism which has a hell of a 
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certainly scope for a TCA leader to take a very strong role in the greenhouse debate had 
they judged it a sufficient priority.417 There was an expectation on both sides of the 
greenhouse that the TCA would take a more prominent leadership role. 418 However, this 
was an opportonity squandered by successive leaders at the TCA. 'W'hile there were 
significant constraints on the their leadership (particularly in relation to financial and staff 
resources, and a diverse membership for which TCA had to compete heavily) they clearly 
missed an opportunity"9, and as has already been discussed, this \Vas not without 
consequence for the network. This research suggests that the TCA's inactivity on 
greenhouse had the effect of assisting the AIGN side of the debate. Given that tills is an 
outcome directly at odds with the TCA's interest as judged by their own leadership, and 
was primarily based on a flawed calculation about the likely actions of government in 
respect of climate change policy, there is little doubt that leadership is a very important 
factor in understanding the TCA case study. 
Resources 
Resources have been a another important part of the story of why the TCA missed its 
opportunity to play a vital role in the greenhouse debate in Australia. As we have seen 
above, financial pressure was a preoccupation of their leadership, particularly in the late 
lot to lose from climate change really hasn't been very effective at all. And I think it is for organisational 
reasons. I think there is a real white shoe brigade, let's grab it while it's there mentality in the tourism 
industry. {You mean an even more short-tennis! approach than in other sectors?} That is certainly the 
impression I get. [3 I ;268-76] 
417 {ls it conceivable, thinking back to Baird and Young and Larkin, is it conceivable that any of those 
guys could have taken a very different approach to greenhouse, made it a priority, become a bit of a 
champion for it and made it a bigger issue?} They definitely could have. They definitely could have done 
that on a lot of issues. They could have really embraced the policy agenda a lot more and gotten into the 
intellectual side of it and the depth of it and really just been better champions all around on a lot of 
issues. {And you think that it's possible that someone could have become a greenhouse champion as a 
leader of the TCA and they wouldn't have had people saying 'bullshit this isn't a priority'?} No, 
someone could have done it. [16;355-61] 
418 Where there would have been a golden opportunity I think for a major demonstration of leadership 
would have been in 1he tourism industry-if you had someone there who really got it and could make the 
linkages between greenhouse and coral bleaching, between greenhouse and 1he rainforests, those sorts of 
problems-then, I would make the point much more widely than greenhouse that if there was someone in 
the tourism industry who was promoting the idea of the environment as 1he natural capital of 1he industry 
1hat had to be protected at all costs, then you would get a very different reception from them. [12;223] 
419 You need comprehensive studies, you need an internal advocate, you also need the research and the 
facts to support your argument and then you need to set up mechanisms to pursue that and none of that 
was there ... [1;133] 
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1990s as the budgetary position worsened· and the competition for members against other 
organisations intensified.420 
Hence, most of their resources and effort went into fundraising and membership retention 
in the face of strong competition from other organisations like the AHA and TTF.421 The 
resources pressure and membership competition only heightened the dominant cultural 
focus on promotion and media activity over policy substance.422 
One of the consequences of this financial pressure was that most policy work in which the 
TCA was engaged was funded from other sources-particularly grants from the 
Commonwealth government. This, as has already been mentioned in terms of the TCA's 
cultural disposition to rely on others, meant that policy work was strongly driven, or at the 
very least constrained, by the priorities of government agencies providing money. The 
TCA's resource constraints left it even less room to decide its own agenda. 
As has already been noted, the very close TCA-departmental relationship was reflected in 
scholarship arrangements which saw key staff move into the department and back to the 
TCA, and it also saw government representation on TCA's own internal committees. Under 
the circumstances, it could be reasonably asserted that it was extremely unlikely that TCA 
420 You don't have the benefits of being able to be farsighted. You have a specific agenda that delivers 
benefits to your constituency and had we not been in an absolutely, unbelievably competitive situation 
then we could have had the benefits of being able to look at greenhouse, but when you're fighting for 
your survival things that are 25 or 30 years down the track are the last things you consider ... {Yes, and 
particularly when your financial resources are as stretched ... } As stretched as they were, yes. {OK. 
That's about all I think I've got for you. Any other comments about what happened in this year because 
I'm not quite across the story of how it all came down.} Oh look, at the end of the day ... the whole thing 
was set up in 1996 or middle of 97 when they made massive losses from activities that they shouldn't 
have been getting involved in in terms of shows. Those losses actually created this situation whereby for 
the next three or so years we were treading water which made it particularly difficult. {Treading water 
trying to survive?} Trying to survive, yes, and ultimately they never did. [1;193-205] 
421 {You didn't have a monopoly on potential membership whereas at the same time you had a Tourism 
Task Force out there bidding for the same business?} We had competitors. {You had competition for the 
same potential members.} Correct. {And the Hotels Association seemed to play a much more ... } And 
they were playing very nasty politics too. {The AHA?} Oh, all of them. {All of them, yes, so presumably 
that intensifies that need to ... } They were looking at us with great jealousy and there was always this 
vying and I must admit I didn't like that very much. [14; 163-81] 
422 (One former TCA senior official said) We were always starved of resources and you always have to 
deal with what's in the media today and there certainly was ... certainly our role was very focused on 
making sure I raised the profile of the organisation and we did get a lot of press and so I think that was an 
achievement we were quite proud of, so there's no doubt we did have a sort of a day-to-day practical 
focus on the media side. [14;137] 
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would dedicate significant resources to greenhouse policy work or advocacy without some 
sort of related program funding from a Commonwealth department. 423 
No grant money came to the TCA from the Greenhouse Office once it was formed, nor 
from its predecessors, and the TCA inaction on the issue seems to reinforce the assertion 
above. Another important development was the shift of the Tourism portfolio out of the 
Environment Department (then the department of Environment, Sport and Tourism) under 
the Howard government. This led, perhaps inevitably, to less emphasis on environmental 
priorities in Tourism portfolio grants. Tourism was then progressively dO\vngraded in its 
stature within the bureaucracy and program funding relevant to TCA dwindled further. 424 
With the shift into the Industry Department, according to TCA staff; a key leadership 
position in the Office of Tourism was taken by an official with a marked lack of enthusiasm 
for environment policy programs. This further discouraged TCA from applying resources 
to this type of policy work at a time when their financial doom was nigh. 
According to TCA staff, they did do some work with SEDA which had some program 
funding attached, and they were supportive of the Greenhouse Challenge but felt its design 
was not appropriate for most of their small to medium si:r,e business membership base. 
According to TCA insiders, dependency on government funding was something which was 
part of the standing operating procedure because internal funding was so tight.425 
There is no question that these resource pressures and lack of autonomy in allocating 
resources was a significant fuctor. Ex TCA staff are the first to admit that the organisation 
"" see previous quote [16;325-41] under footnote 391 regarding TCA dependency on government 
grants, and the influence it as on policy focus. 
424 See previous quote above in organisational culture section on the TCA's disappointment with the fall 
away in resources and priority on tourism within the bureaucracy. [16;185-237] 
425 See previous quote under discussion of organisational culture about TCA's tendency to get 'a little bit 
lazy.' [1;235] {Another comment that's been made to me is that the TCA had a very close relationship 
with the industry department, and the Office of Tourism within the industry department and that a lot of 
the resources that were used to fund environment related work within the TCA came from grant money 
obtained through the industty department and so in a sense the grants helped to dictate what the TCA 
staff were spending their time on in environment related work. Presumably, and l gather that the 
environment committee was quite heavily involved in decisions about yes, we'll apply for this grant and 
... } Oh well, OK, what's the other alternative? (Well, I guess the alternative in other organisations, say 
the Aluminiwn Council, they don'! have to apply to the government for grants to do anything, they've 
got the internal resources to say, this is the issue, we'll focus on that} Oh, I see. {Well, TCA in a way, if 
they're relying on that arrangement, then they're a little constrained in which environmental issues they 
focus on?} That's true. [14;215-25] 
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would have been significantly more active on greenhouse policy had the resources 
pressures been less telling.426 
Meso-level 
While the internal pressures discussed above played a dominant role in the TCA's lack of 
activity in the greenhouse debate, this research suggests that there were also important 
network level factors involved. At least six played a noteworthy role with all but one 
further discouraging the TCA from playing a more significant role in the policy network. 
Policy implications 
One reason for the TCA's inactivity on greenhouse appears to have been a lack of clarity 
about the policy implications of the issue. While the TCA leadership-particularly under 
Phil Young-appreciated that climate change was an issue of relevance to tourism, this 
research suggests that there was a distinct uncertainty about the policy implications. 
The TCA certainly did understand on which side of the debate its bests interests lay. There 
is ample evidence in the interviews conducted in this research to confirm that the they 
appreciated that a progressive pro-Kyoto Protocol ratification, and strong greenhouse 
emission reduction policy direction by government, was in its members' best interests. 427 
However, beneath this superficial perception about their commercial interest, the policy 
implications of climate change were neither clear to TCA leadership nor to most of the 
organisation's members. 428 
Within the TCA, there was certainly concern about the potential damage which climate 
change could cause for major tourism assets like the Barrier Reef, Kakadu and the 
snowfields. This is reflected in their response to the Greenpeace report on coral bleaching. 
However, the severity and urgency of the policy implications of climate change for tourism 
426 {If you had five time the resources would you guys have done a lot more on greenhouse.} Of course, 
but that's just a no brainer. Yes. (16;339-341] 
427 
••• our basic line was: implement Kyoto. [14;213] 
428 Like I didn't pick up the impact or I didn't pick up some of the figures with regard to the impact of 
greenhouse until maybe a year ago and then I realised the importance of it ... (until then), it simply 
wasn't available. You need comprehensive studies, you need an internal advocate, you also need the 
research and the facts to support your argument and then you need to set up mechanisms to pursue that 
and none of that was there ... [1;129-33] 
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were not clear cut. W11ile the consequences being discussed were certainly a cause of 
concern, they were also very long term. Lack both of immediacy and of certainty about the 
impacts, meant that the TCA would have faced a significant task in persuading its 
membership base of the need to devote scarce resources to the issue.429 
This was a significant hurdle to TCA involvement according to former staff at the 
organisation.430 Many observers of the TCA in the policy network were also correct in 
assessing that this was a significant factor their lack of engagement.431 
Policy limitations 
Another important meso-!evel behavioural pressure in this case is the limited scope for 
greenhouse policy measures to reduce the daniage likely to be associated with climate 
change for tourism. For that reason, the TCA arguably faced a somewhat unique situation. 
Wnile there is little question that the industry has plenty to lose in the longer term from the 
impacts of climate change, paradoxically it arguably has little to gain in the short, medium 
or perhaps even long term from government efforts to deal with climate change. 
429 {Can you conceive of a different scenario where someone else could have been leading the TCA in 
tl1e 90s when these opportunities came up, process opportunities came up to get tourism involved in 
greenhouse and that the TCA may have taken a different tack?} That's an intere>ting question. At the end 
of the day we basically articulate the wishes of our members and it depends. If you would have had 
someone that was more interested in greenhouse as opposed to profitability issues yes, sure, but they 
wouldn't have been in the job for too long because they weren't acrually making member businesses tick, 
so while certainly you could have had someone different it's all about balancing diverse interests that are 
confronting the industry and there were a massive number of diverse ones confronting the industry over 
that time. [1;147-9] ... we had to attract members and greenhouse wasn't a way of doing it. [1;189] {So 
why is it that that wasn'trecognised in the mid 90s?} Because there was no intensity of interest in it. This 
was not a thing that members believed would impact on their business. Like it was an agenda !hat was 
being pursued by governments but at the end of the day there \Vas no way that it would acrually impact 
on the profitability of your business. [1;67-9] 
430 
... there were a whole range of other issues? {Reef taxes?} ... reef taxes, that were immediate and 
greenhouse was something that was 25, 30, 100 years down the track and it didn't seem as immediate. 
So, a CEO has a tough job I must admit in terms of balancing the immediacy of particular interests 
versus pursuing a longer-term interest. In all of these organisations the only way you actually sell your 
advocacy wins is by the intensity of interest and the level of threat that it offers your membership. If 
you've got 30,000 members, clearly the intensity of !hreat is dispersed so you're not going to make the 
same impact. .. lfthere is something that is so long tenn, unless you can prove in a quantitative sense 
what the impact to the industry will be you need a champion and an advocate to ensure that they can push 
the agenda and really translate that into policy. Now that wasn't there. {And with greenhouse it's very 
hard to get those concrete figures on what !he impact will be no matter which sector you are really?} Yes 
it certai11ly is and at the end of the day the figures really didn't come out until quite later in the piece. 
fl ;93-7,129-33, 181] 
431 I !hink that they did simply not see that this was going to be among the issues confronting the tourism 
industry. [51;34] I don't think they saw it as being anything immediate. You see, this debate has been 
long tenn-it hasn't been something which is going to happen to anybody immediately, and the TCA is 
more worried about getting people into beds, and on aircraft seats on the day. [48;31] 
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That is, it is readily acknowledged that ecosystem damage associated with greenhouse 
pollution already in the atmosphere will occur irrespective of whether ambitious new 
attempts to reduce emissions are successful. In the case of tourism, the die is already cast. 
For the Barrier Reef and the Australian Alps, the damage likely to be caused by climate 
change over the next 30-50 years cannot be prevented. It cannot be reversed by reducing 
emissions, even on the most generous climate science assumptions. Under these 
circumstances, there is a certain 'why bother' factor inherent in the TCA's non-response to 
climate change. 432 
Two somewhat Machiavellian 'policy limitation' explanations for TCA inaction are also 
put forward in the interviews for this case study. The first suggests that under 
circumstances where the TCA knew that the 'die has already been cast for tourism' there 
may have been an appreciation that aggressive greenhouse policy measures by government 
might not assist tourism but could involve significant costs. For example, a carbon tax or 
renewable energy mandates might lead to increased energy costs which could adversely 
impact on tourism operators. While this explanation is offered by some AIGN players, 
interviews with ex-TCA players did not provide any support for this theory. 
The second Machiavellian 'policy limitation' explanation suggests that, given that the TCA 
knew that 'the die was cast for tourism,' there was little to gain in highlighting it, and 
plenty to lose by panicking tourists. That is, by talking up the potential damage of climate 
change to tourism's natural icons, organisations like the TCA might inadvertently be 
talking down their own industry. This could create a perception among potential visitors 
that the very attractions that Australian tourism wants to promote might already be 
compromised. This explanation, which was suggested by TCA outsiders, was actually 
confirmed by insiders as a legitimate consideration.433 It appears that there was definite 
432 The way I would look at it from the tourist industry, if you like the dice had already been rolled with 
regard to whether it be coral bleaching or whether it be recedence (sic) of snowfields. The trajectory of 
the carbon dioxide increase is there and it's going to continue on for the next 50 years. So, come what 
may, no matter whether Australia does anything or countries do anything, the 'dice are already rolled.' 
So in that sense, my guess is that the tourist industry has basically ducked its head down and said 'look, 
let's look at the here and now and make sure we can bring people to the coral reef.' In fact if we actually 
talk about bleached coral reefs at this stage then maybe people won't come. If we talk about problems 
that are going to be occurring in the snowfields then people maybe won't come. So in a sense to me 
there's a logic which says for the tourism industry what you do is you bury your head in the sand. [52;51] 
433 See previous quote [52;51] under footnote 432 on why it was arguably logical for the TCA to 'bury its 
head in the sand.' 
{Some people say to me that one of the reasons why the tourism industry might not have been very vocal 
on the coral bleaching issue is that why would you want to draw attention to the reef itself declining?} 
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reluctance within the TCA to take a prominent leadership role on greenhouse policy for this 
very reason. 
The final policy limitation aspect of the TCA story relates to the difficulty of the task of 
assessing the implication of greenhouse pollution reduction measures on the tourism sector. 
Some, particularly AJGN figures, suggested that the TCA was simply not capable of 
properly assessing the potential costs of carbon taxes and the like for its stakeholders. 
Wbereas it is significantly easier to quantify the impacts of energy cost imposts for large 
consumers like electricity generators, aluminium smelters, paper mills and the like, this is 
not the case with tourism where energy use is far more dispersed.434 It appears that some 
credence is given to this suggestion, at least in explaining why the TCA did not seriously 
consider taking the AIGN side of the debate. However, notv.ithstanding, the balance of 
probabilities suggests that the TCA leadership would still have taken the green side. 
Coalition activity 
1be level and type of coalition activity among interests in the greenhouse policy network 
was another meso-level factor which contributed to the lack ofTCA engagement. 
First, there was relatively little effort on the part of environmental interest groups to engage 
tourism on greenhouse issues. Interviews with various significant players on the green side 
suggest that there was cynicism about the responsiveness of tourism to green issues, and 
lobbying them to be part of a progressive greenhouse coalition was not worth hothering.435 
That's right. {Because people think well it's not as good as it used to be anyway so I won't go.} That's 
right. I think it was the fear of the unknown. If you go out and speak on environment issues you're just 
leaving yourself too wide open for negative publicity so Jet's just say nothing about it. [16;363-9] 
434 They are a significant part of the economy but they have practise<l being peripheral players in this area 
for as long as I can remember. The other thing about it is I think essentially they're schizophrenic about 
the issue. On the one hand the selling points for them, for tourism, all relate to a dean, green Australia. 
On the other hand by the time you factored in the trains and planes a11d buses and cars and all the rest of 
it and simply the amou11t of use of energy that a tourist consumes, people in hotels are high energy users 
almost by definition, and what's more even when they're not there, as in hotels running with lower than 
desirable residency, they're still burning all sorts of energy just to keep the hotels going .. .l just think the 
Tourism Council and the whole tourism industry has never been able quite to get its head around where it 
ought to be in this debate. [13;63] 
435 See previous quote [12:39-43! under footnote 396 regarding the green movement's Jack of support 
from the tourism industry over tnany years and across many issues. 
I mean l've always found the tourism industry very, very difficult to work with, partially because they're 
not as centrali'led in their lobbying and their ability to have political clout, but secondly I think they've 
always avoided ... I mean when I worked on Kakadu issues back in the 1980s we really wanted the 
tourism industry to back efforts to stop various impacts on Kakadu and they were never very good on any 
of the issues, even though we kept saying, you're the beneficiaries of this, you're the ones that are going 
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TCA officials confinn that there was little evidence of significant lobbying by the green 
movement to play a role on the greener side of the debate.436 
The second, and perhaps more powerful coalition influence on the TCA occurred on the 
other side of the network. As has been noted, a very strong coalition of industry groups 
opposed to strong greenhouse emission reduction policies by Australia emerged early in the 
1990s. The AlGN was a collection of well established, well resourced interest groups either 
representing carbon intensive energy production or heavily dependent upon cheap access to 
those resources. 
The TCA had previously cooperated with members of the AlGN in relation to other policy 
issues-tax reform, Oceans Policy, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Bill to name a few.437 The TCA had been a member of a group loosely called 
the 'Executive Directors' which met occasionally under the leadership of the ESAA's Keith 
Orchison and the then MCA's Dick Wells (both leading figures in the AlGN). TCA was 
involved in coalition activity in Canberra, but this involvement was generally marginal, and 
its role was viewed with some scorn by central players.438 In addition, TCA insiders felt 
they gained little from their previous engagements as part oflobbying coalitions.439 
to benefit from the tours in the future. I think they just didn't want to be seen as being political on these 
issues and it may well be the same on this, that it reeks of being political and somehow they've had the 
advice at some point that you mustn't be political, even though there are other industry associations who 
have no fear of being political in that sense. [35;95] They just do not see that (greenhouse) as a priority 
amongst the batch of issues which they are dealing with. But nor has the tourism industry shown any 
interest whatsoever in any environmental issue over the past decade. [15;124] 
436 Maybe this whole thing didn't rest in TCA's hands. When we look back at it and you try to be wise in 
hindsight maybe it was the role of an environmental group to take up to tourism rather than a tourism 
group to take up a greenhouse environmental stand. [1;157] I had very good relationships with the 
Australian Conservation Foundation. {And they were never saying to you come on you're going to lose 
your Reef, you're going to lose your ski fields and Kakadu?} No, they were actually quite lazy on 
tourism. They had a real focus on it I think around '95 and '96 then they laid off the industry when I just 
started to tell them about all the things that we were doing and then they just laid off us. [16;133-7] 
437 For example: the EPBC was being reviewed and there was a Committee set up at the Minerals 
Council of Australia that had all the Seafood Association or whoever they were, the Fisheries people, the 
aluminium people and the petroleum people and we all used to meet at that office and we had a working 
party that looked at reviewing that Act so we used to go along to those meetings ... this was an informal 
committee the one I'm talking about, there was no money mentioned. [16;89,113] 
438 See previous quote [18;256] under footnote 389 confirming that the TCA were never 'played into the 
Canberra system. 
They (TCA) were never really engaged in the broad industry consensus on these things. [13;184] 
439 When the tourism industry was aligned with the Business Coalition for Tax Reform which also was 
another peak body representing the interests of industry with regards to the implementation of the GST 
we found that we were dudded enormously there so for us to actually align our interests and come in 
under another group, mate, you've got to be very suspicious. {How were you dudded with tax reform?} 
Well tourism remains one of the only export industries that isn't recognised as such under the GST. 
[1;291-95] But when they wanted to get specific work done on the EPBC and wanted everyone to chuck 
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In the case of greenhouse policy the AIGN were very concerned to broaden their coverage 
so as not to be perceived by government as being too narrow. Tourism and agriculture were 
two of the groups which the AIGN reached out to in order to broaden their coverage. In the 
case of tourism (as with agriculture), the outreach failed to deliver dividends for the AIGN. 
Tourism had been involved, somewhat passively, in early AIGN precursor meetings440, but 
when it came time to officially join and pay the substantial membership fees, they baulked 
and chose to opt out.''" 
Many in the AIGN viewed this move with derision and pointed to what they saw as a 'free-
rider' mentality, and a failure to appreciate the implications for tourism in higher energy 
costs should the AIGN's blocking agenda not succeed. Others in the green movement also 
viewed very cynically the TCA decision not to officially join the AIGN. Some agreed that 
the TCA was simply free riding442, while others suggested that even if the TCA did not 
agree with the AIGN it would never break ranks with the industry consensus view. 443 
However, the interviews conducted with TCA officials suggest a different story. In fact, the 
TCA realised quite early that it could not justify AIGN membership because the interests of 
in money l wasn't allowed because we didn't have, I was told we didn't have any to go into it and 
basically their interests were different to ours so if we wanted any specific work done we'd commission 
it from a tourism industry perspective, not with the group [16;! 13] 
440 {Do you recall, others have said to me they remember the Tourism Council ... Bruce Baird used to go 
along to these executive directors' meetings?} He did. { ... but once the AIGN got going they maybe 
once or twice saw TCA underlings come along but never the senior people and they never stuck 
around?} I think as the AIGN turned more and more into an organisation as opposed to a loose gathering, 
first of all because it was 'put your money on the fridge' time, that scared a few people away. [37;89--95] 
BrW)e used to come to those bigger meetings I was just telling you about befote----when he was the bead 
of it-he used to come to the executive dire.ctors' meetings to talk about general issues. So, Bruce was 
around it and he knew what we were doing but they had other agendas. {But you did discuss it with 
him?} Oh, yes. It was around. But, I mean they never-like if we had a crisis or whatever, and you could 
never look to the Tourism Council to throw in five or 10 grand or to do some work-because it would 
never come. [13 ;200-4] 
441 See previous quote [53;35-43] under footnote 372 confirming the TCA 's unwillingness to join. 
441 I think they would have assessed that there were other people who were perhaps going to feel as much 
pain or more pain than tnem, that were pressing the case and so I don't think . , , {And so leave it to others 
to fight their fight?) Yes, I think so. [29;97-101] What I would say is that there are groups that can 
logically sit on the fence because there's others who logically must fight. So why put your head above 
the parapet when others have to have their heads above the parapet? [52;59] 
443 It is very hard--we have a complex issue, we have a very divisive and uneven debate in Australia. 
The debate here is still going over ground that we were going over l 0 years ago. Is it right? ls it not 
right? Whether or not the economy would be damaged? Now, in the context of that mishmash, it is very 
easy for an industry like tourism to say--ilow can we make a response, there are absolutely too many 
question marks still. We have a political situation with governments that simply do not want to do 
anything--they do not want to act on climate change-why should we get involved? I think that accounts 
for the Tourism industry's lack of action, [15; 128] 
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tourism were diametrically opposed to those of most members of the AIGN.444 In addition, 
the TCA recognised that it was unlikely to be able to moderate the policy direction of the 
hard-line, close-knit clique running the AIGN. The moderate TCA position on greenhouse 
was likely to be over-ruled.445 Furthenuore, as their staff have noted, the financial resources 
of the organisation were stretched and there was no funding available to spend on 
greenhouse policy coalitions.446 
In swn coalition activity led to even less involvement on greenhouse by the TCA. Despite 
its familiarity with the players on the AIGN side, there was a clear realisation in the TCA 
that the interests of tourism on greenhouse were different from the AIGN. There was little 
prospect of moderating the AIGN view. At the same time, lack of resources on the part of 
the TCA, and lack of green movement interest in building bridges with tourism industry 
organisations also fostered a reduction in TCA activity. 
Related government policy agenda 
The government's policies on climate change were a prime influence on the TCA's failure 
to participate in the greenhouse policy network. As has already been noted, the TCA 
recognised an interest for the tourism industry on the green side of the greenhouse debate. 
So their inaction was not based on a lack of understanding of their own interest. However, 
as we have seen, one of the most important factors in the TCA's decisions not to engage on 
greenhouse was a crucial political miscalculation. That is, they were very supportive of 
444 
••• fuey were on a different policy agenda to the one that we were on ... these guys were actually 
building up mechanisms and processes as a way to sort of, not necessarily enhance greenhouse policy but 
to stifle it and the natural alignment with the tourism industry was to actually be more interested and 
involved in greenhouse policy so there was a misalignment between our interests, and that's what 
happened with Bruce (Baird). Phil (Young) did the same thing so Phil came on board, Phil was invited to 
one of these (AIGN inspired meetings). l think it was convened by the ESAA, a guy called Keith 
Orchison, and Phil found exru:tly the same thing, that their policy agenda didn't necessarily align with 
where the tourism industry's agenda should be going with regards to this matter. Now I'm not saying that 
there's any conspiratorial action on behalf of those involved but it was just a situation of a total policy 
misalignment. [1:255-99] 
445 {So this wasn't a club you'd want to join because your natural policy inclination was on the other side 
as a sector. ls that what you're saying?} Correct. It was very clubby, very cliquey, the relationships were 
formed well before these two guys came on board and it was very hard for an individual to actually enter 
in and make a difference ... [1;255-99] ... we'll be disagreeing with them all the time so don't waste your 
time. {ls there a sense also that you don't want to pick a fight with big players in industry who ... you 
don't really need this fight because it's not core business so why go and pick a fight?} Yes, well we're 
not scared ofa fight but at tbe end of the day if you're one of them fighting against ten of them there's no 
real reason to get involved and I think that that's a fair explanation as to why we opted out ... [1;271-9] 
446 As evidenced in fue previous quote regarding TCA 's lack of funding for EPBC coalition activity. 
[16;111-13] 
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ratification and quietly took the green side of the issue: however they assumed (wrongly) 
that having worked so hard to win a + 108 per cent outcome for Australia at Kyoto, the 
federal government would ratify as a matter of course. Hence, they say, they opted not to 
dedicate too much time and effort to the issue, believing it was already decided in their 
favour. 
Government and/or departmental processes 
On balance, government processes acted to dissuade TCA from involvement in the 
greenhouse policy network. As mentioned previously, it was their standard operating 
procedure to assume that government had the interests of tourism at heart.447 This is 
probably reflected their miscalculation in relation to Kyoto Protocol ratification, but there 
is little doubt among TCA insiders that the pattern of reliance led to the organisation 
effectively ceding agenda setting and resource allocation powers to government patrons.448 
Under the circumstances, as has been discussed previously, this reliance on government left 
the organisation vulnerable to changes in government priorities and expenditure. It also 
meant that for the TCA to get actively involved in the greenhouse debate there probably not 
only needed to be government programs to encourage it to do so-the programs had to 
come with funding attached. The reality is that there were no federal programs with 
significant funding attached to enable such participation by the TCA. The various 
greenhouse policy processes implemented at departmental level over the years-sl!cb as the 
ESD process, the National Greenhouse Advisory Panel, the Greenhouse Challenge, 
Emissions Trading Discussion Paper development, the Renewable Energy Action Agenda, 
the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program, and the Greenhouse Business Dialogue to 
mention a few-did not provide an organisation like the TCA with any significant financial 
incentive to participate. Indeed, in most of these cases, the incentive structure was the other 
way round-with participants required to spend resources to participate in any meaningful 
way. 
447 
... they had the best interest of tbe industry and the environment at heart. [16;201] 
448 Tourism in a lot of respects is its own worst enemy. It actually ... I've worked in otber industries. 
Tourism persists in Balkanising itself, in trying to set itself up as discreet and different to tbe rest of 
industry. It also relies enormously on the government although maybe not as much as tbe Minerals 
Council and others, but we do rely on the government to make a lot of the policy decisions and that's 
something that this industry has decided to do but tbe problem with that is that you leave yourself 
vulnerable to the vagaries of bureaucratic decisions and that's exactly what's happened here. And had we 
been in the (federal) environment department from 1997 you might find a totally different story. [1;237] 
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Under the circumstances, and given the TCA's track record, there is strong evidence found 
here to suggest that the departmental processes of the federal government acted to dissuade 
the TCA from active involvement in the greenhouse policy network. Aside from the TCA's 
proxy involvement in the Greenhouse Challenge, via the AHA, hotels and airlines, there 
seems little evidence to suggest that the greenhouse policy initiatives of government had 
any positive involvement facilitating impact on the TCA.449 
International processes 
The interviews conducted here suggest that TCA assumptions on the international 
negotiating processes associated with the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were critical to 
TCA inaction on greenhouse. As has been noted previously, the TCA recognised that it was 
in the interests of tourism in the long term to support measures to minimise the damage 
associated with global warming. On that basis, they backed the government's stated support 
for the Protocol negotiated in Kyoto in 1997. However, they made the critical error of 
assuming that Australia's ratification of the Protocol was a fait accompli, as former TCA 
officials now readily admit. 450 
Greenhouse media coverage and public opinion 
Greenhouse media coverage was the only meso-level pressure which actually made the 
TCA more engaged on climate change. However, as we have seen above, this effect was 
fleeting. Concerns had been highlighted publicly about the potential impacts that climate 
change might have on the Australian skiing industry as the snowline in the Australian Alps 
moves higher. There were also well reported projections made about the impacts on 
Kakadu and other sensitive wetland areas close to the coast. While these concerns were all 
highly relevant to the tourism industry, only the coral bleaching threat involving the Great 
Barrier Reef jolted the TCA into action. 
The Greenpeace report in July 1999 prompted then managing director of the TCA, Phil 
Young, put out a strongly worded press release expressing great concern on behalf of the 
449 (Government wasn't making) any clear recommendations with regard to how we're going to enter the 
greenhouse debate ... So what it really did was it segmented us from the mainstream and Balkanised us 
and made us into this pigeonhole which couldn't be compared with anything, couldn't be brought into the 
mainstream debate and was more or less focused specifically on product. [I ;37] 
450[14;57-61] [14;129-133] 
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Tourism Industry about increasing evidence suggesting that global warming might be 
causing substantial coral bleaching of Australia's Great Barrier Reef.451 As has already 
been discussed, despite the promise of 'appropriate action,' there is no evidence that the 
TCA in fact took significant further steps after that announcement and discussions with 
former senior TCA insiders confirm this to be so. Indeed, there is strong evidence that the 
TCA saw its media response to the Greenpeace report as a way to avoid acting by merely 
appearing to be doing something. 452 
Greenhouse science 
\\'bile it is closely linked to the policy implication issue mentioned above the continued 
uncertainty in climate science about the precise impacts of climate change on tourism was 
another meso-level factor which reinforced the TCA inclination to sit on the sidelines of the 
greenhouse policy network. There is a growing body of evidence supporting serious 
concern for the tourism industry. (Viner and Agnew 1999; Graham 2003). The past decade 
has seen climate science progress to the point where almost no climate scientist or advocate 
directly or indirectly supported by high emitting industrial entities disputes that man-made 
greenhouse emissions are warming the climate. In parallel, there has been an increase in the 
degree of certainty about temperature increase leading to rises in sea level. 
However, while the clarity of climate change science is improving, there still remains a 
significant degree of uncertainty about the specific implications for tourism. There is not 
yet sufficient confidence in climate science to enable firm predictions about what will 
happen and when to particular tourism assets. Even where organisations such as 
Greenpeace (as in the case of the Barrier Reef) have made alarming predictions, the 
timescale and implications at particular locations are still somewhat vague. 
It might be argued that there has long been sufficient information for tourism to act based 
on the precautionary principle. However, as has already been noted, there is also sufficient 
information for tourism to arrive at the judgment that the 'dice has already been rolled' and 
any advocacy by the TCA to reduce greenhouse pollution would make no difference. 
Nevertheless, there does appear in this researeh to be some evidence to support the view 
451 
'Great Barrier Reef Must Be Protected,' TCA Media Release 617/99 
452 {So this was an opportunity to be seen to be doing something that ... } While not doing any!hing, yes. 
{And being seen to be doing something that had rocketed to !be top of the agenda thanks to the 
Greenpe<l(:e report?}Yes, that's right. So they brought it to the forefront of the agenda, !he way to tackle 
that head-on Wlls actually to make a PR statement that could actually delay action. [1; I 05-17] 
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that the TCA at least used scientific uncertainty as a reason to justify its lack of 
involvement in the policy network.453 The lack of immediacy surrounding the impacts of 
climate change was also a factor.454 
Selective incentives 
According to former staff of the TCA, there was a shift in emphasis in the closing years of 
the organisation away from advocacy and policy towards fundraising and marketing.455 
This was driven largely by financial pressures. These pressures, in tum, were partially 
linked to heavy representative competition from other interest groups-for example, TTF 
and AHA. As well, there was a physical shift in the organisation's headquarters from 
Canberra to Sydney. In these circumstances, the organisation applied itself strongly to 
providing selective incentives to members.456 However, in such a diverse sector, it was 
almost impossible to restrict the benefits of significant policy and funding wins to members 
of the TCA. There is perhaps some credence due to the notion in this case that an inability 
to deliver sufficient selective incentives to membership was a determinant factor in the 
demise of the organisation.457 It was also, in all likelihood a contributing factor in the 
TCA' s lack of capacity or intention to focus on climate change. 
453 See previous quote [1;129-33] under footnotes 428 and 430. 
454 Their biggest cost by far is labour. And the labour market regulation I would have thought was far 
more important to them than anything else. I mean if you were sitting on that body and you were looking 
at all this forecast of rising oceans and all this stuff and you had any knowledge about it at all you'd say 
forget it. {It's very long term?} Very long. I mean you'd say well I'll be long dead before any of this 
worries me. If you gave any credence to it at all. [49;152-8] 
455 TCA membership was pretty good but between 1995 and 2000 membership was in decline. There had 
been a distinct shift in style and focus away from policy and advocacy to fund-raising this was reflected 
in the 97-98 shift of the Canberra office all to Sydney ... Bruce Baird left the TCA in significant deficit. 
As a consequence Phil Young's focus was more on raising dollars than on looking after the members. 
The 'platinum members' were the ones that got most looked after. By 2000 the TCA had become less 
policy focused and instead was focused on events. Policy became much less of a core function under Phil 
Young. [43:17,22-9] 
456 TCA offered numerous selective benefits - for example, a tourism industry card which provided 
discounts. Between 1997 and 2000 the management of the card was outsourced. Members were asked to 
pay for it, the whole thing faded after that... TCA members got discounts to events conferences, trade 
shows and social events. Members also got a newsletter which became less frequent in 2000 and the 
quality of the publication also dropped at the same time. It also became less focused on policy issues. 
Members also got a weekly fax-stream, by the end it only went to gold and platinum members and the 
quality of it also declined. [43;32-4] 
457 Conversely, because they were more niche focused than the TCA, it is arguably an advantage of 
competitor groups like the AHA and the TTF. 
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Macro-level 
Broad government ideology and culture 
There has been a significant shift in the emphasis and approach to environment policy 
under the Howard government and this had implications for the TCA response to 
greenhouse. Environment programs have been aimed principally in three directions-the 
Natural Heritage Trust, The National Action Plan on Water and Salinity, and the programs 
of the Australian Greenhouse Office. Of relevance here has been a reduction io emphasis 
on eco-tourism, and on the environmental policy linkages with tourism more broadly. The 
TCA had been heavily lioked ioto tourism fundiog programs with an environmental 
emphasis under the Keating government. These eroded quickly under the Howard 
government. As a consequence, the TCA lost significant patronage in the bureaucracy and 
lacked the familiarity or access to fundiog programs in the AGO. The impression gained 
from the interviews with TCA officials is that the decline in government eco-tourism 
programs left the TCA lost and unfunded on environmental policy. Stagnation was the 
consequence. 
Related policy networks 
The TCA's activity in other policy networks was also an obstacle to greater involvement in 
the greenhouse network. First, the TCA was thinly spread across a wide range of policy 
areas, and policy analysis and advocacy as noted above were a secondary concern to 
promotion and short-tenn media coverage. Second, policy networks dealing with other 
issues were judged more likely to provide short tenn ·wins for the TCA.458 
Conclusions 
Perhaps the overwhelming finding from an examination of these different behavioural 
influences is that while there were at least a dozen factors effective in dissuading TCA 
from involvement, perhaps only one factor-media coverage--was effective in 
encouragiog any TCA involvement. Furthermore, this single facilitatiog factor only 
458 See previous quote on the imperative to focus on short term issues in previous quote [ 1 ;89-97] in 
footnote 430. 
Similarly, see previous quote [14;139-41] in footnote 405. 
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managed to elicit a one day, one media release response. The TCA's response to 
greenhouse is a classic case of clear organisational constraints on behaviour which have led 
an interest group to ignore what it recognised was in its members' own interest in a major 
public policy issue. The organisational culture, its membership base, its leadership, and its 
lack of resources, all contributed in a significant way to the organisation not properly 
pursuing its interests. As an issue, climate change also presented inherent obstacles for the 
TCA, not the least of which were the lingering lack of scientific specificity on impacts to 
tourism assets and the reality that much of the likely damage could not be reversed. The 
interviews conducted here also show that the TCA made an ultimately flawed assumption 
that Australia would ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and decided there was no need for them to 
engage in lobbying on the issue. This strongly suggests that they would have been more 
closely involved but for this miscalculation. However, the TCA's non-involvement cannot 
be pin-pointed to a single error of political judgment, or to the irreversibility or scientific 
uncertainty of climate change as it relates to the tourism sector. Rather than being causal, 
the error of judgment is more symptomatic of a wide range of factors which collectively 
conspired to dissuade the TCA from pursuing its interest. 
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8 
Case 6-the Insurance Council of Australia 
Introduction 
The Insurance Council of Australia (ICA) has been arguably the most significant absentee 
from the Australian greenhouse debate. It has also been the least receptive interest group 
and most difficult case study in this research.459 Nonetheless, it remains a very interesting 
and important case. While the ICA has played little public role in the greenhouse policy 
debate in Australia, insurance is becoming a more central player in the global greenhouse 
debate. There are tentative signs very recently that Australian insurance companies may 
move their industry peak body in that direction. 
The Australian insurance industry, like its international counterparts has seen the costs of 
insurance losses due to major storms increase dramatically over the last two decades. 
Increasing evidence suggests there may be a causal link between insurance losses from 
severe weather events and global warming. As the Association of British Insurers puts it: 
Insurance is in the front line of climate change. As the v.idespread floods of autumn 
2000 demonstrated so clearly, it is insurance companies that will have the 
responsibility of dealing with many of its consequences. And it is insurers who must 
be equipped to analyse the new risks that flow from climate change, and to help 
customers manage these risks. Climate change is no longer a marginal issue. We Jive 
with its effects every day, and we should prepare ourselves for its full impacts in the 
years ahead. (ABI 2005) 
The president of the Reinsurance Association of America has also stated that 'the insurance 
industry is the first in line to be affected by climate change and that global warming could 
bankrupt the industry' (Coleman 2003:12). Given the concentration of population in coastal 
settlements most vulnerable to severe weather events in the Australian context, the 
implications in this country for the insurance industry are arguably even more serious than 
in other parts of the world (2003 :6). Therefore, the Australian insurance industry would 
459 The !CA was the only organisation among the seven case studies here for which a past or present 
executive director or senior officer was not made available for interview. 
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appear to have a clear interest in advancing policies likely to lessen those possible impacts 
of climate change-particularly increased losses associated with sever weather events. 
It is not well known (even within the ICA) that the ICA was one of the very first industry 
associations in Australia to take a close interest in climate change--as early as 1987. 
However, unlike the insurance sector in other parts of the world, the Australian industry has 
been a 'bit player' in the greenhouse policy network. This research suggests that many 
factors have contributed to the ICA's slow and modest response. 
There is no question that the long term nature of much of the climate change threat has 
enabled the industry to postpone action. Similarly, it remains very difficult to attribute to 
climate change with any precision the increased costs associated with particular severe 
weather events. This has made it easier to leave the climate change issue in the 'too hard 
basket.' However, this does not account for the stark difference between the proactive role 
of insurance in the climate change debate abroad compared with Australia. The contrast 
between the responses of the ICA and the BCI in the UK is an obvious example. The lack 
of reinsurers in Australia as a proportion of the industry is cited as one factor, and this 
research finds some evidence to support that. 
However, the overwhelmingly significant factors underlying the ICA response have been a 
lack of leadership on climate change and a heavy cultural inertia within the organisation. 
Climate change has long been recognised as a threat to the industry. The ICA has 
acknowledged this, for example in its progress reports under the Greenhouse Challenge 
program (ICA 2000b: 1-2). However, this is not reflected in public statements. It is well 
within the powers of the sector and the ICA to play a major role-they are very well 
resourced as a lobby group and have enormous influence as one of Australia's largest 
investors. According one government agency (Axiss Australia:2005), 'as at 31 December 
200 I, insurers held over A$265 billion in financial assets and are the second largest 
employer group after banks. However, climate change is an issue which has been outside 
the comfort zone of the insurance sector and the ICA. It has therefore been an issue most 
conveniently handled with apparently tokenistic public relations measures. These are, in the 
main, peripheral to the climate change policy debate but they satisfy a perceived 'need to 
be seen to be doing something.' 460 
460 I mean they are making judgment calls all the time on longer term returns on capital. And I don't see 
an enormous amount of any of this understanding going into new technology driven investments that 
look like and if they are encouraged to be more competitive in the marketplace will grow at a faster rate. 
I don't see any of that happening. [30;64] 
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Interviews confirm that the insurance industry in general and the ICA in particular are 
universally viewed as having missed an important opportunity on climate change. 
However, the inaction has not been benign. Indeed, the lack ofICA engagement has helped 
blocking groups such as the AIGN to dominate the policy network. The ICA could have 
been a player of considerable significance, and may yet emerge as one.461 The story behind 
why it has chosen not to be is one worth exploring. Their reluctance to provide their own 
explanation makes that task more difficult, but worthwhile all the same. 
Activity 
Counter-intuitively, given their lack of engagement on greenhouse issues in recent years, 
the Insurance Council was one of the earliest interest groups in Australia to demonstrate 
interest. At 'Greenhouse 87, the first major conference on the matter held in Australia, two 
insurance industry representatives were prominent speakers. Brian Peele from Royal 
Insurance of Australia Ltd spoke on the greenhouse effect as it relates to insurance, and 
Gerhard Berz of Munich Re spoke about the impact of climate change on reinsurance 
(CSIRO Atmospheric Research 1987:2). The ICA was then represented by Ron Baxter and 
Les Lester on the planning committee that prepared the prospectus for the follow-up 
Greenhouse 88 conference (CSIRO and the Commission for the Future 1988). This hinted 
at ongoing involvement by the Australian insurance sector and the ICA in the emerging 
greenhouse policy network. However, the hints couldn't have been more misleading. For 
eleven years between 1988 and 1999, the ICA was silent about climate change and a non-
participant in the policy network. The federal government and others in the network 
explicitly identified insurance as a sector that was particularly vulnerable to the impacts 
associated with climate change (DEST 1994:26). In the 1990s it was steadily becoming 
more apparent that massively increased insurance payouts associated with severe weather 
events might be linked to climate change. Overseas, the insurance industry was by the mid-
1990s a significant presence in the international greenhouse policy negotiations.462 
461 {So, it is conceivable that they could get to a point that they are quite strong advocates in the debate in 
saying to some of the carbon intensive crew 'get on board and start improving your energy-efficiency or 
we're going to start investing into some of these other industries?'} Well, yes. Exactly. So, I don't think 
the ICA is involved; it is not clear ro me why they're not since they are a prospective major winner and 
they are certainly a major loser. (30;74-6] 
462 (A member of Australia's international negotiating team noted) There was a big splash (by insurance 
intematioru:tlly) around the time of Kyoto. Very great interest, and real changes in the way for example 
insurance was written in England \vith some areas becoming almost uninsurable. Houses and so furth, 
and buildings in some areas being almost uninsurable in the longer term. [2;92] The international 
insurance industry is so heavily engaged on this issue. I would say that apart from !he coal lobby~well 
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However, the Australian insurance sector including the ICA were conspicuously silent-
something widely noticed by other participants in the policy network. 463 
This silence was in spite of attempts by govermnent and tbe green movement to engage the 
industry's peak body.464 In tbe final days of tbe Keating govermnent, the Greenhouse 
Challenge Program was established with insurance firms like F AI General Insurance 
choosing to be among the first participants. Unlike many other industry associations 
representing sectors potentially affected by climate change, the ICA chose not to get 
involved at that point. In the mid 1990s, tbe federal government also unsuccessfully invited 
the ICA to get involved in the work of the National Greenhouse Advisory Panel and 
contribute to the NGAP report on tbe National Greenhouse Response Strategy. The ICA 
did not act on the invitation (Environment Australia 1996:79). ICA silence continued 
through tbe pivotal Kyoto conference in 1997. Despite acknowledging tbat international 
reinsurers and ICA members were suffering revenue losses and having to increase 
premiums as a result of severe weather events like tbe 1999 Sydney hail storms, tbe ICA 
made no real link to climate change. 
let me say the tight knit fossil fuel lobby internationally-the insurance industry has been the most 
prominent bodies represented at the international conferences. [31;280] 
463 Well, they were non-players as far as I was concerned. [21;61] No, never seen them in a meeting. 
[2;88] .. .insurance-next to nothing really. [53;173] Very late ... when it did come it was a case of catch 
up ... there's no consistent engagement ... they certainly never actively sought a place at the table in 
industry consultations on these matters. [51;38,42] {Are there any other groups to you would say have 
been conspicuous by the absence? Their absence from the greenhouse debate--even though you would 
be able to identify a vested interest for the group in the debate?} We have covered the main ones-those 
who have a vested interests are perhaps the farmers, Insurance, Tourism. [27;222-4] The Insurance 
Council of Australia-again I have had no dealings with them in the last several years on energy policy 
matters or on energy policy greenhouse related matters ... they essentially are, or have been a non~ 
participant. [47;16,112] It seemed to me that they weren't greatly involved. [32;22] Yes, I mean I 
certainly confirm I haven't ever had anyone from the Insurance Council of Australia approach me so 
they've certainly not been active in the policy sense. [7;87] The Insurance Council is of course again 
another one of those ones that's in the opportunistic basket in all of this ... I've just sort of been sitting 
here thinking as we've been talking that what you're doing is genuinely interesting because you see those 
of us who are upon the sea in all of this don't have time to sit down and think about things like you and I 
here in what people are doing. I mean the buggers went missing in action and that's the end of it. In 
actual fact when you put it in a diagrammatic form like that, it's quite curious that ... that's a seven-year 
gap and it's seven years where this thing was building up one hell of a head of steam. I don't know why 
they were missing in action. I'll be very interested in the fullness ohime to find out what their version of 
it is. [37;101-115] 
464 (For example, from a highly placed government source) I have always seen the Insurance Council-
even more so than the tourism industry-as a counterweight to the Aluminium (Council) and other 
interests. And I must say that I have not spent much time myself trying to get those doors open but I have 
been instrumental in trying to get other agents to achieve that. All the messages I get are that it is like 
water dripping on snow-it has taken a long time. [27;100] We have actually been fairly proactive in 
trying to get them to focus, we've actually tried to engender some involvement in this issue with the 
financial sector generally and the insurance industry in particular. [30;56] 
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This started to change in late 1999 when a flurry of activity commenced, demonstrating 
more interest and awareness of the issue and a need to be seen to be acting. This coincided 
with a keynote speech to the ICA national conference by then federal Environment 
Minister, Senator Hill in which the ICA was told that climate change was an important 
threat to the insurance industry. 'This is possibly not what the insurance industry was 
hoping to hear, but it is certainly another example of how climate change will affect all 
industries in one way or another,' he told the conference.465 
The ICA hired energy efficiency consultants Energetics (ICA 2000a:2), launched a new 
environment committee466 and started a 'Greenhouse Cuttings' newsletter supported by the 
AGO and prepared by Energy Strategies Limited. The newsletter was intended to keep 
members 'informed of the developments in government and industry in response to the 
greenhouse effect and the threat of climate change' (2000a:l).407 Numerous appeals were 
made for members to get involved in the Greenhouse Challenge program and the ICA 
surveyed its members on greenhouse issues to assess awareness and to gauge opinion.468 
An energy audit of the ICA headquarters was conducted by external consultants and the 
results and consequent benefits were promoted to members (2000a:l). Finally, the ICA 
established an Environment Working Group 'for insurers to address environmental 
challenges relevant to the industry. ' 469 
The ICA attended a couple of meetings of a loose gathering of peak bodies to keep 
informed about greenhouse, but this attention soon dropped off.470 Their actions on climate 
change might be characterised as very determinedly passive. There has been no hint of 
policy advocacy, no desire to ensure that the interests of the industry were considered by 
465 Hill, Senator Robert, (then) Minister for the Environment-Address to the Insurance Council of 
Australia Annual Conference, Canberra, l 0 August 2000 
'"'
5 Confirmed in [26;3 I] and [ 42;27] 
467 Confirmed in [45;153,161] 
'""'Confirmed in [26;23] 
469 Letter from Ms Sandie Watson, !CA National Public Affairs Manager, 4/4/0 l 
470 (This indifference and lack of proactivity on greenhouse is also reflected in the ICA's conspicuous 
lack of cooperation or interest in this research onee interviews with senior officials were requested). The 
BCA kicked it off, because there was a view within the AIGN that there were a number of associations 
out there that ought to be a bit more aware of what was going on. And that the AIGN wanted some more 
engagement with some of these other people. Particularly with the National Farmers' Federation in mind 
but others as well-Trucking Council, the truckers-and the insurance people were particularly in the 
minds of the AIGN then. The Insurance C',ouncil came to a couple of those meetings ... the whole thing 
has not continued-it went for no more than 18 months, and they have not had a meeting for nearly a 
year now. {\Vhy?} Anyway, the Insurance Council came to one of two of those meetings at most but 
then did not appearagain. It's a mystery. (19;1ll,ll5----123] 
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government or the business community, let alone any attempt to exert influence by using 
the industry's position as one of Australia's biggest investors. For example, between 1998 
and April 2004, the !CA issued media statements on over 50 policy issues, but not one 
about climate change. Over the same period, the Insurance Disaster Response Organisation 
(IDRO), run by the ICA, issued a over 50 media statements-again, none about to climate 
change 
This avoidance of climate change in public communications required some semantic 
'dexterity' from the organisation. Avoiding any reference to climate change was no simple 
task as the ICA lobbied at local, state and federal level for better flood-plain management, 
and the increased risks and costs posed by flood and storm damage. There were regular 
public statements on such issues. How they managed to focus on all of the related issues 
and apparently to overlook climate change baffled even some closest to the organisation.471 
Their stance is in stark contrast to that of other policy domains where the organisation has 
not been so bashful. Despite participating in parliamentary committee hearings and other 
federal processes on other issues,472 the ICA has chosen to completely avoid involvement 
three high-profile greenhouse related inquiries.473 At the same time, the Australian Property 
Institute (which faces some of the same greenhouse-related issues as the ICA) were more 
active in the government climate change fora. 
In more recent times passivity has degenerated into almost total indifference. Though the 
ICA was notionally a member of the federal government's Business Dialogue from 2002 it 
rarely contributed or attended. The frequency the Greenhouse Cuttings newsletters fell 
away. The articles became more superficial, and content has become less about climate 
change and more a collection of 'sustainability tit-bits.' Almost throughout, articles quoted 
third parties with virtually no comment from ICA leaders about greenhouse issues. The last 
edition of Greenhouse Cuttings appears to have been issued in August 2003. At the time of 
471 So there has been a focus in the Insurance Council of Australia on increased claims as a result of 
weather incidents, but there hasn't been a commitment to saying it's because of greenhouse. [45;45] 
472 For example-the !CA has made submissions to federal parliamentary committees in relation to a 
wide range of legislation, they have made submissions to senate inquiries such as one looking at the 
impact of public liability and professional indemnity insurance cost insurances. They have also made 
submissions to the Productivity Commission. 
!CA did not participate in stark contrast to their strong advocacy in things like insurance reform where 
they, like other financial sectors, were very active. [26;24] 
473 The Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References 
Committee Inquiry into Australia's Response to Global Warming, the Joint Committee on Treaties' 
Inquiry into whether or not Australia should ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Enviromnent and Heritage inquiry into the regulatory arrangements for trading in 
greenhouse emissions. 
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VITiting, aside from a passing reference to an event not involving their organisation, ICA 
Briefing-the remaining newsletter-has made no reference to climate change. 
Similarly, the ICA had, at the time of writing, still not issued a single media release on 
climate change nor made any publicly available submissions to government--beyond their 
1-2 page annual report under the Greenhouse Challenge.474 Climate change remains a very 
low priority on which the ICA appears to want only to meet apparently low public and 
government expectations that they be seen to be doing something. 
The overall impression gained about the ICA's approach to climate change has been that it 
is very ill-prepared to engage in this debate, is confused about its interest, or is extremely 
cautious about membership reaction, or perhaps its attitudes result from a combination of 
these factors. These and other possible reasons for caution are explored below. 
Analysis of group response 
The impression received by most commentators in the greenhouse debate is that the ICA 
have wanted to be seen to be doing something without really doing anything. The 
consensus is that they fail to understand the subject, they are out of their comfort zone 
dealing with greenhouse, and they have 'bigger fish to fry' with other issues seen as higher 
priorities.475 There is less competitive pressure in the Australian insurance industry to take 
an interest in greenhouse issues. 476 
Closer analysis suggests more complex answers. Deeper cultural, leadership and 
membership related forces, along with structural aspects of the Australian insurance 
industry-have led the ICA to remain on the margins. 
474 This is in keeping with the impressions of government representatives interviewed in this research. 
475 I've met \Vith them and know that they are intellectually interested in the issue ... they're supportive, 
understand that it's au issue aud not hostile at all, and you know gave me contacts for potential people in 
different rompanies who would be worth speaking to. But as far as them themselves, they had no interest 
in acting politically on it. It ;vas more that 'we've got too many other things to do with our 
membership.'[39;64,84] The dominant issue was financial reform legislation affecting the insurance 
sector. [42;15] 
476 {Why the big difference between the international insurance industry jumping on this and the 
domestic industry not?} I think because the Australian domestic insurance market is so competitive. 
[23;338-40] 
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Micro-level 
Organisational Culture 
The organisational culture of the ICA is seen by most interviewees as highly conservative, 
dominated at the senior levels by long·time insurance executives rather than by 
professionals with an interest group, political or bureaucratic background. The ICA's 
culture is seen as one of the most important forces shaping their climate change response, 
or lack of it.417 Headquartered in Sydney, its culture is closer to the fmancial centres of 
Australia rather than the political centre in Canberra. There is an expectation and general 
impression that it will always be less· attuned than most other industry associations to 
political agendas and processes in Canberra.478 Others close to the ICA indeed suggest that 
their low key approach has achieved political results in the past.479 
The ICA working environment is high on funding, pressure, and professionalism,480 but 
part of the culture is sticking to the comfort zone despite strong staff competency.481 One 
477 {How significant a factor do you think the culture of the Insurance Council and the wider insurance 
industry has been in shaping their slow response to greenhouse?} It's been central. They are indelibly 
conservative investment managers, they've not, in the slightest bit previously interested in the v.ider 
science of the environment except where it shov.'ed up in the bottom line annual reports of the companies 
that they did choose to put their funds into. Yes, the culture has ultimately been the determinant, their 
approach to the emerging issue which has been slow, not public, opaque, they would say thoughtful and 
considered. [45;207-9] {I'm wondering when you look domi the list whether you see an example there 
where, in the first instance organisational culture has been a significant shaping force in terms of their 
greenhouse response or non response?} Well, the !CA I thought is an example of that. [54; 112-4] 
478 The Insorance CounciL .. they too have not been played into the Canberra system. [18;256] lnsurance 
Council-I've only been there once or twice. It looked a little bit on the dttll side. As a culture, it looked 
like it wasn't very innovative probably. {Make a comparison between the type of people v1ho work there 
and the type people who work in the NFF?} Those working on the !CA are much less political.. {So 
people working in the NFF are more likely to have a political background--they worked on the {Capital) 
Hill?)Yeah that's right-they know how to get what they want in politics whereas with the Insurance 
Council-I don't think they do. [39; 168-178] 
479 
... they lobbied where they thought it was effective forthem to lobby and they didn't often go public 
on an issue because it didn't serve their ends. {It wasn't their style?} It wasn't their style as well. But it 
certainly didn't serve their ends. They got more efrective results by being on first name tenns with the 
Ministers for Finance and appropriate legislators. [45;225-29] 
"
0 ICA's membership culture-mainly well resourced, weaHhy and professional. [26;18] 
4
" lnsorance in Australia has typically not taken a very strong public policy stance outside it's own direct 
regulatory interests ... some of these bodies see themselves as having a very broad remit, prepared to 
speak and become engaged in a large range of topics-·-see themselves as being part of the political 
landscape. The NFF is perhaps the best example of that. Others don't. And the Insoranee Council, I 
think, has been pretty much in the 'don't' field. [54;86] I think the membership requires them to do much 
more bread and butter issues-and I know what they are--but there are Jots of insurance regulation 
issues, other types of thin&>< which their members demand be addresse-0. {So, for ICA staff, because they 
are not familiar witb environmental issues, so to engage on climate change would require an even bigger 
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aspect of their perceived comfort zone is that it does not include environmental issues. 
They have traditionally had no requirement for strong environment policy expertise nor any 
inclination to obtain it. This has been a significant barrier to entry into the greenhouse 
policy network.482 
To outsiders, the ICA appears to have a deliberately low profile-shying away from the 
limelight and from controversy if at all possible. Insiders confirm a tradition of low key, 
behind the scenes, opaque operations v.ith the ICA for many years going out of its way not 
to have any substantial public image. Only in recent times with the controversial 
circumstances engulfing the industry has it taken a more public position. To many 
observers, the ICA is conservative, secretive, complacent, slow moving and cozy .483 It had 
not until recently had to deal witlt any major high profile crises and is seen as having little 
track record focusing on longer term strategic challenges. Climate change could easily be 
viewed as sometlting to get around to in due time.484 The ICA is also viewed as being run 
by old men unaccustomed to change. 485 Some interviewees were scathing on this point, 
suggesting that the ICA's conservatism, and lack ofbotlt strategic direction and willingness 
to change with the times, had come at significant cost not only to tlteir members, but to tlte 
nation. The failure of the ICA to engage on climate change was viewed as symptomatic of 
a larger problem of organisational immobility and intransigence.486 
investment than. nonnal?} And I think their members expect them to do their much more nuts and bolts 
things covering jobs that they've always done. [39;278-82] 
""' I mean l don't think the insurance industry ever needed to have a commitment to environment issues 
unlike the tourism industry did and the forest industries because it was central for them--environmental 
issues, whereas for the insurance industry it has never really been in the centre of it until climate change 
and that is why they have been picking up on the last couple of years belatedly. [31;284] (As one ICA 
insider commented when asked how Environment lvfinister Robert Hill's speech to the !CA conference 
was received) It's like talking to a room full of dentists and announcing that false teeth are never going to 
get subsidised again. I mean it's threatening. [45;117] !CA players generally come from an insurance 
industry background, they are not accustomed to dealing with environmental issues, though they have 
some experience with spills. Floods are also a major issue. Flood maps are an important matter. It is more 
seen as a risk issue but this is changing. [ 42;3 l) 
483 !CA political disposition-it is conservative but it gets along with both sides. [26;28) 
484 
... the lt1surance Council those days was a pretty ... well the industry was a pretty comfortable 
industry it seems to me. It's only in the last, it's only been since HIH and September 11 and a few ... 
well a bit before that, the collapse of Lloyds and so on. I mean it's really only been late 90s with the real 
risks that the Insur11I1ce Council 11I1d the insurance industry has to face. So I think, I mean I suspect that 
they were fairly complacent and this was just too far out and too ... and in the risks they dealt with it just 
wasn't sharp enough. [6; 139] 
485 Mason is from the UK and has a long background in the insurance industry. Along witlt Rob 
Drummond and the second in charge the top 3 players are 'old gents.' {26;29-30] 
4
"' I think in many cases you get people that are leaders and create policy that an industry adopts and so 
in some of these cases that's possibly what's happened, and actually the Insurance Council of Australia, 
one might observe 1hat some of the difficulties experienced by the insurance industry at this point in time 
were because of the 'head in the sand' attitude of the senior people in the industry in the mid to late '90s 
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This culture is apparent in the choice of issues dealt with by the ICA. While the 
organisation has addressed a wide range of issues in its public statements, these can be 
generally grouped within quite narrow parameters of insurance industry-specific issues 
which pose a clear short-term threat to the bottom line ofmembers.487 The organisation has 
historically focused on a narrow agenda and there is great internal pressure not to break that 
mould. Many interviewees believe that this narrow focus and heavy weight of 
organisational inertia in part explain the reluctance to take up climate change.488 
Also, the conservative culture is reflected in the industry's investment patterns. ICA 
members are seen as risk-averse and likely to stick with traditional investments.489 
Investing away from carbon intensive industries into more greenhouse friendly alternatives 
would go against the grain of tradition and inertia. It goes against industry culture. This 
and that an industry that doesn't move with the times because it hasn't got a leader that moves you with 
the times causes some awful problems. {Are you speaking about particularly the weather related 
greenhouse side or are you just talking about their problems generally?} The insurance industry. All the 
current problems they've got is because there was not a succession of ... from the old guard of the late 
'80s to the new guard of 2000, and the futures industry could have got stuck if it got a weak leader and 
the most vocal people in the late '80s in the futures industry were, 'let's stick with our knitting and stay 
with wool and cattle and whatever and not move into the new area,' but that industry would be in a lot 
worse place, or it wouldn't exist now. So in some of these cases, if the industry or the business is 
dominated by the old guard and there's not strong, new blood coming through with new, with new Turks, 
to move it into the new world, you get a problem. [ 46; 194-8] 
487 
••• you have a group of people who are focused on other issues in their own enviromnent rather than 
working across the whole range of different sectors and clusters. [40; 130] 
488 {I'm wondering when you look down the list whether you see an example there where, in the first 
instance organisational culture has been a significant shaping force in tenns of their greenhouse response 
or non response?} Well, the !CA I thought is an example of that ... Insurance in Australia has typically 
not taken a very strong public policy stance outside its own direct regulatory interests. [54;112-4,86] It's 
the nature of the industry. They're not going to I mean they are conservative people. They are very 
conservative. And they assess risk, indeed, with a knowing eye based on history. The greenhouse things 
aren't predictable for them and therefore very scary. But they've got nothing to go on. They can't say, 
'Oh we must put the rates up because of the increase in risk.' They don't know what the risk is. Risk is 
all based on assessment of historical events. You can't have future risk that you need based on historical 
events. Do you know what I mean? {I know what you mean. Jeremy Leggett put it as if you're walking 
backwards towards a cliff?} Yes, that's right. [45;165-7] 
489 {What about though in terms of them actually being investors and changing their investment patterns 
to take in Greenhouse considerations into account?} That certainly has been discussed in this committee 
they've got. It's called the finance and sustainability group or whatever. (but) nothing's been done 
about it because the whole industry is in turmoil...people are much happier to keep $5 in their pocket 
now than spend it to save $10 next year. {So the same would apply then to their investment patters in 
that they're not about to pull out their money from MIM or someone like that to put it in to Energy 
Developments?} ... no, it hasn't quite got home to these guys that the business of energy is fundamentally 
flawed, the conventional energy (sector), and that costs are going to pop up everywhere ... They (the 
ICA's members) are very conservative ... {So they're not about to jump in to all these other companies?} 
No, the insurance industry--low venture capital funds run by insurance companies all know they're very 
conservative investors. Very conservative managers. {So that explains in part why their now using their 
investment decisions to be as part of a greenhouse response?} I'm not aware that they're doing that to an 
extent yet ... changes can be quite threatening for the older operators who have worked so hard to get 
where they're going. They're not going to change anything, they're just hanging in there. [45; 183-205] 
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helps to explain why even though ICA have internally recognised the value of energy 
efficiency audits and investments to save money by using less energy, there has been a 
reluctance to link that message to how members invest premium revenues. This might also 
explain ICA bashfulness in terms of policy advocacy. 
Another important aspect of the ICA culture is how they approach and respond to 
problems. First, there appears to be a preference for short-term problems and tactical rather 
than strategic responses.490 Second, as actuaries, they tend to use historical precedent as a 
measure of future risk. Climate change creates a problem in this regard as it is without 
precedent so the past is not a reliable guide to future insurance risk. However, as many 
interviewees noted, insurers in general will tend to use insurance coverage and premium 
price as the tools of first choice in responding to changes in risk assessment. As a 
consequence, therefore, the culture of the insurance industry itself might predispose the 
ICA not to look at greenhouse emissions reduction as an appropriate industry response. 
Instead, the natural response would be to reduce coverage and raise premiurns.491 The fact 
that Australia's insurance sector includes few home grown reinsurers might also reinforce 
this tendency, in that the ICA's constituency is somewhat less exposed than the sector in 
other countries where there are more reinsurers.492 
With so much invested in traditional carbon-intensive industries and a long history of 
staying within the insurance industry-specific comfort zone on policy issues, and dealing 
with problems in a narrow actuarial manner, the ICA's culture has kept the response to 
climate change within narrow, modest, and passive limits. 
490 We just seem to be a lot better at handling crises than we are at handling slow rot. [6;147] It's like 
most businesses I guess, it concentrates on its priorities and its priorities haven't been long-term [48;124] 
491 
••• they're not rrurrketing a product, they're looking after risk and they've got other ways of adjusting 
risk like changing prices and such. [54;94] ... the fact that they are not engaged means that they don't 
really understand it. But, being actuaries, I think what they are tending to focus on is how we minimise 
the risk, and how do we structure instruments to protect ourselves and what does that mean to our 
premiums from a management point of view. But none of it seems to be turned around to a longer focus 
that 'perhaps we should be putting our money into sectors of the economy which because of their growth 
could help to ameliorate the risk.' l just don't see that they have focused on both sides of the risk.' 
[30;72] 'The timeframe is such that the insurance industry has the opportunity to slowly but surely 
change their contracts and opt out, or increase the prices for the insurance that you have to pay for 
tempestuous events. So in a sense they have an adaptation strategy automatically built in because of the 
timcframe that's occurring. [52;67] 
m As far as I can see we don't have a relnsurerleft in this country now, nota home grown one. [30;103] 
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Membership structure 
Though its impact has been less powerful than organisational culture, the membership 
structure of the ICA has been a factor in its non-involvement with global warming policy. 
One obvious example is the ICA's non-coverage of the health insurance section of the 
industry. One of the areas of insurance industry exposure is the risk of insect vector-borne 
diseases like malaria, and this risk is increased by a warmer climate. The range of these 
diseases, and associated insurance losses is of particular concern in northern 
Australia.493Non-coverage of health insurers thus removes at least one aspect of climate 
change risk for the ICA. Nonetheless, this does little to explain the lack of ICA interest and 
engagement because the vast majority of potential damage to insurance is related to ICA 
members. The bulk of the insurance threat is likely to fall on the general and property 
insurance side of the industry because of increased losses associated with severe weather 
events. These organisations are exposed to increased risk and financial costs and therefore, 
the ICA's modest response would seem on the surface at least to go against the financial 
interest of most ICA members. 
As already mentioned, a more telling membership-related factor may have been the 
relatively small presence of Australian reinsurers. While the general and property insurance 
companies and the insurance brokers associated with them are among those likely to suffer 
from increased damage payouts associated with climate change-induced weather events, 
the reinsurance is possibly even more exposed. Reinsurer premiums have doubled since the 
early 1990s (Coleman 2003:9-10). The threat is well appreciated by reinsurers and there is 
strong evidence already to suggest that this pain is already being felt and to an extent has 
been passed on to insurers through higher fees.494 Major overseas companies involved in 
493 For example, in June 2005 over 80 health professionals in the Northern Territory drew attention to this 
risk. (ABC News Online ). See also the position statement of the Australian Medical Association (AMA 
2005). 
494 I mean the part of the insurance industry that's been active internationally is the reinsurance industry. 
Those who underwrite things like property damage. And I think it's quite clear why that is. Munich 
Reinsurance industry was saying at Greenhouse '87 that they could see continually escalating premiums 
to cope with the continuing rise in property damage claims. And the reinsurance industry said at Kyoto 
that claims for property damages globally in the 1980s were more than the 1960s and 1970s put together 
and the claims for the first five years of the 1990s were more than for all of the 1980s. So in the 1990s 
claims were running at about four times the levels they were in the 1960s and 1970s. So they had a very 
direct commercial interest. I think a fellow from Munich Reinsurance said at Kyoto, 'We see climate 
change by the red ink on our balance sheet.' [9;138] Reinsurers were quicker than general insurers to 
recognise their interest in the issue. They were quicker to respond to (!CA) survey inquiries too (because 
they have) a European perspective. [26;27] 
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both general insurance and reinsurance are ICA members- for example, Munich Re and 
Swiss Re, but there are almost no significant locally owned and headquartered reinsurers. 
Foreign reinsurers with Australian branch offices are well represented in the ICA and its 
processes, but Australian firms dominate, including some such as Suncorp Metway who are 
on record playing down the risks and costs associated with climate change (Johnstone 
2002). Australian government sources report little policy intervention-even on the part of 
foreign headquartered reinsurers, but note that these issues are possibly left to head office 
overseas.495 Hence, it would seem that the ICA membership has helped to motivate its 
professional association to invest much time or effort on the issue. Interviewees for this 
research viewed this non-reinsurer dominance as the most significant membership-related 
constraint on the ICA in terms of how it has reacted to climate change.496 
One somewhat related membership factor has been the steady concentration of ICA 
membership. According to ICA annual reviews, between 1999 and 2003 the number of 
ICA member groups fell from 127 to 61. This reflects consolidation in the sector rather 
than any significant drop off in coverage of the sector by the ICA which still claims to 
account for more than 90 per cent of all insurance business transacted in Australia by 
authorised insurers. ICA memberships are becoming fewer but bigger. The Insurance 
Australia Group (IAG) is a good example--bringing together 8 once autonomous 
495 I know that companies like Munich Re and Swiss Re take climate change very seriously because of 
the insurance implications of it and certainly they may ... from time to time you see comments coming 
out from companies like that indicating how seriously they rake the issue but yes, I'm not aware of any 
sort of action, sort of policy interest [7;87] I suppose most of them have international links to either 
larger parent companies or to international associations that run this issue if you like or were allowed to 
run this issue internationally ... and they saw it very much as an international issue-an international, 
global and world issue. [19;!27-3 lj 
4
% This was seen as a higher order problem and usually dealt with by head office. (So leave that to 
Zurich to look after?} Yes, Zurich would look after that ... what I'm saying is that they came through 
with a head office mentality. [44;161-5] Now I don't know what the balance of the Insurance Council of 
Australia is between for ex.ample property damage on the one hand, and other things like life insurance 
and one off insurance of events against rain and so on. But it may well be that the Insurance Council of 
Australia's members have their property damage interests reinsured through underwriting agencies off 
shore so don't have the same sort of vested interest that the reinsurance industry globally bas, that led 
them to be very active up to and including Kyoto. [9; 138] l have always been a bit puzzled for the past 
few years as to why the Australian industry seems to be so far behind the world Industry. And it may be 
because the Australian industry is dominated by private insurers and that it is really the Reinsurers 
Industry which seems to have dominated the international debate because in the end they have to pick up 
tab ... [31;280] l mean his (Ro<l Frail of !CA) explanation was basically that most of the activity on 
climate change was done by the large insurance companies at their headquarters overseas, that there was 
a strong commitment by the insurance industry to look into these issues but it was basically a sort of a 
branch office phenomenon, that the non Australian insurance companies were not interested in it because 
overseas was dealing with it, and in tenns of Australia, when we said, what about Australian based 
insurance companies, his view was, well, they're probably not big enough and significant enough players 
internationally to be involved at that level. [35;103] 
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companies and some of the biggest brand names (NRMA, NZI, CGU and SGIO) together 
into one of Australia's top 50 companies.497 
On the surface this would seem to suggest an increasing capacity for unity of purpose on 
climate change.498 However, this has apparently not occurred. ICA insiders point to the 
number and diversity of their membership as one reason why the organisation could never 
arrive at a common view on greenhouse issues, let alone decide a course of action.499 A 
contributing factor may also be that as companies consolidate they tend to assume more 
policy analysis and government relations functions beyond the capacity of smaller firms. 
This can lead to reluctance on the part of these larger entities to allow the industry 
association 'to take the running.' That might further explain continued hesitation on the 
part of the ICA to get involved in issues like climate change. 
Leadership 
Leadership also appears to have been an important factor in the ICA's lack of involvement 
on greenhouse. With the exception of its early enthusiasm demonstrated by Les Lester and 
Ron Baxter in the late 1980s when there was clearly a personal interest in leading the 
insurance sector into the newly emerging greenhouse debate, ICA leaders appear to have 
deliberately chosen to position their sector on the periphery. The impression which comes 
through very clearly is that since about 1990 their leadership have opted first for a 'head in 
the sand' approach and since about 1999 for a bare minimalist approach to climate change. 
Since the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, there have been no notable public 
497 Interestingly, !AG is the only major Australian firm to demonstrate serious concern about climate 
change to date, and its CEO, Michael Hawker, was recently elected as chairman of the !CA board. 
498 The Insurance Council is much more like the Australian Aluminium Council-a relatively small 
number of members; they are mostly big. [11 ;278] 
499 With the Aluminium Council you have to understand has only a very few members. Very large 
members. It's not like the insurance industry. Well the insurance industry has fewer members but 
certainly they weren't quite as cooperative, one might say, as the members of the Aluminium Council, so 
closely bonded in a unique business situation. {Yes, so there's not that unity of purpose around one 
issue.} Yeah-and not even necessarily the same business drivers. Because different insurers have a 
different focus in the market. Different products to roll out, different business drivers and models. 
[45;243-9] The key question is why they have not moved like their international brothers and sisters and 
actually become key advocates. One of the insurance companies you have here did agree to be a member 
of that of that climate change business leaders' group (which the interviewee was involved in) ... So, I 
think there is a difference between the Insurance Council and some of its players. I can only assume that 
there is a difference of opinion amongst the big players in the Insurance Council as to the position that 
should be taken on climate change. And that the division has caused them to do nothing. And the interest 
by (the compaoy) in moving to an advocate approach a couple of years ago seems to support that notion. 
That the problem with the Council is division between the Council executive rather thao any general non-
interest among the individual companies operating in Australia. [15; 140] 
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comments made by ICA leaders on the issue of climate change, no press releases issued, no 
notable speeches, no evidence presented to a plethora of parliamentary inquiries and 
bureaucratic consultative processes. 
This is not, however, to suggest that the ICA leadership has behaved as if climate change 
did not exist. On the contrary, it is very clear that they recognised an obligation to get 
involved yet they have characterised that obligation in a way which has severely limited 
engagement. Rather than assessing the implications of the issue for Australian insurance 
companies in terms of their financial exposure to c!lmate change impacts, or considering 
the implications of insurer investment patterns, and the potential for ICA to play a role in 
shaping government policy, the leadership has apparently decided to frame the issue as a 
way in for insurance companies to demonstrate good corporate citizenship by minimising 
the emissions generated in insurance company offices. In doing so, ICA leaders have 
defined the issue for their industry in almost the narrowest conceivable terms. 
However, against the grain of their actions it would appear that their leadership partially 
recognises that there is a potentially much more significant role which the organisation 
could play-far beyond the passive and internal focus of measures implemented to date. 
For example, in an ICA Progress Report to the Greenhouse Challenge Program, CEO, Alan 
Mason, said: 'While the insurance industry itself is not a large emitter of greenhouse gases, 
it is hoth highly susceptible to the manifestations of climate change and potentially an 
effective channel for educating business and the public about ways to minimise emissions 
and the adverse impact of climate' (lCA 2000b: l ). This statement, which is typical of 
others made by Mason and his colleagues, suggests that while the impact side of the 
equation is somewhat understood, the influence of insurance companies on emissions is 
not. That is, it appears that ICA leaders have been unable or unwilling to appreciate that the 
investment decisions of their members have a very significant influence on the shape of 
Australia's greenhouse emissions profile. 
This too has not gone unnoticed by other players in the greenhouse network. Many felt that 
ICA leadership on greenhouse had been noticeably lacking and that this had enabled 
government policy direction to flow more easily in favour of the AIGN side of the debate. 
Even ICA insiders acknowledge that it is absolutely conceivable that the chief executive 
and senior staff at the ICA might have taken a much more proactive stance.500 The 
500 {Do you think it's conceivable that there might have been another leader of the Insurance Council 
who may have taken them in a very different direction on greenhouse issues?) Well individuals who 
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prominence of severe weather events like the Sydney hail storms, and major flood and 
drought damage in recent years, provided 'every opportunity' for ICA leadership. 
Suggestions that Australia's insurance sector is disproportionately exposed to the risks of 
climate change would on the surface seem to invite a strong, positive attitude to combating 
greenhouse pollution, rather than the hesitant one so far exhibited. 
The failure of ICA leadership is lamented particularly by those on the green side of the 
debate who saw them as potentially their most powerful business ally. Their involvement 
was also seen as an important precursor to effective engagement of the Australian banking 
and financial sector. Interviewees not surprisingly thought very little of those actions that 
had been taken by the ICA (Greenhouse Challenge, Greenhouse Cuttings and so on), and 
the general impression was that the ICA had deliberately stayed out of the game for 
opportunistic reasons. That is, their leaders had narrowly defined the issue so as to 
quarantine insurer investment thereby postponing difficult decisions against their own 
apparent longer term interest. 
The consistent decision by ICA leaders to contain involvement in the greenhouse policy 
network to the bare minimum is also viewed with regret within the federal government-
particularly the Australian Greenhouse Office and the Department of the Environment and 
Heritage. Senior officers in these organisations would have liked to see the insurance 
industry more active if only to broaden the range of positions factored into policy-making. 
This would, in their view, have strengthened their hands in negotiations involving other 
departments taking a pro-AIGN blocking line within government.501 In the absence of 
leadership by organisations such as the ICA, the policy turf was more easily dominated by 
blocking elements. Puzzlement at the Jack ofICA involvement even extends all the way to 
the Prime Minister's office.502 
have had the willingness to stick their neck out and commit some of their own personal resources have 
made a difference to the organisation. And I say that's the same with all of these industry associations, 
that often it is individuals who can establish, articulate and maintain an agenda often in the face of 
management that will take the industry in a different direction. It's quite plausible that had there been a 
different person at the helm, it could have gone somewhere else, yes. [45-231-33] Both the !CA board 
and the CEO are very supportive of the greenhouse related initiatives. Both McGuire and Mason are very 
interested but they are spread very thin. Phillip McGuire has the main responsibility on greenhouse. 
(Rod) Frail is spread too thin with the heavy workload. [42;30] 
501 Alluded to by at least three senior environment portfolio bureaucrats in interviews conducted for this 
research. 
502 !CA should have a position but finds that they very rarely have much to say mostly platitudinous stuff. 
(Their lack of involvement is) a bit puzzling. [50;28] 
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The lack of ICA leadership on greenhouse, however, has been viewed with thinly veiled 
relief by AIGN members.503 For them, some of whom have been central players in the 
network with among the strongest grasp of the issues involved, strong intervention by the 
insurance sector would have significantly compromised their own efforts to keep the brakes 
on greenhouse policy. These players had seen the insurance sector get heavily involved at 
the international level and appreciated the danger to their cause if this were emulated 
domestically. Under the circumstances, timid leadership of that sector by the ICA was a 
stroke of luck. Predictably, AIGN-linked interviewees maintain that the ICA would have 
had no business running hard on the green side of the debate, and cast such an approach in 
opportunistic terms.504 
There is little doubt that the ICA's leadership on greenhouse issues has been a powerful 
factor in shaping the response of the organisation over many years. The early enthusiasm of 
former ICA leaders suggests that the position of the organisation's leaders on climate 
change was in no way preordained. The individuals concerned exercise significant control. 
The ICA leadership since the early 1990s has tried to ignore climate change and when it 
could not be ignored, they have deliberately framed the issue narrowly so as to minimise 
the need for involvement. The ICA's leadership may have been heavily influenced or 
constrained by other factors. However, due to the unwillingness of ICA leaders to 
participate in this research, these factors are difficult to explore. One significant 
development in recent times has been the leadership of IAG in the greenhouse network-
most importantly through chief executive Michael Hawker and Tony Coleman (Gottliebsen 
2004; Australian Climate Group 2004). It remains to be seen whether Hawker's recent 
election as president of the ICA board will result in any significant change in greenhouse 
network engagement by the peak body. 
Resources 
While they have been a contributing factor in the ICA's very limited response to climate 
change, resources appear not to have been a decisive factor. To some observers, the ICA 
503 They were not active players in the any of the discussions that I wa.s involved in. ft is not as though it 
was going on in the backroom and no one knew about it. There was no one wanting to be engaged. 
[40;122] 
504 I think the financial sector is a slightly different kettle of fish beCllllse they are part of the 
opportunistic side of this thing par excellence. You know, there's a buck out there and they're chasing it 
as hard as they can go. I don't say it to denigrare them, it's just .... they're very much seen as people 
chasing opportunities flowing from the issue with not a significant amount of focus on the downside the 
rest of us are dealing with. [37;131 J 
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response was the result of an organisation trying to deal with too many issues and 
inevitably making a decision to allocate scarce resources to more urgent priorities. 505 The 
actions taken by the ICA-Greenhouse Challenge involvement, the Greenhouse Cuttings 
newsletter (which was contracted out), and the work of external energy efficiency 
consultants-at least appear to be aimed in part at minimising monetary and staff time 
costs, and even comments from ICA insiders seem to confirm that.506 
However, the ICA is a well resourced organisation. While its membership base is relatively 
small (with less than 100 members) it has an extremely wealthy and powerful membership 
base. Even though the profit margins of these companies have come under increasing 
pressure in the late 1990s and early 2000s-in part due to costs associated with the very 
damage which climate change threatens for the sector-the ICA is undoubtedly still one of 
those industry associations with the most formidable resource backing in the country. What 
is not clear is the extent to which the ICA benefits from access to these resources--either 
via direct membership dues or through in-kind support from member companies. The 
membership fees of the ICA are not publicly available. 
Even so, there is enough information available to confirm that they were not short of the 
resources needed to take a more active role in climate change had a decision been taken to 
do so. We need only look as far as their concerted, professional, and clearly well resourced 
work in other policy areas, where they issued media statements concerning some 40 issues, 
participated in public debate on a range of pressing matters, and engaged in extensive 
discussions with government, vigourously advocating particular policy decisions or 
direction. The ICA's close involvement with the federal government in the wake of the 
HIH collapse, and on the question of public liability and indemnity insurance are two 
visible examples, but there have been many others.507 The interviews conducted for this 
research also confirm that the ICA had plenty of resources and could easily fund external 
research ifrequired for issues deemed priorities. 
505 The Insurance Council has so many other fires going right now that they have not got a hope of doing 
anything. [33;70] In the last 24 months there's been other issues in the insurance industry that have 
tapped their resources so they've not been able to apply much thought to it anyway, or put any resources 
on the task. [45;45] {The Insurance Council is not a poor organisation though is it?} No it's not poor ... 
As industry associations go it's not poor. But it has a lot of complicated regulation and legislation to deal 
with and in Australia of course, even states to deal with and their legislatures. [45;83-5] 
506 Greenhouse is very much a second tier issue for !CA and for (me) ... It is a fact of life with the !CA 
that they have to prioritise and that there are limited resources, so greenhouse drops down the list on the 
organisation's agenda. [42;10,17] 
507 It (the !CA greenhouse response) was half-hearted and in stark contrast to their strong advocacy in 
policy areas where they felt more comfortable. [26; 1 OJ 
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Some interviews conducted here also suggest that one important resource area in which the 
ICA may have suffered a lack was staff. That is, the organisation may have lacked the type 
of staff who would have the level of knowledge required to overcome the very significant 
information barriers to entry into the greenhouse network. Without the policy expertise and 
advice, some feel that, in the field of climate change, it was impossible for the ICA's 
leaders to confidently express opinions in publie, in correspondence with government, or 
by participating in government inquiries on climate change. 
The problem with this seemingly plausible view, however, is that there is significance 
evidence to the contrary. That is, the ICA has at times had staff with precisely the type of 
knowledge and background required to underpin a much greater involvement by the 
organisation in the greenhouse policy network. For example, in 2000 the ICA had Rod 
Bruem on its staff, whose most recent position as press secretary to the rederal 
Environment Minister gave him a ready working knowledge of the greenhouse issue. 
Bruem's presence appears to have helped the ICA to appreciate the relevance of the issue. 
In addition, Bruem had current working relationships with members of the federal 
government and the bureaucracy at the highest levels, particularly in the AGO and the then 
Environment Australia. This, however, is not to suggest that Bruem's employment was in 
any way a reflection of greater ICA interest in environmental matters.508 
Similarly, the ICA had a second former federal adviser-Susie Haywood-with close links 
to the government and elements of the bureaucracy with carriage of environmental issues. 
This research suggests that both these staff could and did try to push for a greater level of 
ICA involvement in greenhouse issues. Indeed, without their presence, it seems vezy 
unlikely the ICA would have paid any attention at all to greenhouse. According to one 
interviewee in a clear position to know, their involvement in greenhouse would simply not 
have happened had it not been for the interest and enthusiasm of Haywood.509 She was 
working as Communications Manager at the ICA in late 1999, and reportedly felt 
5
"' Bruem felt his appointment at ICA was not as related to environmental issues as it might appear-
more to him being a spinner with connections to the federal government more generally. [26;10] 
509 The Insurance Council of Australia had no particular view about greenhouse as such. They came to 
greenhouse by the efforts of one individual in the organisation who dedded they needed to join the 
Greenhouse Challenge. {Who was that?} A woman called Susie Haywood who now works in the UK. 
Susie Haywood was the manager of communications at the !CA probably early 2000. And she got them 
involved in the Greenhouse Challenge because of her own personal environmental consideration viev.'S ... 
in 1999 the Insurance Council of Australia had one person who seemed to be seriously committed to 
putting in some extra effort and a few people who said 'well we should do something, but not me.' 
[45;13-17, 89] 
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sufficiently strongly about environmental issues generally and about greenhouse in 
particular, that she was able to persuade the organisation to sign up to the Greenhouse 
Challenge. Haywood's reported background as a staffer in the office of a Howard 
government minister prior to working at the ICA would have provided the direct 
knowledge of or capacity to quickly appreciate the significance of federal programs like the 
Greenhouse Challenge to the ICA. It appears that it was at Haywood's behest that they 
hired energy efficiency consultants from Canberra to assist the organisation with various 
greenhouse related activities. 
There is also evidence to suggest that the in-house support for more involvement on 
greenhouse from Haywood and Bruem510 was backed to a degree by Rod Frail, a senior 
member of the ICA staff.511 However, subsequent events suggest that there has been little 
momentum to keep up the greenhouse focus since their departure from the organisation, 
and comments by other members of the network suggest that Frail's enthusiasm was 
limited.512 It appears a case of staff-initiated involvement which would have required a 
significant amount of additional member education to sustain. While there were human 
resources which provided an initial impetus for greater ICA involvement, these appear to 
have elicited only modest backing, the member education task was unfinished, and the 
extent ofICA enthusiasm appears to have waned following the departure of the key staff.513 
Financial resources have neither facilitated nor prevented a greater ICA role in the 
greenhouse policy network, and human resources have waxed and waned in both directions 
at different times with no sustained long term influence. At least one !CA insider felt it was 
not a case of lacking internal resources, but rather a case of decisions being made not to use 
them. Observers of the !CA drew similar conclusions.514 Had climate change been 
510 What interest there was primarily staff driven rather than membership driven. [26; I OJ 
5
" As previously noted and sourced from internal !CA figures. 
512 (Said one senior green movement figure who met with Frail) We urged him strongly to do exactly 
what you've just described, to be more of an advocate on these issues and he basically sort of ... I guess 
because it was at that period, he sort of said, 'yes, we will,' but we never had the feeling that there was 
terribly much commitment to it, it was a bit like you said, it was pretty passive. [35;103] 
513 December 1999--the !CA joined the Greenhouse Challenge when Susie Haywood was National 
Public Affairs (NP A) Manager. Susie Haywood left in mid 2000 and for six months there was no-one in 
the NPA role. [42;14] 
514 I don't think it's necessarily a lack of resources, it's a lack of will to have the resources. [35;339] But 
if it is a priority in issue, resources are never really a constraint I don't think. You know, it is more the 
other way around. I often say after over l 0 years of running industry groups that there is not one issue 
over time that I would not have fought for lack ofresources. [13;340] 
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considered a sufficient priority, there is little doubt that the organisation would have found 
the resources to invest in the issue--financial and other resources. 
Meso-level 
Various influences at the network level had an influence on the response of the ICA to 
climate change. Most exerted pressure on them to be less involved in the network, but none 
appear to have been as powerful as the micro-level forces discussed above. The only one 
that appear to have had any notable influence in eliciting more ICA involvement appears to 
be government processes. The other influential meso-level factors served to discourage 
greater ICA participation. 
Policy implications 
For some interviewees the ICA's lack of involvement in greenhouse is a straight reflection 
of the policy implications of the issue for the sector.515 According to this interpretation the 
suggested threat of climate change to insurers is massively over-blown green propaganda 
and most of the damage attributed to climate change is linked to other factors.516 For 
example, various people cited tbe increased concentration of the population in Australia 
(and also overseas) in coastal locations, and more specifically increased residential 
development in areas prone to flood damage, bush-fire and other severe weather events. On 
that basis, the argument goes, there is little reason for the ICA to be taking the green side of 
the debate-they ought to be focusing on the planning decisions of local government, 
building standards and the like. 
515 It is a question of whether they think there is an immediate risk. [48;35] I suppose ifl was running an 
insurance company my focus would be on making sure my actuarial predictions were right, to make sure 
I was chasing enough premiums to cover my payouts and so long as I was covering myself in that reg-ard 
I suppose l don't actually have a vested interest in stopping storms from happening. They're interested in 
developing the insurance market and just making sure they make a profit on that market [7;87] 
516 There is a whole lot of paranoia in Miami, for example, because people have gone off for a wilole lot 
of totally different reasons and built high-rise buildings right on the. beach and the risk there is enormous 
but the risk from greenhouse is frankly not very enormous in the next 20 years. But any typhoon that you 
get has the potential to knock over half of Florida Quays .... l mean-you only have to listen to the radio 
this morning. Access Economics were talking about where property values are increasing and where you 
can make a couple of thousand dollars on your house-<lon~ buy in Canberra or Gungahli,,_,_go down to 
Batemans Bay and closer to the coast. {And those areas are more exposed?} That is where everybody 
wants to retire t~loser to the beach. And at the same time you're building property in more exposed 
areas. And the value is going up because everyone wants to be there--and so there is this vicious cycle 
happening-and if you look at Florida it is just amazing-·-you have these huge structures built right 
doVln on the beach with the waves literally washing up to them on a nonual day. So you don't have to 
have much of an imagination to think-if we have a nice storm we could have quite a problem. [4&;35-
47] 
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Other interviewees felt that even if climate change was responsible for increased payouts 
from the insurance sector, there were at least three policy implications discouraging action: 
i) there was still sufficient uncertainty about the proportion of the damage attributable to 
climate change to vvarrant caution; ii) most of the damage associated with climate change 
was likely to impact many years into the future; and iii) insurers could always increase 
premiums and make other adjustments to c-0verage if need be.517 
This is not to suggest, however, that most felt that the issue was a benign one for the 
insurance sector and the ICA. Even those who have also supported the previous argument 
attributing increased payouts to other causes generally also believed that climate change 
presented significant policy implications to the sector. They suggest that the ICA ought to 
have been a player on the blocking side of the greenhouse debate because strong emission 
reduction policies by Australia could threaten their substantial investments in carbon-
intensive industries.518 
Not surprisingly, the green side saw the policy implications for the ICA and insurance 
completely differently. The rationale for this has been discussed above at some length and 
so doesn't bear repeating. Insurance industry insiders have also raised doubts about the 
capacity of the industry to adapt and actuarise its way out of trouble in the longer term.519 
"' But their premiums are set almost on an annual basis and therefore if things start to change and start to 
get worse they can change the premiums. It's not like building a dam wbere you build it today and you 
hope it wiU operate properly in 50 years' time. So you have to make decisions about what the real 
en•ironment you're operating in wiU be like in 50 years' time. Both from the demand side and from the 
supply side. And it's not like that and l think the same applies to the fllrmers that it's an annual 
proposition. They plant a crop and each year they can make a decision about whether they plant, what 
they plant, what varieties they plant, whether they fertilize, and so on. So their capabilities of actually 
adapting as things move around them is a lot higher than for some of these other industries. [38;73] It 
would be their legitimate business concern to match their premiums to their payouts and to make sure 
that the actuarial tables connecting the two up are updated to include any effects of climate change, but I 
mean they don't stand to lose the Barrier Reef for example and it doesn't hurt them if a storm causes big 
payouts. As long as they've anticipated that in probability terms then they've picked it up in the 
premium. [7;91] 
"' For example, both 29 and 40 made this implication. 
519 But they're (insurers) hoisted on their own petard here because as they raise premiums your insurance 
coverage falls off. More people stop being insured, they can't afford it {Or they under insure?) Yes, or 
they under insure. But all of that relates to actually a smaller pool of people paying insurance and again 
it's the people with the more valuable assets and the more income. {It stops working?} Yes, there is a 
point where insurance stops working for everybody. Particularly the people carrying the risk, the 
underwriters. Unless you get what you need--a broad spread throughout the population ... If you increase 
the rate of insurance coverage you might not get a dramatic faU in premiums, but eventually you will get 
some because the reinsurance is reduced. [45;141-9] 
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However, what is interesting is that both sides believe that the policy implications are such 
that the ICA should have been more involved in the greenhouse policy network. 520 
Clearly for the insurance sector and the ICA, the policy implications of climate change cut 
both ways.521 While the timiug and extent of damage attributable to climate change may be 
hard to determine, and to isolate from other factors, increased global warming poses a 
threat to the insurance industry which is difficult to completely dismiss.522 At the same 
time, the sector is one of the largest institutional investors in carbon intensive industries. 
This arguably presents it with a potential lose-lose situation. 
This, however, does not take into account the potential upside of changing course sooner 
rather than later. There's recognition of these mixed implications in the industry--and this 
has kindled increasing but tentative involvement from the likes of AMP and IAG.523 They 
have seen both threats and opportunities (for example, in emissions trading) primarily in 
relation to the sector's role as an investor (rather than in relation to the climate change 
impacts and potential losses). However, the mixed interest problem has caused confusion it 
seems, and the issue has generally been left for the overseas industry. It is, perhaps, easier 
for overseas insurers to deal with, given that their investments are somewhat less exposed 
to carbon-intensive industries. 
520 (This, from a central AIGN player) For the whole time I have been involved in the greenhouse issue I 
have only had one or two discussions with !CA members--that is not for want of trying, it is just that 
again you have a group of people who are focused on other issues in their own environment rather than 
working across the whole range of different sectors and clusters .... It was more a case of them saying 
'well, we know what we're doing but we are not looking for a holistic solution-·-we are looking to a 
solution to our immediate problem' as opposed to saying 'where do we fit into a broader response 
strategy.' {What was their immediate problem?} How do you deal with the prospect of a rapid blowout 
in claims? {Because of extreme weather events?} Yes. [40; 13()-46] 
521 They've got obvious interests in terms of potential climate impact and adverse effects from climate 
change, but they are also participants in the economy and have signific.ant investments and assets that 
could be devalued if you adopted stringent policies in Australia that didn't apply to competitors operating 
in other countries ... [29; 113] I just don't think there's been a conviction that there's an unequivocally 
dear interest tbat their constituency would want to bring to this agenda. [51;42] The problem's too 
diffuse for them I think. [6;59] 
522 They operate in two spheres they are receivers offunds, but also major investors of funds. Now, they 
can continue to offer risk insurance and be receivers of premium funds and they can continue to invest 
that, but if at the end of the day they are putting up premiums so highly because they can't manage the 
risk then their sourees and supply of money just dries up. [30;60] 
523 For example, IAG was the only company involved in convening the Australian Climate Group--see 
'Climate Change Solutions for Australia,' The Australian Climate Group, June 2004. See also AMP 
Henderson Global Investors' Sumbission #72, Commonwealth Review of the lvfandatory Renewable 
Energy Target, May 2003 and (2003) 'Business unprepared for effect• of climate change,' Interview by 
Linda Mottram with Stephen Long of AMP Henderson, ABC Radio, AM Program, 23 January 2003 
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Interestingly, however, while some individual firms have tried to grapple with the issue--
notwithstanding the policy implications--the ICA has largely ignored the implications. 
\Vhile insiders allude to movement in the contrary direction,524 there is no evidence in any 
media coverage, Greenhouse Cuttings, ICA Briefings, or other public statements by the 
organisation to suggest serious analysis or consideration of the policy implications for 
insurers. The policy implications are in the 'too hard basket' with little ICA interest in 
revisiting them any time soon. 525 
Policy limitations 
The above discussion foreshadows the policy limitations for the insurance sector which 
also encouraged the ICA to play a peripheral role in the debate. As we have seen, to the 
limited extent to which they have focused on it, the Australian insurance industry perceives 
conflicting interests on this issue. On the one hand, it is exposed to the potential damage of 
climate change. On the other hand it is also vulnerable to emission reduction policy 
measures because of its exposure as an institutional investor in industrial operations that 
generate large amounts of greenhouse pollution. There is heavy pressure not to compromise 
those investments, shareholder value, or incur the wrath of the market. 526 There appears to 
be a strong and little appreciated argument to say that the ICA would be justified in 
avoiding involvement in a policy debate which had the risk of compromising the very large 
investment base of its membership. While this is little appreciated, it certainly appears to be 
a strong limitation on any highly assertive role of Australia's insurance sector and the ICA 
in the greenhouse debate. Australia's relatively high level of insurer investment in carbon-
524 So there has been a focus in the Insurance Council of Australia on increased claims as a result of 
weather incidents, but there hasn't been a commitment to saying it's because of greenhouse. That has 
shifted in just the last 24 months. The last 24 months is crystallized for them into a clearer concern about 
greerJ10use emissions driving climate change as opposed to other potential reasons for climate change 
and other issues around increased claims [ 45;45] 
525 The issues did not present in a way that they saw as being relevant That's part of the issue here. That 
where it's a complex agenda, where the underlying structural and systemic issues are not immediately 
obvious, and where on the face of it the impacts would be seen to be marginal to the direct interest, then 
the players just don't engage. [51;146] ... the insurance industry is part of the broader financial sector and 
there are some real benefits to be had out of greenhouse in terms of opportunities to invest in sinks, in 
new technologies which are growth technologies, renewables and the like. And 1 don't see any of that 
being understood by the industry. [30;64] I think part of the problem with the insurance industry is that 
they don't understand what they are talking about If the insurance industry were real and understood 
greenhouse they would be lobbying for mandated building c-0nditions on coastal housing, they would be 
lobbying to stop buildings happening on flood plains or adjacent to the ocean, they would be arguing for 
retrofitting and standards for buildings, all of this designed to cut the insurance loss when the first 
cyclone comes through in the extreme Climate Change event. Now instead they are talking still about 
cutting fossil fuels. {So you think their focus if they were serious would be on adaptation?} Yes. (And 
why do you think it has not been? Just lack of understanding of the issue?} Yes. !18;168--76] 
526 See previous quote [29; 113] in footnote 521 
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intensive industries may arguably help to explain the reluctance of the sector to get 
involved in greenhouse policy development to the extent that their counterparts abroad 
have done. That said, it is important to note the major change in the structure of the 
economy. As Axiss Australia (2005) has noted: 
Traditional industries like resources and manufacturing that together accounted for 
over 70 per cent of market capitalisation in 1989 comprised just over 30 per cent in 
2001. Service companies have filled the gap and financial services companies now 
account for nearly 40 per cent of the market, compared to 18 per cent in 1991. 
The other major policy limitation for the ICA appears to relate to a perceived lack of power 
to actually reduce insurers' exposure even if aggressive measures are adopted by Australia 
to reduce greenhouse emissions. As has been discussed previously, the damage caused by 
global wanning to the Great Barrier Reef cannot be reversed by reducing emissions now-
because the emissions likely to cause temperature rise and coral bleaching are already in 
the atmosphere. The insurance sector is similarly limited in what it can do to reduce its 
exposure to the impacts of climate change. That is, if Australia reduced its emissions to 
zero tomorrow, the costs of increased severe weather events anticipated to be associated 
with global warming will not be significantly affected. The increased insurer costs are 
inevitable.527 This does not even take into account the reality that unilateral action by the 
Australian government would not only not prevent damage associated with existing 
emissions--it would also not necessarily be associated with a reduction in emissions 
globally.528 Hence, there is a defensible argument which is put forward by some that for 
insurance 'the die is already cast' so 'why waste time and resources lobbying for policy 
change which will not reduce our exposure. 529 
521 If you look at the science of greenhouse and if you believe it that what is going to happen in the next 
50 years is preordained, you can turn all the fossil fuels in Australia off tomorrow and in the next 50 
years it would have no effect whatsoever on ocean heights and global warming, climatic extremes or 
anything else. It is a preordained equation. {So what you are saying is that if they believe the greenhouse 
science their increased losses from more extreme climate change related weather events is preordained?} 
They are preordained, they are real, and they better start bloody well focusing on it fust [18;160·-4] I 
guess another interpretation is in a sense that the importance for the insurance industry does not have a 
lot to do with the policy process. In other words, if you take the position that you believe the science then 
you would also quite rightly-and their a<:tuaries woul)l understand presumably all this-you then 
quickly come to the conclusion that says the amount of climate change we're gonna have to have in the 
next 50 years is already built into the system-in other words it does not matter what the policy process 
does now, it is already in the system, we are setting our premiums and risk assessments based on that. So 
it is an internal process of evaluating the science, believing it or let's say, or discounting it, or even saying 
that it might be worse than what they are saying feeding that into your premiums settings, and away you 
go. It does not matter what happens in the policy process. [19; 135] 
528 
••• you're (insurer's) not going to he at any less risk if no-one else does anything about it and the 
world's temperature rises and the world's weather pattern is disturbed and so forth. [30;60] 
529 There's not much they feel they can do [45;45] 
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Finally, an important policy limitation taking the above into account is that insurers can 
always opt out of risks as they increase and leave government to carry it.530 This 'in built 
adaptation strategy' is yet another reason why the ICA might logically choose to sit on the 
periphery of the policy network. Also, drawing attention to that strategy is likely to be 
unpopular with both government and consumers. Many also feel that insurance would also 
be unpopular if it tried to blame premium increases on climate change, given existing 
animosity towards the sector and suspicion that the industry would be using the issue for 
opportunistic reasons. 531 
Related government policy agenda 
As has been discussed already, the interests of the ICA are arguably in conflict on climate 
change because of their significant investment in the relatively carbon-intensive industrial 
activities historically prevalent in the Australian economy. As a consequence, members of 
the Australian insurance sector have a significant interest in maintaining the status quo. 
Conversely, as the green movement and many players in the greenhouse policy network 
have argued, the insurance sector would also have a strong interest in being greatly 
invested in any transformation of the carbon intensity of the economy.532 In other words, if 
government were to decide to put the Australian economy on a policy trajectory which Jed 
to large reductions in both greenhouse pollution intensity and overall emissions by 
Australia, insurers would want to have a 'large slice of the action' in any emerging 
investments likely to do well in the new environment. However, in the absence of a strong 
530 I have heard, but aru not certain whether I can identify precisely where I heard it, that AMP has ceased 
to offer weather related insurance in Northern Australia particularly parts of North Western Australia for 
cyclonic and other weather-related risk because the risk is too great. [30;60] Under insurance, 
government pays in the end. [26;26] 
S31 They can't be seen to be scaring people to take up insurance. They can't be seen to be saying 'oh the 
greenhouse effect is coming you've gotta take up insurance.' They can't do that. But, they should be and 
they have been actively telling people that-in communities where there has been a lot of building in 
flood zones for example that there is quite a high risk from extreme weather events. There is extremely 
high risk of short-term flooding, flash flooding. But I actually couldn't tell you where as an organisation 
they are going to go on this. It is vexed for the insurance industry. It is very difficult. [45;267] And so, 
the insurance industry has suddenly thought well, here is a nice excuse for us to start winding up our 
premiums and blarue it on greenhouse. I aru pretty sceptical about the motives frankly of some of these 
people. (In the insurance industry?} Absolutely. {So the risk has changed but you don't think that the 
risk increase is weather-related-but that it is building related}. Absolutely. [48;35-47] I characterised 
them a moment ago as being part of the opportunistic set-and part of the opportunism is driven, as you 
quite rightly say, by the fact that they're staring down the barrel of more unusual climatic events ... and 
everybody has a nervous breakdown. These are the people everybody loves to hate. [37;115] 
532 This carue through in a wide range of interviews from sources as diverse as 33, 35, 46, 12, 56, 30 and 
39 
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push by government to change policy in this ·way, the government policy direction arguably 
encourages the insurance industry and their peak body to do very little, so supporting 
maintenance of the status quo, A number of comments by interviewees indirectly agree 
with that interpretation, referring to the industry's capacity to adapt to any changes 
gradually, and even eventually to <rffload any damage on to the government itself.533 
Government and/or departmental processes 
To the extent that there has been any ICA response to climate change, it was largely driven 
by government processes and the perception that government expected and/or sought at 
least some engagement by them. As we have already seen, government did view ICA 
participation in the policy network as desirable, This comes through more in the interviews, 
however, than in the documentary evidence. There has been a plethora of greenhouse-
related processes implemented by government at the departmental level since climate 
change first emerged as an issue in the late 1980s. In almost all cases, the record shows that 
the Insurance Council has been a non·participant However, the ICA's decision to join the 
Greenhouse Challenge (albeit many years into the program's operation) is an exception that 
warrants mention, There is little doubt that the program gave the ICA a hook on which to 
hang involvement by the organisation in an issue where they perceived a desire from 
government [and to a lesser extent that of their membership and the wider community] to at 
least be seen to be taking part.534 
The only other significant government process to lead to greater ICA engagement on 
climate change has been more recent, with the 'Business Dialogue' process launched 
during the third term of the Howard government The ICA agreed to be part of this process, 
and certainly their involvement would not have been likely in the absence of an explicit 
invitation from government to participate. One of the reasons why this process succeeded 
in obtaining ICA engagement has been that the process itself was open to a much larger 
533 The predictions are 'yes, it's going to get worse but we've got the time now to either write up the 
premiums or drop the coverage ... So where the cyclones come into far North Queensland and lower 
Queensland, north-west Western AustraHa, Darwin and so on like that, again plenty of time to jack up the 
premiums, Make sure the risk/reward balance pays out.' So they have an ideal adaptation policy. (I 
gather in some eases they're already refusing to offer cover.} Yes. Exactly, yes. So 1>1hat happens is risk 
from these sort of events gets transferred to governments eventually, [52;79, 71-5] 
534 !CA \\'11S less interested in greenhouse than it might appear, it was keen ID be seen to be doing 
something ... It was a passive and reactive response to overtures from government, specifically the AGO. 
[26;!0] 
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number of participants than has been the case with previous govermnent processes.535 
Again, however, the ICA involvement reinforces the point that they have only chosen to get 
active where they perceive pressure from government to do so. That said, some well placed 
interviewees confirmed that the ICA involvement in the Business Dialogue Process has 
been minimal, and tailed off after some initial attendance at meetings.536 This too would 
appear to reinforce the impression gained that the ICA participation in the greenhouse 
policy network has been intended to satisfy the bare minimum expectations of others rather 
than the interests of its membership. 
International processes 
Another meso-level factor which this research suggests has played an important, though not 
decisive role in the ICA's response to climate change has been the way international 
processes dealing with the problem have played out. The insurance industry internationally 
is a regular and significant presence at the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) 
associated with the FCCC. Insurers were also strong advocates for aggressive emission 
reductions in the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol.537 However, the lead was taken 
primarily by multi-national insurers, and it has mainly been these companies whose offices 
were at the forefront of raising the issue in Australia-with Australian companies showing 
either less intense interest or delaying any display of interest at all until recently.538 Under 
the circumstances, and from the comments provided in interviews here, it would seem that 
the very visible presence of insurers at international conventions again gave the ICA a 
reason to opt out itself on the basis that the matter was already being dealt with 
internationally by the insurance sector.539 
535 The Government-Business Climate Change Dialogue process initially involved 34 industry 
associations when it was first convened by then Environment Minister, David Kemp. See 'Government 
Works with Business to Map Long Term Greenhouse Action, Media Statement by the Honourable David 
Kemp MP, Minister for the Enviromnent, 21August2002. 
536 The !CA agreed to join the Business Dialogue, but has been apathetic and missed the first few 
meetings. [50;28] 
537 My perception is that the driver of the insurance industry position on greenhouse was actually external 
to this country. That you had a significant body of opinion in Europe suggesting that there were 
significant risk factors that should be recognised and taken into account. [51;38] I can imagine that the 
Insurance Council were interested in the validity of that. But the sceptics jumped on some of that early 
work so strongly and the models were so primitive, the computer models they were using were so 
primitive relatively speaking to now, that they couldn't hold up under any scrutiny. It's interesting that 
the Insurance Council then went away for six or seven years. [45;73] 
538 I thought it was interesting that the insurance people who were at those early greenhouse conferences 
were all representing international bodies like Munich Reinsurance. They weren't representing AMP or 
other Australian insurance bodies. [9;138] 
539 35 refers to conversations with !CA staff confirming this. 
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Greenhouse science 
The common feature of the meso-level influences on the ICA which resulted in Jess 
involvement in the greenhouse policy network is that they gave them another reason to sit 
on the sidelines. Just as the policy implications were mixed making it difficult to decide 
what policy the ICA might push, and just as there were limitations on policy which meant 
that their advocacy might not actually achieve much for their members,540 the Jack of 
certainty in greenhouse science was another readily available excuse for doing little about 
climate change. The past 15 years have seen increasing consensus about the likely impacts 
of global warming sufficient to concern the insurance sector. However, wil.iie the science 
has improved to the point that projections can be made with more and more confidence 
about impacts at the regional level, there is an inherent problem for the insurance sector 
because of the many intermingled and often inseparable risks it deals with. That is, it is 
almost impossible for the insurers to accurately separate out the losses associated with 
climate change from other factors. There is strong evidence that this has been a factor that 
has persistently made it difficult for the ICA to remove greenhouse policy from the too 
hard basket, and provided encouragement for those wanting to ignore or deny the issue.541 
A strand of denial or scepticism about science is apparent in some industry statements. One 
noteworthy comments in support of well known greenhouse sceptic Richard Lindzen from 
Rod Lester (1993), the son of the late Les Lester who, as previously mentioned, led the 
initial ICA foray into the issue in the late 1980s. 
540 Now from the community's point of view, there is because if we finish up in 30 or 40 or 50 years' 
time because of policies now having more risk in terms of property risk and so on and therefore at that 
point in time we're having to invest a greater part of our wealth into insuring against that, well then that's 
not good for us. But to the industry does it really matter? [38;81] 
541 In the case of the Insurance Council I think it's two things. One is the lack of us being able to provide 
them with the information that they want to get, and therefore they could easily say we'll wait around 
until they get there, and the secoud thing is the time scale ... And it's only really this year that our newest 
model we're starting to think we're getting confidence enough that in the next few years we'll be able to 
provide mueh more detailed regional predictions of what will happen rdlher than these scenarios, the 
broad scenarios. Because the models just haven't been good enough to do that. [38;73] My reading of it 
is, having participated in debates in Washington with insurance reps, they haven't got the data on their 
side to justify any increase in rates. [49; 164] It's drawing rather a long bow just saying that al! of these 
are climate change induced [47;120] Well claims have been going up that work was first pointed out by 
World Watch Institute and Greenpeace in the mid 90's and then Swiss Re hopped on in the late 90's and 
they had all said 'yes, well claims are going up' but it was always countered by the insurance industry by 
the argument 'well tl(.1:Ually it's a result of increasing urbanisation of riverside and seaside lands, bad 
planning and larger numbers of insured objects and people.' {And increasing value of the properties?} 
Increasing value of the insured. [ 4 5 ;33-3 7] 
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Macro-level 
Only a few macro-level factors have been found to have had any role in influencing the 
ICA's response to climate change. None of these, however, are as significant as the impact 
of meso-level pressures, and these in tum have been less powerful than the micro-level 
issues discussed earlier. 
Broad government ideology and culture 
While it has not been a strong factor a sense emerges that the general ideology and culture 
of the Australian government over time has played a role in the ICA's response to climate 
change. No federal government has seriously attempted to engage the financial sector in 
general or the insurance industry in particular on environmental issues. As has already been 
mentioned, aside from the Greenhouse Challenge there has been no strong attempt to 
engage these sectors as active players in the greenhouse debate either. Under the 
circumstances, the political environment has left issues relating to sustainable development 
to a limited set of players-primarily green NGOs, resource-based industry associations, 
and certain sections of the government. Interviewees noted this political environment as 
being of great significance, whilst not making the connection with the ICA response. 
However, a few did make the link and put a strong argument that government's effective 
endorsement of a political context, in which environmental issues are dealt with by 'a usual 
set of suspects,' tends to dissuade financial and insurance sector involvement and 
perpetuate policy direction-in this case, a very cautious policy by government towards 
climate change.542 
Related policy networks 
Perhaps the clearest macro-level factor driving the ICA response to climate change has 
been their engagement in other policy networks. As has been mentioned previously, the 
ICA has been active in a wide range of other policy networks--dealing with matters as 
diverse as building codes, financial regulation, public liability and flood mapping. While it 
has had the resources to be concerned to a significant depth with some policy domains, 
there is no escaping the reality that the ICA has been thinly spread across many different 
542 Financial services is 350,000 jobs, so our future is in services and we should be positioned to foster 
that and not be too slowed down by the heritage of where the big voices are coming from at the moment 
because that's the way the world works anyway. [46;258] 
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issues, and active in other networks. Some certainly argue that this has made it more 
difficult for the ICA to play a significant role in the greenhouse debate. 543 Others suggest 
that this refleets a focus on problems which the ICA can solve relative to problems which it 
cannot.544 
Another related matter has been the information ba.rrier to entry in the greenhouse debate. 
While the ICA have been caught up in other networks which appear to be quite diverse, the 
subject matter is less foreign and complex than climate change or the ICA are an integral 
part of an existing or related network-thereby making it easier to participate. Climate 
change, however, appears to have presented the ICA with an issue which is too far out of 
its comfort zone and too distant from the other networks which it has sought to engage in. 
This distance, or higher information barrier to entry is a factor which many view as being a 
significant deterrent in the case of the ICA.545 
Other factors relevant to the case 
There is one other structural factor which it appears may have prevented further ICA 
engagement on greenhouse. This relates to the effective subsidy arrangement which has 
emerged in the property insurance industry whereby the risk is averaged across suburbs. In 
years gone by, for example, the premiums in high income areas of Sydney's eastern 
suburbs outweighed severe weather losses. However, according to some insurance industry 
543 It's a bit difficult for them now because they have so many other urgent issues on their plate ... they 
are still interested ... but they can1 put much time in for obvious reasons because they have so many 
other pressing concerns. [11;98) ... they've got other things do worry about. [23;340] They've been 
overtaken by events.,, there's too many other hot potatoes for them of an immediate nature that they've 
had to deal with. [ 45;89] 
544 So in the last ten years while there hasn't been a presence by the ICA in greenhouse politics or public 
debate they've been directly involved in Landcare. Much more directly involved in forums for toVvn 
planners. Directly involved in the debate about land ll'lC. Where they could see some immediate 
decisions, immediate issues where decisions have been made daily that will create potential risks (like 
Land care) because of this issue of people clearing in catchments and building on river banks, building on 
sea fronts and all that stufl:; smaller clearances between buildings. [45;45] 
545 { .. .it's all too hard so they just don't show up?} And when they do show up they'll find that there's a 
number of personalities who do know each other and it comes down to who's sharing documents across 
working groups and within working groups and how many subsets those working groups are operating. 
[34;440] {NAFI and NFF had dealt with green issues; before do you think that gives them much of a 
head start on for example the Insurance Council?} Yeah-I think so also but only because it is about 
politics and promoting the group interest and playing that in the political field and because environment 
issues have been resolved in a political framework in Australian groups whicb have participated in 
environmental debates and understand politics and better tend to he more successful. [39;344-6] {Were 
they (the !CA) pan of the executive directors' group?} No. {Why is that? Were they too Sydney based?} 
Well---yes. But the finance community-..even the Bankers' Association--didn't tend to get involved 
much. [!3;218-28] 
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insiders, this is changing. It is now arguable that drastically increased prices of property in 
these suburbs and increased severe and localised weather risk have in combination led to a 
situation whereby fewer lower income and lower insurance risk locations like western 
Sydney are subsidising the losses of what have until recently been some of the most 
lucrative insurance agencies in the country. It's suggested that Australia's actuaries have 
made a judgment that premium increases in wealthier areas are harder to impose because of 
the risk of underinsurance or non-renewal, and hence there has been a tendency to raise 
premiums in lower risk areas in order to subsidise the high risk associated with climate 
change in more exposed locations (which almost inevitably are associated with higher 
property values and potential losses).546 If this suggestion is correct, it may be something to 
which the industry would prefer not to draw public attention-something which 
engagement in the greenhouse debate might make more likely. 
Conclusions 
The lack .of activity on climate change by the ICA is one of the real mysteries in this 
country's greenhouse policy network. Here is an organisation which recognised the 
relevance of climate change to its industry early, participated in, sponsored, and even 
assisted on the organising committee for the first major conferences held in Australia on the 
issue in the late 1980s. It is an organisation that is well resourced, professionally led, has a 
relatively small number of wealthy members, and has a strong representation from overseas 
companies that are well aware of the greenhouse policy role being played by insurers 
overseas. It is an organisation whose industry arguably has the most to lose, and yet they 
are effectively sitting on the sidelines in the Australian debate-even today. This has been 
a source of concern, confusion, and angst among many participants in the greenhouse 
debate. However, when the internal and external forces at work are examined more closely 
as has been done here, the response of the ICA is much less surprising and more easily 
explained. 
A wide range of factors have encouraged the ICA to play a peripheral role. All four major 
internal pressures on group behaviour have acted to dissuade ICA involvement. The culture 
546 I don't think they're going to tell anybody. Because obviously when you're averaging risk across a lot 
of different factors, some people are subsidising others. Some areas are subsidising others. The reality is 
that probably the people in the less expensive houses but with the mid-cost insurance policies are 
subsidising the expensive people and the people in the bush. {So the people in Carnpbelltown are 
probably subsiding the Eastern Suburbs.} The premiums in the Eastern Suburbs. Because that's where 
the real losses lie, potential losses really lie. [45;128-33] 
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and leadership of the ICA have been especially significant. At the level of the greenhouse 
network itself, the majority of factors have also discouraged ICA involvement. These 
diverse pressures have all given the ICA more reasons to sit on the sidelines. The apparent 
impossibility of discovering policy solutions which would reduee the damage likely to be 
ineurred by the sector made engagement in the policy network seem futile. Finally, there 
were important macro-level factors at play which also created an environment in which 
minimal ICA engagement was the most likely outcome. 
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9 
Case 7-the Sydney Futures Exchange 
Introduction 
Though not a 'normal' public interest group or business association, the Sydney Futures 
Exchange is nonetheless an interest group according to the broad definition used here. The 
SFE provides an interesting contrast to the other cases in that its involvement in the 
greenhouse policy network was very intense but restricted to an approximate 3 year period 
from late 1997 to late 2000. 
Their interest in climate policy was almost entirely focused on the opportunity which the 
organisation perceived to play a central role in greenhouse emissions trading. Prior to the 
their recognition of this opportunity in 1997, the organisation showed no interest 
whatsoever in climate change. Since publicly announcing its intention not to pursue 
emissions trading in 2000, they have shown no further interest in the issue whatsoever. 
However, from 1997 to 2000 the SFE was one of the most active players in the greenhouse 
policy network and the story of the rise and fall of SFE engagement is both instructive and 
little understood. This case reinforces the powerful influence that micro-level factors have 
on interest group decisions about policy network engagement. 
The decision by the SFE to exit carbon trading coincided with a period of enormous change 
at the organisation, including a leadership change after 14 years of continuity, along with 
de-mutualisation. Significant changes in the board and the leadership followed, and a 
comprehensive review of the organisation led to a big shift in its priorities, and turnover in 
key personnel. These changes are crucially relevant to SFE decisions in relation to carbon 
trading and their role in the greenhouse policy network more broadly. 
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Activity 
For the period in which the SFE was engaged (1997-2000) the organisation was readily 
acknowledged as a highly active player.547 However, while they received some respect for 
their vigour, there was always a sense of cynicism and suspicion about their 
involvement.548 To most observers, the SFE's activities in the policy network were pure 
opportunism.549 They were newcomers who were clearly out to make a dollar from the 
economic misery of others in the network. They were seen variously as 'carbon cowboys,' 
'snake oil salesmen,' and 'rent seekers' by other players in the network.550 
The SFE' s activities on greenhouse during the above mentioned period were solely focused 
on the opportunity which was seized by the organisation for the Exchange to play a central 
role in any domestic emissions trading system flowing from the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations. Taking a lead from the Chicago Board of Trade's role in the US sulphur 
dioxide emissions trading system, the SFE moved rapidly in this period to carve out a niche 
for itself as the centre for what it saw as inevitable greenhouse emissions trading in 
547 
"'.you know they were very active early on. [2;132] The SFE was extraordinarily vigourously 
involved if you take the last 3·-3Yz year time horizon in the early part Post-Kyoto COP-3. Vigorously 
involved. There was agreement we would have the Kyoto Protocol, early discussion of the use of 
economic instruments, there seemed to be some SFE enthusiasm and indeed they started to get quite 
excited about it, brought in a number of people, even recruited some people out of the bureaucracy. 
(30;96] 
548 Clamouring by some groups to get iheir fill in the new greenhouse trough [34;204] l suppose I 
thought that they believed, rightly or wrongly, that somebody was going to make money out of 
speculating on the carbon credits and if there was money to be made speculating on the future, then 
Sydney Futures Exchange wanted to be part of it. [9;162] 
549 You got a real salesman type of deal from them-they really had something to sell, when I met people 
from State Forests I think they'd been on secondment to the Sydney futures E1<change even ... Yeah, it 
was really like 'I've got something to sell you mate!' 'Geez we're great.' That kind ofoan-do culture. But 
it was a little too much over the top l think-a bit too overoonfident. (39; 180-4] When all this carbon 
trading business slatted to emerge they saw a commercial opportunity for themselves along with all of 
the corporate law firms and the big accounting firms, the brokers, and everyone else. They all wmited a 
piece of the margin. [l 1;!06] I think here you just had a group who saw an opportunity. [6;103] 
Opportunistic. [19;151] Sydney Futures Exchange, well yeah--they are sort of greenhouse policy 
entrepreneurs. In the sense they see the Kyoto Protocol and the sink provisions as a business opportunity. 
[39;92] ... al! I can say is that emissions permit trading was seen as a get rich quick scheme for traders. 
[18;188] 
550 I think they put a lot of money out and I mean they were carbon cowboys in the sense that they were 
entrepreneurs. They saw carbon has a 'wang bang' new product that they could make money out of it and 
they did invest probably a lot of money going around talking about this, producing brochures, putting on 
staff, and then it probably has worked out we!! for them. [39; 112] There was a packet of snake oil 
salesmen who thought they found a get rich quick way-and there was going to be money falling out of 
the heavens for them. [18;198-200] They were just pure rent seeking. They thought they could run the 
carbon trade. [29;192] 
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Australia.551 It was an ambition not limited to domestic emissions trading, but incorporated 
longer term plans to act as an emissions trading hub for the Asia Pacific region, even 
globally.552 Though the Commonwealth had not decided upon the shape of any emissions 
trading system in Australia (nor even whether there would be an emissions trading system), 
and while the details of international trading were far from finalised, the SFE invested 
heavily in a campaign to ensure government decisions favoured a trading system in line 
with a model designed by the SFE. 
Unlike many other interest groups which were slow to react on climate change, the SFE 
moved quickly to see what it recognised as an opportunity to profit from greenhouse 
pollution reduction. In late 1999, they announced that they would establish the 'world's 
first exchange traded market for carbon sequestration credits (CSCs).' The market would 
commence in mid-2000, initially in conjunction with the New South Wales Forestry 
Service.553 The SFE said that the new market 'is as a result of market demand for risk 
management products to hedge the effects of the Kyoto Protocol' (SFE undated). In other 
words, the Protocol was assumed to increase the risk that carbon emissions would carry a 
price at some stage in the not too distant future. Trading in CSCs would provide a way for 
companies to hedge now against the potentially far greater cost of carbon emissions in 
future. Trading would also offer various other benefits of national significance (like 
increased greenhouse sinks) . 
. December 1999 saw the launch of a website sponsored by the SFE ( carbontrading.com) and 
dedicated to the growing interest in carbon credits trading (SFE 2000a). The SFE also ran a 
conference on carbon trading in the Blue Mountains in March 2000 and a workshop in 
Sydney in April 2000. At the same time, the Exchange participated enthusiastically in 
parliamentary inquiries into climate change, offered advice to the Australian Greenhouse 
Office on its emissions trading agenda, and made regular comments in the media promoting 
551 
... our conclusion was there's a global concern about carbon emissions, they will have to be managed 
in some form or another. Some countries are going to break away and create and this is back in '97 mind 
you some countries are going to break away and even without Kyoto as a global ratification, they're 
going to put controls over their own countries and try and deal with the problem. There was a certain 
inevitability about all of that process leading to certification of carbon emissions, just the same as 
America have already certified sulphur dioxide emissions and that was truly a lead to us. [46;46] 
552 Les drove it, he oould see an enormous opportunity, he went into a kind of alliance with Bob Carr to 
work this thing out. I think they both saw in their dreams Sydney being the key Asian Pacific regional 
commereial centre for trading and I think Cathy Zoi had a bit to do with it as well. [15;148] 
553 New South Wales had helped to pave the way for such a market by passing complementary legislation 
enabling the allocation of property rights to carbon and establishing a stale-based greenhouse emissions 
trading system. NSW now mandates a requirement that electricity utilities to reduce greenhouse 
emissions, which in turn is spurring development of a market for carbon sequestration rights (CSRs}. 
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carbon trading. When the newly established AGO sought public input on a series of 
discussion papers on an emissions trading system, and experts to sit on an advisory panel, 
the SFE was quick to get in on the act. During this period of intense activity they seemed 
almost omnipresent-if there was a climate change gig that that mattered, the SFE was 
almost certainly there. 554 At the same time, they were sought out for meetings with a wide 
range of senior bureaucrats and politicians for whom emissions trading was becoming an 
increasingly important agenda item.555 
However, in August 2000 the SFE made a dramatic u-tum on carbon trading, abandoning 
plans for its introduction. 'citing commercial imperatives stemming from the SFE's 
demutualisation' (Horden 2000:8) 556 There was no media release issued by them 
announcing the decision, and hence minimal media coverage.m Since that time, so far as 
this research has been able to establish, they have made no public statements on greenhouse 
or emissiollS trading. It was not immediately dear what led to the SFE's dramatic change of 
plans on carbon trading.558 Understanding this change in course has been the focus of much 
of this case study. 
Analysis of group response 
The interview data confirmed many commonly held assumptions about the SFE's 
concentrated yet fleeting greenhouse response. The comments received add a great deal of 
richness to our understanding of how and why this organisation responded. 
554 And by this time SFE had been in emissions trading enlisting in the Stuart writing newsletters and 
putting in submissions into every inquiry under the sun.} Correct [22;157] 
555 {Stuart was very well connected up in Canberra?} He was. I think Stuart spent a fair bit of time (up 
there}. Les went a few times to the Greenhouse Office ... We spent some time in Canberra with various 
politicians trying tu work {it} out ... [22;1l1-35) 
556 Confirmed in [24; 17] 
557 Within a matter of weeks the main architect of the SFE's trading agenda had resigned from the 
organisation and left to start his own oompany - Universal Carbon Exchange (UCX) which is fucusing 
mainly on the very same agenda which the SFE has abandoned. Source: Universal Carbon Exchange 
Website http://www.ucx.com.au 
'" The leader of the staff running the carbon trading program, Mr Stuart Beil has told the author that he 
is not able to discuss the matter - it is unclear whether this position relates to any confidentiality clause to 
which he might be subject. Interviews with SFE insiders, however, make it very clear that Beil's 
departure was a direct consequence of the decision not to proceed with the CSC market 
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Micro-level 
Internal organisational factors were critically important influences on the SFE's degree of 
engagement in the greenhouse policy network. The SFE provides a perfect example of how 
powerful these micro-level forces can be, particularly when they all exert pressure in the 
same direction. What is particularly useful in the SFE case is that the relatively short-lived 
but intense activity demonstrates how powerful shifts at the micro-level (in this case in 
relation to all four) can lead to rapid changes group engagement. 
Organisational culture 
Organisational culture is a major component of the story on why the SFE in climate change 
came and went so quickly. This is because the departure of the SFE coincided with and was 
directly linked to, a major cultural change which took place in the organisation with 
demutualisation. The SFE has long been an organisation dominated by a financial 
community culture: conservative yet entrepreneurial and very opportunistic yet cautious. 
The organisation's comfort zone has been the setting up and running of markets. It is at 
home as a player in the Sydney financial market scene and unaccustomed to, and poorly 
connected into, the Canberra scene.559 As a mutual entity prior to 2000, the SFE was also 
an organisation with a relatively small number of very wealthy corporate members, many 
from overseas, all seeking to maximise their returns. To observers in the Canberra-centric 
greenhouse policy network the SFE's culture came across as opportunistic and slick. 
An important aspect of the SFE's organisational culture prior to demutualisation that 
encouraged the organisation's greenhouse policy involvement was a strong commitment to 
research and development. This was an integral part of their organisational culture and 
strongly driven by the long time CEO of the SFE, Les Hosking. Investment in new 
products in which the SFE could create long-term profitable markets was seen as a very 
high priority and one to which substantial resources were readily devoted.560 Granted, only 
a small percentage of new products ended up being acceptably profitable,561 but there was 
559 The Futures Exchange ... they too have not been played into the Canberra system. [18;256] 
560 I've made a point that up to demutualisation it was very much led by the CEO. The culture was very 
R&D driven so we'd love to get in a room with a wbite board and map and we weren't really looking at 
the financials and the payback. [22;381-3] 
561 The success of new products at the exchange, in fact any exchange, it's very low, about one in ten 
products actually gets up. You can see a very long list of products that we've tried over the years but very 
few have the prerequisites for success to actually get a viable futures market up and running. So you 
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recognition within the SFE's membership that research and development (R&D) had been 
responsible for their growth over many years and that ·without it the organisation would still 
be dealing solely with greasy wool and a couple of rural commodities.562 
In short the SFE was long-termist, risk shouldering and risk seeking, and not obsessively 
concerned with profits. With demutualisation all this changed. Almost overnight the SFE 
became short-termist, risk sharing and risk averse, and heavily focused on the immediate 
bottom line.563 
could argue we had a very low hit rate ... we were always looking to diversify ... {Why are you focusing 
·on a new product when you know you've got a one in ten chance?} Well I gues.' we keep trying until we 
get one. {So how many would you have on the go in the R&D section at one time?} In those days you'd 
probably have four or five. {Potential new opportunities?} And arguably your resources would be spread 
very thin so you'd be juggling a bit to keep them all running, [22;19,27,33-5,49-55] 
%1 ••• I'm that old that I can remember the Sydney Greasy Wool Futures Market, the original market, and 
the twelve members of the Greasy Wool Futures Market looking at a new instrument like a cattle contract 
and then more particularly a new instrument like the gold contract and saying, 'we're just interested in 
wool and why should we be using the fees that we pay to you at SFE to develop a new product that we're 
never going to use? If you want to develop a new product, go off and get the people that are interested in 
that new product to fund it,' which is the SFE attitude now, right? But most of the successful exchanges 
have always =ss-subsidised their revenue from successful instruments in developing new instruments 
and it's in the best interests of the exchange, the entire exchange and its membership, to actually do that 
cross-subsidisation in the event that you do need to diversify into other products because your existing 
product goes through a downturn in volume or whatever ... We would not have been a leading financial 
futures exchange had not the wool members of the Sydney Greasy Wool Futures Exchange agreed that 
development in new instruments should take place and that's the underlying argument and it works very 
well for mutual entities. They say, 'well yes, we're willing to support a new development because we're 
brokers and ·we can actually price-make in these new products.' It's almost similar to brokers saying at 
the Australian Stock Exchange, 'you know most of our volume, if not 80 per cent of our volume is in the 
top 50 stocks so we're not interested in any other stocks being listed on the Stock Exchange' and then 
they're sort of deciding what's going to be a big stock and under that attitude Microsoft would never 
have been Listed on any exchange in the world, so my argument is always that too. Go back and have a 
c-0ld shower-this has got to go on because otherwise you don't discover these new instruments, or 
you're not part of them, they go somewhere else. [46;74,82] 
563 Post demutualisatiou is a different approach. Product development before was a bit of a 'we wiH build 
and they will come' approach where now ... with shareholder equity, we sort of look for 'okay we need to 
look for somebody to help us underwrite this because the probability of this getting up is low, we're not 
going to spend millions of dollars and see this not work, so we need to go out and we need to get people 
to commit to using il If we build it, or look to people to underwrite some of the costs of buildiug it, 
rather than do it all ourselves, given that we aren't that large a company and our balance sheet isn't that 
large even if it is a one or two million dollar investment it's speculative. A one or two million dollar 
investment on a balance sheet our size is actually a pretty big punt and given the low probability of it 
getting up it's all about risk of return and pay off. {Yes. So, ... there's less scope for speculation into 
new products.} Yes. {Would it also be fair to say that there's more pressure to have a short-term return? 
So irrespective of whether it's a new or and old product, if you're going and getting into something new, 
let's say, there'd be more pressure now that you're listed to have something that's going to start paying 
off relatively soon?} Yes. Yes, definitely. {That's a noticeable change?} It is a noticeable change. 
However before J don't think we ever quantified. V.lhen we said we were doing something because we 
thought it would be big in three to six years I don't think we ever sat dov.11 and tried to quantify it 
because we couldn't. So on any objective criteria we never would have passed that test under the old 
mutual. We would put a finger in the air. We think, therefore we'll take a punt that this will get up. {Yes. 
You might have thought in those days, we think this might happen within five to eight years or 
something and we can probably argue that case to the board.) Yes. [22; 273~87] 
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With much greater pressure for a short-term return, investment in R&D ceased to be a 
priority at the SFE. The organisation was now listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) and had to effectively answer every day, through its share price, to close to 2000 
new stakeholders.564 It is important to appreciate that their enthusiastic involvement in the 
greenhouse policy network took root during the final years of the old mutual pro-R&D 
culture. 
The decision to abandon carbon trading came almost immediately after demutualisation. It 
was no coincidence. The new leadership of the SFE made it clear internally that it would 
not sustain an investment in greenhouse-the payoff was too far off, and it was too risky to 
justify the investment. This cultural change is also reflected in the fact that there was 
almost complete turnover of members in the SFE board, and it is estimated that close to a 
third of the staff have left in the three years following demutualisation.565 
Whereas the old SFE was willing to carry significant risk in R&D work, the new SFE 
hedged against such risk by using partnerships in R&D and sharing risk. After a rapid and 
ultimately fruitless search by SFE staff for new partners able to fund continued emissions 
trading work the SFE made its decision to exit. 566 This organisational culture shift adds 
564 {So they wanted to go to the listing stage with a lot of line areas that were obviously making money?} 
Well basically yes. Basically they just put the very sharp, red pen through the entire exchange 
infrastructure and costs, and wherever there were costs being incurred that wasn't giving the prospects to 
the SFE of being profitable in the short and the medium term, they got rid of it because they were looking 
at, when you list market analysts are going to say, well it's listed at $3 or $4 or whatever it is, but it's not 
worth that because they've got this pocket of wasting money over here etc, etc. So the new chief 
executive of SFE was the chief financial officer for a major corporation, he had a financial focus, not a 
market development focus and so did the board... and the whole momentum of Sydney Futures 
Exchange being this innovator of new products fell by the wayside. That's what happens. [ 46; 148] 
565 Stafftumover-we probably have I in 4 over three years. {Post-demutualisation} We've had a 30 per 
cent, 35 per cent per annum change over four years. {So presumably some weren't comfortable with the 
new environment.} No. [22;383-91] Post demutualisation you could say we've gone through a 
corporatisation process. We've become a lot more corporate, a lot more bottom line focused, yep -lots 
of cost cutting in that process. And you'd argue now that we're going through a commercialisation 
process. We've become a little bit corporate, conscious of the bottom line and how we go out and grow 
the business .... we saw an about face, saw a very different culture imposed. [22;383] I think if you look 
back at the number of things that we wrote off that year it's a pretty big number in terms of R&D 
projects, not just that one, but two or three others. {So at the same time having had no luck there's been 
an edict sent out from above saying listen get out of all these speculative things--we're looking for 
opportunities to cut costs?} Yes. There was a lot of cuts and you could argue that the cost base if you 
look at the annual report has probably come down 20 per cent-20 per cent across the board. 
[22;215,251-9] 
566 (After SFE demutualisation & leadership change SFE's reexamination of carbon trading) we had that 
high profile position and it was pretty much known that we weren't going to take it forward without 
partners, without some equity investment ... there would have been a couple of board meetings passed 
when we would have reported back to the board that we had no luck, we're writing it off, we would have 
written it off. [22;215, 251-9] 
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understanding both to the entry of the SFE into the greenhouse policy network and its rapid 
exit. 
Membership structure 
As indicated above, with demutualisation in late 2000 the membership arrangements of the 
Sydney Futures Exchange changed dramatically and one of the consequences of this 
appears to have been an accelerated departure by the Exchange from the greenhouse policy 
network in general, and carbon trading in particular. 
Whereas managers at the exchange bad previously answered to a small number of mutual 
share holders, the organisation now answered to thousands of individual holders of the 
newly listed SFE stock on the ASX. Management now answered to the broader market and 
was far more vulnerable than in the past to the pressures for short term results. 
These circumstances, as has been confirmed in interviews with SFE people, made it far 
more difficult in general to continue to allocate resources to emerging markets. R&D was a 
luxury which was much less affordable given the new constituency to which SFE 
management felt obliged to deliver a steady stream of tangible and positive results. This led 
to a major overhaul of management priorities.567 
With carbon trading having been so strongly supported under the pre-demutualisation 
leadership, it was little surprise to SFE insiders that it was one of the first areas targeted for 
abolition post-demutualisation. While the relevance of the structural change is well 
understood within the SFE, it is little appreciated within the broader policy network. 
567 The ownership didn't actually change. There was a change in the nature of bow the members voted 
for the ... you see, it's like a t1oat. \\lhen Telstra t1oated the ownership just transfers from the 
government to the people that held ... Sorry, that's not a good example. It's like an AMP. AMP is a 
mutual organisation---0k. Because T have a policy with Alv!P I'm a mutual shareholder. When AMP lists 
I become a shareholder with a vote. {There's a potential for changed membership which then changes the 
incentive structure from a perhaps more long-term view to a short-term?) Absolutely. That's a good 
point. This is something that's being learnt by all exchanges that are listing and by the people who are 
watching exchanges list, that once an exchange becomes a listed company your strategic focus becomes 
one of ... Most companies and the criticism of most companies these days, they're short focused, they're 
annual report to annual report focused. In other words a one-year time horizon because that's what the 
market analysts and the ratings agencies impose on you. You've got to basically explain your twelve 
month performance over and above your three and five year performance, whereas with a mutual you're 
not beholden to the twelve month performance, you can get tbese long term visions. [46; 174-8] 
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Leadership 
Leadership was a major factor in the SFE's greenhouse engagement and exit. As is clear 
from the public record, and from interviews here, former chief executive, Les Hosking, was 
strongly supportive of the development of emissions trading with a central role for the SFE. 
He saw emissions trading as a major opportunity for the Exchange-and one which could 
lead to further opportunities in environment-related products which could also be traded on 
SFE established markets. 
Hosking's leadership style was autocratic.568 He did not have to persuade his board of the 
merits of investing in R&D, such was the degree of delegation or autocracy under his 
leadership.569 There was significant ambivalence among members of the SFE,570 however 
Hosking was determined to champion the issue and ultimately received support from the 
board and its chairman.571 
He took a good deal of personal ownership of the SFE's engagement in the policy network. 
He oversaw the hiring of key staff able to assist the Exchange. Recognising that the SFE 
was an organisation with little expertise in environmental policy (beyond some existing 
energy contracts in the electricity market), Hosking moved quickly to acquire the requisite 
skills to grapple effectively with what was a complex proposition. He commissioned 
Canberra-based consultant, Tony Beck to advise the SFE on how to run the carbon trading 
agenda. Beck was a well-connected player in both the bureaucracy and the greenhouse 
policy network having previously worked in the DPIE, ABARE, the BCA and the AIGN.572 
568 I guess Hosking was a fairly autocratic controller of SFE's development from 1985 and he'd been 
involved in the development ofall ofSFE's successful products in financial futures. [46;154 
569 There was never, ever a vote by the members to agree to develop emissions or not to agree. Hosking 
had authority to develop a contract. [46;78] 
570 Well, there were some of the larger investment banks that ... more particularly the foreign owned 
investment banks that were directly only involved in Australian fixed interest markets that had no interest 
whatsoever in an emissions market, like the Salomon Smith Barneys and the JP Morgaus and so on. They 
didn't say 'don't do it,' they were basically just saying, 'well we're not interested and we're not too sure 
how much the exchange should be spending on this because our fees are going there and they could be 
cheaper. We could have lower fees if you weren't doing it type of thing.' [46;82] 
571 The board's consent was there. The board was fully informed of the development of emissions trading 
and Rick (Holliday-Smith), the chairman, was supporting initially the development, he's changed his 
tune now that it's not a mutual, but a natural thing for an exchange [46;82] I think the chairman, Rick 
Holliday-Smith, was very good in that respect. He championed it very much at the SFE board. It was all 
about positioning SFE for something that could be very, very big. [22;135] 
572 Tony Beck-see, when the BCA-when you go back to the genesis of the AIGN and you see that it 
really has just flowed out of the development, out of the ESD process, and a recognition that these issues 
were bigger than one organisation could handle. So we actually started meetings of executive directors 
looking at environment agendas and actually apportioning lead responsibility to different organisations to 
274 
Beck, in tum, recommended that the Exchange hire someone full time with the skills base 
required to run the campaign from the SFE's Sydney office.573 Soon afterwards, Hosking 
hired one of the members of Australia's Kyoto negotiating team (Stnart Beil) straight out of 
the then Department of Primacy Industry and Energy. Beil was relatively junior player who 
had worked closely with and impressed both influential sections of the bureaucracy 
(particularly Brian Fisher in ABARE574) and old hands in the AIGN.575 Hosldng's decisions 
to bring these people on board was clearly designed to give the SFE the knowledge and 
connections to impress government and business sufficiently with the carbon trading 
agenda to get their plans up. 
Hosking also devoted plenty of time to speaking at many greenhouse related conferences to 
promote a strong SFE role, and in publicising this opportunity in the media. Those working 
on emissions trading in the SFE could not have asked for more enthusiastic patronage on 
handle it. And so, the BCA caught various things. And Tony Beck was originally with the BCA. And he 
haadled greenhouse coordination at the BCA. So, the AIGN really became a formalisation of the 
arrangements that the BCA handled in terms of coordinating greenhouse. And they actually set it up 
independently, and then when David Buckingham took the job he wanted to wind up the BCA's 
involvement in some of these sorts of things, so Tony was employed as the executive director of the 
AIGN and he sat in an office ... in the Minerals Council so ... (But Tony Beck was not employed by the 
Minerals Council?} No, he was employed by the AIGN. MCA contributed to the budget and provided in-
kind support in terms of accommodation and all the rest of it, but when AIGN came round to renewing 
it-Tony wanted to start a consulting practice as we)~ so we started to give him some flexibility to do 
50-50 time wise, and then he moved. You know, he wanted to go into that, and there was a consensus 
that he was not really the right person anyway. So, he moved off into his own consulting practice and 
then John Eyles came in and so on. But, following Tony-the relevance of the Sydney Futures 
Exchange--Tony really was-you know, the Sydney Futures Exchange had been on the margins of the 
AIGN-·and saw a market opportunity there. Tony was obviously marketing as a consultant to them in a 
very big way in setting up models aad trials and so orr----and so he was really the catalyst in my mind 
with Les Hosking in getting the Sydney Futures Exchange interested. But, as l recall they actually went 
very close to getting things up and then they backed away. They decided there wa.s not going to be a 
sufficient market in it. {13;236-40] 
513 Beck said to them that he thought there was a need for an emissions trading (E1) forum-fill 
orgaaisation that fostered debate and infonnation on emissions trading developments both internationally 
and domestically. They took on the idea and retained him. He worked for them over several years but in 
that eady stage they retained him to establish this emissions trading forum and also to chair a financial 
sector working group on emissions trading. That was going on through 1998 and It probably not until 
probably early 1999 before Stuart Beil was employed to extend that work on a more lull-time 
basis ... And then Stuart came on. Most of Beck's work was in organising the ET forum and that was 
putting out regular newsletters and maintaining a website, and organising workshops, and promoting that 
whole area. When Stuart joined he worked mostly on building the foundations for an actual market in 
carbon credits. l mean his appointment was from Beck's advice because Stuart worked for his branch at 
ABARE so they were tied up there. [53;81) 
574 See Brian Fisher's personal acknowledgements to Stuart Beil (Fisher et. al 1998:iv; Brown et. al 
1999:vi). See also the joint presentation by Brian Fisher and Stuart Beil to ABARE emissions trading 
conference in 1998-a conference co-sponsored by the Sydney Futures Exchange (Beil et. al 1998). 
575 {So, Stuart Beil would not have been considered part of that group? (ie. the self-titled A!GN linked 
'mafia')} Well, if Stuart h\ld stayed around long enough, yes he would have-Stuart had very good 
connections. [ !8;254-fi] 
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the issue from the top. Hosking also recognised the push at the time by the federal 
government to make Sydney a financial capital in the Asia Pacific region and worked hard 
to foster the SFE's emissions trading role as a part of that vision.576 
However, in early November 1999 Hnsking left SFE to take up a job with the federal 
government as chief executive of the AXISS (then known as the Australian Centre for 
Global Finance). The decision to leave was one Hosking made reluctantly but he could see 
the direction which the organisation seemed likely to take with the proposed 
demutualisation and decided that this direction was not for him. His departure also meant 
the loss of carbon trading's strongest and most senior advocate at the SFE. The staff 
running the CSC market agenda now operated without a patron. Their days were numbered, 
something Hosking appreciated as he left with some regret. 
Exchange insiders interviewed acknowledged that the strong SFE push for carbon trading 
in 1999-2000 was underpinned by personal patronage ofBeil's ideas by Hosking. Once the 
latter departed, much of the support for the former evaporated.571 Gone were the autocratic 
days of Hosking's relationship with the board. There was a new CEO, a very different 
board, and a corporate management style in which the board played a much more 
prominent role.578 The structural and personnel changes associated with demututalisation 
made the carbon trading agenda unsustainable. 
516 {At the same time you've got Joe Hockey as the Minisier saying, and I think Costello was doing it as 
well, saying we're going lo tum Sydney into the financial centre of the universe?} Correct. And you just 
see where Les ended up now as the head of Axiss. You can see that that was a natural jump. You see fuur 
of five things that Les did in his tenure, particularly towards the back end, '96, '97, '98, '99 when he then 
went to Axiss and he was making the groundwork for that kind of a role going forward. I mean he 
believed in it and believes in it still I'm sure. {So there was a bit of hype around that concept which 
would have reinforced his crusade.} Correct. [22;293-9] {So, it was a pure leadership issue? Because he 
had patronage-Stuart Beil-from Les Hosking didn't he?} He did. That is right. It was entirely driven 
by Les Hosking-;md Hosking's new job is all about creating those sorts of things in the future. And so 
you know I think you correlate that almost perfectly with his departure. Again, personalities and 
leadership are critical-this is a personality issue. But I think the point still stands-that personalities can 
be very important in these things and I think that story we talked about with respect to the SFE is a case 
in point. [48;69--71,91} 
571 They just absolutely ran dead on an issue they'd previously been red hot on from the day of the 
change ofCEOs. [7;127] 
m ... there'd be two board members now that have survived from the initial board. {Out of how many?} 
... there's been quite a change in the board out of JO or 12. It's interestlng--immediately upon the 
demutualisation there was a new set of directors, bar two, the Chairman and one other and the CEO and 
that's been whittled back lo I think we've got about six or seven on the board now. Probably a very more 
senior board. {It's a little unusual for a chairman to survive through such a momentous ... } I think he 
drove a lot of it in terms of he drove through the demutualisation process. I think he was appointed lo the 
board about two years before the demutualisation and very much championed the demutualisation 
through. Probably was the right chairman lo take it right through. [22;395-407] 
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The change in leadership from Les Hosking to Robert Elstone in May 2000579 demonstrates 
SFE engagement in the greenhouse policy network and promotion of the carbon trading 
agenda was no fait accompli. It was not automatically driven by the SFE's interest but was 
an initiative very much at the discretion of the chief executive. Whereas Hosking was 
passionately in fuvour of pursuing emissions trading, Elstone appears 1x> have been 
completely unc.onvinced.580 In hindsight, it is highly doubtful that the SFE would have 
become as involved as it did for as long as it did without the personal drive and vision of 
Hosking. 
The episode also suggests that where personal patronage is a substantial force, 
organisational commitment can be fleeting--particularly where significant organisational 
membership and culture change is also under way. Leadership can sustain engagement in a 
network for a time, but internal forces (such as those already mentioned) and external 
forces (such as the continued uncertainty of the emissions trading policy environment 
internationally and domestically) can ultimately win out. In the case of the SFE, insiders 
confirm the dominance of these forces in the post-Hosking era, and express confidence that 
carbon trading will not be on the agenda of the SFE in the short or even medium term, 
unless the market is effectively presented by government on a platter. 5&1 
579 SFE Appoints New CEO, Media Statement by the Sydney Futures Exchange, 3 May 2000 
"
0 We lost Les through that demutualisation process. You could argue that that was part of the change 
process going from a mutual to a corporate entity. A new CEO was appointed that had a pretty strong 
view on speculative investment, ie we don't do it unless we have partners that are helping underwrite the 
cost of delivering the risk. {And he took that attitude across the board?} Across the board. It wasn't just 
that (greenhouse) that he'd stopped ... {Do you have any sharp memory of the moment when you 
realised this thing is a dead duck?} Yes. The very board meeting that we got the nod to go ahead and 
spend a bit more money to get a pilot scheme up-not a full blown, but to get a pilot scheme up, was the 
first meeting we had the new CEO in the room and he was there as an observer on the board, he was just 
watching, he kept a poker face ... (So Hosking was still chairman.} No, no, Hosking was gone. There was 
the new CEO-no, there was no handover process. We actually went without a CEO for six months. We 
had a chairman who was acting as Executive CEO, executive chairman. {Holliday-Smith?} Holliday-
Smith. Rob walked into the room after the meeting ... {So he's in the meeting and you're saying he's 
poker faced} Poker faced and Rick gets it through, gets the nod after twisting a lot of arms and then Rob 
walks into the room just talking about speculative investment. 'Yes, large payoff but relative to size of 
balance sheet, he said this is only going to work if we can find some partners.' {This is ... after the 
meeting.} ... straight after. [22;151-99] { ... the previous guy, Les Hosking, had just left and the new 
person was in charge and he's never mentioned carbon trading, and so it sounds like he wasn't interested 
in all.} No, it sounds like he wasn't interested. Beil said he wasn't interested. {Sounded like Beil lost his 
patronage?} Yeah-I think that's right. [2;112-116] 
581 {You'd need a fairly strong degree of confidence to go back to the board with this issue.) Correct. 
{And also what you said to me is that the bar is significantly higher now because they're less inclined to 
do speculation and they're more inclined to support things that have got a short-tenn retum.} Correct. 
Yes. Short but fair. I think three or four years with a client. It could be five or seven but it would have to 
be in tenns of the risk return, that the risk would have to be low, ie we'd have be assured that within five 
or six years it was going to get up. (And one of the ways to get around it is to do it through a partnership 
arrangement sharing the risk?} Correct. And better still if the government comes out and actually tenders 
a process and there's a fixed fee and there's annuity income associated with operating the market on 
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Resources 
Financial and human resources have been another important reason for the behaviour of the 
SFE in relation to greenhouse. As discussed above, it has traditionally been a well 
resourced organisation supported by member companies with solid financial backing 
relative to many other interest groups. It has had a well resourced office, well qualified 
staff of approximately 250, and strong connections in the financial community. 
Traditionally, the SFE has invested heavily in research and development of new products 
for which the Exchange sees potential for a new market. The prevalence of R&D resources 
and the willingness pre-demutualisation to dedicate them to new opportunities such as 
carbon trading was an important driving force behind their involvement on greenhouse. 
Before demutualisation the SFE was committed to R&D in general and carbon trading in 
particular. They eagerly recruited new staff with the skills and contacts to effectively 
advance their carbon trading agenda. As mentioned already, they contracted two high-
powered greenhouse policy experts in Tony Beck and Stuart Beil. These important human 
resources had a very big impact by enabling the SFE to 'box well above its weight' in 
sophisticated debates on greenhouse policy for which it would otherwise have been totally 
unequipped.582 Within the organisation, Beil and Beck could also rely on a small team of 
behalf of the government. So you'd go to the board and say here's armuity income because the 
government has got a tender process and we think we're the best party to operate that with these other 
partners. The board wouldn't blink and (they'd) say 'yes.' [22;357-73] {Let's presume you've got the 
same issue now in 2002 and it's five to eight years, no matter how good the hard sell is you just wouldn't 
bother.} Yes. Comparing one with the other, yes it would be harder now than it would have been back 
then to have got it approved. Not so much because of the governance per se but a second order effect of 
the governance under a mutual is that a CEO with a series of members on his board could drive a 
different agenda, arguably a personal agenda, to lift the profile of the exchange in itself by being 
associated with emissions trading. I think that was that personality issue. We keep going back to it, I 
think that was a big part of it. [22; 159] I mean we were disproportionately focused on something that was 
potentially very, very big, speculative and people could say well you're not focused on the core interest 
rate and equity products and that's what the new CEO did when he came in. (He said) 'Right, interest 
rate and equity need to be focused on the because they account for the bulk of our business.' [22; 179] 
Also (24;23] 
582 See previous quote [53;81] under footnote 573 regarding Tony Beck's belief in the need for an 
emissions trading forum in Australia, Stuart Beil's links with Beck via ABARE, and the process by 
which they both came to SFE to work on emissions trading .. 
They hired Stuart Beil out of ABARE. Actually, at that time he was not with ABARE but at the 
Department of Primary Industries and Energy. [27;108] A lot of it was personality driven by Les. With 
the backing of Stuart who was an excellent employee and he did a very good job driving it. Far exceeded 
my expectations. And he was trained at ABARE of course. [22;519] Les just knocked on the door when 
he came back from this ABARE conference and he actually dragged somebody with him called Tony 
Beck who was one of the presenters up there who was a consultant for ABARE. {Had he been a 
consultant to SFE at the time?} No he hadn't. He said right, I want us to sign Tony up, manage him and 
work out what we're going to do. So between Tony and Anthony Collins, they worked out what SFE 
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staff to provide support for their work--<>omething which also required significant financial 
resoutces to be diverted from elsewhere. 
As we have seen, Beil and Beck c-0uld also rely on leadership resources in the form of the 
enthusiastic patronage of Les Hosking. Hosking was a regular participant in SFE 
promotional efforts and provided invaluable support at board level in sustaining the 
resource commitment internally. Externally, he was also able to amplify the effectiveness 
of Beil and Beck through his many informal contacts in the financial and political 
communities. 
However, as we have already seen, pressure for short term results intensified dramatically 
with the demutualisation process and listing of the SFE. There was far more immediate 
pressure to cut running costs and R&D was no longer a high priority. Even where R&D had 
sufficient support to attract continued SFE support, they have hecn generally only pursued 
in partnership so as to share financial risk associated with new products. With the structural 
changes afoot and with Hosking gone from late 1999, the resources which had been 
available for opportunities such as carbon trading simply evaporated. 
It was little surprise then when arguably the most important human resource for carbon 
trading at SFE-Stuart Beil-departed the Exchange soon after the project was dropped by 
the board.583 One of the consequences of this, which is not well appreciated outside but 
needs to do is to employ somebody in that area within the Exchange to manage the product But before 
that, before we got to that point we looked at how do we take the space, we get a set of industry 
associations together, a broad cross-sections of industry associations, get the chief executive on to an 
advisory pane~ that is all about, okay we're not going to take a position pro or against emissions trading 
or how did we put it at the time, we said we're not going to put an advisory committee together !hat's for 
or against the protocol but assuming the protocol does get up wbat the advisory committee needs to be 
about is how do we do it at the lowest cost. [22;81-7] Beil was well resourced by the SFE and was 
investing plenty of time and effort into getting the SFE message through to the federal government 
through a range of processes, including the AGO's emissions trading discussion papers. [3;18] TI1ey saw 
a role for themselves and they sought to excite interest in the agenda. Now they in fact engaged Tony 
Beck. .. [51 ;46] They put on board two, who I regard two very good analysts, even though tney were 
young. {Who were they, Stuart and ... } Stuart and ... V.'hat was his name? Stuart Beil and ... look I'm 
sorry about that. {Stuart was from ABARE wasn't he?} Stuart was from ABARE, I mean he was young, 
but he understood how difficult this all was. Anyway, they backed the wrong horse (carbon sequestration 
first). As it turns out it wouldn't have mattered which horse they backed actually. [19; I 7"-91] 
m Stuart was head and shoulders above everybody else in terms of his knowledge, his insights, his 
contacts, his drive. I believe he used to work tirelessly on the initiative. So initially it was all about 
positioning SFE for when this comes through, it wasn't about an}ihing proactive to start the market 
early. But it quickly became that. {So, carving out the territory so that if this happens we're the obvious 
people to run ii?} Correct.., (After demutuatisation) Stuart just very quickly got frustrated with the 
process and could see it going nowhere and decided that he'd leave the exchange and have a shot at it 
himself - I think was his motivation for leaving. So we were very quickly left with a whole lot of IP 
(intellectual property) on bits of paper, and IP in people's heads tnat had left. [22; 103-7, !99] 
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readily accepted internally, is that the SFE could not now re-enter the greenhouse policy 
network on emissions trading in a hurry because it lacks the in-house human resources to 
do so and may struggle to attract external resources given recent history.584 
Meso-level 
Network level forces exerted mixed pressures on the Sydney Futures Exchange at different 
times, on balance encouraging the organisation to play a greater role in the policy network. 
Perhaps the clearest impression gained from meso-level pressures is that while they can 
exert influence on group decision making they are not as decisive as the forces in play at 
the micro-level. 
Policy implications 
The policy implications of climate change were very important in explaining interest group 
behaviour in the case of the SFE, if only for a period. The essential policy implication of 
climate change is the requirement that emitters will ultimately have to curtail and 
significantly reduce greenhouse emissions in order to effectively respond to the problem. 
This imposes economic costs and risks on emitters at the international, national, firm and 
individual level. How to allocate and minimise the costs is the primary challenge for 
policymakers. As a consequence, cost-effectiveness and risk minimisation are two central 
issues in the policy debate. 
By the late 1990s, market mechanisms had started to become mainstream policy measures 
in the management of environmental problems. These measures have one thing in 
common-they require an overall reduction in an environmentally harmful emission or 
process over time, and establish a market framework under which the rights to the reduced 
amount of emission or process are traded. Futures markets provide companies facing 
uncertain risks and costs-such as a requirement that emissions be reduced, or alternatively 
a carbon tax-to use a financial instrument to effectively insure against that future risk 
today. A carbon credits market would provide companies with the right to invest in 
greenhouse emission reduction now-with the surety that this investment would be 
credited to them against any future tightening in regulation. 
584 If you go back to the kind of people that were employed (pre-demutualisation), actually there's not a 
lot of policy, there's really no policy role within the exchange. {Now?} Now. [22;383-91] 
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Given the proven advantage in cost-effectiveness of market mechanisms, the establishment 
of such a system was presumably likely to be relatively more popular among businesses 
than a command and control approach. In this sense, moves to combat climate change 
culminating in Australia's 108 per cent target from the Kyoto conference were ready-made 
for the SFE. The establishment and management of the sort of futures market which could 
assist government, and might be viewed more positively by business than other policy 
mechanisms, put the SFE in poll position to play an important role in Australia's 
greenhouse response. Not only did the government lack the expertise and infrastructure, 
they also expressed a strong desire not to have government running any emissions trading 
system-preferring a more arms' -length arrangement. The policy implications of climate 
change, particularly after Australia agreed to a target at Kyoto clearly encouraged greater 
involvement by the SFE. The push was on for market-based cost-effective policy solutions 
which did not require government administration. The SFE had a strong track record in 
establishing markets to manage emerging risks and costs. Carbon trading was a good fit 
and one which the SFE eagerly sought to capitalise on.585 Sequestration credits were 'first 
sss See previous quote [l 1;106] under footnote 549 describing SFE as part of a rush of law firms and 
accountants seeing a financial opportunity in emissions trading. 
There's a certain cluster of people that will trade anything. The brokers and dealers within the Exchange 
want opportunity ro trade in new product and to offer insurance management, risk management to their 
customers, so it's a bit like an insurance company itself. You tell me the new risk and I'll price it for you. 
So the likes of Societe Generale, &"IZ, Enron and a number of other brokers said, 'you beaut, bring it on 
beeause we can provide our customers,' particularly the banks saying, 'well we've got customers, BHP 
and others that will be required to manage their risks. We like SFE to provide a secondary market to 
transfer these credits because our brokers, the SFE brokers, understand that transparent markets create 
greater liquidity over time, and that's in the secondary market and the derivatives market, so the earlier 
we could provide transparency of price for the certificates, the earlier they could engage their customers 
and do business and the earlier they could start developing derivatives markets to also manage the price 
risk of the secondary market.' So the banks and the brokers have a natural take-up of a new instrument, 
particularly when they saw the magnitude of this potential. [46;38] The Sydney Futures Exchange had an 
ex-eoonomist from ABARE, Stuart Beil, who was going to establish emissions trading but you 
understand all of that was a response of a hungry market looking at the conunodification of the 
atmosphere. It wasn't really a useful response to greenhouse. Well it wasn't ,.. I mean it was an 
interesting organisational response to an emerging market, that's what they saw, not the problem. 
[45;257] Before Kyoto, and we were starting to look at (carbon trading) ... mainly because it just ... I 
can't remember the defining moment but it was just a natural thing. Gee, we're looking at coal, we're 
developing an electricity market, here's another aspect to it, let's get rolling on this, and we started to talk 
to ABARE and whoever else was writing papers about emissions. l don't think they understood the way 
we looked at it, like this is a strip of risk, but that's the way futures markets have always looked at strips 
of risks ... Now that same thing occurs in ... the people that dig it out of the ground in coal are the 
primary producers, the secondary market is when you sell it overseas or to the local generator and the 
derivative market is still managing that sort of risk. So we just looked at it and said, 'well OK, we've 
now got a carbon certificate potential through Kyoto because Kyoto's suggesting that you've got to 
control your emissions and to do that you've got to know where those emissions are,' so there was 
always this focus that ... Kyoto suggests that there will be some furm of certification process to ensure 
that they're monitoring how these emissions are occurring so as soon as that certificate was created we 
thought, 'well, here we go, there's a secondary market going to be naturally formed in certificates and 
there's going to be a derivatives market. Why shouldn't SFE, that's got all the infrastructure to trade and 
price discovery and to register contracts and to be a registry and a clearing house and all of that, we are 
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cab off the rank' because they were easiest to do first and had strong support at state 
government level. 586 
Policy limitations 
There were various policy limitations which played a role in undermining the SFE's 
proposed carbon trading system. None were decisive, but all contributed to the failure of 
the venture and to their continued reluctance to consider revisiting the scheme. What is 
particularly interesting in this category is the common thread-that the SFE failed to 
anticipate significant policy limitations on its carbon trading plan in three crucial 
constituencies: business, government, and the environmental movement. 
What the SFE apparently did not appreciate was that, while government and business 
recognised the relative attractiveness of carbon trading compared with more regulatory 
approaches and carbon taxes, this did not mean that they supported carbon trading. Carbon 
trading was generally considered better that these other options, but still something which 
business in particular only wanted if they were forced to take something. In some sections 
of the business community there was deep suspicion.587 There was also strong opposition to 
the natural offerers of infrastructure for those instruments and it fitted into our energy policy anyway of 
whatever it is, the coal or the oil or whatever producing these emissions out the other end. [ 46;30] 
586 Our decision was to go to a carbon sequestration market first, create a certificate in the sequestered 
carbon because the other thing was it's something you can look at there's that stored carbon, it's in that 
tree and you could actually take a picture of it and it was easier for the banks and the traders and 
everybody else. It was like wool or grain. There was something there. The carbon that's out there in the 
atmosphere and trying to describe that and get people to think of it like a global fungible product like a 
bar of gold is a little bit harder. [46;66] Carbon sequestration rights was the area that we focused on and 
we thought well how would that work so we said 'we'll get accounting standards to measure the carbon, 
we need some kind of legal status underpinning those carbon rights and we never actually worked 
through that from memory. We need a registry service what would that look like.' So we partnered with 
(NSW) State Forests because they were doing a lot of work on the measurement and the accounting for 
carbon sequestration and they had a lot of forests with a lot of interested buyers. Obviously it was a very 
politically correct subject for the NSW goverrunent so we had no shortage of ministers ... {So NSW was 
very supportive?} Very supportive. From memory Les, Michael Egan and Yeadon I think was the other 
minister that was involved, all very supportive. So, Forestry was going to come together with a pilot 
scheme. [22;107-111] 
587 If the Nasdaq's collapse has properly caused traders to be a little more circumspect about what they 
are doing but any trader with half an ounce of salts would never have gone anywhere near carbon trading 
in the first place ... carbon is a commodity when you trade it. You know, there is money, there are 
commissions, there is forward selling, there is the legal fees, there is arbitrage, 'yay- money money 
money money money!' But look, carbon trading was a get rich quick speculative activity. {And it was 
one which did have the support of the Sydney futures Exchange CEO at the time?} I think there is more 
garbage talked about carbon trading than about any other subject. [18;188-200] Organisations like mine 
and AIGN in general are pretty cautious on the subject of carbon trading. Doing it at a local level has a 
number of problems, not the least of which is effectively it's a tax, but even doing it when you're talking 
about doing it globally you change the cost structure of an industry like ours, therefore you impact on the 
mix of generation and when you impact on the mix of generation you create winners and losers and the 
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any meaningful greenhouse agenda within the Howard ministry and sections of the rederal 
bureaucracy.5&& A voluntary approach which did not impose any significant costs on 
business, was by far the consensus preference of both the federal government and 
Australian. Interest in, and discussion of, emissions trading was one thing--support for it 
quite another.589 
Similarly, the SFE faced strong opposition from the green movement for the type of 
emissions trading system it had in mind. They were focused heavily on carbon credits 
generated from sequestration--or 'Kyoto forests.' Under the scheme, investors (mostly 
industrial companies with energy-intensive operations) would buy the rights to the 
greenhouse emissions sequestered by forest plantations. The SFE viewed this as the first 
step in a broader carbon trading agenda which would encompass other types of credits (like 
those generated at the plant level through energy efficiency investments). As we have seen, 
CSCs were chosen for their perceived practicality as an initial step to get the market going. 
However, this was a choice which presented major problems as far as the green movement 
was concerned. It would, they worried, enable industry to avoid any obligation to reduce 
the emissions associated with their existing activity.59-0 If companies were allowed to buy 
carbon credits from plantation timber they could effectively 'skip the greenhouse hurdle.' 
As a consequence, not only could the SFE not count on green support, they had to confront 
significant green opposition to the carbon trading plan. 
winners are keen and the losers are not so keen, so Sydney ... I think une<juivocal!y, Sydney Futures 
Exchange is part of the opportunistic end of this spectrum. [37;14 7] 
"' I guess what is surprising is that notwithstanding all the clamouring by some groups to get their fill in 
the new greenhouse trough like the renewable energy traders as such. {Emission traders?} Yes, and 
brokers and all those sorts of people. The government has chosen to maintain a fairly rational economic 
dogma and that is that competitiveness is recognised. [34;204-8] 
589 The danger 'l'.'as, without a legal framework which made an enforceable contract, you weren't going to 
get the depth and liquidiiy of price discovery that was really necessary to create the ... It just meant that .. 
because of that, the whole development of the marketplace takes a lot longer because the fence-sitters 
stay on the fences longer and it's still the case today that there's fence-sitting whereas in other places 
around the world with more certainty and support from the govemment you've got more people in 
various industries saying, 'I've got to get into this market and I'm confident because there's legislation 
that backs it.' New South Wales is pretty aggressive in certain areas, in the electricity renewable energy 
area etc, but there are still fence-sitters out there because as late as the Prime Minister's statements of a 
week ago we're still not in there. [46;126-30] 
590 See previous quote [45;257J under footnote 585 on the SFE response not really being 'a useful 
response to greenhouse.' 
I think most of them, and this would include the SFE did not think bard enough or didn't know enough 
about the issue to think about what the market would be and you can see this reflected in a lot of the 
debate. They keep on talking about carbon credits all the time whereas an emissions trading scheme---to 
be a real scheme-has got to be one based on pennits like the sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide schemes 
in the US, not on credits. [l 1;106] 
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The other major policy limitations on the SFE's carbon trading agenda relate to certainty. 
Companies expressed great interest in the idea, but would not consider investing in a 
market without certainty about the policy environment. Continued uncertainty about the 
Kyoto Protocol, emissions trading internationally, and the direction of domestic policy 
(discussed in greater detail below) all served to discourage participation in any SFE carbon 
trading market. Without investors and liquidity, markets cannot operate effectively and 
both were missing without a more certain policy environment. 591 
Related government policy agenda 
The evolving policy of the Howard federal government was a very powerful force in the 
establishment of the SFE's carbon trading program, its demise, and the organisation's 
engagement in the policy network in between. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the 
government's policy direction as far as it influenced the SFE has been its ambiguity. In the 
lead-up to the Kyoto meeting, the federal government gave strong signals that it intended to 
implement a robust set of measures aimed at reducing emissions, irrespective of the Kyoto 
meeting. However, the federal government's policy of 'differentiation' (which appeared 
unlikely to obtain the support it eventually did in Kyoto) cast doubt over whether Australia 
would be bound by any international commitments. Just the same, the signals coming out 
of Canberra were strong enougb, even before Kyoto, for the SFE to start its push for a 
carbon trading scheme. 
With the signing of the Protocol (as distinct from ratification), the acceptance by Australia 
of a + 108 per cent target, strong support for the idea of emissions trading from various 
ministers, and the establishment of formal government processes aimed at designing an 
optimal emissions trading scheme for Australia, the SFE not surprisingly became very 
enthusiastic and optimistic about prospects for a scheme in which it could play a central 
role. The government also appeared to take steps towards emissions trading with some 
promising ministerial statements seemingly foreshadowing movement (Hill 1997e). There 
were also strong hints from the government that it would prefer a hands-off approach by 
591 The difficulty we always had was what were the legal rights underpinning the carbon sequestration? 
And we were talking about marketing something that could be a liability in five, ten, twenty, thirty years. 
Laws could change, things could change, legislation could change, the protocol might not get up. So 
there was lots ofuncertainty, there was always uncertainty. [22;111-35] It is almost as though the 
Futures Exchange concept came too early and there wasn't the sort of background of work and 
knowledge that there is now as a result of a fair bit of private sector effort to properly define the basic 
components of what would be in any formal trading scheme. So, the perception I got was that they were 
going to trade in what they believed to be a clearly identified product but the rules about how to define 
the product and measure the product simply were not there. [40;162] 
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the state to any emissions trading market. 592 Without these signals from government about 
the likely policy direction, it seems mnch less likely that SFE would have devoted to it the 
time and resources they did. 
However, either these signals were illusory and the government merely wished to be seen 
to be seriously investigating all policy options, ot there was an intemal policy battle going 
on inside government which the forces supporting emissions trading ultimately lost. Either 
way, the pace set and sought on emissions trading by the SFE was fur beyond that of the 
Howard government's and the initial stated enthusiasm for emissions trading soon 
evaporated.593 Signs of government reluctance were there in the government's 
establishment of the Bush for Greenhouse program which appeared to be based on 
philanthropic foundations rather than the use of price signals which would be associated 
with any genuine emissions trading (Hill 2000). Soon after came the death knell for 
emissions trading with the announcement by then Industry Minister, Senator Minchin, that 
Australia would have no emissions trading system sanctioned by government until at least 
2008 (Counsel 2000:24; Taylor 2000:16). Such a definitive policy direction effectively 
killed off any prospect for a successful carbon trading system by SFE as without 
government approval such a system was unlikely to receive the investor support it needed 
to work.594 
592 
••• the impression I get is that yes, there was a very distinct intere't just a couple of years ago at the 
possibility of providing a service for emissions trading, if I can just use that term generically, that 
emissions trading seemed to be building up a head of steam and it was quite likely that the government 
wi:mld find itself in the position of the celebrated Duke of Parzitoro, that it would be leading gallantly 
from the rear. In other words that there may well develop a market in emissions irrespective of any 
official or formal adoption of emissions trading by tbe government. [47; 136] 
593 {(Re: Lobbying Canberra on SFE plans} \'v'hat are your recollections on how that process went?} A 
bit early they thought. (Brian} Fisher was like, 'good if you can get it going' but a bit sceptical that we 
were in there before they had gotten their head around all the issues themselves. Probably a bit of a 
nuisance would have been my impression ... ['l\.'hy is that?} Just because we were pushing so early to 
develop a secondary market in certificates and tbe certificates hadn't been designed and they were 
worried that the 'tail was going to wag the dog,' the certificate was going to be designed by us as 
opposed to them. {So you were ahead of the policy curve really at the time?} Most markets are. Most 
people understand what their risk is and they want a certificate to trade that risk and bugger the 
govemment, they'll catch up and they'll regulate that market. In actual fact that's the proper, natural 
development of a market God help us if markets are designed by governments because all you'll end up 
with is this four-sided camel that doesn't actually drink water. Forget it. The Australian financial markets 
and the Australian markets in general have been designed and developed by the risk takers in those 
markets and the government comes along later and decides whether they're fair and orderly and whether 
customers should be protected, but don't come in right up the front. No, that's my comment to them. I 
was consistent with tbat message ... some (hearing the message) were a little bit more visionary than 
others, but where there was a threat to tbeir assigned duty of deciding how a carbon certificate should 
look and what it should entail, SFE wasn't too welcome at that table because we bad these market 
practitioner ideas that didn't fit with them ... [46;96-106] 
594 
••• you know they were very active early on. Maybe, the fact that the government said that they 
wouldn't introduce a domestic emissions trading scheme until an international one might have been the 
killer. [2; 132] ... all these people who are seeking rents or margins or whatever you might call it from 
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Government and/or departmental processes 
Ironically, as it turns out, the SFE push to establish a carbon trading market was given more 
momentum by federal government processes. In the lead-up to and following the Kyoto 
conference the federal government was increasingly aware of the relevance of emissions 
trading programs as a potentially important component of a policy package aimed at 
reducing Australian emissions.595 However, while emissions trading was well understood 
as one of the more cost-effective approaches to reducing pollution-particularly given the 
success of such approaches in dealing with environmental problems elsewhere---there was 
little expertise or experience in such programs. The government was looking around for 
expertise in anticipation that interest in emissions trading would only grow stronger as a 
matter on the government's agenda596 and there was a realisation that sooner or later 
government would be expected to take a position. The SFE sought to fill that policy 
vacuum. 
Informal and formal government processes provided the vehicle for greater SFE 
engagement. Meetings were sought with them by ministers and bureaucrats and the SFE 
sought as much as possible to participate in government activities on greenhouse matters 
and to use these to promote the carbon trading role it saw for itself. The SFE sought and 
obtained positions on government advisory panels related to emissions trading in the newly 
established Australian Greenhouse Office, and when the AGO launched a fonnal public 
consultation process on emissions trading the SFE was one of the most enthusiastic 
participants. 
emissions trading-I think they are grossly overoptimistic about that or don't understand. So I think that 
was the SFE position, and I think the government's decision was really the nail in the coffin really. 
[11;130] 
595 For example, in July 1997, then Environment Minister, Senator Hill said, '. .. the Clinton 
Administration supports the establishment of a system of trading greenhouse emission permits between 
Annex I countries in an effort to achieve abatement at the lowest cost. Australia supports emission 
trading in principle, recognising its possible contribution to improving the cost-effectiveness of emission 
reduction, but there would have to be a satisfactory equitable allocation of initial emission entitlements' 
(Hill 1997a). 
596 Senator Hill's comments at the press conference the morning after the Kyoto Protocol was agreed 
make this clear. He said: 'As you know, we started with the 18 per cent figure because we knew that we 
could deliver that, we knew that if we could get the land-use change into the protocol we could deliver 
more and we knew that if the protocol provided for the setting up of an emissions trading regime, we 
could deliver a bit more on that ... the emissions trading doesn't officially start for I 0 years although there 
is already emissions trading taking place in anticipation of it. We would like to keep working along that 
path and we will see how it develops over the coming months ... ' Hill, Robert Kyoto Climate Change 
Conference---Daily Briefings, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 11 December 1997 
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Parliamentary processes 
During the time in which the SFE sought to promote carbon trading, parliamentary 
processes~specially public inquiries-were an effective mechanism for greater 
involvement by the SFE in the greenhouse policy network. The SFE provided evidence to 
parliamentary inquiries in 1998 and 2000. Certainly during this period they were looking to 
promote the idea of a carbon trading market which they would run, so it is not as if these 
inquiries spurred more involvement. Instead, they provided a platform for the SFE from 
which to push an agenda. To the degree that this platform enabled greater allocation of time 
and resources within SFE to the greenhouse policy task, indirectly these parliamentary 
level activities may have resulted in greater involvement. 
International processes 
International processes and agendas were critically important to the story of the SFE's 
involvement in and subsequent exit from the policy network. Without the momentum of the 
international negotiations under the FCCC to reduce greenhouse pollution, and the Kyoto 
Protocol, it seems highly unlikely that they would ever have considered becoming involved 
in climate policy.597 The pressure to reduce emissions in Australia has been driven heavily 
by the international climate change policy agenda In order for the conditions to be right for 
SFE engagement, a number of prec-0nditions needed to be met. The most important of these 
was that Australia should make a serious commitment internationally to reducing domestic 
emissions and more specifically set an actual emissions target with reference to a specific 
future date. Such a commitment was provided by the Kyoto conference and Australia's 
signing of the Protocol that emerged from it. This gave the SFE sufficient confidence that 
carbon emissions were likely to become more increasingly costly to the emitter as a result 
of government commitments. Under the circumstances, the SFE could potentially play a 
role. 
597 Well, this is a straight example of business opportunity if you Zike. The Kyoto protocol, and you can 
see they start immediately after that ... they in fuct staned a bit before that. {It was a bit before that.} 
They started probably at least a year before that, but if the Kyoto protocol was going to become a reality 
then this was a business opportunity and being first in carries "1th it some risks but it also carries with it 
some potential big gains if you're successful. They took a business decision that this was worth a go ... 
(19; 155-9] That was all about the thought that Kyoto presented the possibility of creating a new carbon 
trading market [48;51] 
287 
Unfortunately for the SFE, however, not all of the necessary preconditions for it to play a 
major role were met. As it would tum out, international processes would 'giveth and taketh 
away' to a large degree. Just as the international negotiations had spurred the SFE's push 
into carbon trading, the continued uncertainty in finalising the emissions trading rules to 
apply under the Kyoto Protocol was to deflate much of the enthusiasm at the domestic 
level. While this research finds that internal factors were more decisive in killing off the 
SFE's role in the greenhouse policy network, it seems certain that the lack of clarity in the 
international emissions trading environment also played a damaging role. 598 
Less specific to emissions trading, the continued uncertainty over whether the Kyoto 
Protocol would come into force (let alone be ratified by Australia) also damaged the SFE's 
plans for carbon trading.599 It was impossible for them to sustain the commitment required 
to push emissions trading, with such prolonged uncertainty in the regulatory environment 
internationally-and by extension, in Australia.600 While the SFE's push was largely 
598 
••• at the end of the day it took longer for the nations of the world to figure out what they were going to 
do than these people had in venture capital to keep it going. [19;155-9] l've noticed it would sort of come 
in waves. Their influence and activity is dependent on how discussions about carbon sinks are going of 
international level. [39;96] In dealing with this when it became clear that there wouldn't be an easy 
ratification of the Protocol coming into force globally or domestically they substantially lost interest. 
You'd expect them to pick that interest up again if you got into an environment where that sort of trading 
is likely to occur on a large scale. [54;98] ... everybody knew that knows anything about the greenhouse 
negotiations that the markets were not going to be deep until-assuming that Kyoto flies-that the 
markets were not going to be deep until at least 2008 anyway. Which is a long time to invest resources in 
it. [ 48;63] 
599 If I was the Sydney Futures Exchange I would be thinking Kyoto is going to happen, there is going to 
be international trading in carbon, someone is going to make a lot of money out of it we want to be in 
that pool rather than standing on the side wondering why other people are having so much fun. So if I 
were the Sydney Futures Exchange I would be quite actively lobbying for Australia to be part of the 
Kyoto Protocol. [9;174] 
600 {You wouldn't suspect that the government decision on emissions trading, about Minchin saying, 
we're not touching this until 2008, that wouldn't have ... would that have made it harder to sustain an 
interest in this?} Well, it obviously wouldn't make it easier. So long as you continued to believe that you 
were going to ratify the Kyoto protocol and have trading in 2008 it shouldn't have made a difference 
because the actual trading contract the SFE were developing was for 2008 commencement period with 
sequestrations ... {Yes, so it's the future. You're taking a bet on the value ofcarbon in 2008 and beyond 
that?} Yes, but you can have a market today taking that bet, so in principle, given the type of contract 
they were setting up, a statement that you wouldn't do anything before 2008 shouldn't make it more 
difficult unless there's an implication in that statement that you're raising uncertainty as to whether 
you'll actually honour the 2008 obligation. I mean governments that say, 'yes, I really believe in this but 
I'm not going to do anything for the next seven years,' obviously raise a question as to whether they're 
going to do anything after the seven years, so to the extent that you send signals that you might back off 
later on down the track with regard to the Kyoto commitment period by saying you won't do anything 
before it then yes, that would have made it more difficult for Les. And certainly ifthe uncertainty that's 
now around as to whether we'll ratify the Kyoto protocol would definitely make it difficult for these 
characters. Had they still been trying at this stage, they'd have got knocked on the head now, I suspect. 
[7;141-9] They (the SFE pulled out of emissions trading because they) probably got a word out of the 
Greenhouse Office that it was not going to amount to much. And the fact is that it is and it is probably 
going to end up being a government to government deal. [33;72-74) 
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abandoned by then, the announcement by US President, George W Bush, that he would not 
honour the Kyoto Protocol commitment of the Clinton administration killed off any 
prospect that it would return to the SFE agenda. 
Greenhouse media coverage and public opinion 
Media coverage of the climate change issue, particularly in the lead-up to the Kyoto 
conference appears to have been a significant factor which helped to drive SFE enthusiasm 
for the carbon trading agenda. The publicly canvassed and intensifying interest in market-
based, cost-effective policy mechanisms to deal with what looked like an inevitable 
tightening on greenhouse emissions in Australia highlighted the potential opportunity for 
the Exchange. The heightened media coverage was a signal which that well noted by the 
SFE and strengthened their desire to get active on the issue. 
Conversely, greenhouse media coverage also played an important role in the demise of the 
SFE's carbon trading push. Month after month ticked by with continued uncertainty about 
the future of the Kyoto Protocol-whether it would come into force, whether Australia 
would ratify, and what would be the emission trading framework internationally. Media 
coverage steadily eroded the notion that a domestic emissions trading scheme in Australia 
was inevitable. As media coverage played down the inevitability and urgency associated 
with carbon abatement, investor enthusiasm for the SFE' s agenda steadily waned. When 
the government finally announced its less than ambitious intentions in relation to emission 
trading, the subsequent media coverage killed off any prospect of large scale carbon trading 
in the near to medium term. 
In these ways, media coverage of important developments in the greenhouse policy 
network first exerted powerful incentives for greater SFE involvement and later exerted 
proportionate disincentives. 
Selective incentives 
Selective incentives were a significant but not decisive factor in the SFE's engagement. To 
the extent that they had succeeded in their objective of establishing the only govemment-
sanctioned carbon trading market in Australia, the income associated with running that 
market would have flowed exclusively to the SFE's members. The benefits could be 
excluded from all other potential competitors (like the ASX). The SFE also had much 
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larger ambitions in the field. The carbon credits market based on sequestration by 
plantation forests was seen as only the beginning of a much broader domestic emissions 
market. There were even plans for the SFE to secure a wider regional leadership role as the 
pre-eminent carbon emissions trading market in the Asia Pacific region. It is most unlikely 
that the SFE would have embarked on such an ambitious agenda had the prospect of 
exclusive access to the benefits of establishing such markets not existed. The establishment 
of monopolies in futures markets in order that the SFE could fully capitalise on emerging 
markets was a very powerful motivating force.601 That said, it is also unlikely that this force 
alone was sufficient to spur the SFE's activities. As we have already seen, internal micro-
level forces (especially leadership) were far more powerful in this particular case in the 
entry and exit of the SFE from climate policy. 
Macro-level 
Broad government ideology and culture 
In a couple of important ways, the dominant culture and ideology of the Howard federal 
government played a role in the rise and fall of SFE engagement in this policy network. 
There was, for example, less enthusiasm for command and control environmental 
regulation than existed under previous governments. Statements by the Howard 
government on a range of environmental issues over time suggest a much greater 
preference for market-based mechanisms to solve environmental problems, less reliance on 
government to finance environmental repair, and less hands-on involvement by bureaucrats 
in addressing environmental challenges. Against a background of generally negative 
comment on greenhouse matters from its traditional business constituency, the government 
601 I think most at the other groups see greenhouse as just one of the portfolio of issues which they feel 
they need to cover, but do not cover in any particularly special way-they sort of monitor it and put out 
press releases and do a little bit of policy analysis when they think there is something specifically related 
to their interests. Along with the whole range of other issues which they cover. The Futures Exchange is 
probably--they probably saw a competitive advantage in getting into this early. { ... and they would be 
the one group on this list which would be able to deliver something exclusively to their members-if 
they were the only ones running the emissions market?} Yes-that's right. [53;161-5] { ... had they got 
the exclusive rights to that market, it would have been the Sydney Futures Exchange members that would 
have been sharing the profits?} Yes, but I would have to say that that would have been a pretty naive 
view if that's what drove them and I'd be surprised if they were that na'ive in the sense that if all this got 
off the ground, the notion of trading was going to be in effect that you would be able to trade worldwide 
and there would be plenty of competitors to trade through ... {What, Chicago and London and ... ?} 
Exactly, it would be a commodity. Now there's a question about whether you can, as Chicago and 
London have done for particular commodities, whether you could have been far enough in front to have a 
consolidated position such that you became recognised as, yes, that's the main place that you trade this 
commodity. {You wouldn't think of Australia?} Well, you wouldn't think so, a big call. {But they may 
have had the exclusive rights to the Australian market.?} Yes, I guess that's possible. [19;289-305] 
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was also hearing generally positive comments about the cost-effectiveness of emissions 
trading. Therefore, the idea of establishing a carbon trading system as part of a suite of 
measures aimed at reducing Australia's emissions had an obvious ideological appeal to the 
government of the day. 
The ideological synchronicity is also well reflected in the advocacy of the initial carbon 
trading idea to the SFE by two ex-bureaucrats. Both of them-Tony Beck and Stuart 
Beil--came from the elements of the bureaucracy which at least according to many 
interviewed here dominated the Howard government's greenhouse policy direction; the 
Industry portfolio in general and ABARE in particular. Beck, as a consultant, and Bei~ who 
was headhunted by the SFE for the specific task of making carbon trading happen, were 
both strong advocates of the idea. For them it fitted neatly in any effective government 
response to greenhouse as a business-friendly, cost-effective, rational response. It was the 
sort of approach which the Howard government was assumed to find more palatable. Had 
the notion not been seen as ideologically and culturally acceptable, even desirable, to the 
government of the day, it seems unlikely that the SFE would have supported it, nor that 
Beck or Beil would have invested the time and effort they did to advance it. In hindsight, 
more conservative forces won the day in cabinet by opposing both emissions trading as 
well as alternative regulatory approaches. However, the SFE was certainly motivated by a 
mistaken perception that the balance of government ideological sympathy lay with their 
side, perhaps not factoring in the extent to which inaction was an alternative for cabinet. 
Related policy networks 
One important way in which the SFE's activity in related policy networks drove its 
dalliance with carbon trading is that, as we have seen, there was a strong push in the late 
1990s for Sydney to become a financial centre for the Asia Pacific region. This had the 
forceful backing of both the NSW government and the federal government. Ministers in 
both Canberra and Sydney were promoting the idea that more and more companies ought to 
establish regional headquarters in Sydney, and they also strongly pushed the idea of a much 
more expansive role for existing financial infrastructure in the city: including the ASX and 
the SFE. This expansionist, and arguably over-blown, atmosphere certainly contributed to 
the SFE's carbon trading push--as an exciting new market in which the organisation could 
play a key role in Australia and also in the wider region.602 It was also a notion embraced 
602 I ,ook~you have to remember that through that period of time we harl a Treasurer in Australia who 
was saying we are going to promote Sydney as the financial capital of Asia. You know··.Sydney is going 
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by them, something which is perhaps reinforced by Les Hosking's decision in late 1999 to 
resign from the Exchange in order to accept a job effectively promoting that concept on 
behalf of the government. 
The other way in which related policy networks had an influence on the SFE was that the 
Exchange had been active in energy-related markets for some time in the lead up to the 
Kyoto conference. Coal and oil futures were being picked up by the organisation along 
with other energy opportunities. The establishment of the National Electricity Market 
(NEM) had been a policy issue which elicited close SFE interest and involvement during 
the Hosking era. The notion of a carbon trading market seemed a logical extension of their 
existing engagement in emerging energy-related markets.603 
Conclusions 
Many micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors made it possible for the SFE to engage as it 
did in the greenhouse policy network in the very intense way that it did from 1997-2000. 
The R&D culture of the organisation was an important precondition and this was closely 
linked to its mutual structure. Media coverage and government processes provided an 
incentive and opportunity for the carbon trading agenda to be readily promoted. The 
momentum flowing from climate change negotiations internationally provided impetus for 
the SFE to get involved. However, while these and other forces made their involvement 
to be the trading hub of Asia. If Sydney was going to be the trading hub of Asia, then by definition 
Sydney was going to be the carbon trading hub of Asia as well. The reality is that Sydney was never 
going to be the trading hub of Asia. Singapore would have done us hands down anyway. You know, our 
capital market is just not big enough to do it. So there were some very unreal expectations. {So reality 
finally jumped up and bit them?} Yes. [18;204-8] You had Michael Egan, you had on tap you could 
basically call him up any time you had something that was promoting or Bob Carr even came along for a 
few gigs. Anything that was associated with promoting Sydney as a financial centre was very easy to put 
a phone call to his secretary to get him up as a keynote speaker or to introduce a conference or even a 
seminar session or press session. {And that hysteria has faded away do you think?} I think it's dropped 
off. Both the certainly of emissions trading but even the financial services hub has dropped off a bit in 
terms of profile. {Less ambitious.} Less ambitious or everyone's just heard it all before. I think it was a 
new story there for a year or two and therefore it would get to the front of the paper rather than the back. 
[22;299-307] 
603 See previous quote [ 46;30] under footnote 585 describing this logical progression. 
Tony (Beck) in the first instance was an information gatherer and provider of intelligence on the 
marketplace and that relationship worked pretty well, but by no means, it wasn't the initial stimulus of 
SFE. I would accredit more of the work, the initial work, to a guy called Julian Fairfield. Julian didn't get 
directly involved in emissions but Julian Fairfield, who was a principal of a company called Bach 
Consulting, did a lot of work for SFE and traveled with Hosking to Japan on a number of occasions on a 
coal project. They had this connection. Hosking since 1997 had been a Director of the National 
Electricity Market, NEMCO, so for this coal they knew what the electricity market was doing and 
emissions just ... as soon as they heard it they thought, well there you go, there's the other leg to that. 
{Yes, it's not a big leap.} No, it's just a natural progression. [46;58-62] 
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possible, even probable, the leadership of Les Hosking drove it. This factor emerges as far 
more significant than any other in the SFE's engagement phase. 
The disengagement is not so clear cut. Three main factors appear to have been most 
important in the SFE exit from the greenhouse policy network. First, and most obviously, 
was the loss of Les Hosking as CEO at the Exchange. This removed the main patron for 
SFE involvement and investment in a CSC market. Second, the demutualisation of SFE in 
2000 resulted in a change in the organisation's balance of power and a marked shift in 
priorities with more focus on short term results and less willingness to devote resources to 
higher risk, longer term propositions. Finally, an uncertain policy environment meant that 
the CSC market proposed by the SFE suffered from chronic lack of sufficient investors and 
'liquidity' to be effective. Of particular importance were the uncertainty related to whether 
Kyoto would come into force, the Jack of clarity on what rules would apply to emissions 
trading internationally, and the associated hesitation by Australian policy makers about 
both ratification and emissions trading. 
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10 
Patterns across the case studies 
Introduction 
The previous seven chapters have aimed to present research findings in a way that focuses 
heavily on the what drove group behaviour in the individual cases. What is not readily 
accessible to the reader because of the case by case approach is the extent to which patterns 
emerge across the seven case studies. It is not clear, for example, which if any of the micro-
' meso- and macro-level pressures analysed here are consistently important across the cases 
and what noteworthy patterns if any emerge. With this in mind, this chapter looks across 
the seven case studies. It considers the patterns and variations which emerge and enhance 
our understanding of what shapes perceptions of group interest, and in tum, influences 
group behaviour. This enables us to appreciate which are the most commonly significant 
pressures and which have proven to be relatively unimportant. It also enables us to consider 
how rapid change in these influences can have major consequences in terms of group 
behaviour. 
Micro-level-patterns, exceptions and observations 
The most overwhelming pattern which emerges from this seven case study is that micro-
level group pressures greatly shape perceptions of group interest and influence group 
behaviour. Almost without exception, where a group has chosen not to engage in the 
greenhouse policy network, all four major micro- influences were instrumental in 
dissuading the group--culture, resources, leadership and membership structure. 
Conversely, where a group has chosen to engage, these factors have all been significant 
incentives. This pattern is similar irrespective of the extent to which external meso- and 
macro-level factors have played a role. 
At times, there have been major shifts in the level or nature of a group's engagement-the 
AGA, the NAFI, and the SFE are the clearest examples. Tellingly, in all cases this shift has 
been linked to major change at the micro-level. It seems no coincidence that all three of 
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these dramatic shifts also all involve simultaneous changes in leadership, culture and 
membership structure. 
Micro-level organisational forces are found in this research to be critical to assessments of 
group interest and consequential group behaviour. They are relatively the more powerful 
forces (taking into account how much more often meso- and macro-level factors are found 
here to have no impact). Most important, micro-level factors appear to be at the heart of 
rapid changes to group involvement in the policy network. Not one of the four main micro-
level forces has been shown to be dominant in the 7 cases studied here, though the evidence 
suggests that resources have been somewhat less relevant to rapid shifts in network 
involvement than the other three. 
The other important observation which can be made and is well illustrated by the AGA, 
NAFI, and SFE is that there appear to be powerful feedback loops between the forces 
shaping group interest and behaviour. This applies to all levels, but particularly bet\veen 
micro-level pressures. The result found here is that there is a great deal of inertia associated 
with the internal influences on perceived group interest. Consequently, change in group 
behaviour in general and in relation to greenhouse in particular often takes much longer 
than might be expected by those looking in from the outside. It tends to occur all at once 
after a 'tipping point' is reached internally-more often than not helped along by a new 
chief executive or board leader. Revolution under a new leader, rather than evolution 
appears to be needed to drive significant shifts in group behaviour and perceptions of 
interest. This has certainly been the experience with the change in greenhouse policy 
positions with the NAFI, the AGA, and the SFE. While revolution seems unlikely, there are 
signs of change at NFF with Peter Corish's recent comments on the seriousness of global 
warming, and at ICA with the elevation of IAG's Michael Hawker to chair the board. 
While on the surface this research might suggest that leadership is the most pre-eminent 
internal factor, it seems impossible to make that conclusion given the strong evidence in 
various cases that leadership changes were pre-empted by or co-incided with crucial 
cultural and membership related shifts. 
Organisational culture 
Organisational culture has been a critical influence on group decisions about whether to 
engage in the greenhouse network and on the level and type of engagement. In all seven 
cases, the organisational culture was found to have played a major role in group decisions. 
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The AAC is the only case where the culture of the organisation exerted sustained pressure 
for greater engagement in the network. As we have seen, the culture was aggressive, 
ruthless, connected, professional and 'ready for any fight with the greens.' Personal 
ideological zeal for the cause was another important characteristic of the AAC. Its staff, 
consultants, members and supporters have been believers in Australian produced 
aluminium first and foremost, proud enemies of the 'pro-Kyoto brigade' and true believers 
in the AAC's greenhouse policy position. Crucially, the AAC culture was also largely 
homogeneous~a small group of like-minded people used to having their way. According 
to all sources covered here-their culture was key to enabling the AAC to be perhaps the 
pre-eminent sectoral player in the greenhouse policy network. 
In the case of the SFE, the organisational culture has since mid-2000 changed dramatically 
with the departure of Les Hosking and many staff along 1'.ith the demutualisation of the 
organisation. However, the Hosking era culture was a highly significant part of the story of 
the SFE's initial forceful engagement in the policy network from 1997-2000. The SFE in 
those times was inherently supportive of investment in potential new markets. The culture 
valued a longer term focus, looking over the horizon to the potential of emerging markets 
to provide the Exchange with an income stream in years to come. The overwhelming 
consensus of interview comments here holds that the SFE culture heavily drove their 
greenhouse policy activity. Conversely, the shift towards a listed Exchange and a much 
more short-termist culture less supportive of R&D in new market opportunities, helps a 
great deal to explain the SFE's seemingly permanent departure from the greenhouse 
network. Their entrance to and exit from the greenhouse network were both fim1ly culture 
driven. 
Culture was also a powerful force in the five remaining cases; in the case of the Insurance 
Council, Tourism Council and NFF exerting heavy pressure not to get too concerned with 
the policy nel\vork. The role of organisational culture is even more instructive with the 
AGA and NAFI because changes in the culture were so closely lioked to big shifts in 
perceptions of group interest and involvement in the policy network. In both cases, a major 
break with the previous culture led to the groups taking a fresh look at the greenhouse 
issue. 
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Leadership 
Individual leaders have been found repeatedly in this research to have a powerful influence 
on the pereeption of group interest. This has been at the core of the extent, nature, and style 
of engagement of groups in the greenhouse policy network in various examples. 604 As 
might perhaps be expected there is no inherent correlation between strong leadership and 
greater participation in the network--there are too many associated factors, not the least of 
which are the likely policy implications for the membership. The NFF case under Wendy 
Craik's leadership provides a good example of a strong leader judging it best for the 
organisation to play a watchful but peripheral role. 
While there are multiple examples found here to suggest that leaders lacking confidence or 
direction tend to be less likely to engage in the network (the TCA and ICA provide the 
clearest examples), the opposite does not appear to hold. Certainly there are good examples 
where strong advocacy by a leader has been absolutely central to group engagement--as 
was the case with Les Hosking's personal crusade on carbon trading at the SFE. However, 
even where there has been strong and effective leadership associated with a group which is 
very active in the network, that involvement is sometimes not a consequence of the 
leadership but rather it has been ancillary to consistent engagement in the network-as has 
been the case in the Aluminium Council where other driving forces have been far more 
decisive. 
However, some interesting patterns do emerge. Most important, dramatic shifts in group 
engagement with the policy network do appear to be associated almost always with 
changes in organisational leadership. These shifts can be associated with a move into or out 
of the network or a significant move from one side of the network to another. The departure 
of Les Hosking, for example, was clearly instrumental in the decision taken by the SFE to 
abandon carbon trading and largely exit the policy network. The arrival of Bill Nagle was 
without doubt instrumental in bringing on the exit of the AGA from the AIGN and 
facilitating a very different AGA position in the policy nen>rork. The arrival of Kate Carnell 
had a similar effect at NAFI. 
604 I mean the overwhelming characteristic of involvement by the groups you've listed here in my own 
experience is-the reading of the interests of the group concerned that is given by the personalities 
employed-is the chief driver. So, if you've got someone who is by nature very aggressive and 
confrootational, then that is the way their group behaves and is represented--they pick up their interest in 
that way. If you·ve got people who are a bit more skilful and subtle then the group behaves that way. So, 
the style in my observation is not di~'tated by their interest, it's really dictated by the personality. [2;44] 
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This is not to suggest that leadership changes at interest groups always cause shifts-
sometimes they are symptomatic of shifts already under way. In all three cases-NAFI, 
SFE and AGA- strong evidence was found to suggest that movement or conditions 
conducive to it were already evident prior to the leadership changes. 605 What is clear, 
however, is that new leadership can be a very powerful accelerant of change. New leaders 
provide the opportunity for a reassessment of group interests, a reappraisal of the group's 
involvement in policy networks. Often, it appears, this opportunity results in quite dramatic 
shifts. 
However, all groups are not equal when it comes to the reassessment opportunity presented 
by leadership change. This research finds that in many cases, there is significant flexibility 
for leaders to take their organisations in different directions on greenhouse policy-the 
nature and extent of the group's engagement are not necessarily pre-ordained in many 
cases. Interviews conducted here suggest a great deal of leadership flexibility at the NAFI, 
TCA, NFF and ICA (the last two of which may now be tested with Corish and Hawker 
respectively). Conversely, there are some circumstances where leadership flexibility is 
much more limited. The AAC provides the clearest case where it was almost universally 
agreed that leadership change would never change the position of the group--something 
probably also true of the AIGN. 
605 I think it has been vastly different since about 1998-and they (the AGA) have taken a whole new 
strategic direction ... the Gas Industry has undergone a huge change ... {Do you put that down to 
individuals?} Yes-I think they have had some savvy individuals on the AGA Executive Board. 
{ ... other people have painted it very much as this individual story with Bill Nagle coming into the 
organisation and ever since then it has undergone this revolution?} It started before Bill Nagle. They 
were off down that road ... [27;28-44] {Do you think Kate Carnell's selection was premeditated by the 
organisation recognising that there was a need for a change in direction?} Yes, and that's not to be 
negative to her predecessors at all, but you know times change and the industry ... you would have to say 
the industry hasn't won too many battles over the years and you could say that it means we haven't 
fought hard enough or alternatively our approach has been wrong or over time has become wrong ... It 
might have been right once, but we as an industry can't fight the surge towards environmental thinking 
and nor should we ... {A lot of people have commented to me about NAFI that there was a kind of siege 
mentality ... that over the years with this siege mentality there was just more and more of their resources 
were dedicated to defending the hardwood guys from the greens ... } That's why they've split. { ... and 
hence the split. And so they ended up with a shrinking organisation if they weren't careful and so it 
sounds like what was left of that organisation decided that they needed to have a decisive change in 
direction. Would that be ... } I think that's ... look I know that's what happened. A number of the 
principals got together and decided that they had to make some pretty definite decisions here on what 
they wanted to do with NAFI and I think the decision was that it had to become more involved in the 
debate, you know not just the punch up the greenies debate. [4;88-102] I guess by mid 1999 there were 
two areas of slowdown. SFE was totally distracted by its merger discussions with the Australian Stock 
Exchange, its demutualisation discussions and so on and we probably, because of those distractions ... the 
process of development, of driving towards a contract being listed, slowed down. [46;134] 
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Two conditions appear to be instrumental to leadership flexibility. First, the fewer the 
number of issues on the group's agenda the harder it appears to be to move the position.6-06 
Second, the stronger aod clearer the perceived interest of the membership, the less scope 
there is for a new leader to change course.6ifl In the case of the AAC, the gronp deals with 
very few issues and the perceived greenhouse interest is very clear. As such, it is generally 
accepted that no new leader could shift the position. With the NAFI, NFF, AGA and others, 
however, neither condition has been met and as a result there has been much greater scope 
for movement. 
Membership structure 
Membership-related characteristics have been central to the participation of all seven case 
study groups in the greenhouse policy network. Tue effect has been mixed. With the 
Aluminium Council the structure of the membership generated consistent pressure to play 
the strongly active role we have seen over many years. For the NFF, TCA aod the ICA, 
over many years the membership structure was an obstacle to greater involvement. Then 
there are the cases involving major shifts-the NAFI, the AGA and the SFE. In this final 
category, changes in the membership structure have been closely connected to major shifts 
in the groups' role in the policy network. This diversity of impact allows various 
observations to be made. 
First, membership is vitally importaot as ao enabler of group engagement as it helps to 
establish a perception of group interest, which is a necessary precursor of meaningful 
606 See previous quote [1;93-97] under footnote 430 in relation to the many issues confronting the TCA 
and the difficulty it created in addressing longer term challenges like climate change. 
(Also, with the TCA) ... there were other priorities that strategically were more important. [14;213] (In 
relation to the AAC) And that's because we're engaged in priority areas, I highlighted those priority 
areas as this energy/ greenhouse bit. We do a number of other tasks, but they're I was going to say 
peripheral, but they're not peripheral but they are certainly at a level of magnitude below the focus the 
Council has in this area. [34;68] 
607 At the end of the day the industry organisations are representative of their constituencies. And as such 
you won't find the bead of the Coal Industry Association arguing for the displacement of coal as an 
energy source. And you'll always find ESAA and the Aluminium Council wanting attention to the 
adjustment the economic adjustment implications, the commercial adjustment implications for their 
constituents. You'll never get away from that reality. [51;190] (For example, the AAC) {Do you think 
it's conceivable that there might have been a CEO of the Aluminium Council thal would have taken a 
significantly different direction on greenhouse ... } No. {Or would you say that ilie direction is fairly 
constrained by the interests of the membership on this issue?} I think it's that. And I think that any 
incoming CEO would find it difficult if be had a position that was differenl to that. {So you're not going 
to get a John Brown suddenly taking the Aluminium Council off on a boldly different direction on this 
issue.} No. Or a Meredith Helicarl (then advocating a greener position within the BCA than the AIGN 
would like to have seen) (34; 142-52] 
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participation in a policy network. The fewer members a group has, the easier it is to 
perceive common interests and establish consensus, and similarly the more homogeneous 
the membership, the easier it is to reach agreement. 608 The more democratic, hierarchical, 
or federalist the membership structure, the harder it is to reach consensus on group interest 
and network involvement. 609 Finally, it would also appear that the larger and better 
resourced the individual members, the more direct the representation, and the more 
complete the sectoral coverage, the easier it is for groups to engage effectively. 610 
A comparison between the AAC and the TCA illustrates all of these findings well. 
Excluding its associate membership, the AAC has 27 very large corporate members with 
many running the same sort of business. They have common interests and shared priorities. 
They have a simple group structure at the AAC which allows for quick decisions and 
delegation of work to the secretariat. Conversely, the TCA had tens of thousands of 
members operating hundreds of different types of businesses-many of them individual 
small businesses. The hugely diffuse membership had few perceived common interests and 
608 See previous quote [9;238] under footnote 398 regarding the diversity of TCA's membership and the 
organisational problems this creates, and the similar problems encountered by NAFI due to split interests. 
(The same interviewee went on to say) ... whereas at the other extreme, the Aluminium Council we talked 
about the fact that the small group of members and obviously singing from the same song sheet. [9;238] 
609 
... with greenhouse it is much more diffuse and difficult to deal with l00,000 farmers out there who 
are your constituents on greenhouse than it is on lamb exports. Whereas with the Aluminium Council, 
they are a much closer knit organisation with just a few CEOs and they all know what their interests are. 
[48;75] As soon as you start to get into what I would call a representative model where you have one 
person representing interests of many-so many-then that one person can obviously represent their own 
interests well but not necessarily represent the views or the expectations or behavioural responses of 
everyone else they represent. And as the model cascades out from a Council where you have the whole 
industry represented by the chief executive officers--the next model would be the whole industry 
represented by people two or three tiers down in the organisation who aren't in a position to make 
decisions without reference back to head office or to the top. The next one is where you have only some 
of the industry represented on the board and that is by design or some of the companies opting not to be 
involved. That becomes sort of a further step away from a coherent response. Then I think you have 
some of the Tourism Council of Australia type models-and there are probably two categories there--
one where you have got nominated representatives in an elected sense-and the other one where you 
have people from state based organisations representing everyone in that State whether they are elected 
or whether it is part of the state based Council with its own agenda. You are starting to bring together a 
set of totally different representational agendas I think as opposed to a direct company decision-making 
ability. (40;230] 
6 !0 See previous quote [54;122] under footnote 61 regarding the correlation of power and influence with 
groups which have relatively small rich memberships--or 'the five star membership.' 
{Perhaps--contrasting the different types of membership arrangement with say the Aluminium Council 
for example whether only 8 or so very large players all of a similar mind versus--and I do not want to 
put words into your mouth here but just by way of example-say the Tourism Council where they're 
representing 40,000 or so members, mostly mum and dad bed and breakfast owners?} I think you've hit 
on the main thing. Where you have direct company representation, and you have full sector coverage on 
the board of an association you have probably got the most effective response, the most effective ability 
to address greenhouse and greenhouse response strategy. [40;228-30] 
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priorities. Decision making by the TCA was also complicated by the role of state chapters 
and various internal committees. The consequences in greenhouse policy have been stark. 
While groups like the TCA have battled to reach member consensus partly because of their 
organisational structure, the membership arrangements have acted to accelerate consensus 
in other groups like the AAC and enabled them to play an effective role in the network. The 
NFF, and for many years the AGA, provide other good examples where the membership 
coverage and structure contributed to a slower establishment of group consensus. 
The other observation to be made is that membership changes have been central factors in 
major changes in greenhouse network involvement by the groups studied here. In every 
case where there was a big shift in the extent and/or nature of a group's engagement (AGA, 
NAFI, SFE) there has also been a big change in the membership arrangements. At the 
AGA, the departure of the large gas producers led to a much more proactive AGA pcsition 
and the organisation's very public fallout vvith the AIGN. The departure of the plantation 
industry appears to have shaken some in NAFI, and laid the ground for the arrival of Kate 
Carnell and a more proactive stance. Conversely, the demutualisation of the SFE was 
central to the exit of the Exchange from carbon trading and the greenhouse network. 
As these examples show, the impact of membership change can run in either direction. 
Dilution of membership in the case of the SFE fucilitated less involvement, whereas 
concentration of membership led to increased and changed engagement for the AGA and 
NAFI (perhaps because it is easier to achieve AAC-like consensus). These membership 
issues, however, are intricately tied up with changes in leadership and organisational 
culture with none being clearly dominant. Like these other changes, they would appear to 
be powerful in paving the way for reappraisal of group interest and involvement in policy 
networks. 
Resources 
The results of this research confirm that interest group resources are an influence on the 
extent of group engagement. Whilst they have the benefit of significantly more resources 
(particularly financial and political) than most public interest groups, for example, the 
seven cases examined here demonstrate that limited resources remains a perennial problem 
for business interest groups. Every organisation considered~with the possible exception of 
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the Aluminium Council-had considerably more work to do than its resources would 
allow. 
For those who have not been consistently engaged in the greenhouse network but might 
reasonably have been expected to be (based on the views of network players, or indeed by 
their own public remarks) there would seem to be a superficial argument at least to suggest 
that lack of resources has been a factor. Heavy commitments elsewhere and the comparably 
very high information barrier to entry and consistent engagement in the greenhouse debate 
have arguably made it more difficult to justify the allocation of scarce resources to serious 
involvement in the greenhouse network. This has arguably been a factor in the case of the 
TCA, ICA and to a lesser extent NAFI and NFF-with the TCA perhaps the strongest 
example. 
However, upon closer analysis, the argument appears fragile. The clear implication of the 
'we didn't have the resources' argument is that 'had we had more resources we would have 
been more engaged.' Upon closer scrutiny it would appear that more resources would have 
made little difference in the above-mentioned cases.611 In this way, resources are somewhat 
different to the other micro-level factors considered here. That is, while changes in 
leadership, membership and culture have driven big shifts in greenhouse network 
involvement this is not true of changes in resources. 
Clearly for the AAC, their access to virtually limitless resources has underpinned their 
strong and effective engagement. So, to the extent that plentiful resources enable groups to 
fund effective campaigns, they are obviously an important influence on behaviour. 
However, plentiful resources do not necessarily lead to close and consistent engagement as 
is evident from the ICA example. Judgments about the relative priority of the issue are far 
more important than the level of resources available to a group. 612 
Where resources appear to have a significant role is in influencing a group's capacity to 
even consider the relative priority of a new or unfamiliar issue. Where an organisation is 
611 When you go down their list of priorities industry associations can only deal with the top I 0 per cent 
of their priorities properly and if the issue's not in that top 10 per cent then it falls off. {But it's not that 
they don't have the resources, it's ... } They devote them somewhere else. {If they had ten times the 
resources would they get to greenhouse?} Probably. {What about twice?} No. {Probably not?} Probably 
not. [19;267-83] 
612 I think that's true and I think that for many of the industry organisations where the interest has not 
been centre stage, front of mind, a key priority concern, they find they simply cannot afford to commit 
the resources required to fully appreciate what's at stake ... 
302 
pre-occupied with high profile battles (as with ICA and NAFI) or fighting a huge range of 
issues (as with ~'FF and TCA) they appear to be inherently disinclined to take more on. 
This tendency seems even more pronounced where the issue in question is considered 
complex, not immediately threatening, and resource intensive. Thus, it would seem that 
lack of resources has fed into organisational inertia and indifference towards the 
greenhouse network. Groups like the ICA, TCA, NAFI and NFF have appreciated the 
significant resources required to be a major player in the greenhouse debate and 
consistently made the decision to stay on the periphery. The long term, complex, resource 
intensive nature of the issue has made that decision easier and prevented a deeper 
assessment of group interest.613 Thus, lack of resources does appear to be connected to 
feedback loops with other micro-level forces strengthening the status quo. 614 
Meso-level-patterns, exceptions & observations 
A wide range of factors operating at this level were influential. In particular this research 
finds that the key meso-level factors are: policy implications, policy limitations, coalition 
activity, and scientific uncertainty. Less important but at times significant in eliciting 
activity have been government processes, parliamentary processes, international processes 
and goverrunent greenhouse policy. This is not to say that no other factors have had an 
influence; however, beyond what has already been said in the case study chapters the ones 
covered below have had a broader significance. 
---------·-·--
613 I don't know that in that sense that environment issues are intrinsically different than say health issues 
or others. {Do you think, though, that greenhouse as an issue has a higher information barrier to entry 
and other environmental issues?} Oh-·yes it does--l'm sorry--O!e difference between greenhouse an<l 
most other environment issues is that it has much broader ramifications potentially much bigger 
ramifications. One way of putting that, if you like, is that greenhouse impacts on the macro-economy-I 
can't think off hand of another environment issue that could really be said to have perceptible impacts on 
the macro-economy over a long period of time. They obviously have impacts on the micro-economy. 
And it is international much much more-so yes-it is much bigger and more complex than almost any 
other emironment issue. [43;198-202] 
"
4 
••• there's another factor that's relevant in all this and that is the complexity of the agenda. lfyou track 
back the history the way you've been doing and recognise what's been involved in keeping pace with Rio 
itself in '92, followed by the whole COP process, followed by the negotiation in Kyoto, followed by the 
detailed work that's been done in areas like new and renewables and emissions trading, you're talking 
about a very complex agenda that for many people sees their eyes just glaze over. {So the information 
barriers to enter into the debate are so high that many of them just walk away?} I think that's true and I 
think that for many of the industry organisations where the interest has not been centre stage, front of 
mind, a key priority concern, they find they simply cannot afford to commit the resoru-ces required to 
fully appreciate what's at stake. [51;130-34] 
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Policy implications 
Policy implications should not be confused with notions of 'vested interest.' Here, the term 
refers to the perceived consequences of government policies which might be used to 
address an issue. As has been explored in Chapter 1, the concept of vested interest is 
constructed out of many elements. It is a perception which is not quantifiable in any 
meaningful sense because it incorporates financial and non-financial costs and benefits 
which are in tum shaped (and arguably distorted) by a range of micro-, meso- and macro-
forces. 615 A group's perception of the likely implications of policies available to 
government would logically seem to heavily drive the assessments of group interest, and in 
tum the extent and urgency of network engagement. The case studies certainly support the 
idea that policy implications for a group can sometimes be clear. A carbon tax resulting in 
higher electricity prices would in all likelihood hurt the Australian aluminium industry. 
Yet, more often than not policy implications are not clear cut-they may be multi-faceted 
given the complexity of issues involved. 
An issue may present both positive and negative implications. This was clearly the case 
with the TCA who recognised that policies aimed at reducing global warming might lessen 
very long term damage to the barrier reef and snowfields, but also lead to higher jet-fuel 
and electricity costs in the near term. It was similarly the case with the NFF for whom 
615 See previous quote [54; 122] under footnote 61 highlighting small, rich 'five star' memberships . 
. .. they represent what they see as the interests of their members [9;66] All the associations have their 
Board of Directors made up of their members or represents some of their members on their Board so they 
can't deviate too far away from the core interests of their members they'll get pulled into line very 
rapidly ... [29;37]The minute you start to represent a diverse group of people, unless you're somewhat 
suicidal in your approach to these things and there have been some examples of that, you must have 
cognisance of the varying interests that you have to represent and it creates a significant problem in terms 
of being able to have an impact in the public debate ... (37;187] At the end of the day we basically 
articulate the wishes of our members and it depends. If you would have had someone that was more 
interested in greenhouse as opposed to profitability issues yes, sure, but they wouldn't have been in the 
job for too long because they weren't actually making member businesses tick, so while certainly you 
could have had someone different it's all about balancing diverse interests that are confronting the 
industry and there were a massive number of diverse ones confronting the industry over that time. {So 
you think to a large extent the position of the group on the issue is just preordained by the perceived 
interests of the members?} Oh well certainly you're constrained by that. You're constrained by their 
interests. [1;149-153] (can you conceive that there might have been a different leader of one or more of 
these groups who could have taken the group in a very different direction in greenhouse or is the 
direction of leadership pretty much constrained by the interests of the group or is the answer to that 
question different in different industries. Is there more flexibility in say the farmers' response to say 
Aluminium?} At the end of the day the industry organisations are representative of their constituencies. 
And as such you won't find the head of the Coal Industry Association arguing for the displacement of 
coal as an energy source. And you'll always find ESAA and the Aluminium Council wanting attention to 
the adjustment the economic adjustment implications, the commercial adjustment implications for their 
constituents. You'll never get away from that reality. [51;188-90] 
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policy proposals for carbon credits from agro-forestry were an opportunity while policy 
measures to reduce livestock methane emissions was likely to be a threat. For the Insurance 
Council, policy to reduce global warming is clearly a positive as it reduces the long term 
risk of damage from extreme weather events, but greater insurance industry involvement 
risks throwing an unwelcome spotlight on existing cross-subsidisation practices and 
threatens insurer inves1ments in carbon intensive industry. The seven cases are full of such 
examples of mixed policy implications which have to be weighe<l up by interest groups.6i6 
Inevitably, judgments on each facet are laden with assumptions, many of which are 
themselves open to debate. For example, various models endeavouring to calculate the 
costs and benefits to individual industries and the nation from Kyoto Protocol ratification, 
have generated vastly dissimilar results by using different and highly contested 
assumptions.617 As a result, it would appear that policy implications are not cut and dried 
most of the time. They are complex, often mixed, and highly debatable-as has certainly 
been the case ;vith climate change. 
The reflexively anti-green movement culture of the NAFI was, for example, an important 
influence on that organisation's long-term negative perception about climate change policy 
implications. The similarly conservative, anti-green culture of the l><'FF drove sceptic.al 
assumptions about the seriousness of climate change as a policy threat to Australian 
agriculture for many years. The financial sector comfort zone of the ICA-"-a culture simply 
not at home in the climate change network--continues to foster policy implication 
assessments which discourage network engagement. The domination of the AGA culture 
by large gas producers with interests in coal and oil provides another good example. In that 
case, cultural and membership issues drove inertia on greenhouse policy-feeding 
616 (For example - in relation to the AGA) {\Vhat do you put that lack of activity down to?} I would 
imagine internal conflicting interests, short and long term within the group. {The fact that some of their 
players have got eoal interests as well as gas and that sort of thing'?} Yes. [54;32-8] I suspect 1hat some 
of their members see greenhouse as a douhle-edged sword really. I mean they probably feel that while 
there might be some medium term benefits there might be some long term risks of being too proactive on 
greenhouse. And even within their member companies there might be some conflicting interests anyway. 
[53;15] (In relation to the Tourism Council) I think it probably is still a mixed interest story really. Again 
you have the problem of long term interests versus short term costs. [53;55] (Re: NFF and NAFI) NAFI 
and the NFF are probably fairly similar-mixed interest' [53;173] (In relation to other organisations) 1he 
BCA and most of the umbrella groups suffer from split interests. They suffer from internal contradictions 
on the issue. [50;36] (Regarding the lCA) Again l think there's, the industry overall maybe has been a bit 
tactical again b=se again they do have interests on both sides of this. [29;!13] 
617 For example, the Howard government has heavily promoted one study which was prepared using the 
ABARE GTEM (global trade and environment model) model and Warwick McKibbin's G-cubed model. 
This study found that Australia's economy would be twice as badly off if Australia ratified 1he Kyoto 
Protocol than if it stayed out of the protocol. Conversely, a report by 1he Kyoto Protocol Ratification 
Advisory Group found that Australia's economy would be more than twice as badly off if Austr<1.lia 
chose not to ratify compared with a scenario in wliich Australia did ratify (Kemp 2002b; 2002c; Cabinet 
Office ofNSW 2003:12). 
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assessments which had less to do with the policy implications for Australian gas and more 
to do with those for coal and oil. 
The assertions made here are also reinforced by the examples of change found in the case 
studies. As we have seen with the AGA, NAFI, and SFE, there have been significant shifts 
at times in the forces which impact on the subjective assessments by groups about the 
implications of greenhouse policy. Where this has occurred it has not been uncommon to 
see completely different assessments of group interest. This was the case at the AGA post-
Nagle, and with NAFI post-Camell.618 This reinforces the notion that policy implications 
are not set in concrete and that that group behaviour is not driven by clear objective 
interests. Rather, it is the likely implications arising from government policy action that are 
part of a group's assessment of its interests, and this assessment is in turn strongly 
influenced by other factors at the micro- , meso- and macro-levels, which, as the cases here 
show, are not always static. 
Policy limitations 
As might be reasonably expected, policy limitations are also found here to have an 
important influence-more often than not as a disincentive to group engagement. Possibly 
the most obvious example of that was the NFF, which took some advantage of the reality 
that policy measures to reduce greenhouse emissions in the agricultural sector would be 
difficult in a technical and practical sense when compared with other sectors like transport 
and electricity generation. The NFF, therefore, was able to 'sit on the sidelines' of the 
greenhouse policy network much of the time, knowing that there was little serious risk of 
government policy attention to them. 
Conversely, the very same policy limitations acted as an incentive for involvement by the 
Aluminium Council-that is, the comparative ease with which the electricity sector could 
be targeted in policy terms made intensive electricity consumers like the Aluminium sector 
even more vulnerable to government attention. Interview data strongly supports the notion 
618 It ls also interesting to note that the NFF has now made a completely different assessment of climate 
change to that which dominated during this research. The new NFF president, Peter Corish mid the 
National Press Club in 2004, 'Possibly the biggest risk facing Australian fanners in the coming century is 
that of climate change. Australia is a country of climatic extremes, with aroood 80 per cent of farm profit 
made in around 30 per cent of years. Climate change predictions for South-Eastern Australia forecast 
more frequent extreme drought events, higher temperatures, lower rainfull and possibly increased 
evaporation as a result. The implications of such changes for agricultural production, particularly 
cropping, are obvious and we must take action to manage the business risks that are posed by these 
changes' (Corish 2004:7). 
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that the same policy limitation incentive applied strongly to others representing high energy 
use sector:;~~ for example. the Minerals Council of Australia, the APPEA, the ESAA, the 
CIF and the AIGN c-0alition. 619 
In the case of the SFE, policy limitations also ultimately proved to be a catalyst for 
disengagement. The bulk of the SFE story is associated with the leadership and departure 
of Les Hosking, and to a lesser degree changes in membership and culture at the 
organisation soon afterwards. However, there is no question that the continued lack of a 
legal framework and certainty required for a carbon trading market was a factor in the SFE 
decision to disengage from the greenhouse policy network. Notwithstanding the debate 
over whether Australia might have unilaterally introduced an emissions trading system in 
the absence of an international system (just as it has unilaterally committed to meeting its 
Kyoto target without ratifying the protocol) the international uncertainty limited options 
considered viable within the federal government. 62Q This limitation contributed to the lost 
greenhouse opportunity at the SFE. 
619 {There weren't any regulatory measures in the '97 package for anybody except the electricity sector 
and minhnum energy performance standards for equipment. And objectives for the car industry which 
haven't yet been actually agreed and delivered. But nonetheless agriculture wasn't exactly singled out 
with what you would say would be a proportionate attention given its contribution to the inventory. 
Perhaps that takes into account the relative contributions to emissions growth?] !l's both a combination 
of contribution to emissions grmvth and the ease with which, in that '97 package, you could identify 
measures. The technical ease, the technical ability. One of the great advantages from a regulatory point of 
view of the energy intensive sector and, although agriculture is relatively energy intensive, is the 
concentration. You can move upstream in the carbon use or carbon production cycle and you end up witb 
fewer and fewer players that are concerned. [54;66-70] (In relation to the relative ease of imposing 
greenhouse costs on business versus consumers) 1bere is an anti capitalist element in the greenhouse 
debate that is real. However when it starts to get in the way of trying to take decisions that can lower the, 
reduce the environmental footprint of energy intensive industry and energy supply sectors, then it's a 
nonsense and that's-the example par excellence of this is the inability of this country to come up with 
an end use energy efficiency program that would deliver us an outcome that's world's best practice or 
equivalent to world's best practice. We've calculated that by 2010 that could reduce emissions in this 
country by 20 to 30 million tonnes a year. It's not a particularly popular issue with business or with 
government and not least because it fits into this area of well, who do you impose it on? A bunch of 
refiners or power stations or anything of that sort are a bloody sight easier to impose a regulation or a 
comtnar1d or whatever it is on than 900,000 businesses, 8Y, million electricity customers and all the rest 
of us. [37;223] 
62° For example, on the one hand the federal g1)Vernment said that emissions trading in Australia would 
only be considered if there were an international emissions trading system in place. See, for example, the 
LNG Action Agenda launched by then Industry Minister, Senator Minchin, which stated that: 'The 
Government will only implement a mandatory domestic emissions trading scheme if the Kyoto Protocol 
is ratified by Australia and enters into force, and there is an established international emissions trading 
regime' Liquefied Natural Gas, Action Agenda 2000, Department of Industry, Science and Resources, 
Canberra, 2000 p.6; On the other hand, the government also implied that Australian participation in the 
Kyoto Protocol was conditional upon US ratifying. As Senator Hill told media in July 2001: We accepted 
the Kyoto Protocol, we've signed it, we accepted our target... it's more complicated now because of the 
US wanting to reconsider its policies but we just have to accept that complication and work out the best 
way forward... what we do know is that we need the US if we're going to get an effective global 
response. They are as I said a quarter of global emissions, they are about a third of developed country 
emissions, and this whole process is only going to work effectively if everybody accepts their fair share 
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There are many other examples among the case studies analysed here where policy 
limitations contributed to group interest and group decision-making. Without question, they 
appear to play a very important role in determining how organisations responded. 
Coalition activity 
Coalition activity has been another very important force in shaping group engagement. 
Some groups have seized an opportunity to be involved in coalition activity in order to 
convey to government and the wider community the impression that their position carries 
more clout. This could, for example, be said of the AAC, which, while it engaged directly 
in negotiations with government, also saw great value in being a part of the AIGN and a 
narrower coalition with the Cement Industry Federation and the Australian Paper Industry 
Council. 'Strength in numbers' and 'presenting a larger front,' in a context where interests 
are sufficiently similar not to discourage association, appear to have been the primary 
reasons why groups have made use of coalition opportunities. In most cases (TCA, NAFI, 
AGA, ICA, NFF and SFE), opportunities have been missed in spite of apparent shared 
group interest because cultural baggage and other factors precluded collaboration with 
potential allies. 
Saving resources has certainly been an issue for some members in that for example the 
AIGN puts on regular meetings and sends out regular information and this saves each 
member some resources in keeping up with the issue. Resources can also be saved where 
the AIGN lodges submissions to government and this saves some members doing one of 
their own. However, for the core members of the AIGN (for example, AAC, MCA, ACA, 
APPEA, CIF) saving resources has been more of a fringe benefit than an explanation for 
group involvement in coalition activity. For these groups, it appears unlikely that different 
membership costs and resources savings associated with AIGN membership would have 
significantly altered their involvement. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
AI GN has cost rather than saved resources for the core members, because they have had to 
contribute a disproportionately great share on occasion-'-especially in funding research. To 
of the burden. Hill, Robert Transcript oflnterview with ABC Radio, Bonn July 18 2001. Taking the two 
together, US disengagement from the Kyoto Protocol effectively limited any policy move to a domestic 
emissions trading scheme. 
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the extent that this has occurred there has been a free riding factor at play for the less 
prominent AIGN members, even some organisations outside the AIGN. 621 
For some groups, the costs of involvement in coalition activity provide a convenient reason 
for non-participation but usually disguise deeper reasons not to engage. The NFF is a 
perfect example. While it cited financial reasons as a reason for its eventual decision not to 
be active in the AIGN, this research conclusively finds that it was a perception of separate 
interests which dissuaded the NFF-a feeling that they did not want the agricultural sector 
to be 'used' by the AIGN to share the costs of what was perceived as an environmental 
policy problem largely created by others in the energy sector. The NFF was better off with 
its tendency to 'catch and kill its o\\>11'622 rather than enhancing the credibility of the AIGN 
by being a part of it. 
Overall, decisions on group activity in coalitions come down to judgments about the value 
to be gained from involvement. These judgments are less about cost and more about the 
perceived degree of shared interest, strategic relevance and group compatibility. The 
decision of the AGA to opt into the AIGN, and then to withdraw was based on two such 
judgments taken before and after a significant shift in the make-up of the AGA membership 
and a change in leadership. The AGA's on-again, off-again decisions in and out of tentative 
cooperation with green groups like the ACF reflect continuing oscillation in judgments 
about shared interest and compatibility. The assessment was that these factors were not 
sufficiently aligned to warrant more formalised, lasting collaboration. While the TCA was a 
group under serious financial pressures their decision not to be part of the AIGN or any 
other greenhouse coalition was again shown here not to be money-related. While money 
62
' See previous quote [37;95] under footnote 440 regarding the reluctance of some groups to formally 
join AIGN when it was 'put your money on the fridge time.' 
When the AIGN does work, or it gets some consultancy work done, it has to raise e>.im funds, so the 
funds that it has to exist as an organisation are quite minimal. They are operational just in the sense of the 
people and the necessary infrastructure and whatever, operating expenses, so whenever they want to do 
some research they have to say to the members, look, who's prepared to throw some money in, and I 
think V<ithout fail the Coal Association would have put in the hat every time and I would think so has the 
Alwninium Council every time. Those two probably every time, and it is also true that the Coal 
Association has helped in other ways. I said to you before that it's had a representative at these 
international meetings, every one of them, and that's partially to also bolster the AIGN's presence at 
those meetings, so I guess that's ... so I gues.' that's the perception, but the perception that the ACA 
funds the work for the AIGN is not right. I mean all those projects would have eight, nine or ten people 
chucking money in. [19;379] ... the perceived benefits of a group of associations working together 
lhrough tile Australian Industry Greenhouse Network is a good example of where people believe they can 
collectively gain more than individually-but even there you have got up in some people who would say 
that the groups who continue to sit outside the AIGN despite approaches are prepared to free ride on the 
back of the AIGN achievemenls. [40;2621 
622 [37;3 IJ 
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was a constant and ultimately fu:tal problem for the TCA its decision to remain outside the 
AIGN was based on an assessment about whether such coalition activity was sufficiently 
relevant and compatible with TCA interests. 
This research also finds that cultural a:ffmity can be another major factor in the emergence 
of coalition activity and the decisions by individual groups to participate. In the case of the 
AlGN, as will be expanded upon later, there was a crucially important cultural affinity 
story associated with this coalition activity in that the individual players involved came 
from a very close similar career background, had known and worked with each other for 
years, and had broadly very similar 'world views' on matters either directly or indirectly 
associated with climate change. These individuals were powerful influences upon their 
organisations and they have played a major role in succeeding to engage their respective 
industry associations in coalition activity. Without their advocacy, and the previous 
relationships built with each other over many years, it seems unlikely that the AIGN would 
have been anything like as active or effective. 
The final important finding about coalition activity made here is that it can act as a very 
powerful disincentive for organisations which are considering a role in the network. Where 
a policy network is dominated by a powerful coalition of interest groups it would appear 
that other groups considering a contmry role can be intimidated by the coalition and 
ultimately dissuaded from heavy involvement. This scarecrow effect certainly appears to 
have been an important factor in Australia's greenhouse policy network. For the TCA and 
ICA the collective power and overwhelming edge enjoyed by the AIGN appears to have 
made close involvement in the network on the green side of the debate all too hard. For 
others, like the NFF and the NAFI, this was also a problem but perhaps more significant 
was a cultural disinclination to take on fellow industry associations. The intimidation factor 
of the powerful AIGN coalition also appears to have for many years succeeded in keeping 
the AGA in line. Beyond the group of cases studied here, there is also strong evidence 
discussed further below to suggest that umbrella groups such as the BCA and AlG (which 
toyed with greener positions than the AIGN) were also discouraged from straying from the 
AIGN line in part because of the latter's intimidating presence. In short, where there has 
been a powerful coalition other groups have thought twice about whether taking them on is 
worth the fight. 
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Related government policy agenda 
There is little doubt that government policy---especially where either policy change occurs 
or it appears that it might-ha~ been influeutial in contributing to group decisions about 
their level of engagement. The influence is generally not a decisive one except for major 
government decisions which can occasionally cause a shift in the centre of gravity of the 
policy network 
These shifts in centre of gravity occurred, for example, when the Hawke government 
announced serious emission reduction commitments (as opposed to the previously vague 
targets) following the establishment of the FCCC in 1992. Without question, this drove 
rapid and sustained participation from precursors to the AAC and AJGN. Similarly, in 
1997, when the federal government unexpectedly won a deal which it believed it could live 
with in Kyoto, the AAC shifted its position to conditional support for the protocol.623 Then 
in early 2001, when the US announced it would not participate, and the Howard 
government followed suit, A.AC support for the Protocol evaporated and their opposition 
hardened. The same is true of most of the resources sector represented by the AIGN in the 
debate. 
These examples demonstrate that government policy can move, and has partly moved, the 
centre of gravity of the network with major decisions. However, most of the time it would 
appear that government policy announcements have a minimal impact-generally not 
making the difference between groups deciding to engage or not, and generally not 
influencing the policy position of a group. Government policy appears to have two 
recurring impacts: it reinforces group trends already under way, and sometimes it leads to a 
re-ordering of priorities in a group's network activities in terms of how and what they seek 
to influence by their involvement in the network. 
Where government policy reinforces existing trends, these trends are already being driven 
primarily by other factors-most commonly policy implications and limitations along with 
micro-level fil.ctors. The trends can be in either direction, heartening the position of those 
groups which agree with the government and adding momentum to their efforts, or 
623 According to a September 2000 AAC submission to a parliamentary inquiry into the Kyoto Protocol 
(AAC2000:3), 'The aluminium industry has consistently made clear that it supported the government in 
the outcome achieved at the COP3 negotiations in Kyoto, even though the final result has some flaws 
from the aluminium industry's perspective ... Some vital principles were incorporated into the Protocol, 
partly as a result of the Australian government's stance.' 
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dampening the level of enthusiasm among those who disagree. They can foster greater or 
lesser engagement depending on the circumstances, but what appears to be clear is that 
most government policy movement does not directly determine whether groups act or not 
and it appears to have only a marginal impact on the extent of engagement. 
The case studies provide some good support for this argument. For example, the Howard 
government had a long-standing policy of supporting differentiated targets for FCCC 
countries which were likely to have binding obligations to reduce emissions under the 
Kyoto Protocol. If this could be achieved, there was in-principle government support for 
both a domestic emissions trading system and for Australian participation in international 
emissions trading. With Australia obtaining approval for differentiation and a Kyoto 
Protocol emissions reduction target acceptable to the Howard government, many saw a 
green light for emissions trading-including the Environment Minister. In a media release 
titled, 'Kyoto Agreement a Win for the Enviromnent,' Senator Hill (1997e) said: 'The 
Kyoto Protocol protects Australia's export competitiveness and employment prospects in 
Australia's substantial mineral processing and energy export industries ... The agreement to 
establish a greenhouse gas emissions trading regime will be an essential component of 
this.' 
For groups like the Sydney Futures Exchange, this was a powerful signal which reinforced 
their efforts to play a role in any trade. However, it is important to appreciate that this 
campaign was already under way. It was not driven by government policy movement, 
rather it was reinforced. Conversely, when the government signed on to the Kyoto Protocol 
(as distinct from ratifying it) some groups like the TCA misunderstood the issue to be 
resolved and not requiring any further attention on their part. However, once more, the 
TCA disengagement was not new-it was a trend already under way and the Howard 
government's initial enthusiasm for the Kyoto Protocol only reinforced this existing trend. 
Then, when the Howard government steadily backed away from this position it added 
significant credibility, momentum, and enthusiasm to the AAC's efforts, whilst delivering a 
series of blows to the hopes of environmental organisations. This hardened the campaign of 
the AAC and its allies in the AlGN. Conversely, the green movement's campaign has lost 
momentum and floundered. However, on both sides it is difficult to see that the government 
policy change led to any major change in the level of engagement by either side. It might 
be argued that the NAFI is one such example. The government's decision to acquiesce in 
certain rules appears to have changed the position of NAFI from one of interest and 
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cautious optimism about opportunities to indifference, scepticism and cynicism (a position 
which has changed significantly again under Kate Carnell's leadership). For NAFI, 
government endorsed movement in the international process meant the debate did not 
justify allocation of significant resources. However, it could be argued that this trend was 
already under way with NAFI. Meanwhile with the backing away from Kyoto and the 
unambiguous announcement by Senator Minchin that Australia would not have any 
emissions trading before 2008 the SFE could see that the writing was on the wall for their 
short to medium term hopes of running a nationally-sanctioned carbon trading market. 
Once more, though, the SFE retreat ¥las already under way because of other factors-
govemment policy announcements reinforced rather than cansed it. 
The second way in which government policy appears to influence group activity is to re-
order the list of priorities for groups which are engaged in terms of where they allocate 
their resources in the network. That ls, where government policy moves it may necessitate a 
reallocation of time and effort on the part of participant~ in the network. For example, after 
the Kyoto deal was reached, groups like the AAC rapidly devoted resources to the technical 
aspects of the Protocol and the international negotiations to finalise these. For them this 
was the policy arena of greatest importance. Then, when the government decided to 
proceed with an MRET, the AAC and others in the AIGN rapidly repositioned and diverted 
resources to attend to what they viewed as a clear and immediate domestic greenhouse 
policy threat. 
Similarly, when the government asked the AGO to conduct a series of discussion paper 
consultations on emissions trading, this caused a rapid shift of resources to commnnicate 
the different iuterests of various groups (for example, AAC and AGA). The NFF's reaction 
to the government's Safeguarding the Future statement in 1997 is another instructive 
example. Because the statement involved no significant policy attention to agriculture, it 
created an incentive for the NFF to continue to be relatively disengaged. There was a 
minimal allocation of resources to the sequestration opportunities, but the prospect of any 
'taxes on cows' was gone along with any serious government attention to emissions from 
agriculture. Again, this reinforced an existing trend. 
Government and/or departmental processes 
Government processes and agendas have at times driven a great deal of activity by groups. 
This is perhaps hardly surprisingly given that government decisions to launch a process are 
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viewed in the policy network as often being a sign of government concern and/or 
indecision-at the very least they are often a prelude to government policy decisions and 
actions. Therefore, they can be expected to raise the level of interest among groups and 
possibly heighten the tempo of the debate. While there have been partial exceptions which 
are discussed below, generally government processes have not been major influences on 
group decisions about their greenhouse position or level of engagement. Similarly, 
government processes (as distinct from government policy) have in the main not been 
decisive in making or changing an interest group's mind or steering them in a different 
path. 
This is an important finding given the wide variety of government processes on greenhouse 
over many years. However it is not to suggest that the processes are all irrelevant. While 
these processes have not been decisive in eliciting a major change in course they have 
driven greater group activity and made an incremental contribution to advancing group 
decisions and policy positions more rapidly than might otherwise have been the case. 
Perhaps the most widely noted impact of these processes (for example, AGO Emissions 
Trading Discussion Papers, Business Dialogue, the COAG Energy Markets Review, the 
ESD process, the MRET review, the NGAP and others) is that they have forced some 
groups to look more closely at the issue than they otherwise would. In this research, the 
comment has regularly been made that government processes forced groups to work their 
position out where previously greenhouse had languished in the too hard basket. Awareness 
of a time-restricted government process can make a group to form a view, particularly 
when there is an explicit invitation from government for input from the group. 
In some cases, whilst perhaps not decisive, this has been a catalyst for some evolution in 
group positions. While the influence is not direct, there is evidence to suggest that 
government processes did contribute to a crystallization of the policy positions in the NFF 
and the AGA. In the case of the NFF, this better understanding contributed to a decision not 
to participate in the AIGN, nor to play a prominent role in the debate. Similarly, the AGA 
found after its own internal greenhouse policy review, and following a change in leadership 
and significant membership shifts in the late 1990s that it was no longer comfortable 
signing on to AIGN submissions purporting to represent the interests of the AGA. The 
mere existence of government processes presented decision points which helped to bring 
this to a head. 
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As to why government processes have not been more successful in broadening the range of 
groups playing an active role in the policy network (in spite of government effort~ to 
achieve this) there appear to be a few reasons. One factor has been the lack of 
persuasiveness on the part of government officials who have not been able to convince 
groups not central to the debate to get involved. Another factor has been the relatively high 
information barrier to entry into the debate. Groups that have not devoted the resources to 
the issue are not going to 'make fools of themselves' by submitting something they know is 
'half-baked' on an unfamiliar issue. 
However, the most overwhehning reason is that the way in which the government frames 
its processes has significant consequences. It would seem that these processes are usually 
associated with a government agenda such that a process is only launched when the 
government has something in mind in terms of the views it seeks and often the policy 
options it wants to pursue. This, not surprisingly, limits the range of input and the process 
outcomes, Invitations may be issued far and wide and announcements made in all the 
newspapers. However, the message does not always get through to the decision makers at 
group level that government genuinely wants their views. Even when the message does get 
through it can go ignored because of a perception that the game is rigged and the outcome 
predetermined anyhow. This problem is linked to the way government frames the process: 
the make-up of any advisory board, the timeframe, the terms of reference, the type of input 
sought, the process by which input is considered and so on. Decisions on all of these issues 
can have a powerful effect, skew the process in one way or another, and have significant 
influence on which groups take part. 
In the greenhouse network, it could be argued that these decisions merely reflect the reality. 
AlGN members are undoubtedly among the most consistent and enthusiastic players in the 
network and, it could be argued, they put themselves in a better position to take advantage 
of government processes, even as they are being formulated. The ubiquitous presence and 
unflinching attention of organisations like the AAC to these processes ensures that they are 
always represented and their view is always taken into account. An alternative argument is 
that the government is biased towards the AIGN view on elimate change. Whatever the 
explanation, the view of many interviewed here is that government decisions about 
greenhouse policy processes have gone the way of the blockers.624 
624 I think you could also say it's fuir to say that the let's say the carbon dub have been very instrumental 
in making sure, if you like, they're always at the table and there hasn't been equitable representation for 
other parts of the industry, including, in particular, renewables. I mean I participated in some meetings 
from time to time, but l mean it's the AIGN and their ilk that have been driving these processes. [23;56] 
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For example, the work of ABARE has at various times reflected perceptions by groups 
which reinforce this point-with some groups devoting time, activity, and significant sums 
of money to the ABARE process because they sense an opportunity to boost their position, 
while others view it as being rigged against them.625 The best documented example is the 
funding of the MEGABARE climate change model for which interest groups (including 
companies) reportedly paid $50,000 or more for a seat on the steering committee 
overseeing the ABARE modelling work. The steering committee included core AIGN 
members and major coal and petroleum producers. 626 The renewables sector was not 
represented, and requests by the ACF to have the fee waived in order to grant it a seat on 
the steering committee were reportedly denied (Hamilton 2001:57-8). 
Interview data collected here would suggest that most greenhouse related government 
policy process have tended to favour the AIGN side of the debate. The COAG Energy 
Market Review is a good example. The review was led by former Howard government 
minister and long time coal industry advocate, Warwick Parer. The review panel included 
former Woodside Petroleum executive, David Agostini, and Mr Paul Breslin. Previously a 
director-general of the Queensland Department of Minerals and Energy, Mr Breslin was a 
director of ACIL consulting. ACIL's client list includes a long list of coal companies627, 
petroleum companies628, and aluminium producers629, along with core AIGN members, the 
ESAA, the AAC, and the MCA (ACIL 2005). The COAG panel included no-one from the 
625 
••• the new entrants can't see the justification to actually fund a lot of effort. Whereas if you stand to 
lose, you'll but a lot more effort in. And we've seen that's what happens. You can see it on some of the 
consultants' reports. The ABARE thing too. Why the hell do all these companies want to steer and throw 
up a whole of money to steer ABARE's analysis. I mean I've worked for big companies. I used to work 
for two large mining companies (not named here in order to protect interviewee identity). You don't 
spend the money unless you think unless it's going to achieve some outcome. You just don't do it! 
[23;80] I mean it just looked terrible and ABARE really ruined its credibility. I mean others had been 
plugging away at the modeling and saying that the modeling was crap and a few people were listening 
but as soon as it became apparent that they had been taking money from the oil companies, their 
credibility was just shot. Now the oil companies and the coal association and the Aluminium Council 
thought they were on to a winner because they thought they could influence modeling which was going 
to determine government policy. But as soon as it became public-you know it turned into a public 
relations disaster [31; 127]. 
626 Australian Coal Association, Australian Aluminium Council, and the Electricity Supply Association 
of Australia, CRA Ltd, Exxon Corporation, Mobil Oil, Texaco, BHP Billiton. 
627 Anglo Coal, Allied Queensland Coal, BHP Billiton, Coal and Allied Industries, Curragh Queensland 
Mining, Macarthur Coal, Pacific Coal, Wesfarmers Premier Coal, and Xstrata. 
628 Chevron Texaco, Exxon Mobil, North West Shelf Gas, Shell Australia, Southern Pacific Petroleum, 
and Woodside Petroleum. 
629 Alcan, Alcoa, Comalco, Rio Tinto, WMC Resources, and BHP Billiton. 
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renewables industry. The review's general manager was Brad Page, of the federal Industry 
Department-he has since been recruited to run the ESAA, a core member of the AIGN. 
Similar analyses are arguably appropriate for a r.ange of other government processes. The 
MRET Review was chaired by former Howard government parliamentary secretary and 
senator, Grant Tambling, and led to a government decision which was viewed as a major 
victory for the coal industry and AIGN. The Greenhouse Challenge Joint Consultative 
Committee was chaired by then APPEA boss and prominent AIGN figure, Barry Jones and 
included a large number of members dra"''Il from AIGN member associations (AGO 2002). 
The Greenhouse Challenge Evaluation Steering Group was chaired by former ABARE 
head and Kyoto Protocol sceptic, Stuart Harris, and had all three non-government members 
drawn from AIGN member associations: John Tilley of the Cement Industry Federation, 
John Eyles of the AIGN, and Barry Jones of APPEA (AGO 1999:81). The demise of the 
National Greenhouse Advisory Panel is another example where the AIGN' s interests were 
well served-in this case, the gradual phase-out of a process which was less amenable to 
the AIGN line, without government ever actually announcing its abolition. 630 
One final important observation is that internal government processes cannot be ignored. 
The workings of cabinet committees, the AGO ministerial council, and the processes by 
which cabinet submissions are prepared are such examples. These processes are intended to 
be confidential and not influenced by lobby groups. The evidence accumulated here 
suggests that this is far from the case. While internal processes do not shape the position of 
most players in the policy network, they are crucial to the activities of the most influential. 
Cabinet processes are where the decisions are made. For those with an inside track into 
these processes, all other government processes are a low priority by comparison. This 
research finds ample confirmation that AIGN members have had unrivalled access to 
internal government processes-reverse-managing the AGO's ministerial oversight and 
influencing submissions to cabinet.631 It is a crucial advantage. 632 
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... well NGAP's never been abolished, it's just that it was never asked to meet again after a certain 
period of time ... the government didn't actually know that it actually had quite an effective consensus 
organisation there but groups like the Aluminium Council, through the Business Council decided they 
were better off doing it themselves, that is the lobbying. That is they could achieve their objectives more 
effectively by not necessarily being in this consensus group. [6;51,87] 
6
" I think that with the downsizing in the public service ~ to some extent that the deskilling in some 
areas ... on a lot of public policy issues if you take the industry department we (an AIGN member 
organisation) were doing the public policy work that used to be done in the department. Because they 
did not have the capability ... {on issues like this?} Oh yes. And quite seriously there would only be 
about four or five occasions I suppose over 10 years, but seriously, I have sat inside (one federal 
department--not named for reasons of confidentiality) and helped to draft cabinet submissions in that 
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Parliamentary processes 
The impact of parliamentary processes has been similar to that of government processes-
they generate more activity, they can catalyse group consideration of issues so that a 
position is reached more rapidly than might otherwise be the case, but they do not seem to 
be decisive in changing a group's position or level of engagement in the policy network. 
They can create a spike of activity but do not lead to ongoing involvement, and their impact 
on policy has been incremental and modest. 633 
period on things like (issue not named for reasons of confidentiality). I have sat inside (another federal 
department-not named to protect confidentiality) writing briefs -- you know... (Due to our past 
experience) we knew about it and we knew the detailed knowledge and they didn't. {On greenhouse?} 
On some aspects of greenhouse ... that is mutual trust type of thing. It is high-value and not to be abused. 
And you know, people who abuse those relationships and confidences badly do not survive. Because 
you end up with no network. [13;560-8] {Reverse-managed?} Reverse-managed that ministerial 
committee-you know, the AGO was trying to run things up through Robert Hill-and very stupid 
things because the process was like a sieve. And we knew exactly what was going on so at critical points 
we would produce other pieces of consultants' work which we thought they should have been doing or 
we would advise the Prime Minister's office and various other people about the fact that these things 
were going on. {When you say we-you mean people from the AIGN?} Oh-sort of the executive 
directors really. I mean we are always in contact, and some us have better links in there than others. You 
know, I used to read the cabinet papers, you know, I know what was going on. And it was a question of 
using those 'ins' carefully and protecting sources, and you never go public on it. It is about fixing the 
outcomes. But at times there are some quite critical political games going on in there-power games, 
information games. You know, I could speak forever on this-but Robert Hill was sending letters to the 
Prime Minister trying to say that certain actions that he was about to take were consistent with previous 
cabinet decisions and so on and the Prime Minister is about to go overseas and we get wind of it-we get 
a copy of the bloody letter, and then show it to Anderson and other people on the ministerial committee 
who Robert hadn't bothered to copy in. And then, you know uproar breaks out because what Hill was 
trying to do was to slide it by the Prime Minister. You know, to say that 'this is consistent with previous 
cabinet decisions, Prime Minister, you know-so I am going off to the United States now to do a deal.' 
And you know-the rush of paper and everything that goes through people's offices-I mean Robert Hill 
had a lot of trust with the Prime Minister after 1997, but then he started to over-play his hand and in the 
end he lost the trust of the ministerial committee and the backbench because he was seen to be arguing 
his own book..[13;170-76] {A number of them have said to me that they remember various occasions in 
the last decade or so where the governments had them in, in some cases to the department, to look at 
Cabinet submissions?} Yes, we used to do it. {It's not uncommon?} No. [36;291-7] I don't think I'd 
want to go· into whether we draft Cabinet submissions. But I think anybody who is attuned to 
bureaucracy, and at a level that they can do it might talk to a group of individuals or talk to a number of 
contacts to get a feel for how various industries might react to certain possibilities. [34;368] {They even 
say to me -- we know better about greenhouse the government does, if they want to know what they think 
they ring us and we tell em.} ... that is true. {they say they had been involved in writing Cabinet 
Submissions.} Yes. {Or in vetting cabinet briefs before they go up?} Yes. sure. {Or even in writing the 
policy?} Yes -- that is all true. That is how it works. [45;307-21] 
632 For further discussion of the implications of interest groups and social movements bypassing 
parliament to deal primarily with the government of the day, see Abbott (1995:2) 
633 { ... have they made any real difference one way or the other to policy direction or do you think that 
policy sort of chugged along?} .. .I don't know if the parliamentary inquiries have ... there has been quite 
remarkable change and it's attitude more than anything else, that greenhouse is now real, it's part of 
policy direction, it's something you take into account, it's something you don't argue about. We don't 
see so many arguments now about greenhouse science which not that many years ago most of the debates 
on greenhouse ended up debating the science ... Now the debate is at a very different level and it is what 
318 
Parliamentary inquiries are probably effective in generating group activity in the 
greenhouse policy network because they are an ideal platform for groups to get their 
message heard-especially groups that are not generally listened to by government.634 Just 
as the framing of government processes (who is invited, terms of reference, who sits in 
judgment/writes the report) is important, the same is also true of parliamentary inquiries. In 
the case of senate inquiries, because they have tended to be used by non-government 
senators to promote more aggressive greenhouse emission reduction measures they have 
been fertile ground for groups with views in conflict with those of government. This has 
two consequences. First, it provides an incentive for those on the green side of the debate to 
use the platform to their advantage. Second, it behooves those on the other side of the 
debate to defend their policy turf and in so doing support government members at the 
inquiry. 
The long series of parlian1entary inquiries into greenhouse policy in Australia over the past 
15 years shows repeated evidence of this pattern. \Vhilst appreciating that the government 
pays little attention to the outcome of parliamentary inquiries635 -~specially those 
instigated in the senate by opposition parties-groups on both sides recognise an obligation 
either to take advantage of the platform it gives to get their pro-emissions reduction 
message into Hansard and the media or conversely to be on the record defending against 
that very message. 636 
we do about it. Now that's huge, that is a big change. {And you think that those public inquiries have 
added to that process of getting us beyond the scepticism debate about the science?} I do ... It's true that 
every time you push au envelope shall we say, you don't end up back where you started. Debate, 
community perception, community debate, business debate just takes another step. It might not take a 
S"'Jl all the way up to where say a parliamentary inquiry reported or other inquiries got to, but you just 
move the perceptions every time a little bit I think. {Do you think though in tenns of their impact on the 
policy they've had much impact?} I think the change has been in perceptions as I have said, that it is now 
real. We have debates about what we are going to do about it and what the outcomes might be and what 
abatement might really look like and a whole range of things like that which is a step forward, but are we 
fundamentally changing an)thing about the way we operate in our society? I have to say no, and that's 
very, very tragic and it's not just at higher levels,. [ 4;372-382] 
634 (From a senior adviser ln the Howard government) most parliamentary inquiries on greenhouse were 
political exercises and they achieved only very 'wall steps. [50;24] 
635 {Parliamentary Inquiries on Greenhouse, we've had about six ofthem?}Yes, time consuming. {Have 
they made any difference one way or the other?} No, they never do ... In my view they're largely a waste 
of time but you're going to have to front up. A lot of people put out a press release too. You've got to get 
your point across. [ 5 ;294-304] 
636 What a government inquiry allowed you to do was to put certain statements on the table v.11ich 
promoted your position which you could then use in the media, so we'd often use a parliamentary inquiry 
if we V.'llflted particularly to get a message out as a bit of a focal point for a media release, for a doorstop 
or an interview so if we had a big inquiry to go to you'd often have the president and the ED on the back 
doorstep of Parliament House before or afterwards saying, this is what we're taking . , , gave a bit of a 
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The other interesting thing about these inquiries is that generally they involve much the 
same groups and much the same message from either side. This includes the 'usual 
suspects;' groups on the energy intensive resources sector side (AIGN, AAC, ACA, 
APPEA, MCA), the umbrella groups they have persuaded to their view (ACCI, BCA, 
AIG), renewable energy associations (like the Business Council for Sustainable Energy) 
and the hard core green groups (Greenpeace, ACF, Friends of the Earth). However, it also 
includes what might be called Canberra's permanent part-timers-those groups which feel 
the obligation to take an interest for whom appearing at the inquiries is enough to 'tick the 
box' in the eyes of government (this includes groups like NAFI and the NFF). While for 
these groups parliamentary inquiries have helped to force a finalisation of a group position 
on greenhouse issues637, there is little if any evidence that the inquiry itself changed a 
group's position or led to more engagement. 
Moreover, the parliamentary inquiries have been on the whole very unsuccessful in 
attracting interest, activity or engagement on the part of those groups not fitting into either 
the usual suspect or permanent part-timer categories. This is true for example of the TCA 
and the ICA. While they have been partially or indirectly engaged through the Greenhouse 
Challenge program, by and large government and parliamentary processes have been 
unsuccessful in catalysing significant attention to the greenhouse issue, let alone significant 
action. 
International processes 
International processes have been an important factor in some of the cases examined here. 
More often than not they impel a reduction in involvement by interest groups, either 
because of the high costs associated with being involved in the international negotiations, 
or as a consequence of the continuing uncertain international policy environment associated 
with them. That is, for many groups, policy uncertainty internationally-and more 
specifically the lack of certainty on whether Australia would ratify the Protocol and 
focus, because tbe media gallery at parliament house do vaguely follow them, they keep half au eye on 
tbem, so they are a potential conduit to get a message out. [36;213] 
637 {It's been suggested to me tbat the main way tbat these inquiries help is actually helping tbe group 
internally to work out a position, because when tbey front up to these inquiries they have been bouncing 
around on au issue but tbey haven't really worked out what they tbink aud having a deadline forces them 
to put something on paper?} I tbink that is a very, very reasonable statement ... fronting up to committees 
aud all tbe rest of it does force your haud a little shall we say. (Focus tbe mind?} Focus tbe mind on what 
it is we really, really, really waut aud not just the rhetoric. [4;392-98] 
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whether it would come into force--contributed to a sense that the problem was not one 
sufficiently urgent to justify devotion of serious resources to it. 638 
In the case of the SFE, while the Kyoto Protocol negotiations had initially sparked a frenzy 
of activity and optimism about the potential for a greenhouse emissions trading system in 
which the Exchange could play a leading role, the enthusiasm and willingness to devote 
resources declined as the ratification process and finalisation of emissions trading rules 
internationally bogged down. 
In the case of the ICA, the international negotiations were regularly being attended by the 
European offices of many multinational insurers, particularly reinsurers like Munich Re 
and Swiss Re. However, this appears not to have facilitated greater involvement by 
Australian offices in the domestic policy process. Rather, it appears that a 'let's leave it to 
head office' mentality took hold in Australia's multi-national insurers. Meanwhile, 
Australian O\VTI insurers were by and large indifferent about climate change until the recent 
emergence of companies like IAG taking a leadership role. 
In the case of the NAFI, very specific teclmical decisions taken as part of the finalisation of 
the Kyoto Protocol rules led directly to a pulling back in the level of interest in carb-On 
sinks. In the case of the TCA, the leadership of the organisation erred badly by assuming 
that Australia's agreement to a Kyoto target would automatically lead to Australian 
ratification and entry into force. For the TCA, therefore, a deliberate decision was made 
that there was no need following Kyoto to devote resources to greenhouse. For the NFF and 
the AGA it is not clear that the international processes associated with the FCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol have significantly affected on the groups' decisions either way. 
The clear exception to the pattern described above, however, is the AAC, for which a great 
deal of activity and involvement has been driven by the international greenhouse 
negotiations. Unlike all of the other case study groups the AAC has invested heavily in 
ensuring that its interests are represented at most if not all COP negotiations and meetings 
in between. In the mid 1990s this was sometimes achieved via a BCA or AIGN 
638 See previous quote [48;63] under fuotnote 598 regarding the slow pace of negotiations towards an 
intemaiional emissions trading, and the cost of devoting resources until it materialised. 
(The SFE, for example) In dealing with this when it became clear that there wouldn't be an easy 
ratification of the Pro~ol coming into foroe globally or domestically they substantially lost interest. 
[54;98] (Similarly with the NFF) we just sort of be in there and go along with the game sort of thing, 
because there's this big international thing going on. Oh look, on the Kyoto Protocol where are we at 
now-··well we don't know ifit's ever going to be signed anyway. [36;53] 
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representatives while in more recent times the AAC has had its own consultants at most 
international meetings, monitoring, lobbying, and issuing a regular stream of media 
statements. Unlike the insurers who could leave monitoring of the international climate 
debate to their overseas counterparts, the Australian Aluminium Council appears to have 
had the opposite problem. In their case, their international counterparts were significantly 
'softer' on greenhouse policy because of their better capacity for fuel switching (in 
particular, to nuclear) in order to reduce emissions. The constraints on the AAC's 
membership meant that they had to do the international work themselves to be comfortable 
about it. 
Greenhouse science 
The next important meso-level pressure in the greenhouse policy network has been 
scientific uncertainty. Again, the influence has been predominantly to discourage network 
engagement. In all but one case where it has been an influential factor over the past 15 
years or so, it discouraged involvement by interest groups. This can be said of the Tourism 
Council and the Insurance Council for example. 
In the case of the TCA it was difficult to justify group focus on issues such as coral 
bleaching, receding snowfields, and the spread of insect-borne disease when there were 
plausible alternative scientific explanations for year to year impacts other than climate 
change. In the case of the Insurance Council, there was similar scepticism of climate 
change science for many years in spite of clear patterns of warmer and more severe weather 
conditions here in Australia and abroad. Until scientific certainty could be established 
around the impact of human activity on the climate, insurers as a group could afford to 
postpone attention to the issue. This has been particularly so when other factors, such as 
higher property prices and building in areas more prone to weather damage, are also known 
to contribute at least some of the increasing insurance losses due to severe weather. 
Indications of ICA scepticism are still apparent in contrast to the positions of insurance 
industry peak bodies abroad. 
Another good example is the NFF, for whom the interviews establish clearly that there was 
a high level of inherent suspicion among members as to the legitimacy of greenhouse 
science. While lack of scientific certainty did not encourage the NFF to play a very active 
or sustained role on the AIGN side of the debate, as might have been expected, it certainly 
killed off any prospect that the NFF might play any significant role on the green side of the 
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debate. For that to occur, farmers had to be convinced both about the problem and that 
responding to the problem would not threaten their livelihoods. \Vnile farmers remained 
unconvinced about the problem, and also unconvinced that solutions might not harm them, 
the NFF was never going to be heavily engaged. 
Similarly, the NAFI under the leadership of Warren Lang took advantage of the lack of 
complete scientific clarity on the greenhouse issue to express very sceptical views in policy 
c-0mmunications with government. The impression gained is that during this period NAFI 
used scientific uncertainty internally as a reason to justify inaction. One exception to this 
pattern is the AAC. While for some years they have not explicitly questioned the science of 
greenhouse in public communications, apparently a strategic decision related to being 
perceived as more proactive, this research confirms very strong scepticism in the AAC's 
support base as a crucial underpinning of inaction.639 Beyond the seven cases examined in 
most detail here, this research suggests that while few other than the Lavoisier Group have 
explicitly challenged the science in recent years, scientific uncertainty has been widely 
used as an excuse to postpone interest group engagement and reduce the pace of 
government policy response. More recently, those opposed to stronger measures to reduce 
greenhouse pollution have found alternatives to explicitly questioning the science. Instead, 
they have questioned the economic assumptions involved in the IPCC's projections.640 The 
most prominent example, a critique by Australia's Ian Castles641 has been seized by the 
639 This L< reflected in the comments of third parties highly supportive of the AAC agenda. Hugh 
Morgan, for example--former boss of Aluminium giant, Western Mining-ooted soon after the BCA 
decided to abandon efforts to arrive at consensus, 'You won't find a uniform view that global warning 
exists' (Garnaut 2004). Morgan's close colleague from WMC, Ray Evans, who is aloo an office bearer 
with the Laviosier Institute, and strong supporter oftl1e Australian aluminium industty, makes no attempt 
to hide his scepticism in repeated public forays. For example, in 2003 he said the following: ' ... the 
IPCC's policy makers' summaries of 2001, 1995 and 1991, are based on junk science ... an economist, 
well advised by scientists who are internationally and nationany recognised, can drive a horse and cart 
through the nonsense which the EU and its green friends in other countries, have been parading as the 
advice of 2,500 eminent climate scientists. There are some immediate steps which the Australian 
government can now take. The Australian Greenhouse Office, with an annual budget of $250 million 
can be closed. The scientists who have mis-spent many years justifying their research budgets by 
dressing up their projects in global warming clothes can address a very real climate problem in Australia 
how to predict El Ninos. Solving that problem would save Australia hundreds of billions every 
decade.' (Evans 2003). 
640 You see the brilliance of the fossil fuel lobby is that they do not debate the science. If you even look 
at half the evidence that is given to these bodies it is all about the science, the minutiae, the science and 
whether it's good or whether it's bad, and what you need to do more on and oo on. The fossil fuel lobby 
debares the policy outcomes instead. And the economics. And that is much more difficult for the Greens 
to counrer. [18;488] 
641 Castles was secretary of the federal department of finance and the official Australian statistician prior 
to his current role at the ANU. In articles published by the Anti-Kyoto Protocol think tank the Institute of 
Public Affuirs (2001) he has s!r(Jngly defended controversial Danish author, Bjorn Lomborg. He has 
spoken out repeatedly against the IPCC, and made numerous contributions to conferences and journals 
organised by the blocking forces in the Australian greenhouse debate. 
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Lavoisier Institute, the IP A, the APEC Studies Centre, ACCI, and a wide range of interests 
opposed to a stronger greenhouse response by Australia (Fyfe 2004). 
Selective Incentives 
For all the focus on selective incentives in the literature, there is little evidence that this has 
been a major force in the decision making of groups in the Australian greenhouse policy 
network. As we have seen, the desire to secure selective incentives was an important 
element in the TCA's unsuccessful fight for survival, given the competition to represent 
that sector. Greenhouse policy was not an issue which could help to secure such benefits 
for such a diffuse membership. The SFE is probably the best example of selective benefit 
potential influencing engagement in the network. For some time, the exchange saw an 
opportunity to secure the exclusive rights to carbon trading for itself. This was a strong 
incentive for engagement, particularly before demutualisation which diluted the ownership 
of the organisation--reducing the concentration of such benefits. 
Macro-level--patterns, exceptions and observations 
It is possible to mount an argument that a wide range of macro-level pressures all play 
some role in shaping the response of interest groups engaged in the greenhouse policy 
network. It could be argued that factors as different as the state of the domestic economy 
and the very system of government in Australia each exert some influence. It could be 
argued that a re-ordering of international policy priorities following the September 11 
attacks on the United States in 200 I have in some way shifted the parameters in which the 
greenhouse policy network operates. The rapid economic growth in the past five years in 
China and India (with consequent rapid increase in greenhouse pollution) might also be 
seen as something which has hardened the Australian greenhouse policy network against 
the Kyoto Protocol. The rise of 'affluenza' in our society might be seen as another 
important macro-level influence (Hamilton and Denniss 2005). There is an almost 
inexhaustible list of developments beyond the bounds of the policy network which have 
influenced it. However, while it is arguably legitimate to assert that these forces have 
exerted subliminal influence, they were not raised in the interviews. Of the macro-
pressures raised here, only two stand out as being consistently influential in shaping group 
interest assessment and decisions on engagement: activity in related policy networks, and 
the broad government ideology and culture. 
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Broad government ideology and culture 
Just as the cultural and ideological baggage of network activity affects how groups respond 
to the emergence of new networks, these same properties in the govermnent of the day also 
exert significant pressure. This is a macro-level factor which has been important in shaping 
the direction of Australia's greenhouse policy network. As has been mentioned previously, 
the greenhouse policy trajectory has been fairly consistent and progressively less ambitious 
ever since consideration of 40 per cent cuts in emissions by former Senator Graham 
Richardson and state governments and federal Liberal Party commitment in 1989 for at 
least a 20 per cent cut in emissions by 2000. This was followed in 1990 by ALP support for 
an interim planning target to stabilise by 1988 and reduce by 20 per cent by 2005. In 1992 
there was bi-partisan (but conditional) support for stabilisation, and by 1995 the federal 
government under Keating proposed policy measures equivalent to a 3 pereent increase. 
Under the Howard government this has increased to an emissions increase target of 8 per 
cent 
This is mentioned again here because it reflects major shifts in ideology and govermnent 
culture at both the bureaucratic and the political levels. These shifts have had significant 
implications for the greenhouse policy network in that they redefine the bounds of what 
policy is considered realistic and what policy is considered out of bounds. This research 
reveals various instances where a change in government ideology and culture has 
contributed to major shifts in the range of greenhouse policy considered politically viable 
in Australia. 
The decisions by the Hawke and Keating govermnents to initially support a very ambitious 
emissions reduction target by Australia provide a good example. This was posited, 
according to evidence found here, in no small way upon an ideological and cultural habit 
for Australia to sign on to multilateral agreements in order to reap domestic political kudos, 
with little thought being given to meeting any consequent obligations. Headline 
commitments by then Environment Minister, Ros Kelly, would simply not have occurred 
without this govermnent tendency. 642 While this gave enormous encouragement to green 
642 It was called the Gareth Evans Doctrine that you basically agreed within the international protocol or 
treaty going because it was costless and what happened, happened later on-and generally most of the 
treaties were put forward by sol! left liberal Democrats who were probably fellow travelers with the 
Gareth Evanses of the world anyway. So at that time there was a view by the government that issues to 
do with human rights, the environment, international treaties were all good things to support strongly 
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groups, it also led to a rapid engagement in the newly emerging greenhouse policy network 
by Australian industry-particularly those active in the energy intensive sectors who would 
go on to be represented by the AIGN. 643 
The emergence of the political sacredness of rural and regional Australia provides another 
good example. In the 1990s rural and regional Australia became politically more potent due 
to a confluence of factors as diverse as tbe commercialisation of government entities, the 
loss of bank branches, depressed commodity prices, drought and flood, proposals to 
privatize Telstra, and the rise oftbe Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party. The importance of 
various rural and regional marginal electorates only served to highlight the political clout of 
tbe bush, fuelled by prominent media figures like Alan Jones and John Laws (Farmhand 
Foundation 2002). Doing anything which might be perceived as unfair to rural and regional 
because they were trying to get the issues on the agenda. The practical implementation of some of these 
treaties was secondary and that became a very different picture from about the mid 90s onwards. So at 
that time the view was that if there appeared to be something crook in greenhouse and there was an 
interim planning target then there was very little discussion within government. It went through and the 
Environment Ministers were allowed to go off and sign up from what I can tell and that was all OK and 
then they came back and we realised that was what had happened ... The environment groups focused 
much more strategically and I think pretty effectively on the various international conferences and the 
treaties and began to look at the specifics of the words while the government tended to skirt over the 
surface so the green groups were much, much more effective in a way of reading the role of international 
treaty stuff ahead to the government. So therefore Ros Kelly and people were allowed to sign stuff and 
they did. The government always expected to always lose the next election anyway and they didn't 
expect really to win the 1990 election but they did. The '93 election was a fuckin' miracle as everybody 
knows and then in '96 reality caught up with everything so ... {So that made it even more costless?} It 
was definitely costless, definitely costless and there was this strong view ... [41; 171-79]. 
643 The Rio Conference was seen by business at the time as pure pandering to the green movement. But 
business took it seriously because it posed very serious implications. Bora! and North had both been 
burned by the greens before. Business' response to greenhouse post Rio was a damage limitation exercise 
and there was a perception in business that business did not have access to the government to the same 
extent that the greens did. In the early business response to greenhouse, the coal industry was in the 
vanguard against it early, along with Shell and BHP. Companies were looking to their own sectors. BCA 
helped to organise an energy/electricity users' group covering the big energy users this was to promote a 
business greenhouse reform agenda; the BCA dedicated some money to it. There was a levy on members 
on greenhouse matters post Rio. Post Rio BCA then actively involved in Megabare model held a position 
on the steering group but there was no intervention. The Aluminium industry then got active with Noel 
Bushnell and John Hannagan-who had until then been Public Affairs Officer with Alcoa. Alcoa had 
been tuned into the issue early. Western Mining was also there early with Ray Evans--a guru from the 
IP A circles. He was tuned into the dangerous environment for business which was emerging because of 
the greenhouse issue. Alcoa moved to invest in defending their interests on the issue. Hannagan set up a 
consulting business. Hannagan and Bushnell were then funded by the energy intensive interests to go to 
the COPs at Geneva and Kyoto as observers; this sort of co-ordinated activity would have started in 
about 1995 ... and was funded by AIGN (25; 16-20] ... it was only in the early 90s when, after the reality 
of the 20 per cent cut one was enshrined in the Rio doctrine that people began to think, shit, we could be 
here and responsible for implementing this ... Ros was basically was given her head. Again people had 
the view that it really didn't matter. We were making commitments that were going to be somebody 
else's problem in ten years' time. And that all went on and then I think people began to do calculations 
about what it meant to cut emissions by 20 per cent by 2005 and people began to shit themselves and 
there was two schools of thought; don't worry about it, we can sign every UN treaty on earth and no 
other country is going to pay or do the right thing anyway so we won't have to do it or people took it a 
little bit more seriously. (41;183, 199] 
326 
Australia became a much greater political risk in Australia in the 1990s. By proxy, not 
looking out for the interests of farmers became 'un-Australian.' The election of the Howard 
government elevated the political clout of rural Australia to a new zenith-something not 
lost on the NFF as it pondered its engagement in the greenhouse policy network.644 While 
there were other factors involved which have already been discussed in depth in a previous 
case chapter, it is clear that the NFF was extremely confident that the ideology and culture 
of both bureaucracy and governing Liberal/National Par(y coalition would prevent 
agriculture being targeted over greenhouse emissions. Hence, they felt, they could largely 
coast along in the network, limiting their engagement primarily to keeping out a watchful 
eye. 
Another veiy significant cultural and ideological trend with major implications for the 
greenhouse policy network has been entrenchment of the view that the health of the 
Australian economy is inseparable from that of the Australian coal industry. While it is not 
often expressed in this way, the canonical faith of bureaucrat and minister in the notion that 
Australia's competitiveness in a global economy depends upon continued availability of 
fossil fuel energy at a very low price can be accurately summarized thus. While there has 
long been a group of bureaucrats who have advocated this position within sections of 
govenunent, it was a position which took on an almost religious whole-of-government 
fervour during the 1990s. 645 Under the Howard government in particular it has become 
644 If you look at it from both this country, but also from other countries, what you find is that I can be 
very, very cynical on this, and that is the political process is such that those groups that have voting lobby 
power, and I really truly mean voting power in the sense of they can change a marginal electorate here 
and there are in an incredibly strong position. Those businesses and industries that don't have that are in 
a weak position. So what you see, l think. is you see groups like alunrinium and coal being very vocal but 
there's not too many electoral issues in there. Some of the coal areas perhaps, but not so much in the 
aluminium. But you take the farming groups, it is such a powetful lobby and particularly in rural and 
regional Australia, particularly in today's political climate. You could almost say they can stop anything. 
And one of the arguments that a lot of us have said is that whether you look at this country or other 
countries certain groups have managed to almost opt out of having to do very much, but what lt does is it 
passes the burden onto those groups that don't have that voting potential behind them et cetera There is 
an argument which says basically the burden is going to more likely lie on companies like some of the 
mining industry companies, some of the oil industry, even the aluminium industry and even coal, than it 
wi!l lie in other sectors. Because people v.ill be able to opt out in a sense. The consumer will try and opt 
out in a sense. And therefore, what I believe we're seeing is the vocal ones are the ones who are saying 
that the burden is going to land on them for the straight scientific reasons but also from this 
magnification effect that occurs from the politics of it all. [52;23} 
645 One of the myths is that the business community ha£--wbichever of the major parties have been in 
office - (had) a hand up (the government's) back and really treats it as a glove puppet. If you actually 
have a look at all the things that have happened over 20 years that's not necessar!ly true. Tue frnest 
example of it actually predates your timeline. In 1986 Gareth Evans as Minister for Minerals and Energy 
established a thing called Energy 2000 and it was the last throw of the big summits, it was a child of '83 
and Gareth had his very 0"11 summit in 1986 in the Lakeside 200 or 250 of the captains of industry and 
others, including your humble servant. .. Gareth looked at energy policy and said, you cannot do this, you 
have to have a view of energy policy that's integrated, coherent and a!! the rest of it and Gareth caused 
this thing to happen. By the time the product of this thing was published Gareth had moved on, and if 
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scriptural which has meant that the bounds of thinkable greenhouse policy have been 
relatively narrow. Policy options which might result in an increase in the price of energy to 
industry are almost all considered out of bounds-a dynamic amplified by the longstanding 
political unacceptability of nuclear power in Australia. To point out the relative 
insignificance of increased energy costs compared with fluctuations in interest rates, 
commodity prices or exchange rates verges on being un-Australian. The sanctity of energy 
pricing has had a range of impacts on group engagement in the network. For example, it 
has made the job of the AAC and its colleagues in the AIGN significantly easier in putting 
the brakes on greenhouse policy. It has enabled the NFF to stay on the margins confident 
that diesel prices will not be subject to any greenhouse cost. It also appears to have 
discouraged some non-resources sector business interests not to bother engaging in the 
network. 
The cultural and ideological affinity between the Howard government and the Bush 
administration in the United States is another important influence on the policy network. 
While the Bush decision to opt out of the Kyoto Protocol commitments entered into by his 
predecessor had a direct impact on Australia's own decision to opt out, it would appear that 
the closeness between the two governments on a broader range of issues has further limited 
the capacity for Australia to revisit its decision. With Russia ratifying the Protocol, 
enabling its entry into force, it seems less likely that Australia would change its mind than 
it was in a pre-9/11, pre-Iraq invasion world. For groups which might see opportunities in 
Australian participation in the Protocol (for example, the SFE) this adds further incentive to 
stay out of the policy network for the foreseeable future. 
These are some obvious examples, but there are others which cannot be covered in any 
depth here. The clear finding, however, is that the ideological and cultural markers of 
government have a significant influence on the direction and bounds of policy network 
you go and get a hold of a copy of Energy 2000, which you can from the Parliamentary Library, you will 
find, and I forget how many chapters it is-I think it's 12 chapters-it's very obvious that one's missing, 
and the one that's missing is the one on greenhouse and the reason the chapter on greenhouse is missing 
is that the then senior public servants perceived it as their patriotic duty to prevent the coal industry from 
being undermined by an untoward focus on something that in their thinking was a load of cobblers. {So 
this was presumably DPIE at the time?} ... It had just become DPIE, and their perception, and I don't 
think you could even argue that it was because they were under intense lobbying pressure from the coal 
industry. I think it was very much a matter of some senior and quite strong public servants taking it into 
their heads that having a whole chapter in something like this on greenhouse was just plain wrong, so 
they took it out, or they persuaded the minister of the day who was Peter Cook. {Was the chapter 
written?} Oh yes. {Really?} Oh yes. It was, as I understand it, although I've never seen the aforesaid 
piece of paper, it was in the original draft and it got removed. [37;187-99] 
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activity. It also seems likely that there is a good deal of two way feedback between network 
activity and government ideology.646 
Related policy networks 
The most significant macro-level influence on group behaviour in the Australian 
greenhouse policy network has been the activity occurring in other related policy networks. 
In order to appreciate how, it is first necessary to understand that interest groups have 
multiple commitments which almost invariably require them to dedicate resources to 
monitor and/or participate in a range of policy networks. The resource requirement varies 
as issues dse and fall on the political agenda of relevance to the membership. What issues 
are judged relevant also varies as the leadership, culture and membership of the interest 
group change over time. It is almost an inevitability of interest group behaviour--certainly 
reinforced by the seven cases examined here--that groups have more commitments than 
resources allow them to accommodate as fully as they would like. Consequently, decisions 
on the allocation of time and resources are constantly being revisited. These decisions-
whether to remain active in existing networks and how group interests in emerging 
networks are perceived--are in no small part influenced by group experiences in existing 
networks. 
These experiences help to shape the culture of the interest group because they involve 
taking policy positions, building alliances with other like-minded groups, and forming 
relationships (friendly and hostile). Because the same groups and people have interests 
across a range of issues, assessments of group interest and decisions about involvement in 
one network can heavily influence what occurs in another. This influence can manifest 
itself in various ways. The extent of a group's commitment in one network may mean that 
it is simply incapable of seeing the relevance of other networks, let alone engaging in them. 
This is something which seems more likely where most networks in which a group is active 
646 (For example) Now do you know, this is the thing about the musical chairs and the Food and Grocery 
Council and APPEA and all these industry bodies, the current head of the Department ofindustry has of 
course come out of ACCI. He's left a spaee free by going back into the Department of Industry though as 
the Secretary. The day Paterson arrived, the Department of Industry essentially withdrew from the 
greenhouse debate in Australia. Their role now, they closed doV¥n the International Greenhouse 
Partnerships Office, the Energy and Environment Division, they cut off (publishing a) magazine ... which 
was too green, it was too green for them. That was exactly what was said ... by the Press Secretary to the 
Minister-'It seems too green.' (So), new minister, new secretary of the department the same day, new 
group head who is an economist, and they've withdrawn from tl1e greenhouse debate in essence in its 
entirety. [45;325] 
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are unrelated to a new network. 647 Negative experiences in one network can discourage a 
group from bothering with investing resources in a similar network.648 Conversely, positive 
prior experiences can make new engagement easier. The way groups respond in one 
network (for example, taking a position contrary to the green movement) can become 
somewhat habitual and easily replicated in another network. 649 Similarly, where strong 
alliances and working relationships have been made in one network it can be harder to 
separate out and take a contrary line in another network where many of the same players 
are involved. 650 In these and other ways, it seems that there is a strong degree of 'cultural 
and behavioural transfer' between policy networks and that this is something which exerts 
a powerful influence on all network players-groups, bureaucrats, political figures, and 
others. 
The cases examined here certainly reinforce this view. In the case of the TCA and the ICA 
the intensity of their commitment in other policy networks made it extremely difficult for 
the organisations to even consider serious involvement in greenhouse policy. In both cases, 
the networks with which the TCA and ICA were familiar were sufficiently unrelated to 
make the information barrier to entry into the greenhouse debate even more daunting. 
The opposite, however, can be said about the AAC. The organisation (and its precursors) 
was familiar with energy policy networks and environmental issues, and this made it much 
easier to engage in greenhouse policy from early on. This is true of most members of the 
"''See previous quote [40;198-·206] under footnote 324 regarding how familiarity with related networks 
can make effective engagement with a particular network easier. 
648 See previous quote [1;291-9] under footnote 439 regarding TCA reluctance to be involved with 
AIGN members after their experiences in the GST debate. 
649 See previous quote [9;50--58! under footnote 207 regarding NAFI's negative predisposition in relation 
to the green movement based on experience in other networks. 
(In relation to NAFI, pre Kate Camell the interviewee went on to say): I have the impression that NAFI 
were involved simply because NAFI hated green groups and if green groups thought that climate change 
was a serious problem then they'd have to be countered. l think at one stage they did think that there was 
an opportunity to get some commercial gain out of creative interpretation of sinks. But, as you say, they 
haven't done a lot since Kyoto. Again I think they've been misguided because the 'Australia Clause' and 
the other provisions from Kyoto do allow for the possibility for the development of new forests to be a 
Kyoto response, And I woUld have thought there was some commercial gains that could be made. 
Certainly the forest industries in other cmmtries perceived that.. [9;50--58} 
650 See previous quote [15;36--44] under footnote 132 in relation to the reluctance of gas corporations to 
stray from the pack because 'it's cold out there on your own.' 
{As another senior member of the green movement said in relation to the AGA): ... they've said a bit 
more but l don't perceive them to be any more effective and if you look at the pattern of Australian fuel 
use there's been no significant shift away from coal towards gas. {Why do you suppose they haven't 
been as active. Do you think it's cold out there and they don't want to break away from the pack?} That's 
the only rational interpretation I can put on it. [9;42~6] 
330 
AIGN, for whom familiarity with policy networks dealing with environment-related issues 
and energy deregulation in particular made them more responsive to greenhouse and able to 
ascend the learning curve required to be significant players in the network.651 
The NFF is an interesting example. First, because it was one of the most thinly spread 
interest groups-constantly in demand for representation in a wide range of policy 
networks--they were reluctant to dedicate significant resources to climate change for a 
long time. However, while this constrained their capacity to play a part in the greenhouse 
policy network, it also gave them an edge in making a political judgment about the urgency 
of involvement. That is, through the relationships built at the political and bureaucratic 
levels via their engagement in other policy networks, the NFF leadership was able to make 
what turned out to be an accurate. assessment that there was little need to worry about 
government doing anything to reduce emissions from Australian agriculture. The NFF's 
intricate association with government across many portfolios gave it confidence that no 
government would attempt to touch agriculture on greenhouse policy in any adverse way, 
and if it did they had the political clout to stymie it. 
Those groups which have opted into the greenhouse network in a significant way have been 
influenced to do so by the cultural and ideological 'sediment' accumulated in other 
networks. For example, the experiences and relationships shared over many years between 
the AAC and their AIGN colleagues in other policy networks had an important cultural and 
ideological influence which is very apparent in their greenhouse policy network 
engagement. Cornerstone beliefs about inseparability of cheap fossil fuels and Australian 
economic prosperity were not formed in the greenhouse policy network, but they have 
contributed to the responses of the AAC and its allies in other groups and government. 652 
651 We used to have these executive director's meetings as well as separate AIGN meetings. {Executive 
directors of what?} Executive directors of the major associations - we used to just bring them together 
periodically and talk about a whole range of issues. {How often?} Where we had regular quarterly 
meetings. And we always had greenhouse on the agenda. (Who was there?} Oh well -- for a long time 
Keith Orchison was the convener. But I mean there was David Buckingham, Dick Wells, Mitch Hooke 
from Food (AFGC, now bead of the MCA), Keith Orchison, Barry Jones, Mark Paterson, all the majors -
·we used to have about 12 of the executive directors of the major industry associations. {Did they have a 
name?} We just called them Executive Director's meetings. And we used to get together and talk about 
issues that were common to our agendas and talk about who was doing what so that there was 
opportunities for synergies, [13;92-108] 
652 Basically what is common around that network is that they are all in business, they all have a major 
interest in a cheap energy supply, and it's one which is based largely on coal. In the case of the coal 
association, their business is coal, in the case of the ESAA and the AAC they have an interest in selling 
or consuming electricity in great quantities at a very low price and that equals coal. And so it all links 
back together. [27;20] The big energy market reform procedures processes from '92 onwards were 
successful in ensuring that greenhouse was not a policy lever in there. {Which is funny because now 
you'd probably want it?} Yes, well [mean we all Jive with these contradictions, but at the stage when we 
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Overcoming these articles of fhlth has been extremely difficult for players who have 
ultimately changed their position in the greenhouse policy network--the AGA being an 
obvious example-as it has meant having to compromise existing relationships. NAFI 
provides another good example of this. The ferocity of its engagement in forest policy 
battles with the green movement fostered a mindset that almost inevitably pnt it on the 
opposite side to the emission reduction advocates in the greenhouse policy network. 
Ideologically, a change in the NAFI position has only become possible through change in 
the leadership, personnel, and culture of the organisation. Even so, cooperation with old 
foes still seems anathema. 
In short, based on how a diverse array of seven business interest groups have responded to 
climate change it seems clear that the demands of, and the baggage accumulated in, other 
networks exerts strong and lasting influence on how groups assess their interests, whether 
groups engage in a network, and the position they take. 
In closing 
This chapter has brought greater clarity and cohesiveness to the multiple case study by 
providing a cross-case lens with which to view the relative influence of different pressures 
that contribute to interest group behaviour. \Vhile the case study chapters provide a more 
easily followed version of how and why each group has responded to climate change, it is 
not until the cases are looked at together that important patterns really stand out. 
Wnat does emerge is clear confirmation of the overwhelming importance of micro-level 
forces relative to others in driving the perceived group interest and consequential level of 
engagement in the greenhouse policy network. \Vhilst not ignoring the important role of 
meso-level factors (especially policy implications and limitations) and macro-level factors 
(especially activity in other networks and government culture and ideology) more often 
than not these forces are not decisive in the same way. Micro- forces also appear to be the 
most difficult to shift. While greenhouse policy implications, for example, might change 
were talking about energy market reform, breaking up the electricity market and reforming it, the view 
was we had to drive energy prices down and consumption up. {Consumption up?} Well, I mean so we 
would attract energy intensive industries and therefore increase consumption. Yes, basically make 
Australia the homeland for footloose capital that required cheap energy, aluminium and so furth. And 
therefore we expected to see increased consumption of energy because that was our companrtive 
advantage. When we went through the whole reform processes there was an attempt to get in there that 
there had to be a lot of fuel switching and greenhouse and prices should actually reflect carbon and all 
that sort of stuff, that was effectively removed by Keating and all of those people involved in the early 
energy market reform. [41;415-23] 
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and the dominant ideology of the government might change, the culture of interest groups 
and other internal forces appear to carry substantial inertia. This renders assessments of 
group interest and decision making on network engagement very difficult indeed to 
redirect. 
Another important finding is the common linkages or feedback loops operating in both 
directions between all of the micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors. Changes in leadership 
have been closely tied to changes in membership structure and culture and more often than 
not it is very difficult, if not impossible, to say with confidence which factor emerged first 
and which was most responsible for shaping behavioural change. Similarly, there are close 
linkages between factors operating at different levels. As we have seen, the experiences 
accumulated by players in one policy network can have a major influence on how they 
respond to the emergence of new networks. Along the way, these experiences shape 
interest group culture and other internal forces which influence group interest and future 
behaviour. 
The links between these forces is complex and highly unpredictable depending inevitably 
on the interaction of people and institutions. They are so often intertwined. 653 The upshot is 
that it is virtually impossible to attribute causalify to particular aspects. Although it is 
relatively easy to identify that a factor was influential, it is much rarer to find that it has 
been decisive. More often than not, decisiveness appears to be most often apparent at the 
micro-level-though even then it is commonly a combination of one or more forces. 
653 It is difficult, for example, to distinguish between the relative influence of Bill Nagle's views on the 
AGA 's decision to exit the AIGN and the infl1rencc of the changing structure of the AGA's membership. 
It is difficult to distinguish between the personal advocacy of AIGN members and patron ministers on 
decisions by the greenhouse ministerial committee and the design of the committee itself. It is bard to say 
whether the individual on the NFF's environment committee who stridently denied the science of climate 
change had the impact or whether it was the design of the committee itself which enabled such influence 
to occur. There are countless examples where it is impossible to accurately allocate causality to structure 
or agency. 
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11 
Conclusions 
Introduction 
The findings of this research are most meaningfully categorised into two groups which 
relate directly to the initial research objectives: i) improving our understanding about 
business interest group behaviour, and ii) shedding light on the inner workings of business 
group activities in the evolving Australian greenhouse policy network. These contributions 
are dealt with separately below. 
Improving our understanding of interest groups and policy networks 
Renewed focus on what constitutes and shapes group interest and behaviour 
As has been noted already, tbe focus of this research was on what interest groups do and 
why they do it. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not a very common approach in the field. Most 
interest group studies, and policy network analyses for that matter, don't focus heavily on 
why groups behave as they do. Instead, they focus on collective action obstacles to group 
formation on the one hand, and scrutiny of the influence that groups may or may not have 
on policy outcomes. There is increasing attention in the business literature on the factors 
which make some business associations more effective (Doner and Schneider 2000), with 
much closer scrutiny of micro- and meso-level forces. However, this work too is ultimately 
directed at explaining outcomes and focused on whether groups are a positive or negative 
force for society. It is perhaps understandable that the greater interest is in the 'product' end 
of the process rather than the 'ingredient' end. However, this research was born out of a 
view that there might be more to interest formation and group behaviour. The idea that 
group behaviour can be assumed to reflect group interest also seemed inadequate. 
On that basis, this research set out to see what else underpinned group behaviour. Perhaps 
as a consequence of the conscious decision to go down a less well trodden path, what soon 
became clear early was that perceptions of group interest were very powerful but that these 
perceptions were far from a simple equation of financial costs and benefits at stake--in this 
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cruse in relation to climate change. A wide range of internal (micro-), network (meso-) and 
broader political (macro-) forces exerted powerful influences assessments of group interest. 
This assessment in tum shapes group decisions on engagement in the greenhouse policy 
network-whether to engage (and how deeply) or not Hence, the use of 'group interest' as 
a variable on its own for explaining behaviour was fraught with difficulty, as it was 
impossible to measure (due to the wide range of influences) and disguised all of the factors 
contributing to group perceptions of it. 
The outcome suggests that we should never simply assume that group behaviour is a 
reflection of group interest. In many cases this research suggests that groups often behave 
in ways which are arguably contrary to their ovm interests. What appears to be more 
important is what factors shape their (sometimes mistaken) assessments of group interest. 
These factors·~uch as culture654 and leadership655-appear to be the primary influence 
upon interest russessment and ultimately group behaviour in the seven case studies 
conducted here. This has important implications. It suggests that simplistic notions that 
group behaviour mirrors group interest are inadequate and also crusts some doubt on other 
approaches to group preferences and interests. Rather than glossing over group interest or 
assuming it away, the concept is an important su~ject for study in its own right, and one 
about which further work in the interest group studies and policy networks fields might be 
of significant benefit. 
Sharpening focus back on to the group 
Just as the findings of this research suggest that group interest warrants greater focus, it 
also finds that the strongest forces shaping the perception of group interest (and group 
behaviour) are internal to the group and that these deserve greater focus. Across all seven 
cases examined here internal or micro-level factors were the most powerful in shaping 
'perceived interests,' decision making and behaviour. While external meso- and macro-
level factors are shown to exert influence, these are less consistent and relatively less 
powerful. This suggests that greater attention is required between the collective action 
focus at one end of the field and debates about group influence at the other end. Increased 
attention to what occurs at the meso-level in the policy network is highly valuable, but it 
654 See previous quote [53;117] under footnotes 73 and 99 regarding how the AAC culture was 
dominated by a narrowly defined set of interests which does not reflect community values and is even at 
odds with the culture of the aluminium industry internationally. 
655 See previous quote [2;44] under footnote 604 regarding the overwhelming importance of the 
personality of individual interest group leaders, rather than group interest, in dictating group behaviour. 
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overlooks part of the explanation if the causes for decisions by network participants on the 
extent of their engagement are not investigated. This research demonstrates that what lies 
behind assessments of group interest and consequent decisions on network engagement is 
complex and important. It reinforces the idea that understanding the decisions made at 
group level on the nature and extent to which groups engage or not in policy networks is 
critical to any assessment of network structure and outcomes. 
Reinforcement of recent findings on business interest groups in Australia 
Another contribution made here is verification of some of the findings of other Australian 
scholars on the role of business interest groups in recent times. Researchers like Bell and 
Eccleston have looked closely at changes in the behaviour of groups. They suggest major 
shifts in recent years from a highly fragmented business community, used to protecting 
narrow sectoral interests, to one much more accustomed to working together and in 
collaboration with government. This research strongly reinforces these findings. Across the 
case studies, and in the evidence assembled here about the wider policy network, there is 
compelling evidence of collaboration hetween business interest groups in Australia in the 
past decade on greenhouse policy. Coalition activity has been extensive and effective--· 
particularly in the case of the AIGN. Confirming the findings of Bell (l 994a, 1994b) and 
Eccleston (2000), this work also corroborates very close collaboration between business 
associations and government, and much greater use of sophisticated research lo support 
lobbying-research rarely resorted to by business interest groups in Australia a generation 
ago. 
New findings about business interest group activity in Australia 
Perhaps building on what other researchers have found, this work also suggests the 
possibility of a new kind of inertia in the Australian political system. Just as others have 
found strong inertia in the past which prevented business interest groups working together, 
there now appears to be a strong inertia proteeting 'old economy' interests in their new era 
of collaboration with government. 
Conventional wisdom about interest groups being captured by government deparrments has 
been turned on its head with this research finding that 'reverse capture' has occurred in the 
greenhouse policy network. Former bureaucrats now working in industry exert a pervasive 
influence on the positions advanced to government by the departments in which they once 
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worked. A 'policy cul de sac' may have evolved in the greenhouse policy arena in Australia 
in which new paths for greenhouse policy are stifled because of the reverse capture 
occurring. Powerful business coalitions like the AIGN have also acted as highly effective 
scarecrows in the greenhouse policy network-scaring other interest groups from engaging 
in the network. 
Whether these findings about business group activity are unique in the greenhouse policy 
network or symptomatic of a wider phenomenon is an open question and one which this 
work would suggest is a worthwhile topic for future study. On the surface, it would appear 
that government perceptions on what constitutes the national interest are being heavily and 
arguably disproportionately influenced by old economy interest groups in a similar manner 
to the way in which government perceptions about the national interest were once heavily 
influenced by groups seeking to protect sectoral tariffs and the like. 
The structure versus agency debate 
One of the main areas of debate in policy networks literature has been whether as a general 
rule either structure (the shape of the policy network, rules of the game, and so on) or 
agency (rational action bargaining between network agents) is more important in 
explaining policy outcomes. This research partly skirts this debate because it does not seek 
to explain or predict policy outcomes but is focused on interest assessment and group 
behaviour. What emerges is that in practice it is often impossible to separate the structural 
from the personal in group and network analysis, because the players and the structures are 
so intricately intertwined. Further, there are feedback loops between the players and 
structures which mean that both are constantly evolving in response to each other. In short, 
this work finds no generic dominance of either structure or agency in the behaviour of 
groups in this particular policy network. Instead it finds evidence that both are important, 
inherently linked, and constantly influencing each other as group decisions on network 
engagement and the networks themselves evolve. 
The network change dehat~ndogenous versus exogenous 
Because it analyses the evolution of a policy network over many years this work enables 
some observations to be made about the contentious issue of what causes policy networks 
to change. Some 'structuralists' like Rhodes and Marsh accept that exogenous factors tend 
to drive network chang~things which impact so significantly on the structure of the 
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network that it ceases to be viable without rapid change. Rational Choice theorists like 
Dowding on the other hand believe that endogenous factors tend to drive network change, 
consistent with their view that it is the bargaining which takes place between agents in a 
network which determines policy outcomes (M:arsh and Smith 2000). This research finds 
that neither exogenous nor endogenous factors are dominant in explaining network change. 
At least in the case of Australia's greenhouse policy network, internal and external forces 
are both closely and simultaneously involved, both in network evolution and in the rate at 
which it occurs. The stories of micro-, meso- and macro-level influence on group behaviour 
reflect this. Similarly, these endogenous and exogenous pressures are involved in foedback 
loops which act either to accelerate or to inhibit change, depending on the circumstances. 
Mapping network structure versns mapping resource dependencies 
The work conducted here might also contribute in a small way to debates about the merits 
of different types of network analysis. A metbodological debate has in recent times focused 
on which of the following techniques holds the greatest explanatory power: mapping 
network structure or mapping tbe resource dependencies of agents in a network (either 
groups or individuals). On the one hand, the structuralists argue that the way a network is 
shaped-who is in, the rules of the game and so on-largely determines outcomes. The 
rational choice alternative suggests that structure is much less influential than the relative 
resource dependencies of network players (Dowding 200 l ). What is crucial in the latter 
approach is the bargaining that takes place between these players. This explains outcomes, 
it is argued, and furthermore it can be measured by applying appropriate quantitative 
methods to map the frequency of interactions of different types. There has been a gradual 
acceptance that both methods are useful and complementary and need not be mutually 
exclusive. This research assumed that the 'what happened and why' answer is a series of 
competing versions (or constructions) of those involved in the policy network. To some 
extent mapping of the structure of the network and the extent of bargaining was used here. 
However, its usefulness was limited and it was merely complementary as a source of 
context. It did little to bolster the validity of competing explanations. 
Shedding light on the Australian greenhouse policy network 
This brings us to the second major contribution of this work-improving our understanding 
of the Australian greenhouse policy network. While the previous chapters give a thorough 
coverage of seven case group responses to climate change, the reality is that this research 
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has also uncovered a great deal of relevant and important information in relation to the 
wider greenhouse policy network. 
Many of the comments made in interviews about the case groups inform our knowledge 
about the broader network. However, the interviews inevitably elicited comments which 
were not focused on the cases but on the wider network. Much of this material supports the 
findings, and at the same time, as many interviewees have been at pains to emphasise, their 
comments on the wider network provide important context for anyone interested in 
understanding what has happened in the greenhouse policy network and why. 
Even though these observations do not relate to the case study groups directly and do touch 
on issues beyond the main scope of the research (like group influence and policy outcomes) 
they are felt sufficiently important in their own right to justify being included here. They 
provide valuable context for understanding the cases, and further for use in reinforcing the 
foundations for future work on the development of greenhouse policy in Australia. 
For the purposes of this piece of work, though, the main value added by including these 
observations serves to illustrate very effectively that the decisions of groups examined here 
as case studies-on group interest and on whether they engage in the policy network, 
which side of the issue they choose, and how they conduct themselves-are not decisions 
without consequence.656 On the contrary, they have played an important enabling role in the 
dominance of the network by a small and extremely effective group of players representing 
a relatively small proportion of Australia's economy.657 
With this in mind, the findings of the research support a long list of observations about the 
Australian greenhouse policy network. Below are ten of the more obvious and telling: 
!. The greenhouse network is largely inaccessible to outsiders 
Perhaps the greatest irony about the greenhouse policy network is that while climate 
change is an environmental issue of arguably the greatest and broadest relevance for the 
656 (From one of the most senior advisers to the Howard government) .. .ifthe financial sector and some 
other absentees had been more active, perhaps (things would have been different). [5Cl;84] 
657 The hands-do\vn winner would be the Australian Aluminium Cotmcil. It's no c-0ntest. And then after 
that, I would say the Australian Gas Association. After that the Sydney Futures Exchange in its sort of 
meteoric day. But apart ft om them I would say that none on your list even register on the radar screen. 
[27;200] 
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community, it involves very few people. The policy network notionally includes a broad 
cross-section as evidenced by the large number of people and organisations making 
submissions to parliamentary inquiries on climate change. Yet, this research finds that the 
real action that actually influences greenhouse policy involves a very small number of 
people-perhaps fewer than fifty-mostly senior politicians, bureaucrats, and business 
leaders. It would appear that the reasons why the policy network is so sheltered from 
contestation are two-fold. First, there are extreme information barriers to entry into the 
debate because the issue is complex and requires significant devotion of resources over 
long periods to stay 'on top of the game.' Precious few have the resources or 
commitment-particularly given the long-term nature of the issue itself.658 Second, there is 
an iron triangle of sorts operating between dominant sections of the bureaucracy, senior 
levels of successive federal governments, and the powerful advocates representing the 
resources and energy sector of the Australian economy. 659 Voices operating from outside 
this triangle have over more than a decade exerted little influence on the direction of 
government policy, as evidenced by the gradual backing away from Australia's 
commitments to reduce its greenhouse emissions. 660 
658 One of the principal benefits people saw in the establishment of AIGN was in infonnation 
dissemination in being able to sustain an engagement with the COP processes for example. The 
representative from AIGN has attended every COP meeting and brought back up to date intelligence on 
where things are at, where they're going, flagging issues. People, if you like, have been able to use that 
as a vehicle for continued engagement, but not the intimate involvement that only a very small number of 
players that have been able to sustain. [51;138] 
659 Interestingly, DFAT in my view-there's one serious flaw in their approach to greenhouse gas 
domestic stakeholders-they identify far too closely with the losers in the Kyoto Protocol process and 
refuse to take seriously even most of the winners. They knee-jerk react to their losers--particularly the 
big coal groups but when people in the financial sector have a different story DFAT don't pay too much 
regard to it. .. Ralph Hillman (Ambassador for the Environment) goes to talk to lunches organised by you 
know people like Minters and Mallesons (law finns: Minter Ellison and Mallesons Stephen Jaques) and 
so on. But they don't get themselves into that part of the economy and I don't know why. It's strang.r--
they really focus on the losers.[2;136-40] 
660 {It seems to me that when you go back and you look at the direction of policy there's been ... a 
decision was taken in I think a 1990 cabinet meeting where essentially the same qualification, 'we will 
not do anything that compromises our economic interests,' and some might argue that there has been a 
change in intensity in policy tenns, but the direction has been largely the same ever since?} These issues 
have been ... the intensity has changed because we've had a focus on the international negotiations. The 
interests, concerns and the arguments become farther and more sophisticated, but they don't vary very 
much. Some of the early moves were naive. I think Ros Kelly in that 1990 decision got agreement to say 
that we would reduce our emissions by 40 per cent by the year 2000. {I think it was 20?} 20 per cent, 
1988 levels ... Which I can recall some of us saying, 'absolute bullshit. It's just not going to happen, no 
way it can happen, because that totally stalls the economy.' So you'd never get anyone saying that sort of 
thing anymore, but at the same time how was that dealt with? It was dealt with by having a caveat in the 
decision in which they would have promised two things simultaneously. You've got more and more to a 
point where you're actually focusing now on the choices of which policies and measures will confinn 
that, but you've gone from 20 per cent to +8 per cent and +8 per cent on a much broader carbon 
accounting base. A big difference I suppose. In the early '90s Ros Kelly was obviously the proponent of 
that submission with some pretty strong support from Hawke and always some caution around it. Keating 
was always more sceptical and that scepticism continued through to the Ber.Jin Mandate when Australia 
was the last country to fall. [54;432-42] 
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2. The network is dominated by a small, powerful self-declared greenhouse mafia661 
It is widely acknowledged by interviewees for this research that a small group of people 
leading resources and energy sector interest groups have dominated the greenhouse policy 
network for years. 662 While there has been occasional variation in the make up of the group, 
a leadership core exists which has been dra\.\'Il primarily from the AIGN's members, and 
consulting firms like ACIL. According to interview comments here, prominent members 
have included, among others, Barry Jones, Dick Wells, John Tilley, Mark O'Neill, Ron 
Knapp, David Coutts, Mike Hitchens and Keith Orchison. Members of the group have 
referred to themselves in interviews for this research as the greenhouse 'mafia. ' 663 The 
self-declared 'mob' works as a pack to keep the brakes on greenhouse policy and to protect 
the narrow interests of a few resources based industries like coal, oil, aluminium and 
electricity generation. 664 They have demonstrated an unrivalled capacity to influence the 
direction of government policy-something which is widely acknowledged across the 
network. 665 They are also true believers in the cause--""ideologically committed to the 
661 The use of this term here reflects no real or implied association whatsoever with organised crime. This 
term (along with the term 'the mob') is a self--Oescriptor used by some industry lobbyists in reference to 
the AIGN. It does not necessarily reflect any views of the part of the author. 
662(Said one senior adviser in the Howard government) The 'club' has had a discernible influence on the 
position of Australia's greenhouse policy. They have been very successful in making the government 
aware of the damage which might flow from major greenhouse measures. [50;80] 
""' {When you think about the reasons as to why the Aluminium Council has been successful-what 
ofuer groups which are not in my list of case studies have also been influential for the same sorts of 
reasons?} Well, the Electricity Supply Association, the Cement Industry Association, the Australian 
Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, the Minerals Council of Australi~e mafia. {That 
is an interesting term you use. Does anyone else use that tenn-the mafia?} Yes. We all talk about 
ourselves that way. {Yes--but does anyone else use it outside?) Does anyone else use outsidtr-no! 
(Laughter). It is an 'in house term.' {That is very interesting.} The other in"house term is the Society of 
Egomaniacs. Which is commonly known as the Executive Directors meeting of the AfGN. [18;39()-404] 
{It has been suggested to me by some who are part of that group that if you look around at the major 
industry associations who have been active on greenhouse, almost without exception they are headed up 
by someone who has come out of the old DPIE) Yes. {They all think the same way?} Yes. {TI1ey know 
fue policy framework better than fue government ... ) Yes. {Because they wrote it?} Yes. {They have a 
corporate memory which goes back to the very beginning of greenhouse policy?} Yes. {And this is one 
of !he keys to their success?) Yes. {In fact I have even heard it described by one of the participants as 
'the mafia?'} I don't think any of us shy away from that. {It is quite amazing--ls that your observation 
that this has been an important part of the success has been that you are dealing with programs which you 
had a hand in or understand from personal involvement and often"times with former colleagues?} ... what 
you have said is basically correct. [40;45}-83] 
664 See previous quote [53;117] under footnote 99 where a senior former AlGN insider acknowledges the 
pursuit of narrow interests ito the exclusion of other oommunitv values.' 
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... a strong network of influence there ...... people like John Hannagan and the Aluminium people were 
influential in having John Eyles talce over the network, and making sure that it reflected their interests 
[53;117] Yes, these people are very influential because influence is all about personalities, your 
relationships and networks and who you get on the phone to talk to. [36;277] I think the Australian 
Greenhouse Industry Network has been super important in developing policy because it represented all 
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expansion of the Australian economy through continued availability of cheap fossil fuels.666 
They are absolutely committed to defeating the green movement on climate change. They 
have successfully drawn on the support of various captains of industry--or 'aces'-to 
apply pressure on government to get their way on greenhouse policy.667 The interviews for 
this research suggest that the vast majority of those active in the greenhouse policy network 
believe the mob has largely had its way so far. 668 
3. Revolving doors and musical chairs have hardened 'mob' influence 
One of the keys to the greenhouse mafia's influence is that they know relevant sections of 
the bureaucracy well. With the exception of very few (such as Keith Orchison), all have 
come from a previous career in the federal bureaucracy. Most have worked in the federal 
the losers and did so under two people I knew quite well-John Eyles most recently, and before him 
Tony Beck-they represented the losers quite effectively because it was sort of during the early stages, 
people were willing to let this group organise them-individual constituent groups-and speak for them 
and that meant that they had rounded up under an umbrella a lot of companies that are in the government. 
So they were very, very influential. [2; 172] AIGN have been very influential in the debate and in going 
and lobbying, and APPEA to some extent have been as well. Minerals Council also. So the individuals 
there I suppose the way I would describe it would be a continual drip, drip, drip of the negative story. So 
in that sense therefore very, very influential. [ 52;259] 
666 Ultimately, in the end they have all on aligned on the basis that any cost on carbon is a cost on 
industry that cannot be met. I don't know this particular cost cannot be met whereas all the other costs 
that are imposed on industry can be met, but this one is an ideological objection to bowing to the weight 
of science or allowing the environment to be more important than profits. It is an ideological objection to 
allowing the commons (i.e. public goods like clean air) to be costed and paid for. [ 45;325] 
667 (From one of the government's most senior environment policy advisers) In terms of who the Prime 
Minister listens to on the issue, he would definitely take notice of what captains of industry said to him-
for example, Hugh Morgan (ex managing director of Western Mining) and Barry Cusack (ex managing 
director of Rio Tinto). He meets with these sorts of people regularly on a formal and informal basis. The 
PM has a huge network of business contacts and listens to a great many people on this. The PM is big on 
people who he can trust to deal with and he seeks a lot of different views on this. He would definitely 
take close notice of Warwick Parer on this issue (ex Resources Minister and coal industry executive), and 
the esteem in which Parer is held by the PM is reflected in the decision to have him head up the recent 
energy policy inquiry [50;62] Oue of the points I was going to make was that one of the successful things 
that people like Barry Jones and Dick Wells and a couple of the other guys have done is at very critical 
stages there's this arrangement where senior business people can ring Howard direct and I think John 
Akehurst, the head of Woodside, the fact that he has this huge investment in the North West Shelf 
expansion and the China deal has given him enormous influence over Howard on some of these things 
and if you've had a look at Friday's version of the Financial Review you'll see Akehurst mentioned as 
one of the people caught up in the leak and another guy, head ofEsso he's probably not as influential but 
he's probably the guy who allegedly rang the BCA up and told them to back off on greenhouse. [17;435] 
Hugh Morgan, it's interesting you know because he's very progressive on some of the minerals industry 
codes of conduct with regard to the environment. So he's very, very progressive. But on greenhouse, 
absolutely luddite. Absolutely luddite. He thinks the world will fall apart under a Kyoto protocol. So he's 
been quite influential. [52;259] 
668 {Also, almost all of them have come out of the same career path. They've come out of the Industry 
department?} That's right, public service. {But specifically that department?} Yes, that's a fair 
statement. { ... they refer to themselves as the mafia} Well they are. {They're quite proud of the whole 
thing.} I mean I'm just fascinated. If you asked me the question what had they achieved, then maybe 
keeping it under control [4;430-38;460-74] 
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Industry portfolio, and many have worked in sections of that department responsible for 
greenhouse and/or energy policy. 669 Various members worked together in the same branch, 
sometimes holding the same positions consecutively. The corporate knowledge which the 
mob has about the development of national policy relevant to climate change is both 
impressive and unrivalled. 670 The greenhouse mafia boast that they know greenhouse 
policy better than the government because they were the ones that wrote it. 671 Some even 
argue that with the decline in policy analysis within the Industry Department the mafia still 
669 Weil yes, the family tree in that sense, in terms of all the industry associations they've all come from 
the Department of Resources Energy at some time or other. [19;507] .. .if you have a look at say the 
people who came out of the Industry portfolio who went into industry associations Barry Jones, David 
Coutts, allegedly the fellow who runs the cement industry [17;251] I think if you have a look at many of 
these organisations they have hired their executive officers nut of DPIE. And in some instances, they 
have hired them out of Trade----which is really not that distinguished from OPIE anyway-so I think 
what you're effectively getting is people at the branch head level out of industry departments-and who 
in a number of cases they have been involved in greenhouse policy process in government-and then 
they are basically bringing that across to the industry association ... { ... are there any examples that jump 
out which you would point to?} Well the obvious one is David Coutts--4here is also John Tilley, Warren 
Lang-·he came out of (the federal Depattment of Foreign Affairs and) Trade originally-4he head of the 
Federated Chamber of Automotive Industries (FCAI) is another one. So I think that has a strong 
influence on the energy industry culture. But, they want that though--! don't think it is a case of the 
recruitment creating the culture-it is because the sponsoring companies want that culture so tlley look 
for the people who will, l suppose--that will give them the homogeneity ofculture. [27;120-28] 
670 Sec previous quote [2;172] regarding the influence of the AI<lN as an umbrella group, under footnote 
665. 
Within industry, you have a corporate memory of international greenhouse negotiations from 1988 until 
the present day. 1ne government does not have that. [l 8;629] {What sort of advantage does it give these 
guys to have had that background, in government?} Oh, look it does give thent a real advantage. {How?) 
... Because greenhouse is such an ethereal issue. I mean none of us re'1lly know what we can do about it. 
We can look at a whole range of small issues, larger issues or whatever, but ifs really hard to grab hold 
of. These guys have leMned how to grab ho Id of it at least in terms of a dialogue. They know what words 
to use, they know how to make themselves sound credible in !he area and so they tend to take over most 
of!he dialogues whatever they might be and whichever one of them there are, they have a tendency to be 
able to manage them. Now from the perspective of the organisations that they represent which are the 
ones that are the high energy users on the whole and they are, that's what !hey are, that's where they 
come from, managing this debate is pretty fundamental to their well as they would perceive their future, 
to make sure government never forgets about export industries and incentives ... [4;476-82] 
671 Building on the previous quote [4-0;483] under footnote 663. 
I would add a couple of dimensions. Most of us have not only worked on greenhouse but we have all 
worked on energy and also some of us have worked on agriculture, so quite a bit of the thinking at the 
fuderal level on energy policy issues is stuff which one or more of us have set in place. lf we haven't set 
it in place we have actually been involved intimately in its development or implementation. So we know 
how the underpinning for greenhouse works, So, we are familiar wi!h the policy structure, what the 
policy approach is, how policy is formulated at a government level in that regard. [40;483] 
{ ... when it comes to dealing with government you are dealing in the main with programs which you 
helped to design along with your predecessors, and former colleagues?} Yes. {And that is a huge 
advantage?) Yes. We know more about energy policy than the government does. We know more about 
industry policy than the government does. We know where every skeleton in the closet is-most of them 
we buried. Now, when the NFF tries to lobby on salinity, there is not the same mafia group--the closest, 
focused group there is the international trade negotiators where again there is a group of industry 
associations and a whole set of people who have a common background in the old Department of Trade. 
That is about the only other comparable group that exists across industry ... [I &;230-236] 
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write government policy--0nly now from the offices of industry associations.672 Whilst not 
all who use it are greenhouse mafia members, the 'revolving door/musical chair' 
arrangements extend to the highest levels of the government and continue to this day-
overwhelmingly to the advantage of the AIGN side of the greenhouse debate as the 
following list shows: 
Barry Jones 
John Tilley 
Keith Orchison 
Meg McDonald 
Dick Wells 
Mitch Hooke 
Belinda Robinson 
David Coutts 
Ron Knapp 
Mike Hitchens 
Jim Starkey 
Alan Oxley 
has worked in both the federal industry department and for 
theAPPEA; 
worked for the federal industry department and APPEA, 
CIF, and AIP; 
worked for the APPEA prior to heading the ESAA; 
(worked for DFAT and was a key negotiator on behalf of 
the Australian government before recently taking up a post 
as head of Corporate Affairs with Alcoa-an organisation 
she now represents within the AIGN; 
reportedly worked in the bureaucracy and for three ALP 
ministers (Evans, Walsh and Kerin) before leading APPEA, 
MCA, and most recently the Australian Food and Grocery 
Council (AFGC); 
replaced Dick wells at the MCA, having left the AFGC; 
recently replaced Barry Jones at APPEA, having come from 
a primary industry and environment policy background in 
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and 
executive director roles at APIC, A3P, and PTAA. She was 
a working group chair in the Government-Business 
Climate Change Dialogue; 
came out of the federal industry department to head up 
AAC; 
came out of the Industry Assistance Commission and the 
Finance Department via the MCA and the World Coal 
Institute to head up AAC; 
moved from the federal industry department to work for 
ACIL consulting and the Australian Coal Association. 
worked on petroleum policy in the old DPIE before 
becoming executive director of the Australian Institute of 
Petroleum. 
(who has close connections to the BCA, Laviosier Group 
and greenhouse sceptic website Climatechangeissues.com) 
came out of the Department of Foreign Affairs to head up 
the APEC Studies Centre which has campaigned against 
Australian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol; 
672 I don't think they do anything in DITR. I think they've gone away from doing policy analysis to being 
process people and there's no vacuum anymore because the guys on the AIGN still do the job for them so 
they don't have to. You know, there's lots of money spent. Those guys have got lots of money and 
there's lots of consultants. [17;407] 
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Mark O'Neil 
Robyn Priddle 
Tony Beck 
AianMoran 
Stuart Beil 
Warren Lang 
Robert Bain 
Robyn Bain 
Brad Page 
Mark Paterson 
Peter Hendy 
Peter Walsh 
Brian Nye 
Catherine Murphy 
Anna Cronin 
WendyCraik 
moved from working for former environment minister, Ros 
Kelly, and former Prime Minister Keating to working for 
the Australian Coal Association.; 
worked for the MCA prior to becoming Executive Director 
of the AIGN spokesperson--she has since returned to a 
federal department; 
worked for ABARE and the industry department before 
working for the BCA, the AIGN, and the SFE; 
worked as deputy secretary of energy in the Victorian 
bureaucracy before moving to the Institute of Public Affairs 
which has consistently sided with the blocking side in the 
greenhouse debate. 
worked for ABARE and the industry department before 
working for the SFE; 
reportedly worked for the old DPIE before becoming acting 
executive director at NAFI; 
worked for ABARE before leading NAFI and the AMA; 
(nee Lloydell) was closely involved in NAFI affairs in the 
1990s as head of the Fore st Protection Society. Having 
worked for Deputy Prime Minister, John Anderson, and 
Trade Minister, Mark Vaile, she now heads the CIF. She has 
twice been a national party candidate at federal level; 
left the federal industry department, where he was a 
member of the panel overseeing the COAG energy market 
review, to lead the ESAA. 
re.signed as chief executive of ACCI where he had been 
active in AIGN circles to become Secretary of the 
Department oflndustry, Science and Resources. 
left a long career as a ministerial adviser in the Howard 
government to take Paterson's place as chief executive of 
ACCI. He was steering committee chair in the 
Government--Business Climate Change Dialogue (Hendy 
2003). 
prior to becoming president of the Lavoisier Group, he was 
a Hawke government cabinet minister in various portfolios 
including resources and energy. 
a prominent member of the Liberal Party in the ACT was 
formerly executive director of the Australian Institute of 
Petroleum. He was a working group chair under the 
Government-Business Climate Change Dialogue 
is the new NAFI chief executive-she was previously an 
adviser to Prime Minister Howard. 
was previously a senior adviser in the Liberal Party before 
becoming executive director of the NFF. She was a working 
group chair in the Government-Business Climate Change 
Dialogue 
has led government agencies including the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA), the Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), and the Murray 
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Darling Basin Commission (MDBC). She has also been 
executive director of the NFF, and worked at ACIL. 
Hence, because of a revolving door--often between industry portfolio and industry interest 
group involving half a dozen key players, the greenhouse mafia has had an extraordinary 
advantage in the network which it has exploited detenninedly. 673 The close collaboration 
within the mob has also been enhanced by the sequential movement of members between 
interest groups. Many members claimed by the mob have held the top job running the 
secretariat of at least two interest groups central to the effort to slow down greenhouse 
policy-for example: Barry Jones (APPEA and MCA), Dick Wells (APPEA, MCA), Ron 
Knapp (AAC, MCA), John Tilley (APPEA, CIF), Keith Orchison (APPEA, ESAA). A 
combination of revolving doors and musical chairs is at the core of the greenhouse mafia's 
influence.674 As a result, the greenhouse mafia is arguably the most potent lobbying alliance 
in Australia at present.675 
673 Oh look, there's no doubt there's a club, and a club at a different level between the group of career 
association executives that have moved around and perceive they know how this is done. That sort of 
stuff. But you always get that in any deal. Again this will sound really cynical. I think the leadership in 
these groups tend to come from the groups that have the most to lose because they're the most 
aggressive, the most out there, which is not a really good outcome but it is my narrow experience that the 
people who are the most vocal and push the agenda the most, attempt to push the agenda the most. .. they 
are a club, there's a group of them. There's not that many of them, there's about eight maybe. I was 
trying to zip through them-about eight-and they have played musical jobs [4;426] 
674 {How important do you think that being so much a part of the system over so many years, has helped 
to perpetuate that inertia that we talked about?) Significant. Absolutely significant. It's a dynasty that's 
difficult to break and it happens in lot' of segments ... in lots ofindustries. [46;268-70! 
675 Guy, let me distract you-jru.t from your questions for a second. What is different about the carbon 
lobby to any other lobby in the country? First, it is cross-industry. Now, very rarely on anyfuing other 
fuan tax do you get a multitude of industries lobbying on oue thing. It has been highly successful if you 
believe the greens. Why? Because it is incredibly well plugged into government, and it is basically driven 
by a group of people who have a common background. For example, the bead of the Australian 
Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, the head of the Minerals Council of Australia, the 
head of the Electricity Supply Association of Australia, all have been heads of the Australian Petroleum 
Production and Exploration Association. With three of the biggest organisations there has been a clear 
succession path. Dick Wells left APPEA to go to the Minerals Council of Australia. Keith Orchison left 
APPEA to go to the Electricity Supply association of Australia. The Coal Association, the Australian 
Aluminium Council, APPEA, The Pipeline Industry Association, the Minerals Council, the Aluminium 
Council, the Cement Industry Association, the Pulp and Paper Industry Association are all headed by 
bureaucrats who come out of the one department. Keith Orchison in the ESAA was a major lobb)~St of 
that department over a 20 year period so, so it was almost as much a part of the bureaucracy. You know, 
there was a group of people who knew each other, who knew how people thought, who analysed in the 
same way, who had a fundamental understanding of the policy processes, who had all been iaught by 
Peter Walsh and Gareth Evans on how to be a bastard in the game. And, they all knew one tbing~you 
didn't beat the greens by taking them on one by one, and you didn~ beat the greens by being defensive---
you bad to be aggressive. And, the big win-what started this whole debate off-is when they derailed, 
in 1995 and 1996, Phillip Toyne and his attempt as deputy secretary of fue Department of the 
Environment to get a carbon tax up. And, they did not derail Toyne by arguing against a carbon tax-
they derailed Toyne by giving the government an alternative policy. And pointing out the cost of a 
carbon tax. Why fue conservation groups don't like it is because the alliance of conservation groups that 
turns up at every conference of the parties is matched in Australia hy an alliance of industry. It is an 
alliance of industry which actually sits at the conference table as part of the Australian delegation. That 
makes the Australian alliance different to anywhere else in the world. In the United States they sit in the 
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4. By working as a group the mafia bas scared others away from the network 
Superficially, the dominance of the greenhouse mafia would seem to merely reflect a 
situation in which relatively few sectors of the Australian economy have a stake in climate 
change, and these few are the loud voices heard via the AIGN and the mafia. However, this 
perception would seem to be highly misleading based on the evidence found here. Rather, it 
would seem that the ruthlessness of the greenhouse mafia, and their capacity to present a 
united and intimidating front has deterred many other interest groups from engaging 
seriously in the greenhouse policy network. 676 No major industry association with the 
possible exception of the AGA (before its break up) in more recent times, has been willing 
to take on the AIGN and the mafia driving their activity. Umbrella groups like the Business 
Council of Australia have found themselves unable to reach consensus largely because of 
the influence of the greenhouse mafia and their AIGN supporters. 677 The BCA, ACCI, and 
gallery-in Australia they sit in the room. They are part of the Wru:n. It is probably the best cross-industry 
allianoo--fue most successful-over the long tenn-it has been going now for at least I 0 years---0f any 
one that has ever been put together. And that is the biggest cultural and organisational factor. {So there is 
an ex DPIE government insider culture that penneates almost every single member of this successful 
fossil fuel lobby?} Yes. We all write the same way, we all think the same one way, we all worked for the 
same set of ministers.[18;224-26] 
670 See previous quote [1;271-9] under footnote 445 regarding the incompatibility of TCA and AIGN 
interests. 
(The interviewee added in the following exchange): (To what extent do you think that the culture of 
these guys in the energy intensive sectors, all coming through from the same kind of career background 
and playing musical chairs around these energy intensive peak bodies in Canberra ... To what extent do 
you think that makes it a club that's very cliquey and hard to break into?} Well, I think it's enormous. 
It's virtually ... in terms of the personalities associated with it, it makes it virtually impossible for us to 
articulate our voice. If you've got ten people that are very cliquey, that are very used to working with one 
another against a group which would be doing it solo, there's a lot of reasons why it makes it extremely 
difficult for us to influence agendas. And it would mean that any sort of group like that would provide us 
with a less than satisfactory outcome, so we're better off not joining the group. [l ;301-3] 
677 And the BCA is probably the most pro at the moment but you then have to look at the dynamics of 
who are the members of the BCA? And of course the vocal people within the BCA are the minerals 
people as well. So to get consensus around a, if you like, around high ground as opposed to the lowest 
common denominator is very, very difficult. It requires an enonnous amount of leadership on behalf of 
the leading companies. Well what I think has happened, whether it be in the BCA, ACCI, AlG, the same 
players who are negatively affected are in key positions in those organisations as well. So it's easier to 
get to the lowest common denominator in all of that. [52; 119] ... the problem is, it's very easy to identify 
the losers, it's a very small identifiable group from greenhouse. The ;vinners tend to be much smaller and 
much more widely dispersed and each of them is only going to get a very small gain so they don't have a 
big incentive to ... I mean, well look at the ABARE models of who wins and who loses. l mean 
aluminium goes down 20 per cent and coal goe~ down and so on, but those industries only comprise I 0 
per cent of the economy and if you have, say a price of carbon in the economy, you have the losers but 
that means resources get reallocated according to the new relative prices and all the winners are service 
industries, the tourism industry but the tourism industry must have huge numbers of members, each of 
whom stands to gain very little relative to the ... even light manufacturing stands to gain if it's not really 
emissions intensive stuff .... But all of those people are probably going to gain 1 per cent whereas the 
people who are losing are losing 20 per cent. .. and so it's hard to get 90 people, each gaining l per cent, 
involved in a debate whereas the one person who loses 20 per cent is clearly going to be right up there. 
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the AIG have all essentially fallen into line v.ith the AIGN position. No coalition of pro-
Kyoto business organisations has been willing to publicly challenge the mafia to any 
significant effect.678 As many suggest, the silence of the broader business community has 
been achieved by the .:r.ealous campaign of a few, and with support from government. 679 
5. Large sections of Australian industry have been missing in action 
The case studies examined here suggest that some of the largest sections of the Australian 
economy have been missing in action on greenhouse policy. Many interviewees described 
interest groups representing various prominent sections of the Australian economy in just 
those terms or something very similar.680 That is, interest groups have an apparently clear 
interest in the debate and the future direction of government policy, and yet they have 
{Yes, let alone get them to organise into a group and coordinate a campaign of lobbying in support of 
that. Does this help to explain what others have told me is that a fairly schizophrenic response to 
greenhouse by the BCA?} l think so because I'd have to say the role ofBCA has been very disappointing 
for a group that represents 100. major companies. Now obviously they've got the aluminium and the 
cement and the big emitting companies in there and obviously those companies are dominating the BCA 
debate and position, but you look at other major companies llke the financial institutions, big banks, big 
insurance companies, the manufacturing companies who are not particularly emissions intensive, all of 
those companies which wonld fur outnumber the heavy emitting side, what do they stand to ... would 
gain from greenhouse just by virtue of the reallocation of resources. You could have a macro-economic 
equilibrium when you changed the price factor, but like I said, you've got the problem that it's hard to 
get the nine guys who each gain I per cent interested when you've got one guy in there who's losing 20 
per cent. {Yes, because they scream the loudest?} But yes, it has been a ... l mean I would have thought 
that major business I would have hoped would have been sophisticated enough to realise that what really 
matters is the health of the Australian economy and if there's an issue out there that poses a risk for our 
future, for ex.ample, greenhouse liabilities twenty years down the track, and there's a risk that we'll be 
left with this industry structure which is a bloody white elephant 111 twenty years' time, you'd think that 
major business leaders would be thinking about those sorts of issues from a strategic point of view and 
saying, hey, we should be doing something about this just purely from the point of view of the economy. 
We don't want to be left with this white elephant structure if things go \VTOng. {Why do you suppose 
they don't? I mean what is it? Is it just a culture that they're not used to taking on these powerful 
players?} Yes, I think it's a culture of worrying about the financials of your own company and not sort of 
devoting tno many resources to getting involved in political debates, which usually businesses end up not 
being rewarded for being active leaders in pnlitical debates, so the only ones who are willing to get into 
political debate are the ones that stand to lose and they're in there screaming and yelling. [7;235-55] 
678 But there is no pro group and getting up a pro group is very difficult. [52; 119] 
679 As long as you're just in a world where the Prime Minister is there saying-'yeah, we have not made 
a fonnal cabinet decision' but-he's de;perately telling everybody he's not going to ratify it-and you 
have one or two business interests who are shortsighted enough not to lry to adjust-just see if we can 
hold this all back a bit like King Canute tzying to bold back to sea. And the other businesses not being 
prepared to antagonise the government-that is what you have got here. So, that is the conspiracy of 
silence-lype unholy alliance-which has developed.[33;62] 
680 See previous quote [37;111] under footnote 463 on how the !CA were 'missing in action' and 
previous quote [50;24] on how the NFF were 'absent \Vithout leave on greenhouse under footnote 273. 
(In relation to these and other groups) ... basically these groups were missing in action. [21;65] AGA has 
also been missing in action (along with the) NFF (and) the car manufacturers.[50;561 
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remained on the periphery for much of the network's history. 681 This has been the case 
with the ICA according to widely held views gathered here. It also appears to be clearly the 
case with the TCA and for much of the time with the NFF. However, this work suggests 
that the phenomenon is much broader. For much of the debate the same can be said if the 
gas industry. The financial community in particular appear to have been unable to come to 
terms with the debate or play any type of role reflective of their arguably strong interest in 
the issue. As has already been discussed, above the intimidation or scarecrow effect of the 
greenhouse mafia has been central to the 'MIA' phenomenon. 682 
6. Green groups have been no match for the mob 
Another important reason why the greenhouse mafia has so effectively dominated the 
policy network is that the green movement has been no match in the policy battles. While 
the inherent better connections and better resources of business interests comprising the 
mob has certainly been a factor, it would appear from the interviews conducted here that 
the green movement itself has failed in many ways on climate change to have the impact it 
might have. 683 The green groups have their own cultural inertia which is heavily tilted 
681 We have already talked about the NFF, and we definitely saw them as part of--we!l, if you look at the 
big lumps of Australian industry that we thought relevant to the public policy area, they were pretty 
much absent, the ACCI was pretty mucb. absent, until tb.e year 2000 and the Australian Industry Group 
has always on the fringes. [13;356] {Are there any groups that you would say have been conspicuous 
through their absence from the debate?}yes--so many, so many. Well I think to start with the National 
Farmers' Federation has been one of them, the Insurance Council has been another. The Tourism Council 
has been another one. [15;210--12] 
682 I think there's also another dimension to it and I think that dimension is that in the business circles 
where those insurance companies would move in, like the BCA circles and stuff like that, there already 
was a culture from the Minerals Council and from the Aluminium Council and people like that, that 
greenhouse was an issue, that they were the ones to deal with it and I think that culture must have .. , I 
think the Australian business community is probably too small to actually engender unless you've got 
genuine leadership it's probahly too small to engender that sort of maverick, entrepreneurial, we're going 
to go out on a limb on these things, despite the fact that our colleagues in the coal industry or the 
aluminium industry have got a different view. I think overseas in places like Europe and America there's 
room for that. [35;103] They (the greenhouse mafia) buy their effective silence, and leave one or two 
business voices out there which are negative. Whereas what the Business Council ought to do is to go 
through-··<md it is very hard for them to do this but they should do this-they should C!)mmission a study 
and look at the benefits, pluses and minuses, industry by industry, arid even though obviously some 
industries are going to have to adjust--! mean what is our national capacity to generating carbon credits? 
I think it's incredible-I think we could buy ourselves years, decades even, but we have to be in the game 
in order to do that. [33;54] 
683 I think most of the major and smaller environment groups operating in Australia have been part of the 
problem. {Why is i«-just departing from my set list of questions for a second--what is it about the 
Australian environmental movement that we have not seen them very closely engaged on climate change 
in a very consistent way?} Well, the priority issue for the environment movement remains forests as it 
has the last twenty years. The leadership of most of the green groups now are old forest activists. And 
they canie up through their organisations as forests campaigners. And it is very hard, it is very hard to 
convince those people that climate change is an issue that transcends all of those traditional issues that 
they have been fighting on and know the intricacies of for the last twenty years. So, there is that. 
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towards forest conservation, indigenous and other issues. 684 There is would appear to be a 
general lack of expertise and determination to acquire such capacity in relation to 
'browner' industry related issues in general and climate change in particular.685 The green 
movement is at a massive disadvantage in terms of its insider experience and connections 
in the greenhouse policy network, and is often more than a few steps behind in the lobbying 
game.686 This may have contributed to their failure to recognise that one of the mob's main 
assets has been its effective use of coalitions to present united messages to govemment.687 
Different priorities, there is lack of resources, and there is the complexity of the issue combined with lack 
of resources which means that it has proven pretty hard for them to get going. And, I think d1ere is a 
defeatist mentality within the environment groups on this now that says we cannot do it in Australia. We 
cannot win this argument in Australia. { ... We just don't seem to have in the tradition in Australia of 
industrial ecology issues in our environmental movement? Having lived in the US for a while and 
certainly got to know many Europeans, in both places there is a strong tradition in the green groups of 
'bro\.Vn' issues.} The role of forests has a lot to answer for-we are still dealing with the legacy of that. 
And the suspicion of Industry for good reason. The polarisation of the debate--the environmental 
debate--the lack of-so, within the green movement we have got a big suspicion of Industry, we have an 
old guard in control, we have got fomial positions not to engage with corporations in the private sector 
even if they're progressive. And we have a complex issue, and lack of funds and we have as a result in 
the Australian green movement of just saying this is too hard. {Whereas in the US there is exactly 
opposite situation. They have the funds, and they are focused on the brown issues, and they cooperate 
with Industry organisations like the EDF for example do that.} Absolutely-even in New Zealand this is 
happening--but not in Australia. [!5;212-24) 
684 {What about the influence of the green movement on this? Have they been ... } Nowhere near as 
influential as overseas. {\Vhat do you put that do\.Vn to?}Native forests. {And the fact that that's tb.e 
bigger priority?} It appears to us. Mind you, you see the other thing is, Greenpeace who started out with 
a couple of campaigns on this ended up focusing on the shale oil in Queensland. They basically left the 
greenhouse debate. I think it's been a bit of a shame. The ACF has been active in the greenhouse debate, 
they've been more active in the greenhouse debate but I think it's probably it's an important issue for 
them but the native forests is probably a bigger one. [23;246-56] 
""' ... one of the reasons why environment groups in Australia have been ineffective on climate change is 
because they are obsessed with forests and land degradation. And so many of them have been unable to 
look at climate change for what it is-ood it is simply seen it as an extension of forestry issues which is 
ridiculous. They really have been hamstrung because a lot ofthese-4ere are only halfa dozen people or 
so in the environment movement working on climate change-it is a very small number. You know, a lot 
of them have come up through forest issues. We don't have this history of industrial environmentalism 
which they have in Europe. And [would say that one of the reasons why the Australia Institute has been 
effective is that they are not hung up on the forests, on land, and the water. The Institute sees climate 
change as an industtial issue. {So, just as an aside, you see the environment movement in Australia as 
very, very green rather than focusing on brown agenda issues to steal the cliche.} Definitely, definitely ... 
I think that has been a real problem with dealing with climate change in Australia [31 ;191··-95]. 
686 {Are there any groups that you would say have been conspicuous through their absence from the 
greenhouse debate? Where you would say that they probably have interest in this but they have not been 
involved in the debate?}., .are we talking green groups as well here? {Sure.} Well, my impression is 
basically that what you get is that if people perceive there is a key meeting coming up then there is a rush 
to Canberra and a bit of lobbying going on and then other things become important in the interim so the 
ACF I think have been-I mean they have got a consistent line but they don't appear to me to be thinking 
about greenhouse all the time. They are prosecuting other cases. {So you would describe them as having 
a seasonal interest?} Yes. So, for example in the run up to Marrakesh-everybody is suddenly in town. 
And they are all in to\.Vn to try and coincide with the cabinet meeting where the decisions arc going to be 
takeu on what the negotiators are sent off to do. {By which point most of the leg-work is already done?} 
Correct. It is all over. [48;113-3 l] 
""' You know you have seen a few celebrated punts at election time by some industry groups and when 
they get it wrong they have three years they don "t get access. [How much do you think the lack of that 
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Despite the valiant efforts of a few, the clear scope to build counteracting coalitions on the 
green side of the debate has not been capitalised upon by the mainstream environmental 
organisations. Some green industry advocates acknowledge that complacency has been part 
of the problem.688 This, along with cultural inertia, has provided the greenhouse mob an 
advantage which they have exploited ruthlessly and effectively. 689 
7. Government efforts to engage wider interests have largely failed 
It is interesting to note that the dominance of the greenhouse mafia has not been achieved 
with complete complicity of government. Certainly the mob have had powerful friends in 
government ranging from the Industry Department and the Treasury to the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and ABARE690 to senior members of cabinet 
type of access to that sort of network of people with that career pathway has hurt the green side of this 
debate?] Well I'm not sure that is what has hurt them ... you know there are people like Phillip Toyne for 
example who carried on their work in the department. [But what if there were 10 Phillip Toynes running 
around?] Oh they would be pretty powerful. Phillip's a pretty crafty guy. [13;572-80] {!asked one of the 
key people who's played musical chairs the most recently, how significant the advantage was and he was 
telling me how big it was and he said, oh look, Phillip Toyne's the only one on the other side and I said, 
what would it be like if you had ten Phillip Toynes on the other side and he said, we'd have our hands 
full, it would be an even battle.} Yes, well there you go, and I think Phillip was severely disadvantaged 
because he hadn't worked in government before and I think he had a lot of learning to do himself, you 
know, like how things work. It's not that he could rely on a network. You know for a lot of them they 
mightn't have worked in government, if they're coming from somewhere, if they're moving in that 
dire<::tlon, but they have a network to rely on anyway.[45;273--275] 
"' But it's really a Ca<.'e of being effectively resourced to provide a well resourced, effective and 
professional counter to the carbon lobby lot. .. There's a very few of us, so there haven't been 
opportunities to get heavy hitters from our industry-they just don't compete with heary hitters from the 
energy intensive industry ... But that's changing and so we've increased our effort in that regard: getting 
some of the senior executives from our industry getting up (to Canberra) to be more effective. Look, it's 
been a slow process. I think it's also fuir to say that people just-industry on our side-just expected 
stuff (in their interests) to happen. [23;268] 
°'9 (As one senior AIGN figure remarked) ... the greens have damaged themselves in my view-
certainly with Robert Hill as you know. And tl1ere is this question that it is never quite good enough for 
them. I mean the government is rather petulant in some ways, if you don't give it a pat on the back when 
it does things, but if you're seen to be playing both sides of the coin all the time, and never give credit 
where it is due, your credibility very rapidly runs out. You see Ros Kelly made the mistake that she 
allowed her agenda to be set by the greens and so she used to keep trying to chase them saying that she 
was a good minister, but the stake was always being moved out in front of her. She kept reaching for the 
stake and they would never give it to her. Vlhereas Robert, you see, the beauty of working with Robert 
was that he had the strength to know ... and he would try to find ways but at times be knew that it was 
getting beyond where it was reasonable to be. And he'd stop. And so when he started getting a lot of 
probing by the green groups on various things like that he just got fed up. And so I think the green groups 
didn't learn to operate in a different way with a very powerful and strong minister and so they burnt 
themselves up. And I think the old ways of doing things don't always work in the future. And I think that 
this government is quite petulant about that you know I have felt it before on various issues and the green 
groups' strength is rooted again in PR, group awareness, hysteria and angst.. [13;580] 
690 However ABARE has, talking about personalities, very strong players. Btlan Fisher is a very strong 
player ... He was always mad then, he's still mad and there's this very strong view coming through 
agricultural ewnomics and that ewnomic profession, they're almost like the intellectual equivalent of the 
Sceptics Society, agricultural economists particularly. They spend most of their lives trying to stare down 
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including the Prime Minister. 691 They have enjoyed advantages not available to others in 
the network.m However, at the bureaucratic and political levels, there have been many 
efforts to facilitate a more balanced outcome than the mafia have sought. Bureaucrats, with 
the support of some ministers, tried to engage a stakeholder base in the policy network 
farmers over subsidies so !here's !his real anti ... !here's this intellectual sort of framework which 
basically if anything smells like it's an excuse for government intervention they'!l oppose it. So they're 
very anti interventionist. On agricultural subsidies and Fisher's v.Titten a number of books about that and 
that same flavour comes into his approach to greenhouse. On greenhouse, he's sceptical oftbe science 
and even if he isn't sceptical of science he says tbat iftbe government accepts that something needs to be 
done radically on greenhouse then basically it opens up public c-0ffers to a v.110le pile of charlatans from 
tbe renewables industry or gas industry or even maybe the coal industry, I don't know. {Has he 
expressed that explicitly to you?} Oh yes, yes informally yes, sure. {And even scepticism oftbe science 
as well?} I think he keeps his powder dry on the science. I think earlier on, in the late 90s he was a bit 
sceptical. I think nowadays I suspect he doesn't say anything on the science. {But what's the source of 
that ideology?} The ideology comes from the old agriculiural economics framework of not having 
government concede fundamental points that will open up the government to subsidies programs and it's 
very, very strong in Brian Fisher and it may be related to the fact that he's a business as well and he's got 
clients maybe, but it's up to you to discover all of that But I have a high regard for Brian intel!eetually, 
his ethics. So even if he is getting large amounts of money which probably make or break him from high 
greenhouse emissions industries I think he'd still nu1 this line, so that's why it's very, very strong 
because he doesn't want to see the government basically pour shit loads of money into renewables or put 
a consumption tax essentially on energy which will upset the competitiveness of Australian exports--
agriculture or minerals or whatever. And so I think it's very, very strong there, and I think it is 
ideological with Brian .... he would argue that it's not ideological, he would say that it's an intellectual 
argument, that people don't understand. He has a very strong intellectual, analytical mind and people 
don't understand him. And he can see 10, 20 years in the future where if we get greenhouse policies 
wrong then basically we'll impoverish Australia to the benefit of the rest of the world and I think that's 
the way he sleeps at night [48;135-147 
691 See previous quote [13;158-70] under footnote 350 and 631 on how the AIGN used ministers to 
'reverse manage' federal government greenhouse policy by undermining the environment minister, 
eajoyed access to cabinet documents, and were adept at 'fixing the outcomes.' 
692 {One of the comments that's also been made to me is that some of these guys---<llld this is from 
tbem-tbat they've been involved over the years umpteen times editing or drafting cabinet submissions 
and policy statements and ... ) It's true. { ... you name it, before the things go up (to the minister and to 
cabinet) and tbat this is not all that common but it's a rare opportunity and you've got to treat it very 
confidentially and be very careful with it because it's a great privilege and all the rest of it. Does tbat 
surprise you to hear that sort of thing goes on?} No. I've seen it happen before, but it's interesting. 
[4;504-8] ... we used to spend a bit of time to making sure tbat a whole bunch of CEOs that were 
members of the BCA used to go to all the policy meetings of the BCA because David (Buckingham) was 
quite a clever operator. David's style W-Ould be to talk in generic terms about-d use terms lik.,_..!I had 
it from the highest levels of government that:' and people would say-'who David?' And it would be 
some adviser or whatever. And David would interpret, you see. So, I ean remember a celebrated meeting 
oftbe Minerals Council where he tried to do this-and there was Keith Orchison and Dick Wells and 
various others there ... And Dick just excused himself. David had said 'I had from tbe highest levels of 
government tbat government is concerned that industry expresses a view about greenhouse etc etc.' And 
he was using that as a driver to drive Australian business in a certain organisational direction. So, Dick 
picked up the phone and spoke to Arthur Sinodin<>s (prime minister Howard's chief of staff)--because he 
presumed that he's talking about him since he said 'the highest levels of government.' {So, Dick went to 
the highest level?} Yes... (Buckingham had after all) said '! was talking tbe highest levels of 
government...' So Dick calls Arthur-and he said 'Arthur, Buckingham is sitting in a room next to me in 
my office here telling us that govemmem wants us to do this, this, and this. And he is talking like it is 
coming from you.' And Arthur says -'Well, it has not come from me, and we do not want you to do it.' 
And so, Dick walked back in and said 'Look, sorry David-I just talked to Arthur Sinodinos and he 
disagrees completely witli what you just said.' It was that sort of game. You see, David's stupid 
presumption was that he was the only person that could access high levels of government. Of course-we 
all do. [13;444-448] 
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broader than the dominant AIGN. Govermnent departments, particularly the Environment 
Department and the AGO have reached out to sectors like insurance, tourism, agriculture, 
forestry, finance and others in an effort to obtain a more balanced industry view for 
government deliberations.693 Despite notional interest and arguably cosmetic programs 
(cosmetic, because they do not require a reduction in total greenhouse pollution by 
participants) such as participation by industry in the Greenhouse Challenge, these efforts 
have almost universally failed. Non.mafia business voices have largely remained mute on 
the periphery and the mob and its political and bureaucratic sponsors have had their way on 
most issues. Even where there has been determined personal commitment to a greener 
outcome catering to a broader stakeholder base-as the Kyoto Protocol outcome achieved 
by Senator Hill could reasonably be characterisedc-the mob have successfully used its 
political and bureaucratic power to kill off proposals against its interest. 694 
8. Federal government policy has largely catered to the greenhouse mafia 
While the federal government has been at pains to portray its greenhouse response as a 
balanced one, there is little doubt that the mafia has won the day since the early 1990s.°95 
693 
•• .it fa interesting because as a group (the AGO) we are just going through a process of consultation 
with a broad range of stakeholders to revamp our corporate plan which is three years old now. We are 
going to do it, it is time to do it, it is post COP 7, post a new government coming in, and our three-year 
time for the first corporate plan has gone out of date now. We have gone out to over 100 stakeholders and 
I can give you a list of those and we've had an 80 percent plus response rate for either face-to-face or 
telephone interviews and we have categorised them into about ten categories-state government, federal 
government, industry associations, research groups, and the like. And, they are all stakehnlders with 
\Yhorn we know there is some involvement but it is greater or lesser, and in some sectors v.·e cannot fmd 
people that there is much linkage with-Md !hat is an interesting issue. [30;16] 
694 I'm just saying that the AGO tended to align themselves with Hill's interests and therefore the AGO 
was seen as a partisan player rather than sort of a neutral policy development arm and the AIGN 
therefore rather than working through ... I mean they still spent a lot of time doing AGO processes but 
they always viewed that the fact that on any crunch issue Hill was outnumbem:I. The ministers left 
everything to Hill until they had some serious decisions and then you had the three Ministers Anderson, 
Truss and Minchin came in and Do"'l1er to a degree to knacker him on issues. [17;127] There was that 
sort of power play but time and time again--! mean, last year we had Hill and Phil from the Institute of 
Company Directors and Buckingham trying to form a good branch of the Pew Centre here in Australia. 
You know, with Eileen Clausen-·and they brought her ant to Australia at the Australian Greenhouse 
Office's expense and did all this lobbying around Australia trying to set up a version of the Pew Centre 
here in Australia. .. BP sponsored it and all that sort of shit And Dick Wells was basically chairing the 
AIGN at the stage and he said 'hey, what is this about? We are not being invited to any of these forums. 
You are pa)ing for it out of C-0mmonwealth funds. I mean what is the story? Don't we have this open 
process?' In the end, business people who AIGN knew very well and AIGN briefed on these things went 
along to these meetings anyway and told them that they saw no benefit in it so it fell over. But, this was 
another attempt of Buckingham, Bourne, and Robert Hill to set up an alternative industry lobby that more 
suited their position. And, this game has gone on for so long and it still goes on a little bit today. 
[13;44o-44J 
695 (Ros Kelly) was travelling the world stage in the late 1980s and the early part of the nineties making 
statements about what Australia was going to do. You know, we are going to do this, we're going to do 
that. On greenhouse. And we're going to stop this and stop that. And she'd come back and l mean in the 
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The flow of statements from greenhouse mafia sources effectively endorsing federal 
govermnent policy is testimony to this victory. The highly supportive releases in response 
to the govermnent's energy white paper in 2004 provide a further example (AIGN 2004a; 
2004b; MCA 2004; APPEA 2004). 
Reversal of the Howard government decision to rule out Australian ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol seems unlikely-particularly given that the decision not to ratify the 
Protocol was reportedly a unilateral one made by the Prime Minister (Miller 2002).6% 
Australian acceptance of the responsibility of developed nations to provide the lead under 
the FCCC has been abandoned. In acknowledging the Kyoto Protocol as a win for the 
enviromnent and Australia in 1997, the government accepted that 'developing countries 
would be encouraged to consider taking on future commitments under the agreement 
through jointly implemented activities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' (Hill 1997e). 
Today, developing country commitments are a precondition of Australian agreement. 
Proposals for a carbon tax and national emissions trading have been blocked. Ongoing 
programs like the Greenhouse Challenge are widely acknowledged as being ineffective697 
and are largely overseen by the greenhouse mafia.698 Expansion of the MRET has been 
formally abandoned, emissions trading has been ruled out, and a range of new measures 
designed to assist Australia's fossil fuel industry were announced in mid 2004 including 
significant investment in geo-sequestration. The 108 per cent Kyoto target itself constitutes 
the latest of many steps by Australia since 1987 to reduce its commitment to cutting 
greenhouse pollution. Every emission target made by an Australian government since the 
late 1980s has involved a lesser commitment, with a steady backing away following a little 
various cabinet discussions-I mean, I know because various people told me that she would sort of get 
rather shrill and say-I have been telling people internationally that you know, we're going to do this and 
that. And people like John Button were saying-that is good for you Ros, but we're not. Because 
basically she had no imprimatur to do it. [13;432] I mean, if you align the BCA's demands and the 
government's responses they are pretty well identical. There is very little variation in them. What you do 
see on the margins are things like the greenhouse challenge and you know environmentally friendly fuel 
and products and stuff-you know, they are really just tinkering around the edges. [12;299] 
696 It's a government decision but Howard has very clearly driven that, delivered that, and embraced that. 
[34;272] 
697 
••• we've always seen the Greenhouse Challenge as a Mickey Mouse program. It was a soft-to be 
seen to be doing something when you're not actually doing anything-program. And it's been 
unfortunate that it sort of there's been a whole lot of hand waving on that, and a lot of noise without 
delivering anything. The whole point of the Greenhouse Challenge is to promote this company's been 
able to promote how good they've been without actually doing anything. Doing stuff under business as 
usual. But even that has come under some problems now where some companies are now concerned that 
they've said they're going to do things under the Greenhouse Challenge and you've got other 
mechanisms now and there's no disadvantage and what not. [23;56] 
698 See previous note regarding the make-up of the Joint Consultative Committee 
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known cabinet decision under the Hawke government. This decision enshrined the so-
called industry competitiveness principle which has been the foundation of greenhouse 
responses by government ever since.699 The long awaited Howard government white paper, 
'Securing Australia's Energy Future' released in June 2004 is arguably the piece de 
resistance for Australia's greenhouse mafia. It signals an almost complete endorsement of 
the mafia agenda. Based on the interviews conducted here, the statement amounts to an 
almost total victory for the mob. The interviews also confirm that the Prime Minister's 
views have been influenced heavily by AIGN affiliated parties, while the views of green 
groups like the ACF and Greenpeace are treated with contempt.700 
It can be reasonably argued that through the cross-fertilization of dominant industry 
associations with Industry bureaucrats the government now receives very similar advice 
from the bureaucracy and industry. An 'enhanced in-house effect' has taken hold, under 
which a small range of policy options and voices are considered seriously. The regular flow 
of greenhouse mafia between bureaucracy and industry association, and between industry 
associations, has steadily concentrated this effect 
699 {I mean it strikes me that the p<ilicy trajectory going way back to the late eighties-we were headed in 
one direction when we had that interim planning tllrget, and then there was a sudden shift in trajectory 
and pretty much we have stayed on it twer since. Because while the media ooverage in recent times 
would give the impression that the Howard Government have been the one that has made the big shift 
and been the international pariah and so on-you can a..iUally trace that line back in terms of policy to a 
cabinet decision when Kerin was around and Ricbo wru; around.} That's right, that's right {And there 
was a battle in cabinet where they said-OK, we will keep this interim planning target but always on the 
proviso that Australia will not take any action which jeopardised the economy.} Dick Wells wrote those 
words v1ith Craig Emerson. {And they have been pretty much the same ever since. The trajectory has 
been pretty much the same?} Craig Emerson was the economics adviser to Keating at the time-·and he 
is now a shadow minister, right. Tuey sat-·-! can remember the cabinet meeting very dearly-because 
Ros Kelly was banging them around the ears-··and called them liars and all sorts of thing&--but the 
cabinet decision that went up was rejected and I cfill remember it was about eight o'clock at night and 
Craig and Dick were sitring in the conference room in John Kerin's office trying to redraft this cabinet 
decision. And Keating wanted to go and have dinner with his family and so Keating is standing over 
them--i:ie is not prime minister at this stage-he is the treasurer. And he is standing around over the top 
saying - 'rome on you bastards.' And they are trying to draft these caveats. All right-and so they 
drafted those caveats, and so then they reconvened cabinet and they signed off on the cabinet decision. 
And, Ros Kelly never forgave them. [13;415-32] Australia had always argued differentiation. Australia 
only agreed in Rio on the basis of differentiation. Thus, business believed that Rio was flexible enough to 
incorporate, Rio was the precautionary principle but the condition of no eronomic damage to Australia 
was always there. This has been wilfully lost and forgotten in the mists of time by the US and EU and 
these nations had tried to switch to stringent targets ie. shifting the goalposts. [25;32] 
'
00 One of the most senior advisers in the Howard government on climate change acknowledged that the 
Prime Minister's office deliberately ostracised Greenpeare and the ACF, and that they listened closest to 
people like Brian Fisher (ABARE), Peter Hendy (ACCI) and Belinda Robinson (APIA, now APPEA), 
and MCA [50;1l,60]. 
See also previous quote [50:62] under footnote 667 regarding who the Prime Minister listens to on 
greenhouse. 
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9. Major greenhouse pollution cuts are unlikely while the mafia dominates and 
rebuilds 
Based on the interviews conducted here Australia's greenhouse policy seems likely to 
evolve at a pace which is relatively slow compared with that of other developed nations for 
so long as the greenhouse mafia dominates the policy network. Without significantly 
greater engagement by a broader range of greenhouse policy stakeholders, particularly 
industries that are supportive of, or at least comfortable with, a more rapid pace of reform 
to reduce Australia's emissions, the greenhouse mafia is likely to continue to dominate. The 
group is emboldened by their success, but hardly complacent. They pursue the greenhouse 
agenda with an almost religious zeal, and as with most religious battles, they are in it for 
the long haul. While some of them are growing old, the battles have not wearied them. If 
anything, following their steady run of victories in the network since the low point in 1997, 
when Senator Hill and Roger Beale temporarily won Australian participation in Kyoto, the 
mafia has far more turf to protect now than it did in the late 1990s. 
The comments of mob members to this author do not suggest any inclination to give up 
what they have won. In recent times there are also signs of renewal among AIGN ranks 
with revolving door recruits, Belinda Robinson and Brad Page being recruited to replace 
Barry Jones and Keith Orchison at APPEA and ESAA respectively. Former Howard 
government staffer, Peter Hendy, has also become more publicly supportive of the AIGN 
line. AIGN 'supremo,' John Eyles, has also been replaced at Alcoa by Meg McDonald-
widely acknowledged in interviews conducted here has being a highly influential player in 
government policy developments. Hendy, Robinson, and McDonald are all well connected 
and respected within the Howard administration. The internal victory of AIGN-consistent 
companies within the BCA over greenhouse policy is another significant sign of AIGN 
renewal. The BCA is now led by self-proclaimed Lavoisier Group supporter, Hugh 
Morgan, and now routinely promotes AIGN views.701 
701 In his Opening Address to the Lavoisier Group in 2000, Morgan said 'I applaud the objectives of the 
Lavoisier Group .. .! wish it well and it can rely on my support.' (Lavoisier Group 2000) 
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I 0. Yet there are some signs that mob power may have reached its zenith 
Despite the picture of the network painted above, there are some signs of instabili1y in the 
network. 702 While the mafia continues to dominate, its supremacy appears now to be quite 
closely connected to the continued ascendancy of the Liberal and National Parties at the 
federal level. While key elements of the mafia agenda are well supported by ALP 
governments in Queensland and Western Australia, there are signs of erosion in mob power 
at the state level where momentum is building towards a state-based Australia wide 
greenhouse emissions trading system. Federally the ALP appears to be quite determined to 
shake up this policy network. With a federal Labor commitment to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, raise the MRET, and introduce emissions trading, the mafia can no longer rely on 
bi-partisan sympathy from the government of the day in Canberra. This research found 
great cynicism within the federal ALP at very senior levels about the mob's greenhouse 
agenda and its apparent sympathisers in government, like DFAT703 and ABARE. 704 This 
suggests that despite the recent decline in the relevance and power of the AGO (which has 
"
2 They (Alm-') were almost the exclusive business voice on this issue for a long time. It's now finished. 
Because some of the members left--as the protocol got closer to entering force the winners and losers 
sorted themselves out. [2;172] 
103 See previous quote [2; 136-40] regarding focus of DFA T on losers rather than potential winners under 
footnote 659. 
7°' (From a fonner member of the Keating cabinet} ... well if ever you wanted to see a self-serving 
group--ABARE would be the absolute classic of an agency that acted that way in my view when we 
were in government. {How do you mean?} Well I didn't take any of their work seriously by the end of 
it. .. they were guns for hire. {So it would be fair to say that the fact that they are placed in the Industry 
portfolio has impacted on their own organisational culture and their ov,11 biases?) That's a nicer way of 
saying that they're guns for hire. I'm not that nice. They were a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Department of Primary Industries and Energy at the time and they did the bidding of tile Department of 
Primary Industries and Energy. {So the idea that they propose that they're an independent ... ) ls 
unadulterated crap. It was unadulterated crap. {. .. The fact that they are now required to raise a certain 
proportion of their operating budgets from outside consulting, do you think that has an influence on their 
impartiality?} No, because they were never impartial to start with. I mean---<lon't full for any suggestion 
that there's any impartiality about ABARE. I never did. {And yet do you think that they have been sold 
by the government as an impartial adviser?} Governments have been doing that for ages. {To justify 
their own policy direction?} Mmm. (Yes.) {Which is in tum dominated by that portfolio?} Yes. I don't 
think it's any different now to the way it worked then. {Would it surprise you to hear of an example 
where in recent times they had a sub-contract of some $300,000 from an industry group and did some 
research on greenhouse and the research was done according to the industry group's own assumptions 
rather than independent ABARE assumptions? 13;480-4) No, obviously not. I'm obviously not getting 
the message across to you that l don't treat them seriously. (I'm getting the message, I'm hearing the 
message.} But l didn't at the time, I didn't at the time, but they were guns for hire. They were effectively 
used by pro industry interests al the time ... {So it would be fair to say that we're missing an objective 
research agency that could provide the sort of impartial advice to government on greenhouse policy 
that ... } Well, yes and no ..... Don't forget, if you take your mind back eight or nine years there was an 
argument, there was a threshold argument as to whether the greenhouse efliect and climate change was a 
real phenomenon. Was it the view of a few ferals who happened to live out in the rainforest or something 
or was it something that was quantifiable? ... And I think Australian science made a very significant 
contribution to that debate ... I do think that our contribution in that area was first class, first class and I 
would draw a strong comparison between that and the self-serving 'crapola' that came out of ABARE. 
[21;145-201] 
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been folded back into the Department of the Environment and Heritage) there may be a 
realignment of greenhouse policy influence under a Labor govermnent. The foundations 
upon which the mafia rely for dominance may be thinner and weaker than they appear. 705 
The rise of the Greens (though this will be tempered by Coalition control of the senate from 
July 2005) reinforces the fragility of the mafia's position. Another important development 
has been shifts in the greenhouse policy disposition of some key interest groups-some of 
them obvious greenhouse MIAs. The AGA (prior to its break up), NAFI, and most recently 
the NFF have all significantly changed their positions in recent years. This has involved 
very significant, and at times personal, clashes between former political allies. 706 The 
interviews here suggest that this reassessment has occurred beyond this group of cases. 
Wbile a coalition of business interests with a contrary view to the mafia has not yet 
emerged, the prospects seem stronger than they were a couple of years ago.707 The 
consolidation of green energy firms, and the mainstreaming of green power into utility 
705 
••• we're paying a carbon tax in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria !llld with all these funny 
little admin things, these federal things, there's the RECs (Renewable Energy Certificates) and all that 
sort of stuff. We're paying $5 or $8 now anyway, plus another $5 for bloody going to all the meetings 
that relate to it. But they're administrative, they're not market they're administrative ... we're not sort of 
going to go backwards, we're not going to give up paying that money, so ... some are saying, well, let's 
just cut to the chase and say, let's just put a simple system in and get rid of all the state ones, and I think 
that's a debate where ... once that debate goes that way, the old AIGN is dead and those guys step aside, 
the new guard come in and the new guard, and I'd hate to say that Mitch (Hook) and Katie Leahy from 
the BCA are new guard, but new thinking I think is creeping in and the old opening batsmen, the 
opposition people who just oppose evet)ihing, sit there ... the Geoffrey Boycotts of Greenhouse policy, 
they'll all retire. {And so you think that a switch will be flicked pretty quickly probably when it 
happens?} I think so [17;447-455] 
7
"° ... a whole pile of them jumped. They got !O their plateau-I mean Barry Jones wasn't going 
anywhere, David Coutts wasn't going anywhere, Dick Wells was but he got out for other reasons and a 
number of the others weren't going anywhere so they all jumped to industry associations and they took 
with them tbis mental .. this picture that ... Environment Australia, whatever they said about any issue, 
was immediately suspect and they were going to argue against it And at some of these AIGN meetings. 
honestly, some of them even made Freudian slips, you (would) honestly bave thought that they were still 
an Assistant Secretary. The vanguard are keeping the baddies away, and that's why some people stopped 
going. More than any other issue they thought, 'be fucked if I'm going to spend any more of my life 
talking to burnt out Assistant Secretaries from the industry and energy departments thanks.' [ 41 ;319] 
707 The AIGN is a declining influence but was a key influence through most of the 1990s. {Why do you 
say they're a declining influence?} Well, there is no doubt that it has been captured by the Australian 
aluminium industry. And I think as a consequence of that and as a consequence of John Eyles leaving 
and the new guy coming in they are looking at declining membership and that will continue apace .... 
[15;204--8] ... Barry and Keith, who are both larger than life characters have actually, right towards the 
end of their careers, have had to slowly eat humble pie on issues which have been very, very close to 
them for a long time. [17;551 {So do you think these guys have been influential?) Oh, I think they have 
been influential but l think they've overstated their case. I mean basically knocking off greenhouse 
policy has been a relatively easy job because goverrnnents at the end of the day . . . governments are 
disinclined to fuck the economy over irrespective, for whatever reason--good science or bad. l mean the 
economy is the main game in politics so if you can organise a wall ofopposition then you're doing OK. I 
think where some of these guys are very influential is that they wrong foot the A GO by jumping on them 
in a procedural sense. When there's a process of negotiation or consultation going on, if there's a 
mistake, bang, the AGO gets jumped on. {And they work as a tag team too, don't they?} Oh I think so, 
yes. [41;349-55] 
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companies may also drive change, along with a broader consensus that resource-intensive 
sectors of the economy may have disproportionate influence on the direction of government 
policy given their shrinking contribution as an employer and as a proportion of the 
economy.708 Senior corporate and political figures have started to take a prominent role on 
the green side in the last 3 years-for example, Greg Bourne, Richal'd Pratt and John 
Hewson.709 Signs ofindustry collaboration with the green side of the climate change debate 
on renewable transport fuels are emerging. The mafia is well positioned to defend its turf. 
However, it is possible that their power has reached its zenith with the Howard 
government's Energy Statement of mid 2004. Mob families usually end up losing power 
eventually-sometimes in spectacular fashion, sometimes slowly--0nly time will tell how 
Australia's greenhouse mob fares.710 
Anticipating areas of potential criticism 
While this research has made some contributions, the approach taken invites some obvious 
criticisrus to which an anticipatory response here seems appropriate. 
From interest group and policy network theorists 
First, the accusation could in theory be leveled that by using such profoundly constructivist 
assumptions the work lacks rigour as it doesn't meet the expectation of some that interest 
group studies and policy network analysis are of little point unless they explain policy 
'" See previous quote [46;258] under footnote 542 regarding the employment contribution of the 
services sector versus old economy industries. 
(The interviewee added} ... these guys (old economy interests) have voted for the incumbent governments 
for the last 30 years, they still go to the dinner parties and lunches and have a historical embedded 
influence and that's the way the world's gone for the last few centuries I guess. [guess, in the turn of the 
1900s to the 20th century you will have the stockmen and the wagon trains and those people having more 
influence than the railway engineers and builders. [46;258] 
709 Greg Bnurne, Ex Chief Executive of BP Asia Pacific has recently been appointed to head the WWF in 
Australia. (From another leading business figure with strong political links in relation lo the greenhouse 
mafia) .. .it is a club of vested interests-that Ls the answer to your question. And you have to break those 
vested interests. [33;114] See also the work of the Business Council for Sustainable Energy (BCSE) and 
the Envirornnent Business Australia (EBA). 
710 It's the lobbyist type of a group that keep that Canberra clique going, whether they be loc«ted in 
Melbourne or Canberra or whatever, but there's more inherent stickiness ... It's in manufacturing and it's 
in agriculture and it's in mining, the three old economy areas that are struggling, but have got a strong 
voke because the votes in the regions, be it state or federal are still in those ... you know, the industries 
might be diminishing but the people that live in Bendigo and BaUarat and so on are still voting for the old 
policies. {Right, even though there's fewer and fewer jobs.} That's right, but they've still got the 
gerrymander in the vote. {Would it be fair lo say that the interest groups representing the new sectors 
have got a long way to go?} Absolutely, they've got a long way to go. They're not well organised, This 
sort oforganisational structure takes decades, decades. [46;286-94] 
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outcomes, period (Dowding 2001). Second, if this research 'rewinds the clock' to reduce 
policy networks to a metaphorical tool which can only ever generate one of many 
competing and valid explanations and predictions it begs the question-why use the 
approach at all? 
In response, the author believes that interest group studies and policy network analysis need 
not only seek to explain or predict outcomes to be worthwhile. The network approach is 
useful as a way of examining the decisions made by groups about their interest and on the 
nature and extent of their engagement. To study group behaviour (let alone influence or 
policy outcomes) without reference to the policy network concept also seems retrograde. 
Further, there is appreciable value to be added to a network analysis which merely 
describes networks: network structure and components, the important players and 
processes, the lines of communication and so on. Irrespective of explanation and 
prediction, this assists anyone who seeks to know more about the context in which 
government policy is made. 
Beyond this, network analysis does have the potential to generate very useful explanations 
and predictions about policy outcomes. Whilst it is acknowledged that these explanations 
may not be the only valid ones available--indeed most often they are not-it is assumed 
here that network analysis is powerful in informing these explanations and predictions. In 
particular, the type of analysis used here which gives very strong emphasis to the 
competing versions of 'what happened and why' from network participants, it is argued, is 
a potentially powerful way to bolster explanation and prediction of policy outcomes Even 
though that is not the intention in this particular multiple cases study, it could certainly 
assist in such work. 
From participants in and observers of the Australian greenhouse policy network 
There will inevitably be room for those more intricately involved in the Australian 
greenhouse policy network than the researcher to criticise a study like this on the grounds 
that it misses important parts of the story because, by its nature, it involves only some of 
the people concerned and hence it endeavours to present a picture on the basis of a limited 
number of pixels. 
Without question, this research only included interviews with a small minority of those 
involved in the case study interest groups chosen, not to mention the larger number of 
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people active in the greenhouse policy network over the past 15 years or so. Similarly, 
while the interviews conducted here have been quite extensive in their coverage (averaging 
some 15,000 words in transcript) the thesis is necessarily only a very small slice of the 
story in the possession of the interviewee. The interviews themselves are a randomly 
collected set of highlights which could theoretically be significantly different if collected 
on a different occasion by a different interviewer. Any version of events or attempt to 
explain group decisions or policy network outcomes using this data is beset by such 
limitations. 
Given the controversy and sensitivity of the greenhouse issue, there will also inevitably be 
a wide spectrum of opinions about what has happened and why in this policy network over 
the years. At the group level, individuals who actually made the decisions under study may 
find it presumptuous to have their recollection contested. 
As well, there will be those who believe that the version of events which they provided at 
interview has not been accurately reflected in this final written up report-that it has been 
altered either inadvertently or deliberately in a way which does not correctly reflect what 
they believe happened and they were in the best position to know. For some this may 
constitute carelessness on the part of the researcher while others may perceive that the 
researcher is biased in some way. 
Another limitation involved in a piece of research like this is the inevitable inconsistency 
between the versions and interpretations that different participants provide about the same 
events. While one observer may view a group's activity as incompetence, another may see 
'masterly inactivity.' What one person perceives as schizophrenia another may view as 
strategic bet-hedging. Similarly where staff may see poor leadership, a chief executive may 
see poor staff support. These inconsistencies and tensions between explanations provided 
by interviewees (and other sources of information) creates challenges for the researcher in a 
study which can never be resolved in a way that is seen as satisfactory by all with an 
interest in the issue at hand. 
In response 
In response to these potential criticisms, the following comments may offer some 
explanation. First, it is readily acknowledged that the findings made and arguments 
presented here are not the only valid explanations of events which have occurred in the 
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greenhouse policy network. There may be more valid and better supported explanations out 
there at variance with what is suggested here. A concerted attempt has, however, been 
made here to maximise the validity of this analysis by interviewing a relatively very large 
number of people, almost half of whom are drawn from the relatively large number of 
interest groups chosen here for case study. 
Second, it is also readily acknowledged that no researcher is free of bias. However, a very 
deliberate attempt has been made here to set aside personal opinions in relation to the 
groups, the politics, the personalities, and the policy issues involved in this analysis. While 
the author acknowledges strong views in relation to all of these aspects, and while there is 
great scope in the interview material to push an agenda consistent with the author's own 
views, a central focus here has been on setting this aside for use outside the framework of 
the PhD Thesis. 
Finally, by way of defence for what has been presented in this final report, the research is 
based on what data were readily available. To the extent to which information is 
confidential and unavailable to the researcher, to the extent that information was 'spun' at 
interview, and to the extent that people requested for interview chose not to accept that 
opportunity, no responsibility is taken here for the information thereby rendered 
unavailable for use in this research. 
At the heart of this research, in anticipation of the very limitations described above, is an 
attempt to 'let the data do the talking.' The research presents a picture to be sure and offers 
some important observations; however, it is also the aim to enable readers to make their 
own judgments about the validity of those observations by reference to the data themselves. 
In closing 
The previous chapters constitute an ambitious attempt to record and analyse the response of 
a range of Australian business interests to climate change. Inevitably, it is not possible to 
cover the entire business response. However, the work helps us to appreciate why different 
sectors of the economy have responded to climate change in Australia as they have, and it 
sheds a great deal of light on the wider policy network. Whilst adding to the empirical body 
of knowledge on interest group behaviour and policy network evolution, this research 
emphasises the need for greater attention to some important theoretical issues. 
362 
Some commonly held assumptions about group interest and how it relates to group 
behaviour have been shown to be worthy of greater attention. Group interests, for example, 
are not necessarily revealed by group behaviour. Assessments of group interest are 
demonstrably complex, and subject to a wide range of distorting forces. Consequently, 
group decisions about engagement in policy networks can be fur better understood through 
an appreciation of how these forces shape assessments of group interest. Micro-level 
factors like group leadership, culture, membership structure and resources appear to be 
among the most pervasive influences, yet they receive little attention in the literature. 
Various meso- and macro-level forces are also underappreciated. 
This research leaves plenty of scope for further exploration. There is clearly room for much 
more work on the issue of group interest formation, and the link between group interest and 
group behaviour. A range of other issues raised here warrant more investigation. One of the 
most interesting may be the possibility of reverse capture of federal government policy 
direction in Australia by old economy business interest groups. This trend is arguably more 
contentious and relevant as the services sector of the economy becomes more dominant as a 
contributor to economic growth and employment. Given the focus of this work on the 
federal greenhouse policy domain, there is also scope for more attention in future work to 
the state and local government spheres. 
However, despite its limitations and the questions it leaves unanswered, it is to be hoped 
that the thesis has met the goals set by the researcher and constitutes a useful contribution 
to the understanding of interest groups and their role in public policy processes. At the 
same time, it is hoped that the work helps ihe reader to appreciate the many forces at play 
in the ongoing development of policy responses to climate change in Australia-
particularly the role of business interest groups. 
Understanding how and why business interest groups in Australia have responded to 
climate change to date is a prerequisite to projecting their future response, and it is hoped 
that this work provides some insights into the influences likely to shape group involvement 
on the issue of climate change in years to come--something relevant and valuable to 
policymakers and academic observers alike. 
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Appendix A 
Interview dates and interviewee codes 
The following table provides some important details about the interviews conducred in this 
research. In accordance with the Ethics Protocol, the identity of interviewees has been 
suppressed. A code number has been allocated at random to the 56 participants after the 
alphabetical list of surnames was shuffled. While interviewee identity is suppressed this 
table is intended to ,assist the reader in interpreting what characteristics are associated with 
the observations made by different people quoted in the thesis. Categorization of 
interviewees according to their location, comment capacity/capacities, and position in the 
greenhouse policy debate is included along with the date on which the interview took place. 
-
Interview Interview Interview Relevant Case insider Relevant recent Relevant prior Greenhouse policy 
Code Date L-0cation capacity or outsider background background Stance 
l 26/8/02 Svdnev Past Insider lndusuy !n"nciru Green 
2 26/10/01 Canbem Present Outsider Government Government Blocker 
3 513101 Svdnev Past Insider Indusuv Govemment NIA 
4 20/ll/02 Canberra Present Insider lndustrv Political Green 
5 19/9102 Canberra Past Insider IuductM.r Government NIA 
6 25/3/02 Brisbane Past Outsider Academia Go\-enunent- Green 
7 813/02 Canberra Present outsider Government Government Green 
8 1713100 Canberra Present Insider Jndusrrv Government Blocker 
9 716/02 Brisbane Present Outsider Green NGO Academic Green 
10 !2i8102 Brisbane Past Outsider Political lndustrv Blocker 
!I 26/10101 Canberra Present Outsider industrv - Green 
12 ll/12/01 Canbem Past Outsider Government Green NGO Green 
13 2315102 Canberra Past Outsider lndustrv Political Blocker 
14 2314/01 Svdnev Past Insider lndncl~ 
-
Green 
15 1113/02 Sydney Present Outsider lndustrv Media Green 
16 2112103 Svdnev Past Insider Industi>U Government Green 
17 21/11/02 Canberra Present Insider Indu"1rv Political N/A 
18 29/1/01 Canbem Present Outsider lndustrv Government Blocker 
19 15/3102 Canberra Present Outsider Industrv Government Blocker 
20 3115199 Melbourne Past Outsider (tovernment - NIA 
21 818/02 Canberra Past Outsider Political - Green 
22 2/12/02 Svdnev Present Insider Industrv - NIA 
23 24/6/02 Melbourne Present Outsider lndustrv - Green 
24 414101 Svdnev Present Insider Industrv - NIA 
25 31l i/00 Melbourne Past Outsider lndustrY. Government Blocker 
26 23/4/01 Svdnev Present Insider lndustrv Government Green 
27 27111/01 Canberra Present Outsider Government Government Green 
28 1818/99 USA Past Outsider Government Government Green 
29 24/6/02 Melbourne Present Insider IndustrY Industry Blocker 
30 22/ll/01 Canberra Present Outsider Government Academia Green 
31 26110/0l Canberra Present Outsider Green NGO Academia Green 
32 14/2102 Canberra Past Out.sider Academia Government Blocker 
33 3014102 Sydney Present Outsider lndustrY Political Green 
34 513103 Canberra Present Insider Indus•~ Government Blocker 
35 21/6102 Melbourne Present Outsider Green NGO . Green 
36 12/11/02 Canberra Past Insider Government Indus:trv NIA 
37 17/6/02 Canberra Present Outsider lndustrv lndustrv Blocker 
38 3110102 Melbourne Present Outsider Government . \rreen 
39 14/9/0l Canberra Present Outsider Green NGO Green NGO Green 
40 28/2/02 Canberra Present Outsider !ndustrv Government Blocker 
41 26il 1/02 Canberra Past Outsider Industrv Political NIA 
42 2314101 Svdnev Present insider Indncirv - NIA 
43 214101 Canberra Past Insider Industrv - NIA 
44 2813/02 Canberra Present Outsider Government . Green 
45 9/9/02 Canberra Present Insider Industry . Green 
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46 10/9/02 Svdnev Past Insider Government lndustru Green 
47 11/12/01 Canberra Present Outsider Government 
- Blocker 
48 2/2/02 Canberra Present Outsider GoVernment 
-
Blocker 
49 21/6/02 Melbourne Present Outsider Industrv Industry Blocker 
50 20/2/03 Canberra Present Outsider Political 
-
Blocker 
51 2116/02 Melbourne Past Outsider lndust~ Government Green 
52 4/7/02 Melbourne Present Outsider Industrv 
- Green 
53 27/11/01 Canberra Past Outsider Indus...,.., Government Blocker 
54 22/6/02 Canberra Present Outsider Government Government Green 
55 1613100 Canberra Present Insider Indus+.-.' Government Blocker 
56 11/12/01 Canberra Past Outsider Industrv Government Green 
57 1713/00 Canberra Present Insider Industrv 
-
Blocker 
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AppendixB 
Text of consent form used for interviewsm 
Name of project-PhD Thesis 
The Response of Business Interest Groups in Australia and the UK to the Issue of Global 
Climate Change 
You have been invited to participate in a study of interest group responses to the issue of 
Climate Change in Australia and the United Kingdom. The purpose of the study is to 
provide insights into the behaviour of interest groups - particularly those representing 
business; to better elucidate the particular implications which Global Climate Change raises 
for different sectors of the Australian economy; and to inform the histoiy of climate policy 
development in Australia and the UK. 
The Study is being conducted by Mr Guy Pearse, PhD Student in the Graduate Program in 
Public Policy at the Australian National University. If you decided to participate, you will 
be asked a range of questions in a loosely structured one-on-one face to face interview with 
the researcher. The questions will relate primarily to your perceptions, recollections and 
other knowledge of the nature and development of Climate Change responses by certain 
interest groups in Australia or the UK (as appropriate). 
Interviews will be recorded on audiotape. It is possible that some information provided 
during interviews will be of a sensitive nature. As such, the researcher undertakes not to 
attribute direct quotes or to paraphrase or otherwise represent the comments you make in a 
manner which makes you readily identifiable without your permission. 
In addition to the interviews, subjects may be asked to whether they are willing to make 
available related documents which might enhance or support their interviews. Subjects who 
provide such docwnents do so on the basis that the contents may ultimately be published in 
the research results. Any additional information, however, or personal details gathered 
during the course of the study are confidential so far as the law allows. 
The same guidelines set out here will apply not only to this PhD Thesis research, but also to 
any additional work published by the researcher. If you decide to participate, you are free 
to withdraw from further participation in the research at any time v.ithout having to give a 
reason and without consequence. 
I, ................................. have read and understand the information above and any 
questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this 
research, knowing that I can withdraw from further participation at any time without 
consequence. I have been given a copy of this form to keep. 
Participant's 
Name ............................................................................................ . 
(Block Letters) 
"' At the time of the interviews, the project was to include comparative research in the United Kingdom. 
This was later dropped. Fonns detailing the above terms were left with eaclt interviewee. 
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Participant's 
Signature .......................................................... Date ........................ . 
Researcher's 
Name ............................................................................................ . 
(Block Letters) 
Researcher's 
Signature ......................................................... Date ....................... . 
The ethical aspects of this study have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee. If you have any complaints or reservations about any ethical aspect of this 
research, you may contact the Committee through its Secretary (phone: 02-6215-2900 or 
email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au). Any complaint you make will be treated in 
confidence and investigated, and you will be informed of the outcome. 
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